

ALEXANDER'S HEIRS

THE AGE OF THE SUCCESSORS

EDWARD M. ANSON



WILEY Blackwell

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Alexander's Heirs

In Memoriam

Edward M. Anson III

In Dedicationem

Lucy Dorothy Meyer Anson

Alexander's Heirs

The Age of the Successors

Edward M. Anson

WILEY Blackwell

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Abbreviations

Ael.	Aelian, <i>Varia Historia</i> (VH)
Aeschin.	Aeschines, 2 (<i>On the Embassy</i>); 3 (<i>Against Ctesiphon</i>)
App.	Appian, <i>Mithridatic Wars</i> (Mith.); <i>Syrian Wars</i> (Syr.)
Arist.	Aristotle, <i>Rhetoric</i> (Rhet.)
Aristid.	Aristides, <i>Orations</i> (Or.)
Arr.	Arrian, <i>Anabasis Alexandri</i> (Anab.); <i>Indica</i> (Ind.); <i>Successors</i> (Succ.)
<i>Astronomical Diaries</i>	<i>Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia</i> , ed. H. Hunder, vol. V: <i>Lunar and Planetary Texts</i> (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001)
Athen.	Athenaeus, <i>The Banqueteers</i>
BCHP	<i>Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period</i>
BM	British Museum
Curt.	Curtius, <i>The History of Alexander the Great of Macedon</i>
Dem.	Demosthenes, 15 (<i>On the Liberty of the Rhodians</i>); 17 (<i>On the Accession of Alexander</i>); 18 (<i>On the Crown</i>); 19 (<i>On the False Embassy</i>)
Din.	Dinarchus, 1 (<i>Against Demosthenes</i>)
Diod.	Diodorus, <i>Library of History</i>
Ditt. Syll.	Wilhelm Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
Euseb.	Eusebius [Porphry], <i>Chronica</i> (Chron.)
FGrH	Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i>
Hdts.	Herodotus, <i>Histories</i>
Hom.	Homer, <i>Iliad</i> (Il.)
Hyp.	Hyperides, 4 (<i>In Defense of Euxenippus</i>); 5 (<i>Against Demosthenes</i>); 6 (<i>Funeral Oration</i>)
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
Isoc.	Isocrates, 4 (<i>Panegyricus</i>); 15 (<i>Antidosis</i>)
Joseph.	Josephus, <i>Jewish Antiquities</i> (AJ)
Just.	Justin, <i>Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus</i>
Liv.	Livy, <i>From the Founding of the City</i>
LM	<i>Liber de Morte</i>

Memn.	Memnon of Heracleia's <i>History of Heracleia Pontica</i> (FGrH 434 F-5.7)
Nep.	Nepos, <i>Life of Eumenes</i> (Eum.); <i>Life of Phocion</i> (Phoc.)
OGIS	<i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i>
Paus.	Pausanias, <i>Description of Greece</i>
Phot.	Photius, <i>Bibliotheca</i> (Bibl.)
Pliny	<i>Natural History</i> (NH)
Plut.	Plutarch, <i>Life of Agesilaus</i> (Ages.); <i>Life of Alexander</i> (Alex.); <i>Life of Antony</i> (Ant.); <i>Life of Camillus</i> (Cam.); <i>Comparison of the Lives of Eumenes and Sertorius</i> (Comp. Eum. et Sert.); <i>Life of Demetrius</i> (Demetr.); <i>Life of Dion</i> (Dion); <i>Life of Eumenes</i> (Eum.); <i>Life of Lucullus</i> (Luc.); <i>Life of Lysander</i> (Lys.); <i>Moralia</i> (Mor.); <i>Life of Phocion</i> (Phoc.); <i>Life of Pyrrhus</i> (Pyrrh.); <i>Life of Sertorius</i> (Ser.)
Polyaen.	Polyaenus, <i>Stratagems</i>
Polyb.	Polybius, <i>Histories</i>
P. Oxy.	<i>Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i>
Schol.	<i>Demosthenes: Scholia Graeca ex codicibus aucta et emendata</i> (New York: Arno Press, 1983)
Str.	Strabo, <i>Geography</i>
Suda	<i>Antipater, Basileia, Craterus, Leonnatus, Deinarchus, Demetrius, Ophellas</i>
Syll.	<i>Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum</i> , 3rd edn., 4 vols. (New York: Hildesheim, and Olms, 1982 [1915–24])
Syncellus	<i>Georgius Syncellus, Ecloga Chronographica</i> , ed. A.A. Mosshammer (Leipzig: Teubner, 1984) (<i>Chron.</i>)
Tac.	Tacitus, <i>Annals</i> (Ann.)
Thuc.	Thucydides, <i>History of the Peloponnesian War</i>
Trog.	Trogus, <i>Prologues</i> (Prol.)
Val. Max.	Valerius Maximus, <i>Memorable Words and Deeds</i>
Vitr.	Vitruvius, <i>De architectura</i>
Xen.	Xenophon, <i>Anabasis</i> (Anab.); <i>Constitution of the Spartans</i> (Resp. Lac.)

Chronology

323

June 11 Death of Alexander the Great
Summer Philip III and Alexander IV proclaimed kings; revolt
 of the Greeks in the upper satrapies
Fall Start of the Lamian War; Thibron attacks Cyrene

323/22

Fall/Winter Battle of Abydus; crossing of Leonnatus to Europe;
 death of Leonnatus

322

Late Spring Craterus crosses to Europe
June Battle of Amorgus
July Perdiccas and Eumenes arrive in Cappadocia; defeat
 Ariarathes in two battles
Late July/August Battle of Crannon; Antipater arranges affairs
 in Peloponnesus and Athens
Late Summer/Fall Eumenes organizes Cappadocia; Perdiccas moves to Cilicia;
 Neoptolemus moves to Armenia; annexation of Cyrene
 by Ptolemy

322/21

Late Fall/Winter Eumenes sent to Armenia; Perdiccas winters in Cilicia;
 return of Antipater and Craterus to Macedonia;
 Craterus marries Phila

321

Spring Perdiccas campaigns in Pisidia; calls for Antigonus
 to answer charges; arrival of Nicaea and Cleopatra with
 marriage proposals; marriage of Perdiccas and Nicaea;
 marriage of Ptolemy and Eurydice; invasion of Aetolia
 by Antipater and Craterus
Summer Cynnane arrives in Asia and is murdered; marriage
 of Adea (Eurydice) and Philip III; Perdiccas determines
 to seize the monarchy; Alexander the Great's body
 begins its journey west

321/20

Late Fall/Winter Antigonus flees to Macedonia; end of Aetolian campaign; diversion of Alexander's body to Egypt

320

Spring First Diadoch War begins. Perdiccas marches to Egypt; Eumenes to the Hellespont; desertion of Cleitus and the fleet to Antipater; crossing of Antipater and Craterus to Asia; Antigonus attempts to intercept Eumenes, then to Cyprus

Late Spring Eumenes defeats Neoptolemus; later Neoptolemus and Craterus; deaths of Neoptolemus and Craterus

Early Summer Death of Perdiccas; condemnation of Perdiccas by royal army; Pithon and Arrhidaeus new regents for the kings

Late Summer Triparadeisus; Antipater regent; marriage of Demetrius and Phila

Fall/Winter Alcetas defeats Asander; Eumenes winters in Celaenae; failed negotiations among the surviving Perdiccan leaders

319

Winter Antipater crosses back to Europe with the kings

Spring Eumenes defeated by Antigonus and enters Nora

Summer Antigonus defeats Alcetas; death of Alcetas

Late Summer Death of Antipater; Polyperchon new regent, Cassander chiliarch

Fall Nicanor made garrison commander in Munychia

319/18

Winter Flight of Cassander to Antigonus; Polyperchon's "Freedom of the Greeks" decree

318

Late Winter/ Early Spring Arrhidaeus' attack on Cyzicus; Eumenes released from Nora and allies with Antigonus; Antigonus takes Ephesus and Cleitus flees

Spring Nicanor seizes Piraeus; Ptolemy occupies Phoenicia and Syria; Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, arrives in Athens, followed later by Polyperchon

May Death of Phocion; Cassander arrives in Piraeus

Summer Antigonus captures all of Lydia; Eumenes allies with Polyperchon; Polyperchon invades Peloponnesus, besieges Megalopolis; Eumenes moves into Cilicia, joined by argyraspid; Menander occupies Cappadocia; Eumenes creates "Alexander Tent"

Fall Polyperchon returns to Macedonia, orders Cleitus to the Hellespont

Fall/Winter Eumenes moves into Phoenicia

317

Summer	Sea battles in the Hellespont; defeat of Cleitus
July	Demetrius of Phalerum in charge of Athens
Late Summer	Death of Nicanor; Cassander's first invasion of Macedonia
September	Eumenes leaves Phoenicia for the east
Fall	Eurydice claims the regency; Olympias returns to Macedonia
Fall/Winter	Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice murdered; Eumenes in Babylonia; revolt of citadel commander in Babylon; Eumenes moves into winter quarters in the "Carian villages"; Antigonus winters in Mesopotamia

316

Spring	Eumenes joins with the forces of the satraps of the upper provinces
Summer	Cassander successfully invades Macedonia; siege of Pydna begins; deposition and exile of Aeacides
July	Eumenes and Antigonus battle on Coprates
August	Antigonus retreats into Media
Late October/ Early November	Battle of Paraetacene
December	Battle of Gabene

315

January	Death of Eumenes; Antigonus winters in Media; death of Pithon
"Approach of Spring"	End of siege of Pydna
Spring	Death of Olympias; imprisonment of Roxane and Alexander IV; Cassander marries Thessalonice
Spring/Early Summer	Peucestas replaced as satrap of Persis; flight of Seleucus from Babylon; Cassander founds Cassandreia and Thessalonica
Summer	Cassander refounds Thebes, invades Peloponnesus; Cassander's army invades Asia Minor; [alliance between Asander and Cassander?]
November	Antigonus at Mallus

314

Spring	Ultimatum to Antigonus; start of the Third Diadoch War; Agesilaus to Cyprus; Polemaeus to Cappadocia; Aristodemus to Greece, forms an alliance with Polyperchon; siege of Tyre begins
Late Spring Summer	Antigonus' capture of Joppa and Gaza Polemaeus relieves siege of Erythrae; Cassander moves into Peloponnesus

Fall	Alexander to Tyre; Tyre Proclamation; number of Aegean islands including Samos and Lemnos revolt from Athens
Winter 314/13	Antigonus winters near Tyre; Cassander winters in Arcadia; Alliance between Asander and Ptolemy; Athenian expedition against Samos
313	
February	Miletus falls
Spring	Cassander invades Messenia; Acrotatus in northwest Greece
Summer	Siege of Tyre ends; creation of the "League of the Islanders"; Cassander presides over Nemean Games (August), then returns to Macedonia; Aristodemus in Aetolia; Ptolemy sends Menelaus to Cyprus; Polycleitus' successful campaign in the Aegean
Late Summer/Fall	Alexander deserts Antigonus and allies with Cassander, then is slain; Cassander campaigns in Aetolia and Illyria; Polemaeus invades Caria; Seleucus and the Athenian admiral Aristotle unsuccessfully attack Lemnos
Early Winter	Cassander sends an army to Caria; Antigonus leaves Demetrius in Syria and moves to Phrygia
Winter 313/12	Antigonus in Celaenae; Asander briefly allies with Antigonus; revolt of Pontic cities
312	
February	Antigonus gains control of Carian cities
Late Spring/ Early Summer	Telesphorus to Greece
Summer	Polemaeus sent to Greece; revolt of Cyrene
Summer/Fall	Polemaeus' operations in Greece; Cassander in Epirus and Euboea
Fall	Ptolemy to Cyprus: Telesphorus deserts Antigonid cause and attacks Elis; Elis freed and Telesphorus returns to allegiance; Battle of Gaza; Ptolemy occupies Phoenicia
Winter 312/11	Demetrius defeats Cilles; Antigonus in Syria
311	
April	Seleucus retakes Babylon
Spring/Summer	Demetrius' Nabataean campaign
Fall	Seleucus occupies Media and Susiane; Demetrius' raid on Babylonia
Winter 311/10	Peace between Antigonus, Cassander, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus
310	
Spring	Murders of Roxane and Alexander IV
Late Spring/ Summer	Antigonus invades Babylonia

309

Late Spring/	Polemaeus revolts from Antigonus; Ptolemy's operations
Early Summer	in Cilicia; death of Polemaeus
Summer	Death of Heracles, son of Alexander the Great
Fall/Winter	Founding of Lysimacheia

308

Spring	Ptolemy's operations in Lycia; his acquisition of Sicyon and Corinth
Summer	Ophellas' campaign in North Africa; return of Antigonus from the east; murder of Cleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great; Seleucus occupies upper satrapies, makes treaty with Chandragupta

307

Spring	Ptolemy's operations in the Aegean and Greece; Demetrius "frees" Athens
Fall	Pyrrhus becomes king of Epirus

306

Spring	Demetrius' operations in Cyprus begin; founding of Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes
June	Battle of Salamis; Antigonus and Demetrius proclaimed kings
Summer	Surrender of Cyprus to Demetrius; death of Philip, son of Antigonus
November	Antigonus and Demetrius' failed invasion of Egypt

305

Spring	Demetrius launches attack on Rhodes
--------	-------------------------------------

304

Spring	Cassander captures island of Salamis, besieging Athens; Demetrius abandons siege of Rhodes, and returns to Athens; other Diadochs proclaim themselves kings
Summer	Demetrius' advance into Boeotia and Euboea

303

Spring	Demetrius invades the Peloponnesus, captures Sicyon and Corinth; new Hellenic league
Summer	Cleonymus captures Corcyra
Late Summer/Fall	Demetrius secures Achaea, all of Arcadia, except Mantinea, and Argos; marries Deidameia and forms as alliance with Epirus
Winter 303/2	Failed attempt by Cassander to make peace with Antigonus

302

Winter	Alliance of Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus against Antigonus
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Spring	Start of Fourth Diadoch War; formation of new League of Corinth; Demetrius initiated into Eleusinian Mysteries
April/May	Lysimachus and Cassander's general Prepelaus cross to Asia
Summer	Antigonus moves into Asia Minor
Summer/Fall	Demetrius campaigning in Thessaly
Fall	Antigonus and Lysimachus campaigning in Phrygia; Pyrrhus forced from the throne of Epirus and joins Demetrius
Winter 302/1	Demetrius recalled from Greece; Ptolemy seizes Phoenicia and returns to Egypt; Corcyra independent
301	
Late Spring	Battle of Ipsus; death of Antigonus
300	
Spring	New alliance between Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus; alliance between Seleucus and Demetrius; Demetrius takes possession of Cilicia; Lachares takes control of Athens
Late Spring/ Summer	Alliance between Demetrius and Ptolemy; Pyrrhus to Egypt as a hostage for Demetrius' good behavior
298?	Demetrius' failed attempt to "liberate" Athens
298/97	
Winter	Death of Cassander, succeeded by son Philip (IV)
297	
Spring	Death of Philip IV, ruler of Macedonia; Macedonia divided among Cassander's surviving sons, Alexander and Antipater
Early Summer	Pyrrhus returns to Epirus
Summer	Demetrius in Peloponnesus
295	
Spring?	Demetrius begins siege of Athens
294	
Spring	Demetrius "liberates" Athens
Spring/Summer	Demetrius invades Laconia, defeats Spartans twice
Summer	Civil war between the brothers in Macedonia; intervention of Pyrrhus
Late Summer/ Early Fall	Demetrius arrives in response to invitation from Alexander
Fall	Murder of Alexander IV; Demetrius (I) king of Macedonia
Winter 294/3	Foundation of Demetrias
293	Marriage of Antiochus and Stratonice
291	Demetrius marries Lanassa

288	
Spring	With Demetrius preparing to invade Asia Minor, new coalition of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Pyrrhus is formed against him
Fall	Lysimachus and Pyrrhus invade Macedonia; Macedonia divided between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus; Demetrius flees to Cassandreia; death of Phila
Winter	Murder of Antipater
287	
Spring	Reestablishment of Athenian democracy; Ptolemy new patron of Nesiotic League
Summer	Ptolemy repudiates Eurydice and Ceraunus; Ptolemy regains Cyprus; Demetrius returns to Asia
286	Demetrius campaigning in Asia Minor
285	
Spring	Seleucus captures Demetrius; Lysimachus subverts Pyrrhus' army and becomes sole king of Macedonia
284	
Summer?	Ptolemy Philadelphus made co-ruler of Egypt
283	
Winter 283/2	Lysimachus murders his son Agathocles
282	
February?	Death of Demetrius
Spring?	Death of Ptolemy I; Ptolemy (II) Philadelphus, sole ruler of Egypt
282/81 Winter	Seleucus invades Lysimachus' possessions in Asia Minor
281	
February/March	Battle of Corrupedium; death of Lysimachus
Summer	Seleucus crosses to Macedonia; Seleucus murdered by Ceraunus (September); Ceraunus, king of Macedonia
280	Death of Ceraunus
276	Antigonus Gonatas king of Macedonia

Preface

This work is not a history of the Hellenistic Age, only those slightly more than forty years that followed Alexander the Great's death. Its purpose is to look critically at the events which, and the personalities who, set the path upon which the Hellenistic world would proceed, not to examine the resulting journey. It is designed both for scholars and also for the general reader. While presenting a narrative of events, this narrative will be interspersed with the more important scholarly debates that affect so completely this history of the events that occurred more than twenty-three centuries ago. Many of these debates on some of the finer points have been either ignored or relegated to footnotes, so as not to disrupt the flow of the narrative. However, the more important ones will be set forth in their appropriate place in the narrative. Only in the case of certain chronological controversies will the debates appear in a separate section at the end of particular chapters. The ultimate goal is to present a readable and reasoned account of Alexander's Successors, the Diadochi.


As with all my works, I wish to thank my wife Jeanne for putting up with me in general, and more particularly I am most grateful for her aid in reading and commenting on what I have written. I also wish to thank my colleagues in the field of Alexander and Hellenistic studies, and especially those affectionately known as the "Alexander Group." To them all goes my appreciation for their support and insights over these many years. I would also like to thank the editors at Wiley Blackwell, Haze Humbert for suggesting the project and working with the prospectus, Allison Kostka for shepherding it to completion, and Janet Moth for proofing the final manuscript. For all of their assistance I am very grateful.



Map 1 Regions of Macedonia



Map 2 Greece and Asia Minor



Map 3 The Hellenistic world

Introduction

Any history of the Diadochi, the Successors, the generals who inherited the empire of Alexander the Great, will of necessity be an adventure story of larger-than-life characters pursuing glory and empire. This was an age that arose directly out of the conquests of one of the most mercurial figures in world history. It is only by comparison to the great Conqueror himself that these individuals' exploits pale. After all, they were fighting over an empire, stretching from Greece to Egypt to India, that he had created, and that ultimately none of them singularly could hold. Yet it is in their struggles with each other over what might be called Alexander's estate that the Hellenistic world was created. This estate over which they contended was both material and mythical. On the one hand, there was the physical, territorial, empire, but on the other was the legend of Alexander himself. This myth that grew with each passing year was often the exemplar by which supporters of the various Diadochi would measure their generals and rulers. Alexander, however, himself was but a catalyst in the creation of this new age (Anson 2013b: 181–8). He set the stage; he conquered the old Persian nemesis that had haunted Greek affairs since the sixth century BC, but then he left that stage. In his leaving, he is supposed to have said, when asked to whom he left his empire, “to the strongest.” He certainly had done little to ensure the empire's survival. In the words of Ernst Badian (1964a: 203), “Alexander was, essentially, not interested in a future without himself.” He left a legacy of tremendous potential, but also one of administrative ambiguity and a world wedded to warfare as the means to virtually every end.

At his death, Alexander's potential heirs were a child, Heracles, by a mistress; a half-brother of dubious competence, and an as yet unborn son by his Bactrian or Sogdian wife Roxane (Heckel 2006: 187, 241). In short, there was to be no smooth transition in power, and, in the final analysis, Alexander's family, the Argeads, would not long survive the great king's death.

While his Successors contended in a world in which few parameters had been set, some of these were to resound until the fall of the various Hellenistic states to Rome, and in some cases to transcend even this conquest. These qualities were especially important given the personal nature of Alexander's empire and his

Successors' kingdoms. Unlike the later Roman empire, in which lands secured overseas by Roman armies redounded to the benefit of the Roman state, Alexander's conquests were regarded as his personal possessions won through his personal triumphs. For Alexander, Macedonia was a manpower resource only. His connection to his homeland grew dimmer with every new conquest and with every step he took further into the east. He even planned to center his empire on Babylon (Str. 15.3.9–10). This personal aspect of rule was one of Alexander's major legacies to his Successors. Alexander's kingdom was one won on the battlefield, and warfare was not just the backdrop of Alexander's initial conquests, but also that of the first forty years of the Hellenistic age. The ruler as general, ever attempting to increase his personal domains, is the history of the Hellenistic world, and, perhaps, the legacy of Alexander not just to his contemporaries, the Successors, about whom this book relates, but to the age as a whole.

This history is a story of vaulting ambition, treachery, and wars almost without cessation. It was this inheritance, first from Alexander, and then from his immediate true heirs, his generals, that formed the underpinnings of the entire Hellenistic period. Even after the establishment of relatively stable royal families in the kingdoms carved from Alexander's empire by the second and third generations of the Conqueror's successors, personal monarchy and warfare remained the staples of the new age. Alexander's generation was to serve as a transition from the conquest itself to the more settled world by comparison that appeared with the emergence of formal Hellenistic states. In part, these more settled conditions were the result of the emptying of the vast treasures that had been captured from the Persians. These funds fueled the almost incessant warfare of the Successors.

While Alexander had not created an empire that was fixed by tradition or institutions, he had created a governmental pattern that was to be reinforced by his more successful Diadochs. Alexander had in the main copied the administrative structure of the Persian empire, which had the various regions divided up into provinces or satrapies, under the administrative authority of a governor or satrap, but Alexander's legacy was much more than the transmittal of some basic Persian administrative organization, and it was this inheritance that was continued and enhanced by his Successors. Alexander had created his empire in war and blood, and those who came after him fought for their share of this inheritance in the same fashion. The Successors had to demonstrate their fitness to rule on a regular basis, while their descendants owed their legitimacy, in the main, to their forebears. For Alexander the core of his empire was his increasingly polyglot army, with the military camp serving as his true capital. With few exceptions this was another way in which those who followed emulated the Conqueror. With respect to those territories brought under their aegis through conquest, the Successors mostly sought to dominate these areas through garrisons and often, again in the pattern of Alexander, with city foundations, but also through securing the loyalty of local elites. With regard to the last, Alexander had been most adept (Briant 2002: 870, 842–4, 1046–60), and among his Successors, Peucestas and Seleucus were noted for their acceptance of foreign

traditions and peoples. Peucestas, Alexander's satrap of Persis, wore Persian dress, learned the Persian language (Arr. *Anab.* 6.30.2–3), and treated many Persians as his close, personal, advisors and allies (Diod. 19.22.2). Later, in the second great contest of Alexander's Successors, Peucestas assembled an army that included 6000 Persian archers and slingers, 3000 heavy infantry made up of "men of many races ... in Macedonian array," and 400 Persian cavalrymen (Diod. 19.14.5). Seleucus' later success in securing much of the east was tied to his ability "to find common ground with the native populations" (Olbrycht 2013: 168). In both Babylonia and Iran his "generosity" and "benevolence" secured the support of even the common people (Diod. 19.91.2, 92.5).

As part of this courting of the local elite, it was equally important for the successful Diadoch to recognize the nature of the military organization bequeathed by Alexander. This was no longer the national force of Macedonia, but rather a polyglot army of different nationalities, including increasing numbers of true mercenaries, but with all exhibiting many of the characteristics of mercenaries (Anson 1991: 230–47). Troops in this period tended to follow leaders who were both successful on the battlefield and excellent paymasters. Often, defeated armies would desert their now beaten general and enter service with the commander of the victorious force. The other aspect of these armies of the Diadochs was that, while they may have had Macedonian cores, the majority of the troops were Asians or Greek mercenaries. When Alexander died in Babylon in June of 323, his army only consisted of approximately 2000 Macedonian cavalry and 13,000 Macedonian infantry (Curt. 10.2.8). In addition to these Macedonians, there were present 30,000 infantry called the *Epigoni* or Offspring, young Asians armed and trained in the techniques of the Macedonian heavy infantry (Arr. *Anab.* 7.6.1; Curt. 8.5.1; Diod. 17.108.1–2; Plut. *Alex.* 47.3, 71.1), 20,000 Persian infantry armed in their traditional fashion, forces of Cossaeans and Tapurians (Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.1), 30,000 mercenary infantry and 6000 such cavalry brought from Greece prior to his voyage down the Indus (Diod. 17.95.4), and unspecified forces brought to Babylon shortly before his death from Caria and Lydia (Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.1). Moreover, it is unknown, other than the numbers of Macedonians, how many of the original force that entered India had survived the journey down the Indus, the crossing of the Gedrosian desert, or had been left behind in various garrisons. According to Curtius (8.5.4), the army that entered India contained 120,000 men (cf. Engels 1978: 150). Many of these were recruited in and around what is today Afghanistan (Curt. 8.5.1; Arr. *Anab.* 6.2.3, 8.2; cf. 4.17.3). While these Asian and Greek forces in the aftermath of Alexander's death are most often not specified ethnically by our sources, there are indications that they continued to serve in the armies of the various Diadochs in large numbers. Eumenes in 320 had an army composed of "men of many races" (Diod. 18.30.4). In the Battle of Paraetacene in 316, Eumenes' infantry contained 6000 mercenaries (presumably Greek), and 5000 "men of many races" armed in the Macedonian fashion, and in his opponent Antigonus' ranks, 9000 mercenaries, 3000 Lycians and Pamphylians, and 8000 "mixed troops in Macedonian equipment" (Diod. 19.27.6, 29.3; cf. 18.40.7). The cavalry fighting in Asia during

the wars of the Successors was predominantly of Asian horsemen (cf. Diod. 19.14.5–8, 20.3, 27.4, 29.2). In the early wars of the Diadochi, however, while Asian elements may have predominated numerically, it was the Macedonian veterans who served as the core of these armies (Roisman 2012). Over time this Macedonian importance decreased significantly.

While Alexander the Great's importance in the creation of the Hellenistic world is clear, what only in recent years has come to be fully appreciated is the contribution made by the Conqueror's father Philip II. For so many reasons the father deserves the epithet of Great as much as does his son, and in some ways, more so. Prior to Philip, Macedonia was a territorial region not a country. It was he who made it into a nation (Anson 2008a; 2013b: 43–81). Prior to this ruler, the authority of the king was circumscribed by his dependence on the landed aristocracy for both his government and his army. In a relationship accurately described as Homeric, the king shared power with his *hetairoi*, or companions. These were most often aristocratic Macedonian landowners, but did include a minority of those of other nationalities. With the Macedonian court lacking anything approaching a bureaucracy, all of the basic functions of government were entrusted to these *hetairoi*. They ruled their own lands as independent fiefdoms and served the king when it suited them or on those occasions when a king's personality could dominate them. This was in truth a very personal relationship. The companions were formally tied to the monarch by religious and social bonds; they worshipped, hunted, drank, and fought alongside the king. Indeed, the military of Macedonia was dominated by these individuals, who made up one of the best cavalry forces in the Greek world. Due to the fact that Macedonia was not much urbanized, with most of its coastal cities independent Greek city-states, and, therefore, chiefly without a Macedonian middle class, the infantry was made up of lightly armed and poorly trained peasants, the tenant farmers, small land-holders, and herders, who served their aristocratic masters. These features of Macedonia explain what is one of the more surprising aspects of the Classical Age. Despite the many resources of this northern part of Greece – the largest and most fertile plain in the peninsula, large mineral deposits, rich resources of timber, and, by the standards of other regions in the peninsula, a large population – Macedonia played only a marginal role in the fifth century. Most often these Macedonian resources were exploited by the southern city-states, such as Athens, with the Macedonian kings unable to resist their incursions. If these resources could ever be used exclusively by and for the Macedonians, then the nature of the power structure in the Greek world would be transformed.

While the Macedonian kings were so often at the mercy of foreign powers and their own native aristocracy, they were theoretically the possessors of great power. The king shared power officially with no one. Long-standing arguments that the Macedonian king shared power with an assembly of Macedonians (Granier 1931; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 161–2; Mooren 1983; Hatzopoulos 1996: 1:261–322), is not borne out by the evidence (see Errington 1978; Anson 1985: 303–16; 1991; 2013b: 26–42). When supposed assemblies from the reigns of Alexander the Great

and earlier Macedonian monarchs are examined, they turn out not to be constitutional entities but ad hoc assemblages called by the king for a variety of reasons, but in no case involving any mandatory requirement that they be summoned or that their decisions be followed. The king was, in the words of a contemporary of Philip II, “the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything” (Dem. 18.235). It was the king who officially declared war and made peace, commanded armies, and served as the intermediary between the people and their gods (Anson 1985: 304–7; Borza 1990: 238). The sacral nature of the monarchy was carried over even after death. Sacrifices were made to dead kings (Hammond 1970: 64–7; and Griffith 1979: 57). The sacral nature of the monarchy likely accounts for the success of the royal clan, the Argeads, in monopolizing the kingship. Even though kings were assassinated, from roughly 700 to 310, all kings came from this clan. If one of these kings could ever turn his theoretical powers into actual ones, such a monarch might dominate the Greek world.

Such a king was Philip II. However, in 359, his accession to the throne would seem anything but promising. In this year, an invading force from the northwest, the tribal Illyrians, had swept into Macedonia, joined with many of the Macedonian aristocrats, and prepared to contest control of the country with the king. Philip’s brother, King Perdiccas III, gathered his forces and met the Illyrians somewhere in the northern upland regions of Macedonia, where his army was defeated, with 4000 dead including the king himself (Diod. 16.2.4–6). It was with an Illyrian army encamped in the northwest and threats of additional invasions from the north and east that Philip became King Philip II of Macedonia. At the time, none could have imagined that in twenty years he would turn this fragmented region into a nation that would dominate the southern Greek world with his victory at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 and his creation of the League of Corinth in 337, by which he exercised his control of the Greek city-states. It was with no exaggeration that the historian Diodorus of Sicily called Philip “the greatest of the kings of Europe in his time” (Diod. 16.95.1). While it was Alexander the Great and his conquest of the Persian Empire that set in motion the creation of the Hellenistic world, it was Philip who made Alexander’s achievements possible.

Philip, also, transformed the Macedonian army, the army with which Alexander did conquer the Persian Empire, by creating a Macedonian heavy infantry to complement the traditionally strong aristocratic cavalry. Here, he changed the very nature of Greek warfare. Prior to Philip the core of every Greek army was its hoplite phalanx. These heavily armed infantry soldiers wore breastplates and greaves, carried a round shield, 3 feet in diameter, and a 7-foot-long thrusting spear, and fought typically shoulder to shoulder in a compact unit, the phalanx. Cavalry and light-armed troops played only a secondary role, protecting the flanks and rear of these formations. In Philip’s new Macedonian phalanx, the infantryman was initially equipped with a 14- to 15-foot pike (the *sarissa*), and perhaps a 2-foot-diameter shield hung from the neck and shoulder, but little else in the way of defensive armor. Moreover, this new phalanx played a substantially different role in battle than its predecessor. Unlike the hoplite phalanx, this new

infantry formation's purpose was not to win battles, but rather to pin down the enemy's infantry, giving the Macedonian heavy cavalry, now outfitted with *sarissas*, albeit shorter than their infantry counterparts, of their own, the ability to probe the enemy for weaknesses, which they would then exploit. This new strategy has been called the "hammer and anvil" tactic, where the infantry is the anvil and the cavalry, the hammer. Over time Philip added numerous other units to his force, including skirmishers, archers, and mercenaries. With this new army Philip subdued his enemies, and his son Alexander conquered the Persian Empire.

This military change was closely tied to an even more dramatic change inaugurated by Philip. The new model army employed large numbers of the peasant population of Macedonia. Indeed, the origin of the *sarissa*-phalanx had much to do with the nature of the available manpower. Unlike the southern Greek city-states that depended on the middle class to supply their heavy infantry, with little in the way of such a class, Philip designed an infantry that required little in the way of material resources. In this new phalanx, the infantryman had virtually no expensive defensive armor. Moreover, a pike phalanx, when used primarily for defensive purposes, required little in the way of training, and whereas hoplite warfare demanded close-in fighting, for those unfamiliar with the horrors of warfare, the pike presented a measure of distance from your opponent. Unlike hoplites, in the words of one commentator on hoplite warfare, the pikeman could not "smell the breath" of his opponent.

To reward these new infantrymen and to free himself from total reliance on his aristocratic companions, Philip granted these new troops land, transforming many thousands of tenant farmers and dependent herdsmen into land-owning Macedonians, freeing them from their dependence on those landed aristocrats. As Arrian (*Anab.* 7.9.2), claiming to quote Alexander concerning his father, states: "Philip found you wandering and poor, wearing goatskins and grazing a few goats on the mountains ... he brought you down from the mountains to the plains ... and made you dwellers in cities." By so doing, Philip created a confident and exceedingly loyal population, loyal both to the monarch who had given them their land and who defended their possession of it, but also to the institution of monarchy itself. These holders of king's land became "citizen soldiers" (Diod. 18.12.2; Anson 2008a). Land for military service became a characteristic of the Hellenistic kingdoms that arose from Alexander's conquests. Most of the new cities created by the Successors were composed of just such settlers. This desire for land on the part of the landless or the small landowner encumbered by debt or obligation has sparked revolution across the centuries. Philip further cemented this new landed class to him by extending the concept of companionship to them as well. As the powerful aristocrats were the king's *hetairoi*, now the new citizen infantrymen became his *pezhetairoi*, his "foot companions."

Macedonian tradition made the relationship between king and people always one of informality and openness (Adams 1986). As part of this general lack of royal ceremony and decorum, even the title of king was apparently not an official part of Macedonian royal nomenclature prior to the reign of Alexander the Great

(Errington 1974). The king would simply be known by his given name, i. e. Philip, Alexander, etc. This personal aspect of rule was especially true in the army where in battle the king was literally the first to engage and the last to leave (Carney 1996: 28–31). Philip, with the creation of the *pezhetairoi*, changed informality into camaraderie. Alexander's Successors likewise maintained this close tie to their troops. As noted earlier, personal charisma was one very important key to a Diadoch's success.

Unlike Philip, who had created a Macedonian nation tied to the Argead monarchy, Alexander's actions were never about his homeland, but always about Alexander. In this regard, it was the example of Alexander and not Philip that the Successors followed. For the Diadochs, it was never about Macedonia, but about their personal domains. The Successors might be forgiven their lack of interest in the Macedonian nation. It must be remembered that it was only with Alexander's father, Philip II, that Macedonia had become permanently united under the authority of the Argead king. Moreover, these former generals of the Conqueror had been away from their homeland for more than a decade, and of their number few would ever return. Given that Alexander died without a clear and viable heir who could step in and take his place, given that he died far from Macedonia, and that his empire was personal, not national, it is understandable that his generals, his Successors, did not rally to the support of the nation.

While they did initially crown Alexander's surviving brother as King Philip III, and later, with the birth of Alexander's second son, crowned the newborn as king also, Alexander IV, the apparent unity was ephemeral. It would take forty years of incubation for this new age to emerge politically. In the final analysis, the evolution from one man's conquests to a number of stable political states would be accomplished in these roughly forty years of destruction and bloodshed. Out of these wars the new political realities of the Hellenistic world did emerge: Ptolemaic Egypt, Antigonid Macedonia, Seleucid Asia, and others. While these shared aspects of both Alexander's administration and that of his immediate Successors, there was finally no single model that fit all of the states that peopled the Hellenistic world. Each political entity had to accommodate the traditions of the populations that made up their states. Yet, in most every case, the structure was monarchical, heavily dependent on the military, and aggressive in foreign policy.

Before proceeding to these forty years of apparent chaos, the basis for our knowledge requires a brief examination. First, ancient writers were not guided by the modern rules of the profession, with anecdotal material often given the same weight as, or even greater weight than, more trustworthy accounts; they often used the past to excoriate or praise their own present, or to teach universal lessons, sometimes coloring their accounts to make the praise, blame, or lesson more profound. Moreover, in the special case of the period of the Diadochi, as it was for the career of the Conqueror himself, no contemporary narrative source survives. All of our chief sources date from the late Roman Republic or from the period of the Empire. Our principal source for much of this period is the universal history of Diodorus of Sicily, titled *The Library of History*. This author wrote during the last

half of the first century BC. With the loss of most of Diodorus' history concerning events after 302, our knowledge of the following years relies on other far less detailed sources. Indeed, this current history represents both the relative abundance of material for the age down to 301, and the dearth thereafter. This gives my work a rather disjointed aspect with greater attention to the earlier period, but I believe it is better to include all the evidence that is available even if it gives this account of the history of the Successors an unbalanced appearance, than to truncate these years in the interest of maintaining some sense of chronological uniformity in the narrative presentation.

Diodorus' narrative, despite its centrality to the history of this period, does have numerous shortcomings (Meeus 2013: 84–7). He is a secondary source, abbreviating extensive material not often too successfully, frequently inserting his own opinions of the role of fate and “moral utility” in historical causation (Sacks 1990: 24–35, 42–54). It is postulated that he, however, does in the main follow one source for extensive periods (Hornblower 1981: 2–3; Sacks 1990: 19, 21, 41, 158). Unfortunately, like most ancient historians he does not acknowledge his sources. While he may not have been a slavish abbreviator (so Stylianou 1998: 15, 49, 137–9), the writing style, at the least, has been claimed as his own (Palm 1955), there would appear to be a minimum of inserted additional material. In the case of the aftermath of Alexander's death down to the preliminaries to the Battle of Ipsus in 301, Diodorus is generally believed to be following the history of Hieronymus of Cardia, who was not only a contemporary historian of the period, but also an occasional participant in the events being described, and a confidant of three of the major players in this transitional period: Eumenes, from the historian's native city, Cardia in the Chersonese, and likely a relation (Hornblower 1981: 8; Billows 1990: 390; Anson 2004: 5 and n. 29); Antigonus Monophthalmus (One-eyed); and the latter's son Demetrius Poliorcetes (City-sacker), concluding his long career serving the son of Demetrius, Antigonus Gonatas, the founder of the Antigonid dynasty of kings who would rule Macedonia continuously from 276 (Chambers 1954: 386, 392) to the end of the dynasty in 168. Consequently, if the basis for most of the surviving accounts can be traced, through whatever tortuous path of transmission, back to Hieronymus, then some confidence can be assumed at least in the general outline of the surviving histories. But, with the dearth of surviving evidence, this desire for confidence in Diodorus' narrative may, indeed, foster a predilection among historians to accept Hieronymus as the ultimate source. There were other histories written at the time or shortly thereafter by other authors which also have not survived, but which may have descended to our surviving works. All of these exist only as suppositions; others as mere notices, and some in fragments. Like Hieronymus' history itself, the work called variously the *Histories*, *Macedonica*, or the *Hellenica* of Duris of Samos, also survives in fragments. While not a direct participant in the events, Duris did write an account of this period, and is seen by some modern historians as a major source for the surviving Diadochan histories, such as Diodorus' *Library*, that have survived (Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 9–28, 194–203).

Diodorus for the first twenty years of the Successor period presents a fairly detailed narrative. Our other surviving narrative account of the period comes from another Roman survival, *The Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*, composed by Marcus Junianus (or Junianius) Justinus, or simply and conventionally, Justin. Given that Diodorus' history only exists in fragments after 301, Justin's far more abbreviated account is the only surviving narrative for the entire period covered in this book. Trogus' work is most often dated to the period of the early Roman Empire; Justin's has been variously dated from the reign of Antoninus Pius in the second century AD to as late as that of Theodosius I in the fourth (Yardley and Develin 1994: 4). Little is known of Trogus, this despite the fact that he was included in the so-called canon of Latin historians, which included with Trogus, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus (Yardley and Develin 1994: 3). In addition to Justin's epitome, brief undated "Prologues" (summaries) of Trogus' history also survive. While the history centered on the age ushered in by Philip and Alexander, it, through its digressions on various topics associated with the peoples of the lands that made up the Hellenistic world, apparently took on certain aspects of a universal history, and Justin refers to it as such: "encompassing the annals of every period, king, nation and people" (Preface 2). Justin's work, while most often termed an epitome, is not a simple condensation or abbreviation of Trogus' history. Justin excerpted that material he found "pleasurable" and excised that which did not serve a moral purpose (Preface 4). Justin's abbreviated work is far more truncated than that of Diodorus, and often more problematic.

Two additional Roman historians provide critical material for the earliest years: Quintus Curtius Rufus, who, in his *History of Alexander the Great of Macedon*, continued his narrative past the Conqueror's death to the emergence of Alexander's half-brother, Arrhidaeus, as King Philip III; and Flavius Arrianus (Arrian) of Nicomedia's *Events After Alexander*, a detailed history in ten books, covering events from 323 to 320, although now lost, fragments, a late summary, and a synopsis of another author's work based on Arrian's original survive.¹ These works supplement our knowledge mostly of events in the years from 323 to 319. In addition to Diodorus' and Justin's histories and Arrian's fragments, there also survive a number of biographies dating also from the Roman era, but presenting the lives of important individuals from the age of the Diadochi. These include the biographies of *Eumenes* and *Phocion* by Cornelius Nepos, a Roman writer of the first century BC, and those of the early second-century AD author, Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus, or simply Plutarch, including, his *Lives of Demosthenes*, *Eumenes*, *Phocion*, *Demetrius*, and *Pyrrhus*. In particular, Plutarch's biographies of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Pyrrhus become our chief sources for the latter part of this history of the Diadochi.

These histories and biographies, along with a sizable number of inscriptions from widely dispersed locations, but especially from the city-state of Athens, dated to or referencing events in this period, add short and often eclectic pieces of information to our knowledge. There also survive a brief account of the history of the Seleucid Empire prior to its confrontation with Rome by the Roman-era historian, Appian of Alexandria, a number of "stratagems" associated with the

Successors, reported by the second-century AD Macedonian writer, Polyaeus, occasional references in two geographer-travelers from the Roman era, the first-century AD Strabo, and the second-century AD Pausanias, to events in this period, tenth-century brief encyclopedia entries (the Suda), fragments from a thirteenth (?) -century codex known as the *Heidelberg Epitome*,² fragmentary cuneiform tablets from Babylonia, and bits and pieces of lost historians, quoted in other sources.

While these other sources provide additional material, and often critical information, Diodorus' narrative is by far the most complete down to shortly before the Battle of Ipsus in 301. Especially after the loss of Diodorus, but also even with him, as a colleague has written, much of the activity of a modern-day historian of the ancient world in general, and of this period in particular, is attempting to glean every possible "shred of source evidence for a matter they are dealing with ... to toss one more gram of evidence onto the scales in promoting a tricky solution to a problem" (Wheatley 2013).

The story that follows is one of conflict and greed. Tradition and authority fell by the wayside (Heckel 2002: 87). No advantage would or could be avoided, no alliance was destined to last, and all quests for supremacy were doomed to failure. Out of it all did emerge a new world, in which stable governments came into existence and different cultures did interact, although clearly not as fully as once thought. But Greek colonists, mostly men, and these mostly soldiers, did intermarry with native women; Hellenic, Asian, and Egyptian elites did interact on a regular and important basis. Commerce produced relationships, if only at the level of business, technological innovation knew no ethnic boundaries and spread along the byways of an interconnected Hellenistic world, and the different intelligentsias shared philosophies and religious ideas. While Alexander created the stage upon which his Successors and their heirs performed, the play itself was written by those who came after the Conqueror's death. This work is an account of the first transitional generation, the Diadochi.

Notes

- 1 The epitome is by Photius, a ninth-century author, whose work is variously called *Bibliotheca* or *Myrobiblion*, which records 279 summaries of various works including that of Arrian. The three fragments of the original *Events After Alexander* are the "Vatican Palimpsest," which contains two brief extracts from Arrian's Book 7; a papyrus fragment, PSI 12.1284, and the *Gothenburg Palimpsest* (see Dreyer 2007: 251–5, for a new edition and translation), which contains excerpts from Book 10. Photius also summarized the work of Dexippus (ca. 210–273), *History of the Events after Alexander the Great's Death*, which in turn was heavily based on Arrian's *Events After Alexander*. Photius' summary of Dexippus only includes events derived from Arrian's Book 1 of the *Successors*, and references to Dexippus' summarized work will be designated as *Succ.* 1b; Photius' summary of Arrian's original is designated here as *Succ.* 1a for that material summarized from Book 1 and as *Succ.*, without a letter designation, for subsequent references to Arrian's original.
- 2 For a recent edition of the text, with commentary and translation, see Wheatley 2013.

The Death of a Conqueror

When Alexander the Great died on June 11, 323 (Depuydt 1997), he left a world turned upside down. The Persian Empire, whose unsuccessful invasion of the Greek peninsula had brought on the Greek Classical Age, and whose influence, beginning towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, had helped keep the Greek world in turmoil for decades, was gone. In its place was an empire which stretched from Macedonia to the Indus, created by a Greek army predominantly of Macedonians. The Greek world now had witnessed two of the most mercurial personalities in her long history. A father and son had changed the Western world for all time. The father, Philip II, had turned the backward, divided, and long-suffering land of Macedonia into a unified nation and the dominant state in the Greek world. The son, Alexander III, “the Great,” brought virtually the entire Near East into the Hellenic realm with his conquest of the once seemingly omnipotent Persian Empire. The father had died at the hands of an assassin and the seemingly invincible son had died at not quite 33 years of age, and although the cause of his death has been much speculated upon, it remains unknown, although the most likely explanation is that Alexander died from complications of malaria. However, soon after his death tales of conspiracy and poison were promulgated (Diod. 17.117.5–118.2; Curt. 10.10.14–19). The most complete account of a poison plot is found in the *Liber de Morte*, a propagandistic pamphlet likely originating in the struggles associated with the Second War of the Diadochi (see Heckel 1988). While such stories are interesting, they are not convincing. Alexander in his ten-year expedition had received numerous wounds: a head wound on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.7–8; Diod. 17.20.6; Plut. *Mor.* 327A), one in the thigh at Issus (Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.1; Curt. 3.12.2; Plut. *Mor.* 327A), wounds in the shoulder and leg at Gaza (Arr. *Anab.* 2.27.2; Curt. 4.6.17, 23; Plut. *Mor.* 327A) and in the head and neck in Bactria (Arr. *Anab.* 4.3.3; Curt. 7.6.22), and a pierced lung in India (Arr. *Anab.* 6.10.1; Curt. 9.5.9–10). He likely contracted malaria in Cilicia and again in Babylon on his return from India (Engels 1978: 224–8; Borza 1987: 36–8). West Nile disease has also been suggested (Marr and Calisher 2003). Add to these traumas and possible diseases the heavy drinking associated with Macedonian symposia

(Carney 2007: 143–4; Sawada 2010: 393) and the Conqueror's death from natural causes appears as the most likely possibility. As the oft-repeated phrase states, "Live hard, die young."

At the time of Alexander's death, he and his army were in Babylon, the capital of his new Kingdom of Asia (Str. 15.3.9–10). This alone would have made the process of choosing a successor unique in Macedonian history, the selection of a king away from the homeland, but then neither Alexander nor his army had seen Macedonia in years. To complicate matters Alexander had not provided for a successor and the once replete Argead clan, which had held the throne for over 300 years, had dwindled down to three potential heirs. When Alexander died he left but one son, the 3- or 4-year-old Heracles,¹ the result of an informal liaison with Barsine, the former wife of Memnon of Rhodes, a Greek mercenary commander in Persian employ, and the daughter of Artabazus, advisor to Darius and Alexander's one-time satrap of Bactria. Barsine had been captured in Damascus by Parmenion and subsequently had become intimate with Alexander (Curt. 3.13.14; Plut. *Alex.* 21.7; Just. 11.10.2), with Heracles being the result (Curt. 10.6.11; Diod. 20.20.1). Additionally, there was Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaeus, whose competence to rule was seriously questioned because of some mental incapacity,² and the possibility of a legitimate son, since Roxane, his Bactrian or Sogdian wife, was pregnant (Curt. 10.6.9; Just. 13.2.5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.8). Alexander also had two additional wives, Stateira (Heckel 2006: 256), a daughter of Darius III, the Persian king and Alexander's royal opponent, and Parysatis (Heckel 2006: 192), the daughter of Artaxerxes III Ochus, the Persian monarch from 425 to 338, but neither of these produced a possible heir. Stateira was murdered shortly after Alexander's death by Roxane, and Parysatis simply drops out of the narrative; whether she was also murdered, died a natural death, or disappeared into obscurity is unknown. What is clear is that at the time of Alexander's death there was no capable Argead ready to take his place.

But, then, as noted in the Introduction, "Alexander was, essentially, not interested in a future without himself" (Badian 1964a: 203). Moreover, not having a clear successor was not an unusual circumstance in Macedonian history. Disputed successions and civil wars had often followed a king's death. However, this particular succession crisis possessed a number of features not seen in the earlier struggles. While there was no regular constitutional process to choose a new king, certain elements were common. The new king would be a blood member of the royal family. But beyond this basic requirement there was little else. The Macedonian kings were by tradition descended from the Argive Temenus, thus the family was often referred to as Temenid (Hdts. 8.137–9, Thuc. 2.99.3). The ruling family was also called Argead, a term that apparently derives from a tribal name, "Argeas, the son of Macedon" (Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. *Argeou*), but which also came to be associated with their claimed Argive origin. In Macedonia, the king served as the intermediary between the gods and the people (Anson 1985: 304–7; Borza 1990: 238). There was no professional priesthood; the monarch made the sacrifices and obtained the favor of the gods,³ and presided over the sacred festivals.⁴

This religious aura carried over into the ceremonies performed for a dead king. On the death of a monarch a lustration was carried out (Just. 13.4.7; cf. Curt. 10.9.11–12), and funeral games and sacrifices were performed.⁵ The body would then be formally laid to rest in the royal tombs near the Macedonian city of Aegae (Borza 1990: 167, 256–60). This sacral nature of the monarchy likely accounts for the success of the Argeads in monopolizing the kingship over the centuries.

In the past, there had been a surfeit of possible candidates for the throne, which had given rise to numerous competitions for rule. Now, however, as the result of both Alexander's and his father Philip's success in eliminating possible rivals for the throne, there were only three potential candidates left. Also, while not a constitutional requirement but the result of circumstances, most often a son followed a father as king. To take the example of Philip II, an adult son was given responsibilities while the father yet lived, and through the father's efforts bonds were formed with powerful individuals in the kingdom. When Philip was assassinated, Alexander had already been regent for his father in 340 (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1), and had led the cavalry at Chaeronea in 338 (Diod. 16.86.1–4), where the victory ultimately brought to Philip the hegemony of Greece.

While there were challenges to Alexander's succession, these were dealt with quickly, both as a result of the competence of the new king and because of his allies in his father's administration. While the perpetrator of Philip's assassination, Pausanias, was killed fleeing the scene, others were later charged with involvement in the plot. These included three aristocrats from Lyncestis, a region in Macedonia, the sons of Aëropus, Arrhabaeus, Heromenes, and Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1–2). The assassin Pausanias murdered the king, not because of any political agenda, but rather to avenge what he saw as a private grievance (Diod. 17.95.3–94.4). The Lyncestian brothers likely also acted for personal reasons. Philip had exiled the brothers' father (Polyaen. 4.2.3). Not being Argeads themselves, it is possible they hoped through the assassination to bring Amyntas Perdicca, Philip's nephew and the son of Perdiccas III, Philip's brother and his predecessor as king, to power (Arr. *Succ.* 1.22; Just. 12.6.14; Polyaen. 8.60). Plutarch (*Mor.* 327C) reports that after Philip's death, "all Macedonia was festering with revolt and looking toward Amyntas and the children of Aëropus." The personal nature of the crime may explain why it succeeded in killing Philip, but failed in achieving any loftier goals. The conspirators wished primarily to wreak revenge; all else was secondary.

In Macedonia it had been critical in every succession that the new monarch have the backing of at least a powerful faction of the royal *hetairoi*, the king's companions. These individuals had for most of Macedonia's history formed the government under the king.⁶ Prior to the reigns of Alexander and his father Philip, the Macedonian king ruled through these individuals. They were mostly members of the powerful landed Macedonian aristocracy, although some were from different lands. In the non-bureaucratic state that had been Macedonia, they filled the offices of government under the king. They acted as regional officials, and served as ambassadors, advisors, and military commanders when called upon to perform these duties. Their relationship to the king was not institutional, but rather

personal, on the model of warrior-class Homeric society. As the king's companions they enjoyed a social bond, hunting, drinking, and fighting alongside their king. Indeed, prior to Philip II they were the principal arm of the Macedonian military, the cavalry. On the death of a monarch these notables, referred to by our Roman source Curtius as the *principes*, the leaders (Arrian *Succ.* 1a.2 calls them *megistoi*, the great ones), would through their support choose a new king from the available members of the royal family. At some point there might be a formal coronation where the new ruler would be presented to his people, most likely the army, for acclamation. This acclamation was a mere formality. The evidence, however, suggests that there was no formal requirement of a coronation ceremony or even of an informal meeting of the so-called Macedonian aristocratic leadership, these Curtian *principes*, but rather a far more amorphous process in which powerful personalities dominated. As noted in the Introduction, there was no assembly of Macedonians who chose the Macedonian monarch. The king was for all intents and purposes an absolute autocrat, whose rule was tempered only by the traditional informality of the relationship between king and subjects.

In this particular succession, virtually all of the prominent *hetairoi* were in Babylon. The only exceptions, though notable ones, were Antipater, Alexander's regent in Macedonia, and Craterus, who was on his way to replace Antipater bringing home roughly 10,000 veterans of long service in Asia (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9). In this circumstance the *somaphylaces* (seven official royal bodyguards, the most elite of the *hetairoi*) called a meeting to be held in the palace of the chief *philoï*, friends (another term used by our sources for those who are essentially *hetairoi*), and the other leaders of the army (Curt. 10.6.1). The soldiers, who, while Alexander yet lived, had forced their way into the southern palace of Nebuchadrezzar in Babylon (Oates 1986: 150–1) to see their dying king for the last time (Plut. *Alex.* 76.8; Arr. *Anab.* 7.26.1; Just. 12.15.1–4; Curt. 10.5.1), now assembled outside the throne room in the large, 60 × 55-meter, courtyard, awaiting news of the decision of their leaders ("desiring to know to whom Alexander's empire would be given" (Curt. 10.6.1).⁷ Access to the discussion going on within was supposed to be limited to those summoned by name (Curt. 10.6.2). However, the palace's succession of three courtyards leading to the throne room were all filled with soldiers, and, as a result, many of those summoned could not because of the crowds secure passage to the place of meeting (Curt. 10.6.1–2).

The soldiers' anxiety was well placed. Not only was there a dearth of possible candidates for the throne, but among the *principes* there was no clear agreement on how to proceed. Alexander's death just ten days after falling ill had apparently caught all by surprise. The shock and the traditionally amorphous Macedonian selection process, when added to the unique circumstances of this particular succession, made a chaotic situation almost inevitable. Perdicas, Alexander's chiliarch or second-in-command,⁸ who is initially found in charge of the proceedings, was in favor of awaiting the birth of Roxane's unborn child (Curt. 10.6.4–9; Just. 13.2.5). Little thought was apparently given to the possibility that the child might not be male, perhaps because the infant would be male either naturally or

by subterfuge (cf. Curt. 10.6.21). Even this eventuality, if approved, raised concerns. Who would be regent and guardian for the infant? There is little doubt that Perdiccas saw himself in this role. It is also very possible that Perdiccas desired to be king in his own right (cf. Curt. 10.6.16–19), but likely proclaiming that he would only serve as an interim monarch, ostensibly awaiting the coming of age of the Conqueror's son. Such a situation would secure the continuation of order and still point toward an eventual Argead successor, while giving Perdiccas' ambitions the cover of appearing to be serving the needs of the state and remaining loyal to the royal Argead family. When his position was secure, the young man could be set aside and Perdiccas would rule as the founder of a new royal line. This supposition would make sense of all of the surviving evidence surrounding Perdiccas and his actions during and after the deliberations in Babylon. However, at one point the chiliarch was offered the crown, and while there was initial support from those assembled, he hesitated to accept the offer (Curt. 10.6.18–19). This hesitation may have resulted from Perdiccas' fear that later he might be seen as a usurper if the Argead lineage were bypassed. Curtius (10.6.18) proclaims that, while Perdiccas desired the position, his indecision resulted from a sense that such action was improper or shameful. Later, Perdiccas approved the murder of Stateira, one of Alexander's Persian wives and the daughter of Darius III (Plut. *Alex.* 77.6).⁹ There is even a report that it was Alexander's wish that Perdiccas marry Roxane (LM 118; cf. Heckel 1988: 26). This last is associated by the *Liber de Morte* with the well-attested giving to Perdiccas by Alexander of his seal ring (LM 112), by which act Alexander likely was not attempting to make Perdiccas his successor, but was simply attempting to ensure the continuation of official state functions and the oversight of the succession (Rathmann 2005b: 26). No other source mentions the proposed marriage in any context (cf. Diod. 17.117.3; 18.2.4; Curt. 10.5.4; Just. 12.15.12). Such a marriage might have been contemplated, but the general hostility of the Macedonian soldiers to all things Persian would have made such a plan moot. This long-standing hostility towards Asians, and Persians in particular, which had come to dominate the relationship between Alexander and his Macedonians, made Alexander's sons far less desirable as even potential leaders, and a marriage even to the wife of the Conqueror held few benefits. Others apparently, including Ptolemy, one of Alexander's longtime companions, saw no viable candidates and wished to create a ruling council of those most often summoned by the dead king to give him advice (Curt. 10.6.15).

The difficulties involving the succession were not insurmountable and probably could have been resolved in conclave. However, before the *principes* could come to some agreement, the army intervened. These troops in Babylon were not the old Macedonian levy tied solely to the traditions of Macedonia; it was the army that had conquered the Persian Empire. It was now a force more professional than national, with a highly developed esprit de corps (Anson 2004: 255–7; 1991: 230–47; 1980: 56–7). In the chaos attendant on Alexander's death the soldiers, desirous of information, burst into the meeting and showed a disinclination to leave (Curt. 10.6.1–3). In 326, many of these same troops on the Hyphasis river in what is

today Pakistan¹⁰ had failed to accede to Alexander's desire for further advance in the east, and had even jeered at him later at Opis in 324.¹¹ They would not now be intimidated by his lieutenants. All deliberations now had to be carried out before an audience possessed of a strong vested interest in the outcome. Disagreements about the nature of the regency which were meant to be settled quietly behind closed doors by hard bargaining now had to be played out before this very attentive audience.

Perdiccas dramatically placed the ring given to him by Alexander on the throne and proposed to the assemblage that they await the birth of Roxane's child (Curt. 10.6.4–5, 9; Just. 13.2.5). This proposal received little support (Curt. 10.6.16). Nearchus, Alexander's admiral, quickly suggested that Heracles, Alexander's son by Barsine, be given the throne. Nearchus was married to Heracles' half-sister (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6). The troops reacted vocally and angrily to this suggestion (Curt. 10.6.12). They had not been pleased with what they perceived as Alexander's Persianization of the court (Arr. *Anab.* 7.8.1–2, 23.1; Plut. *Alex.* 71). Alexander included Persians in his personal entourage, began to adopt Persian dress, court procedure, and advisors, and increasingly incorporated Asian units into his ever-growing army (Carney 1996: 19–44; Anson 2004: 355–7; 2013b: 162–76). He had married three eastern princesses, two of whom were Persian (Plut. *Alex.* 47.7–8; Diod. 17.107.6; Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4),¹² and had overseen the mixed marriages of 10,000 Macedonian officers and soldiers and Asian women (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4–8). After his victory at Gaugamela in 331, which, except for mopping up operations, gave Alexander control of the Persian Empire, the king began to change the campaign from one of vengeance against the Persians to one where the previously hated Persians were to become comrades-in-arms (Anson 2013b: 153–79). Such a transformation under any circumstances would have been difficult. When combined with Alexander's growing sense of his own importance, it became an assault on the very traditions of Macedonia. All those living in his vast empire were now to be the subjects of the self-proclaimed "King of Asia" (Plut. *Alex.* 34.1). The long-standing Macedonian tradition of a personal relationship between ruler and people would now become one of ruler and subjects (Anson 2013b: 22, 24–6, 163). In the summer of 327, Alexander even attempted to introduce into his court ceremony the Persian practice of *proskynesis* (Arr. *Anab.* 4.9.9, 10.5–12.6; Curt. 8.5.5–24; Plut. *Alex.* 54.2–6), a form of submission which could involve a bowing or full prostration of the individual before a superior, in this particular case, the king (Hdts. 1.134.1; Frye 1972: 102–7). While the attempt was abandoned when it met with opposition, it was a pointed reminder of the changing relationship between the Macedonian king and his Macedonians. As Alexander began to implement this new relationship, his Macedonian troops became increasingly insubordinate and conspiracies arose against the king's life.¹³ Under these circumstances the displeasure with a possible new king who was half-Asian was simply a continuation of the Macedonian resistance to the policies of their dead king.

Given the vocal opposition to a half-Asian ruler, Ptolemy proposed that neither a king nor a specific regent be appointed, but that Alexander's old council be

retained and that they make major decisions collectively (Curt. 10.6.15).¹⁴ As noted, Ptolemy had probably favored a regency council for Roxane's potential son prior to the open meeting, but now seeing the reaction of the troops, especially to Nearchus' suggestion of Heracles as the new king, decided to forgo the regency completely, declaring it would be disgraceful for Macedonians and Greeks to be ruled by an Asian (Curt. 10.6.13–14). Aristonous, perhaps at the urging of Perdiccas, now called for Perdiccas to be made king in his own right, since Alexander had given him his ring before dying (Curt. 10.6.16–17). This suggestion received broad support, but Perdiccas hesitated to act and the moment was lost (Curt. 10.6.18–20). Given that the monarchy had been held by the Argead clan since mythical times, his hesitation is understandable.

Given the nature of Macedonian monarchy, while there may have been initial support by the confused and apprehensive troops for Perdiccas to become king, that support would likely have become fleeting given time for reflection. The Roman historian Curtius (10.6.18), perhaps influenced by the feigned initial reluctance of Augustus and later Tiberius to accept power, states that Perdiccas coveted the prize but hoped his hesitancy would lead to an overwhelming demand that he accept the role. When that was not forthcoming, he moved from the forefront and remained quiet. Indeed, one of the battalion commanders, Meleager, the son of Neoptolemus, spoke forcefully against such a proposition, proclaiming Perdiccas to be unworthy of such a position and further stating that Roxane's child was only a stalking horse for what would then become the *de facto* rule by Perdiccas as regent (Curt. 10.6.20–1). Many of the rank-and-file supported Meleager (Curt. 10.7.1). All suggestions were now actively and openly debated by the troops (Curt. 10.6.16–18), and the meeting quickly degenerated "in sedition and discord" (Curt. 10.7.1). In this emerging chaos a virtually unknown individual proposed that the crown be given to Arrhidaeus, who was the only adult Argead male; this suggestion was soon taken up by the soldiers and by Meleager (Curt. 10.7.1–2).

While Curtius is our most detailed source, his description of events has been called into serious question,¹⁵ with one commentator stating that his problems as a source are sufficient "almost to preclude belief in anything Curtius says about events after Alexander's death, except items confirmed by another source" (McKechnie 1999: 49). The major point of contention concerns the sequencing of the events that led to the proclamation by the Macedonian infantry of Arrhidaeus as king. Justin's description is in a number of ways significantly different from that found in Curtius. Justin (13.2.1–4, 3.1–2) has the Macedonians meeting in three separate groups: the leaders, the cavalry, and the infantry. The leaders made their "unanimous" decisions in private (Just. 13.2.1–3), then gave out the word to the army, who were divided in location according to whether they were horsemen or foot soldiers (Just. 13.3.1). For Justin, Curtius' *principes* were able to arrive at a decision with respect to the new monarch with no interference from the infantry. In private, they had agreed to await the birth of Roxane's child. If the child was male, then Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Craterus, and Antipater would be the infant's guardians (Just. 13.13–14). While the cavalry were in agreement with their leaders,

the infantry were incensed that they had not been consulted and immediately hailed Arrhidaeus as king (Just. 13.3.1–2). The *principes* now, in an attempt to win the infantry over to their decision, sent two Macedonian battalion commanders, Attalus and Meleager, to them, but these individuals joined the infantry and became their leaders (Just. 13.3.2). Attalus, Perdikkas' brother-in-law, would appear an unlikely candidate for this betrayal, especially since he is later found in Perdikkas' good graces, but it has been suggested that the marriage came later as part of a successful attempt to regain his allegiance (Heckel 1992: 381–4; 2006: 63). There are, however, additional improbable details in Justin,¹⁶ that might be dismissed out of hand as confusions by the epitimator of his source, but part of this basic outline of events also appears in the brief synopsis found in Diodorus (18.2.2–4), clearly indicating that there was a source tradition used by both Pompeius Trogus and Diodorus. The latter, however, begins with the division between the cavalry and infantry over the succession already in place, without any explanation of what led to it. He then states that envoys, only specifying Meleager by name, were sent from the cavalry to the infantry. Neither Arrian (*Succ.* 1a.1–4; 1b.1), nor Plutarch (*Eum.* 3.1–2), provides more than the briefest of outlines of these events. The basic scenario of events described in Justin is accepted by many scholars, who reject Curtius' account as either “imaginative fiction” (McKechnie 1999: 49–50), or “a confused pot pourri” (Bosworth 2002: 35–44).

However, Curtius' account is more faithful to the specific historical context. The troops, while initially having no expectation that they would select the next king, yet by the same token not willing to sit meekly by in some distant location while their futures were being decided, ultimately chose a king. The circumstances described by Curtius, the crowded meeting, the division of opinion amongst the *principes*, all led to an emboldening of the rank-and-file and the first true mutiny by the Macedonian army. Much like with mercenaries, many of whose attributes were exhibited by this long-serving royal army, this crisis caused the troops to see to their own interests through democratic means (cf. Parke 1933: 119). Indeed, it was this very succession crisis that gave rise to the brief period of powerful army assemblies that emerged following Alexander's death (see Errington 1978: 116–17; Anson 1985: 307–8; 1991: 236–7). These were the result of the troops' long service in Asia, the personal nature of that service in the period of both Alexander and his Successors, and the uncertainties that arose in this new age. The Curtian description of events is, therefore, not only the most detailed, but, despite rhetorical flourishes, the most accurate. Certain discordant elements of Justin's account may be explained. The private meeting of *principes* may, indeed, have been the preliminary meeting of the *somaphylaces* the formal bodyguards, who according to the Curtian account were the individuals who summoned the general meeting of “principal friends and commanders” (Curt. 10.6.1). Meleager was not, however, a member of this group, and the two divergent descriptions of Meleager's role at the beginning of the disturbance cannot be easily reconciled. At the time of Alexander's death the seven bodyguards were Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Perdikkas, Ptolemy, Pithon, and Peucestas (Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4).

In Curtius, while the proposal that Arrhidaeus be made king dismayed the *principes*, even bringing one of their number to tears, it quickly became the desire of the massed troops, who hailed Arrhidaeus as king under the name of Philip (Curt. 10.7.3–4, 7–15; Just. 13.2.6–8; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.1–3). Meleager then left the meeting and returned with Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10.7.7). At this point whatever order that had existed broke down and a riot ensued, with the *principes* and the elite Macedonian aristocratic Companion Cavalry ranged against the infantry, now led by Meleager (Curt. 10.7.16–19; Just. 13.3.3–4). In the chaos that followed, the Macedonian leaders fled the city and, joined by the cavalry, camped outside in the plain (Curt. 10.7.16–20). Alexander's empire appeared to be dissolving even before a successor could be named and the dead king's body had grown cold.

Out of the chaos, the *principes*, whatever their initial disagreements, emerged unified under Perdiccas' authority (Rathmann 2005b: 32, 50–2). These officers now made use of their many advantages in this split between the elite Macedonian cavalry and their compatriots in the infantry. The latter had all been at one time or another under the command of these leaders. Our sources proclaim that of the officers only Meleager supported Arrhidaeus and the infantry (Diod. 18.2.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.2). Meleager was not one of the *principes*; he had not risen above battalion commander (Heckel 1992: 167; 2006: 160). Attalus was a more substantive character, but it is Meleager who all the sources describe as the leader of the infantry. The charisma associated with those officers who had regularly held independent commands and had been part of Alexander's inner circle had saved Perdiccas from an attempt to seize or to assassinate him prior to that officer's retreat from the city (Curt. 10.8.1–3; Just. 13.3.7–10). Perdiccas had stayed after the cavalry and most of the other officers had fled, hoping to achieve a reconciliation. Those sent to kill Alexander's chiliarch, when confronted by the man himself, became terrified and fled (Curt. 10.8.1–3). Later, the general feeling amongst the infantry was that this attempted assassination was a shameful act (Curt. 10.8.5).

The *principes* were also in control of a far more formidable force than simply the Companion Cavalry. Present in Babylon at the time of Alexander's death was a force of more than 50,000 Persian infantry plus units of Cossaeans and Tapurians (Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.1–4). These troops had become part of Alexander's army. In Susa, Alexander had been joined by the *epigoni*, 30,000 young Persians trained and equipped in the Macedonian fashion (Arr. *Anab.* 7.6.1; Curt. 8.5.1; Diod. 17.108.1–2; Plut. *Alex.* 47.3, 71.1). Later in the year, at Opis, the king created Persian units bearing Macedonian titles and Macedonian equipment (Arr. *Anab.* 7.11.3; Diod. 17.110.1–2; Just. 12.12.3–4). It was also at Opis that Alexander had dismissed roughly 10,000 of his Macedonian veterans (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.1; Diod. 17.109.2; 18.4.1), retaining only 2000 cavalry and 13,000 infantry (Curt. 10.2.8).¹⁷ While his regent in Macedonia, Antipater, was to bring new Macedonian recruits to Asia as replacements for those departing, at the time of Alexander's death these forces were still in their homeland (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9). The army in Babylon was now primarily Asian. Given the attitude of the Macedonian infantry, as demonstrated

in their reluctance to accept a half-Asian successor as their king, these Asian troops would have been loyal to the *principes* and the cavalry.

There were also Greek mercenaries present, but their attitudes in this struggle are unclear. Most likely they simply awaited the outcome. Eumenes, the Cardian, but also an *hetairos* (Anson 2004: 42 n. 4) and cavalry commander, claimed neutrality, and it is reasonable to assume that, while Eumenes' proclamation was disingenuous, since subsequent evidence would suggest that he was likely acting as an agent for Perdiccas, seeking to undermine Meleager's authority with the infantry (Anson 2004: 54–7), it would have been a wise policy for all Greeks of much less prominence, although not all did follow it. Nearchus, the fleet commander, originally from Crete, as noted earlier, had proposed Heracles as a potential king, and at least two of the three later negotiators for the Macedonian infantry were Greek mercenary commanders (Curt. 10.8.15). What is unclear is how many Greeks associated either with the court or army of Alexander were in Babylon at this time. Undoubtedly Greek mercenaries were in Asia in abundance. Many were left from the former Persian Empire, where virtually every satrap as well as the royal army had its Greek mercenary force. Many of these individuals were exiles from their home countries. It was to deal with the large number of such fugitives earning their livelihoods through paid military service that, in 324, Alexander ordered the return of tens of thousands of these Greek exiles to their home cities (Diod. 17.109.1; 18.8.2–5; Curt. 10.2.4–7; Just. 13.5.2–5). Only those judged guilty of sacrilege or murder (Diod. 17.109.1), or those who been exiled by Alexander himself or his regent in Macedonia (Diod. 18.8.4), were to be excluded from the returnees. After Alexander's death, a force of 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry abandoned their homes in central Asia with the intent of marching back to Greece (Diod. 18.17.2).

In Babylon, with the city surrounded by the forces loyal to the *principes* and supplies interdicted (Curt. 10.8.11), the resolve of the infantry began to disintegrate. The troops demanded that their leaders, chiefly Meleager, either come to terms with the cavalry or immediately lead them against the latter (Curt. 10.8.12–14). Neither Meleager nor Arrhidaeus could gain effective control of their erstwhile supporters. Arrhidaeus in particular showed little capacity to lead.¹⁸ It was Meleager who had “dragged” him initially before the assembled soldiers (Curt. 10.7.10), and Arrhidaeus had soon fled “terrified by the authority of the *principes*” (Curt 10.7.13). Under these circumstances envoys were sent to the leaders outside the city and a compromise was reached (Curt. 10.8.14–22). These particular envoys were Greeks: Padas, the Thessalian; Damis,¹⁹ the Megalopolitan; and Perilaus, of unknown origin, but likely also Greek (Heckel 2006: 203; contra: Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 199).

In the final settlement between the infantry and the cavalry, Arrhidaeus became King Philip III (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.3), but it was also decided that, if Roxane was delivered of a male child, then that infant would also be designated as king, King Alexander IV (Just. 13.4.3; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.1, 8), thus creating a dual monarchy. It is possible that Philip was to reign only until Alexander IV came of age (App. *Syr.* 55), but no other source states that this was the case, and it is likely that

Appian or his source was confused by the fact that, given the infancy of young Alexander, Philip was, and would be until his death in 317, the active king.

In this compromise between Meleager, the infantry, and the *principes*, the key to success was Craterus. Even though, or more likely especially because, he was not present, but rather in Cilicia with the veterans that Alexander had dismissed at Opis and was supposedly en route to Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4), he made the perfect foil. His name was popular with the infantry (Plut. *Demetr.* 14.2; Suda s.v. *Craterus*; Plut. *Eum.* 6.2, 6–7, 7.1), and Meleager had served under him (Arr. *Anab.* 6.17.3). The non-present Craterus would become “*Prostates* of Arrhidaeus’ kingdom” (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.3; 1b.4), or regent for the king. *Prostates* was the traditional title for the regent of the kingdom of Macedonia (Anson 1992; 2009: 280–5).²⁰ Since the king’s authority was theoretically absolute in all areas of rule (see Anson 2004: 40–1; 2013b: 19–21), the *prostates* would have corresponding powers. Of course, Craterus was not present to exercise any powers. The compromise appealed to Meleager in the main because Perdiccas was not made regent. That all concerned saw the need for a regent even with respect to the adult Arrhidaeus only confirms his unsuitability to rule. Perdiccas would retain his title of chiliarch (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.3; 1b.4), and be recognized as the second-in-command to the king’s *prostates*. The chiliarchy in this context was to be an official title likely designating Perdiccas as the commander in Asia.²¹ An earlier request by the king that Meleager be made a third leader with Perdiccas and Craterus had apparently been withdrawn (Curt. 10.8.22). Meleager would become Perdiccas’ lieutenant (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.3). Both sides would accede to the authority of an absent third party. Meleager, in particular, was pleased with this agreement; he was at a minimum the confidant of the only current king and he had served under Craterus (Arr. *Anab.* 6.17.3), and hoped to enhance his position with his own adherents through his association with the absent but popular commander. Craterus, like the infantry in general, had opposed Alexander’s Persianization policies (Plut. *Eum.* 6.3; *Alex.* 47.9), although he was circumspect in his opposition, and thus able to retain the king’s friendship (Plut. *Alex.* 47.10; Curt. 6.8.2). He was therefore able to gain the trust of his soldiers (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 6.2–3, 7.1), while never losing that of his king.

Since neither Arrhidaeus, now proclaimed Philip III, nor Meleager was able to control the infantry in his own name, that of this popular commander would be invoked. In Meleager’s own mind he had emerged from the crisis with a new and more powerful role in the new order than he ever would have achieved if the *principes* had been left to their own devices. However, in reality Perdiccas and the other *principes* had no intention of abiding by this agreement. “The Perdiccans made the compromise only to get control of the king and to eliminate Meleager” (Errington 1970: 56). While Curtius’ statement (10.9.7) that Perdiccas rested his only hope for survival on Meleager’s death is an exaggeration, it does point to the perceived need to separate Meleager from Philip. It was for this reason that the *principes* were willing to grant the *prostasia* to the absent Craterus. For them this agreement with Meleager was never meant to come into effect (cf. Curt. 10.8.22). It was simply the means to an end, Meleager’s.

As part of the agreement with the former battalion commander, a formal reconciliation was to be staged; the period of strife had lasted a week (Curt. 10.10.9). Treachery was planned around a ritualistic purification of the Macedonian forces (Curt. 10.9.11). According to Curtius (10.9.8–11), Meleager was tricked by Perdiccas into agreeing to use the purification as a means to eliminate those supposedly working against the agreement. Initially in the negotiations the cavalry had demanded that the leaders of the infantry be surrendered (Curt. 10.8.15). This demand had precipitated the infantry to arm themselves and prepare for battle, but Arrhidaeus dissuaded them and pleaded for additional negotiations, which in turn led to the settlement, without the stated demand for the surrender of infantry's ringleaders (Curt. 10.8.16–23). However, once outside the walls, surrounded by the cavalry and their supporters in the plain, and with King Philip now leading one wing of the cavalry, the king at the instigation of Perdiccas demanded the surrender of thirty of the leaders of the infantry (Diod. 18.4.7; Curt. 10.9.18), the very individuals who had secured for him the throne. The dumbfounded troops meekly watched as their compatriots were taken and subsequently trampled to death by the war elephants.²² While Meleager was not among the thirty, he was subsequently assassinated; it was claimed that he was plotting against Perdiccas (Diod. 18.4.7; Curt. 10.9.21; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.4).

The cavalry leaders now returned to Babylon and held the conclave planned previously to decide the fate of Alexander's empire. This time there were no common soldiers present (Curt. 10.10.1–4). At this meeting Philip was confirmed as king with the understanding that, if Roxane's child were male, he would also be king (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.8; cf. Diod. 18.18.6). Later, when a boy was born,²³ he was presented to the army, who acclaimed him as King Alexander IV (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.1, 8; 1b.1; Just. 13.4.3). It is doubtful that anyone at this point thought beyond the immediate crisis of what the exact implications of a dual monarchy might be. Despite this being the case, scholars have speculated on the constitutional aspects of this diarchy.²⁴

In this final Babylonian settlement made by the *principes* present in that city, in the absence of outside interference, a modified form of Perdiccas' original proposal was approved and Perdiccas emerged as the *Prostates* of the Kingdom for Philip III, and, after his birth, of that of Alexander IV as well (cf. Diod. 18.2.4, 3.1, 23.2).²⁵ As *prostates* he combined the offices of regent and guardian (Anson 2009: 284; Meeus 2009b: 296–7). Neither a shared overall military command, nor in the final analysis is the *prostasia* mentioned for Craterus; instead that commander was to share power in Europe with Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7; cf. Curt. 10.7.9). For those in Babylon this was an ideal way to deal with the two powerful, but absent, *principes*; let them battle it out for control of Europe (so Badian 1964b: 266). Perdiccas, with the consent of the army, had revoked Alexander's command that Craterus replace Antipater in Macedonia, along with certain other of Alexander's "plans" (Diod. 18.4.1–6),²⁶ and substituted the more amorphous sharing of power between the two (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.3).²⁷

Craterus was in Cilicia with the Macedonian returnees and probably in supervisory control of the treasury there. The satrapy of Cilicia, however, had been

given to Philotas by the *principes* in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5, 24.2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.6.16). Even though this Philotas is later described as Craterus' supporter (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 24.2), it is clear that the *principes* as a group wanted Craterus to move to Europe. Some time prior to Craterus' arrival in Cilicia, the satrap there, Balacrus (Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.2), had died while campaigning against the Pisidians (Diod. 18.22.1). This may in part be responsible for Craterus' delay in moving on to Macedonia. He had left with the veterans in the summer of 324 and was still in Cilicia more than a year later. He may also have been ordered by Alexander to await the departure of Antipater and the Macedonian replacements from Macedonia before proceeding (Griffith 1965: 12–15). As to Antipater's reaction to the events in Babylon, it should be noted that even before the final settlement was reached, he was already preparing for what became the "Hellenic War," or the Lamian War, the great revolt against Macedonian authority, which saw Antipater and a Macedonian force besieged in Lamia in Thessaly in the winter of 323/22 (Diod. 18.9.1–4, 12.1). Antipater apparently had other issues as well. Thrace, while initially under the command of a Macedonian general who was likely subject to Antipater's authority (Anson 2013b: 128–9), had proven to be problematical. In 331, Memnon, the commander in Thrace, "revolted against Alexander," but later came to some sort of satisfactory terms with Antipater (Diod. 17.62.5–6, 63.1), and is found bringing reinforcements from Thrace to Alexander in 326 (Curt. 9.3.21). This rebellion, then, most likely was actually against Antipater's authority, and not that of Alexander. Subsequently, Memnon's replacement in that office, Zopyrion, on his own authority, engaged in a disastrous campaign in the Pontic region against the Greek city of Olbia and the Thracian tribe of the Getae (Curt. 10.1.44; Just. 12.2.17, 37.3.2), resulting in much of Thrace revolting from Macedonian authority under Seuthes, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, the dominant tribal branch of this people,²⁸ and formerly a Macedonian vassal (Curt. 10.1.45).

While the Lamian War only began after the news of Alexander's death reached Greece, there were rumblings at least a year before (Ashton 1983: 47–56).²⁹ Dissatisfaction with Macedonian hegemony had lingered since 338 and the defeat of the Greek coalition by the Macedonians and the establishment of the League of Corinth, Philip II's mechanism to control the Greek peninsula, in the following year. This general discontent with the loss of much of the city-states' autonomy was augmented by Alexander's Exiles' Decree of 324 (Ashton 1983: 50–63; Habicht 1997: 34–5; contra: Dmitriev 2004).³⁰ Moreover, likely in the winter of 325/24, Harpalus, the royal treasurer in Babylon (Diod. 17.108.4), fearing prosecution for his massive malfeasance in office, fled to Athens. With the possibility of turmoil in the Aegean and Greece, Craterus may have been ordered by Alexander to prepare for any such eventuality by remaining in Cilicia and seeing to the outfitting of a major sea force to meet a potential revolt (Ashton 1993: 128–9). Curtius (10.2.2; cf. Just. 13.5.7) reports that Alexander, when he heard that his wayward treasurer was in Athens, ordered a fleet to be prepared for an attack on the city. The plan, continues this author, was abandoned when Harpalus was arrested and later

escaped from Athens.³¹ However, it is also possible that Craterus was laying the groundwork in Cilicia for a future campaign that Alexander planned in the west (Ashton 1993: 128–9; Bosworth 1988b: 208–10; 2002: 31). Cyinda, the formerly Persian treasury, could supply the resources needed to amass the vast armada and army proposed for this new expedition of conquest (Diod. 18.4.4; Arr. *Anab.* 7.1.2; Curt. 10.1.17). It is unknown how many of the ships that Alexander acquired when he captured the Phoenician port cities with the subsequent surrender of their fleets were still operating in the Aegean Sea, which after the capture of Egypt was controlled by the Macedonians. Two hundred and twenty-four warships had aided Alexander in the siege of Tyre (Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.1–3; Plut. *Alex.* 24.4–5; cf. Curt. 4.3.11);³² thirty triremes had been left behind in Egypt (Curt. 4.8.4; Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.3–5). What is clear, however, with respect to Craterus is that Alexander must have known and, for whatever reason, approved of that commander's delay in Cilicia. At least, there is no record of his displeasure.

What is, perhaps, more interesting is Craterus' reluctance to involve himself in the events unfolding in Babylon. Although order was restored fairly quickly after Alexander's death, Craterus had the resources – 10,000 Macedonian veterans and access to the treasury – to march to Babylon and attempt to impose his own settlement, if he so wished. Craterus, for all of his resources, did not physically contest or apparently even voice objections to the resolutions reached in Babylon. When he eventually did cross to Macedonia, he immediately deferred to Antipater's authority (Diod. 18.16.5). This is true even though the *Suda*, the Byzantine encyclopedia, states that in Macedonia the army preferred Craterus to Antipater (*Suda* s.v. *Craterus*). Additionally, Craterus never accused Perdiccas of usurping his *prostasia*. He was a loyal Macedonian and royal supporter. Later, he would angle for some role in Asia (Diod. 18.17.7), which he apparently hoped to achieve by negotiation (Errington 1970: 61–2; Anson 2004: 63). He never seems to have wanted the top job. This was clearly due to a lack of ambition, not a lack of courage (*Suda* s.v. *Craterus*), nor was it any absence of self-confidence or sense of self-worth. In his dress he emulated Alexander (*Suda* s.v. *Craterus*), and at Delphi he dedicated a hunting scene of bronze figures depicting Alexander attacking a lion with Craterus providing assistance (Plut. *Alex.* 40.5). Craterus was a good and confident general, but his aspirations were not equal to those of many of his contemporaries, nor certainly was his ambition comparable to that of his former king.

The other apparent loser in the final round of negotiations was the *somaphylax* Leonnatus. He had been part of one suggested solution to the regency issue (Curt. 10.7.8–9; cf. Just. 13.13–14), and Curtius (10.7.20) states that, during the mutiny, the leaders of the cavalry were Perdiccas and Leonnatus (Curt. 10.8.1–2, 6). However, in the settlement following the army's reconciliation, Leonnatus did not emerge as a major figure, but rather as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.6; 1b.2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.5.16). Indeed, while Alexander had associated Paphlagonia with Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Anab.* 2.4.2; Curt. 3.1.22–24; 4.5.13), the former territory now had been attached to Cappadocia and awarded to Eumenes (Diod. 18.3.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.6; Plut. *Eum.* 3.3). Intrinsically

Hellespontine Phrygia was of great strategic importance, controlling as it did the Asian side of the strait, but much of this significance had been negated by the peaceful relations then in existence between Antipater and Perdiccas. In the early summer of 323, Antipater was firmly in control of Macedonia; soon Lysimachus would be in place in nearby Thrace. Craterus, with 10,000 veterans and an acknowledged right to interfere in Macedonian affairs, was already in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7). Leonnatus' diminished role becomes even more extraordinary, if Justin's (13.2.14) claim that he was one of the four initially agreed-upon guardians for Alexander's successor is true. This is, therefore, another reason for rejecting Justin's account of the aftermath of Alexander's death in favor of the Curtian one. In Curtius, Leonnatus is never part of any agreement on the regency, only part of an ignored suggestion raised by Pithon. Unlike Craterus, Leonnatus' ambition was great, and he hoped to seize the Macedonian throne (Plut. *Eum.* 3.8–9; Suda s.v. *Leonnatus*).

In truth, Craterus was caught in a position where only someone with the ambition and the will of an Alexander would roll the dice in an attempt to secure power. Moreover, his troops knew of the original charge and many may have been reluctant to return from whence they had come to fight their fellow Macedonians. The core unit of these returnees was the argyraspids, Alexander's old infantry guard, who until late in the Conqueror's reign were called the hypaspists.³³ Hypaspists, or shield-bearers, was the formal title given to the unit. Later, in India as a result of the hypaspists covering their shields with silver, the unit acquired the title of argyraspids, or silver-shields. Finally, his orders were to replace Antipater in Macedonia, orders rescinded by those in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7; Suda s.v. *Craterus* 3). For a time, Craterus was in limbo. Chaotic events were unfolding in both Europe and Asia. There had been almost a full-blown civil war in Babylon and unrest was simmering in Greece which would eventually lead to the Lamian War.

Perhaps most curious of all is that also at this second meeting in Babylon, while the seeming provocative move of canceling Craterus' *prostasia* was taken, when the satrapies were assigned, conservatism was the order of the day (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5–7; 1b.2–7; Diod. 18.2.4–3.2; Curt. 10.10.1–5). In fact, most of the satrapies were simply reassigned to those currently holding the position.³⁴ Of the eight provinces which were reassigned, Hellespontine Phrygia, Cilicia, Caria, Cappadocia, Syria, Egypt, Media Major, and Thrace, three most likely were vacant at the time of their assignment and two were replacements or partial replacements of non Graeco-Macedonian officials. Eumenes of Cardia was assigned Cappadocia and Paphlagonia (Diod. 18.3.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.6; Plut. *Eum.* 3.3). Alexander had received the submission of the latter and had placed the region under the authority of Calas, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, but Alexander had barely crossed into the former. Sabictas,³⁵ probably a member of the Cappadocian nobility (Atkinson 1980: 135–6), was assigned the satrapy of Cappadocia, which likely only involved at most the extreme southern region.³⁶ The northern majority was under the total control of the local dynast, Ariarathes. Ariarathes I was king of Cappadocia and an ally of the Persians, but not seemingly under their direct authority (Diod. 31.19.3–4).

Sabictas is unlikely to have survived the Persian counter-offensive in Asia Minor after Alexander's victory over the Persian king at Issus in 333 (Curt. 4.1.34–5, 5.13). After that campaign, Sabictas disappears from the record and Ariarathes appears in total control of the entire region of Cappadocia (Diod. 18.16.1). Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia, had been slain by the Larandians and the Isaurians prior to Alexander's death (Diod. 18.22.1). That satrapy was assigned to Philotas by those in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.4.12). A fate similar to that of Balacrus may have also befallen Demarchus in Hellespontine Phrygia (so Briant 1973b: 80). Media was divided into two provinces (Just. 13.4.13) with Atropates, Perdiccas' Persian father-in-law (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.5; Just. 13.4.13), retaining Media Minor, and Media Major being assigned to the Macedonian Pithon (Just. 13.4.13; Diod. 18.3.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5, 1b.2; Curt. 10.10.4). Lysimachus was assigned Thrace (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7; 1b.3; Diod. 18.3.2; App. *Syr.* 52), much of which had been usurped by Seuthes and the Odrysian Thracians (Curt. 10.1.45). Indeed, it is even possible that he was not actually a satrap, but a general answering to Antipater in Macedonia (Lund 1992: 20, 54). If this was the case, then the relationship between Macedonia and Thrace remained as it had existed during Alexander the Great's lifetime, with a *strategos*, or general, managing that region under the overall authority of the regent in Macedonia (Diod. 17.62.4–6, 63.1). It is more likely that Thrace was elevated to the status of satrapy in the aftermath of Alexander the Great's death (Delev 2000: 384 n. 5).

Antigonus, known as Monophthalmus (the One-eyed), was left in control of Greater Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, and western Pisidia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.6; 1b.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Billows 1990: 46).³⁷ Babylonia may also have been reassigned. If it was, then it would represent the replacement of another Persian satrap. The Persian Stamenes became satrap in 328/27 (Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.3) and may have been replaced by the Macedonian Archon prior to Alexander's death (Heckel 2006: 255). If this was the case, then Archon was simply confirmed in his satrapy in the Babylonian meeting (Diod. 18.3.3; Just. 13.4.23).

Despite Perdiccas being the dominant figure in the aftermath of the reconciliation of the infantry and cavalry, he did not control these proceedings, even though certain of the sources do appear to indicate that Perdiccas alone was responsible for the satrapal division (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5; 1b.7; App. *Syr.* 52). These sources represent the official protocol, with the regent acting in the name of the kings ("he made appointments to the governorships of the different provinces, as if Arrhidaeus had ordered him" [Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5]), not the actual process. Both Diodorus 18.3.1 ("having taken the advice of the leaders," Perdiccas assigned the satrapies), and Curtius 10.10.1 ("Perdiccas held a council of leading men in which it was decided that the rule would be divided") make it clear that the division was the result of the deliberations of the *principes*. Indeed, Diodorus (18.23.2) states that early in Perdiccas' regency his position was "not firmly established." Ptolemy, who had opposed the appointment of Perdiccas as regent in the first abortive meeting in Babylon (Curt. 10.6.15), got what he apparently desired, the satrapy of Egypt. It is likely that, if Perdiccas could have done so, he would have blocked this

assignment. Of course, he may simply have wanted him and other powerful members of the former king's inner circle away from the king and the royal army (so Bosworth 2002: 57). While these satraps' later actions with regard to Perdiccas cannot be taken as proof of their attitudes in 323, it is instructive that Ptolemy, Leonnatus, Laomedon (cf. Diod. 18.39.6), and Asander (cf. Diod. 18.39.6) all ultimately proved disloyal to the regent. Still, granting such a satrapy as Egypt with all of its resources to a potential opponent should not have been, and very likely was not, the desire of the regent. After all, Alexander had seen the potential and had distributed authority to a number of individuals in Egypt. However, Cleomenes, the most powerful official then in Egypt,³⁸ was made Ptolemy's lieutenant (*hyparchos*) (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5), probably in an attempt to keep a watch on the new satrap. Of course, Perdiccas once had a lieutenant as well, the ill-fated Meleager. Many of Perdiccas' allies did not receive satrapies. Perdiccas' own brother Alcetas, a distinguished battalion commander, did not secure a province, nor did Aristonous, who had proposed in the initial meeting that Perdiccas be made king (Curt. 10.6.16). These omissions are especially significant since the possession of a satrapy did not necessarily mean one's separation from court or the loss of command in the royal army. Pithon was made satrap of Media Major (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5), but, except for a campaign in the east, remained with Perdiccas and the royal army (cf. Diod. 18.7.9, 36.5). In any case, Perdiccas needed his supporters in Babylon as well (Billows 1990: 55). Controlling the army was all important; the actual administration of the empire was initially only of secondary importance.

In the distribution, certain powerful individuals who were not physically present in Babylon also had to be taken into account. As noted, Antipater was confirmed in his possession of Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7; Diod. 18.3.2), but was to share his power with Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7). Antigonus Monophthalmus was maintained in his large satrapy. He would have been difficult to dislodge from lands he had held since 333 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.3; Curt. 3.1.8; Just. 13.4.14). While Antigonus had been left in Phrygia by Alexander with a force of only 1500 mercenaries (Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.3) and likely the surrendered 3000 Carians and 100 Greek mercenaries who had been in Persian employ there, "very many from his garrisons" were subsequently sent to Alexander (Curt. 4.1.35). That Antigonus was able to maintain control of his province despite the major Persian counterattack after Alexander's victory at Issus (Curt. 4.1.34–5) must have been the result of Antigonus' recruitment of native forces and mercenaries (Anson 1988a: 475). He is reported to have defeated the retreating Persians in three battles (Curt. 4.1.35). Later, in 316, Antigonus deployed 1000 Phrygian and Lydian cavalry, and 3000 Lycian and Pamphylian infantry (Diod. 19.29.2–3). At this particular time, Antigonus had access to far larger Macedonian forces and, consequently, his numbers of troops from Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia may have been much reduced from his years before Alexander's death. Since Alexander's departure from Asia Minor and the Persian assault there late in 333, Antigonus had not moved against any of the native rulers in the area, certain of whom had renounced their allegiance to Alexander; this suggests that he was at the least at peace with these neighbors, or,

even more likely, in alliance with them (Anson 1988a: 475). Alexander's longest-serving satrap was also a "friend" of Antipater's (Diod. 18.23.3), and at this particular point in time Perdiccas wished to cooperate fully with Alexander's former regent in Macedonia, and had requested the hand of Antipater's daughter, Nicaea, to cement the alliance (Diod. 18.23.2). Perdiccas was clearly feeling his way cautiously. His immediate ambition was to solidify his hold on the regency and to gain full control of the royal army.

At this point it is not known what Antipater's thoughts were with respect to the situation in Babylon. While Perdiccas' request for a bride went unanswered for more than a year and a half, it likely had nothing to do with the situation in Babylon or with Antipater's relationship with the regent, but rather the gathering storm in Greece proper. Greek dissatisfaction, especially in Athens and Aetolia, sparked by Alexander's Exiles' Decree, was leading to preparations for war months before Alexander's death (Mitchel 1964: 16–17; Miller 1982: 101; Ashton 1983: 53–5). By the winter of 323, Antipater was being besieged in Lamia. Moreover, after becoming regent, Perdiccas had his own concerns.

In the east, in what was known as the upper satrapies, those east of Babylonia, large numbers of Greeks living in the many garrisons and new city foundations, missing "their old manner of life" (Diod. 18.7.1), on the news that Alexander was dead, organized themselves for a march back to Greece. Earlier, in 326/25, while Alexander was recovering from a wound, 3000 "Greeks," who had been settled in Bactria and Sogdiana, believing that the king had died, "revolted from the Macedonians" and successfully marched back to Greece (Diod. 17.99.5; Curt. 9.7.1–11).³⁹ Curtius (9.7.1; cf. Diod. 17.99.5) states that the revolt did not arise because of hostility toward Alexander, but rather because of their dissatisfaction with their new homes in Bactria and Sogdiana (Diod. 17.99.5). This new upheaval in 323 was on a much larger scale.

As in the earlier uprising, there is no indication of pent-up antagonism towards the Macedonians. Indeed, these settlements contained small numbers of Macedonians (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 4.22.5; Plut. *Mor.* 328E), but were primarily filled with Greek mercenaries. Even though Arrian (*Anab.* 4.22.5; 7.24.7) suggests that others than Greeks were included, those in revolt are collectively called Greeks by our sources, indicating that the overwhelming majority were, indeed, former Greek mercenaries. What is remarkable is the large number of those who joined this revolt, given that at least 3000 settlers from this general area had already withdrawn in the earlier uprising and successfully returned to Greece (Curt. 9.7.11). Diodorus (18.7.2) reports that this new rebel force amounted to 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. While Diodorus emphasizes the military nature of these individuals, many may have been former camp followers who had been part of the original settlements and were equally discontented with their situation (cf. Diod. 17.83.2; Curt. 7.3.23; Arr. *Anab.* 3.28.4). In this second revolt, Perdiccas decided to stop their march and make an example of the participants (Diod. 18.7.3–4). For this purpose, Perdiccas sent a force of 3000 infantry and 800 cavalry from the ranks of the Macedonians, chosen by lot, with an additional 10,000 infantry and

8000 horsemen to be supplied by the satraps of the upper satrapies. This force was all under the command of the regent's lieutenant, Pithon (Diod. 18.7.3). Pithon and his force won a complete victory. Diodorus (18.7.4) notes that Pithon, "whose ambition was great," wished to incorporate the defeated into his army and with this large force conquer the upper satrapies. He further claims that Perdikkas suspected Pithon's ambition and consequently ordered that all of the insurgents be put to death and that their possessions be distributed among the Macedonians (Diod. 18.7.5). While Pithon neglected Perdikkas' command, the Macedonians in his force did not and set upon the Greeks, killing them and seizing their possessions (Diod. 18.7.8–9). The claim that Perdikkas gave the order to kill the rebels because of his distrust of the intentions of his commander is doubtful. Why would Perdikkas assign such an important mission to an untrustworthy officer when he had numbers of other commanders at his disposal? The most likely explanation for Pithon's selection is that at the time Perdikkas was unaware of his ambitions. This claimed desire on his part to become "ruler of the upper satrapies" (Diod. 18.7.4) appears to foreshadow his actual attempt to realize this goal in 317 (Diod. 19.14.1–2). The massacre of the captured Greeks was then to be a lesson to others who might leave their posts, not an attempt to thwart Pithon's ambitions.⁴⁰ With the conclusion of the campaign, Pithon and the Macedonians returned to Babylon (Diod. 18.7.9).

Clearly the more dangerous of the two revolts occurring in 323 was that occurring in the west. This war broke out likewise when the news of Alexander's death was confirmed and a coalition of Greek states led by the Athenians and the Aetolians declared war "to assert their freedom and rid Greece of Macedonian despotism" (Diod. 18.8.6–13.6, 14.4–5, 15.1–9; 16.4–18.3). The conflict was made possible ironically enough because of the relative prosperity brought with the Common Peace of the League of Corinth imposed on the Greek world by Alexander's father Philip II (cf. Tod 1950: 224–31; Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 372–9; Diod. 16.89; 17.8.5; Just. 9.5). By forbidding war between the various signatories and cementing in place the governments of those same states that existed at the time of the agreement, the Common Peace imposed on the Greeks, who had not accompanied Alexander to Asia, the horrors of peace. With the exception of the brief, albeit serious, war launched by the Spartans and their allies (Elis, Achaea, except Pellene, and Arcadia except Megalopolis [Aeschin. 3.165]) against Alexander's regent and the Macedonians in 331 (Diod. 17.48.1, 63.4; Curt. 4.1.39–40), the European Greek world was at peace for more than a decade. While our information is scanty with respect to economics in general, it is clear that the Athenian state at least had prospered, whether through shrewd stewardship (Green 2003: 1), or as the result of the general peace, but likely due to a combination of both. Athens had an income at the start of the war of roughly 1200 talents a year and may have had in its treasury as much as 18,000 talents by 323 (Plut. *Mor.* 841C; Green 2003: 1 n. 3).⁴¹ A talent was a unit of measure equal to roughly 57 pounds, and with respect to these monetary evaluations that amount of silver. The annual income was twice that of the fifth-century Athenian Empire, and Pericles' treasury before

the building projects on the Acropolis and the siege of Potidaea that preceded the start of the Peloponnesian War contained less than 10,000 talents (Thuc. 2.13.3). Even accounting for inflation over the intervening century,⁴² these financial figures for Athens at the time of Alexander's death are still impressive. Moreover, Athens' fleet at this time had at least 240 warships (Diod. 18.10.2; Just. 13.5.8), and perhaps as many as 400 (Plut. *Mor.* 841C); its army had 5000 citizen hoplites, 2000 mercenaries, and 500 cavalry (Diod. 18.11.3).

Athenian hostility toward Macedonia stemmed from a number of factors including its long-standing reluctance to surrender its independence to a foreign power, but recently the major cause for Athenian anger was over Alexander's Exiles' Decree. Athens had acquired possession of the island of Samos in 366, sending cleruchs, settlers, to occupy the island the following year and expelling the Samians (Dem. 15.9; Isoc. 15.111; Arist. *Rhet.* 1384b 32–5; Diod. 18.8.7; Cargill 1995: 18–19). Athenian occupation had been confirmed by Philip in the Peace of Corinth (Plut. *Alex.* 28.2). Either as part of the Exiles' Decree or as a separate order, Alexander commanded that the Samians were to be restored to their island and the Athenian settlers removed. While the Exiles' Decree was officially promulgated in Greece at the Olympic Games in August of 324 (Diod. 18.8.3),⁴³ the knowledge of its content may have become known in the peninsula as early as March (Heisserer 1980: 188–9). Harpalus, the imperial treasurer stationed in Babylon, had arrived seeking asylum in Athens in the late spring (Habicht 1997: 41), or perhaps as late as the middle of July, 324 (Badian 1961: 42–3), but in any case, Alexander's emissary Nicanor, carrying with him the king's Exiles' Decree, was already in Greece when the fugitive treasurer arrived.

Harpalus' arrival in Athens created a dilemma for that city, for he brought with him 30 ships, 6000 mercenaries, and 5000 talents, roughly 285,000 pounds of silver and, perhaps, gold, raided from the royal treasury in Babylon (Diod. 17.108.6; Curt. 10.2.1; Arr. *Succ.* 16; Plut. *Dem.* 1–2). Harpalus was one of Alexander's long-standing "friends" (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5; Plut. *Alex.* 10.4), but was unfit for military service and consequently had been made the expedition's treasurer (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.4–7). Nor was this Harpalus' first flight. In 333, fearing that the Persians would prove victorious in the then approaching Battle of Issus, he fled with part of the royal treasury to Greece (Megarid) (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.7). Alexander forgave his wayward friend and restored him to his previous position (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.4). This later flight, however, found Alexander not in a forgiving mood. While at first denied entry to the city, Harpalus left his forces at Taenarum in Laconia, returned to Athens as a suppliant with a portion of the treasure, and was permitted to enter the city (Diod. 17.108.7). Taenarum and its temple of Poseidon had long been a place of sanctuary (cf. Thuc. 1.128.1; Diod. 11.45.4), and during the fourth century BC it had become a gathering place for mercenaries. Many of these had arrived with their former Persian employers after Alexander's various successes (Diod. 17.111.1). It was here that the Spartan king, Agis, preparing for his war with Antipater, assembled his mercenaries (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 2.13.6). With the defeat of the Spartans and the death of their king at the hands of Antipater in 331, the area quickly became an independent mercenary

center (Badian 1961: 26). This role accelerated after Alexander ordered his satraps to disband their armies, when many of those discharged by Alexander's satraps came there (Diod. 17.111.1; 18.9.1; cf. 17.108.7). Taenarum was attractive for a number of reasons. It was a port with ready access to Italy and Sicily, and it was safely located at the southwest tip of Laconia.

With the arrival of Harpalus, the Athenians debated what to do with this most dangerous of visitors. Many wished to make use of the resources he had brought with him from Asia for what many hoped would be a coming war with the Macedonians (Plut. *Mor.* 531A; cf. Paus. 2.33.4); many were also apparently bribed by Alexander's former treasurer (Diod. 17.108.7–8; Just. 13.5.9; Plut. *Dem.* 25; Hyp. 5.3),⁴⁴ but others were unwilling to anger Alexander and still hoped to influence his decision with respect to Samos. While admitted to the city, the fleeing treasurer was placed under guard by order of the Athenian assembly. Later, leaving behind much of his stolen treasure (Diod. 17.108.7–8; 18.9.1), he slipped away to Crete, where he met his death (Hyp. 5.3; Diod. 17.108.7–8; 18.19.2; Curt. 10.2.3). With demands coming from Alexander, Antipater, and even the Conqueror's mother Olympias for Harpalus' surrender, most Athenians were not yet ready to provoke a war (Hyp. 5.3; Curt. 10.2.2–4; Diod. 17.108.7; Paus. 2.33.4), at least not until appeasement had been tried and a reversal of Alexander's demands concerning Samos sought (Ashton 1983: 53). Also, encouraging this decision was the presence of a Macedonian fleet under the command of Philoxenus in the western Aegean (Plut. *Mor.* 531A; Paus. 2.33.4).

In the winter of 324 (cf. Diod. 17.111.4), certain Athenians were already sending out feelers to possible allies for a revolt against Macedonian hegemony and the enforcement of the Exiles' Decree.⁴⁵ The Athenian Leosthenes, with the tacit approval, according to Diodorus, of the probeuleutic Council of 500, but more likely only that of a presiding subcommittee, the *prytany*, opened discussions with the leaders of other dissatisfied Greek peoples, primarily the Aetolians (Diod. 17.111.2–3).⁴⁶ The council or *prytany* also gave him 50 talents to recruit mercenaries in Taenarum (Diod. 17.111.3). Many of these had been aided in their transfer from Asia to Europe by this same Leosthenes (Paus. 1.25.5; 8.52.5). As 324 waned the Athenians were playing a very dangerous game, surreptitiously seeking mercenaries and allies for a possible future war (Diod. 18.9.2–3), but, at the same time as these warlike preparations were underway, attempting to get Alexander to change his mind with respect to the Samians. Demosthenes had encouraged the entire Greek world to send ambassadors to the Macedonian king protesting his decision regarding the exiles (Hyp. 5.4). Moreover, after numerous hints that Alexander would welcome the honors due a god which were in the main rebuffed by the Greeks of Europe, in the fall of 324, Hephaestion died and, with the approval of the Oracle of Ammon in Siwah, Alexander ordered that his dead companion be honored with the rites associated with hero worship. It was at this oracle in the Libyan desert that Alexander had been proclaimed the son of Zeus in 331 (in general, see Anson 2013b: 97–109). Heroes were at the intersection of mortals and the immortal gods. They were those who had been elevated to divine status after

death based on their achievements in life. Their cult was more limited in scope, most often tied to a particular location. It is likely that, at this time, the hints that Alexander wished to be honored as a god became more assertive. The worship of dead heroes was commonplace in the Greek world. City founders and benefactors were often given cult after their deaths. Such honors were only very rarely given to living men (Anson 2013b: 87–8, 94–5). Hephaestion would receive hero cult, but Alexander wished to receive the cult associated with an Olympian. This was not the result of any belief that he bled ichor,⁴⁷ but a kind of down payment on the glory he believed he would receive after death (Anson 2013b: 83–120). Alexander had not in his own mind become an immortal god, but he believed he deserved to be treated like one as a reward for his achievements and to separate him from the ranks of the rest of humanity.

Initially, suggestions that Alexander be so honored were rejected in Athens. The Athenian politician Demades proposed to add Alexander to the “Twelve Gods,” but was heavily fined (Athen. 6.251B; Ael. *VH* 5.12). Demosthenes is reported, perhaps in reference to Demades’ suggestion, to have made a proposal to the Athenian assembly “forbidding anyone to believe in any but the accepted gods” (Din. 1.94; cf. Polyb. 12.12b.3). Yet subsequently this same Demosthenes “proclaimed that the people must not question the grant of divine honors to Alexander” (Din. 1.94). Demades is reported to have said after the failure of his initial proposal, “see that in keeping heaven safe you do not lose your land” (Val. Max. 7.2.13). The turnaround for Demosthenes may have been the direct result of a reconsideration of the wisdom in denying Alexander the honors of a god, while at the same time lobbying him to rescind his demand respecting the Samians. In 1593 Henri de Bourbon, a Protestant candidate for the contested French throne, when he could not acquire the capital Paris by force, converted to Catholicism, reportedly proclaiming that “Paris was well worth a mass,” and it is very likely that Demosthenes and many Athenians came to a similar conclusion with respect to Alexander’s demand: Samos was well worth the worship of a living king. In the Athenian case, nationalism trumped piety as, in Henri’s example, personal ambition triumphed over religious scruple. It was in the Athenian interest to placate the Macedonian monarch in hopes that he would make the Samians an exception from the general force of the decree. This led the Athenians to send envoys to Alexander to honor him and to bring their petitions to him. Many of these legates from various Greek communities arrived acting as *theoroi* or sacred ambassadors, “as if on a sacred mission to honor a god” (Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.2), and while there is here no evidence of actual worship, their attitude was certainly “reverential” (Bosworth 1988a: 287). Apparently, Alexander’s response to the Athenians was not positive.⁴⁸ At some point during the discussions Alexander replied to an Athenian letter claiming that the polis had been granted Samos earlier as part of the Corinthian settlement after Chaeronea, that this decision was made by King Philip II (Plut. *Alex.* 28.2; cf. Diod. 18.56.7).⁴⁹ It was the issue of Samos more than any other that would bring the Athenians to challenge the power of Macedonia (Diod. 18.8.7). They were not willing to give up the island. Inscriptional evidence shows that at this time the

Athenians were detaining and bringing to Athens for trial all Samian returnees (Habicht 1957: 156–64; 1997: 33–4).

At the time of Alexander's death, much of the Greek world was already on a war footing (Diod. 18.9.3–4), prepared to fight for their freedom and perhaps even for some to defend the immortal gods against gross impiety (Hyp. 6.43). Alexander's death precipitated what likely was an inevitable war (Diod. 18.9.4). It was the catalyst for long-held resentments about the loss of Greek *eleutheria*, freedom, to explode. This desire to be free from and independent of Macedonian authority became the slogan that reverberated through the Greek ranks (Hyp. 6.10–11, 16, 24, 34, 40; Diod. 18.9.1, 5; Just. 13.5.5). Despite the efforts of a number of Athenian leaders, primarily Phocion, a long-standing conservative leader, having been elected one of the ten Athenian generals forty-five times (for his career, see Heckel 2006: 220–2), the Athenians led by Hypereides, Phocion's long-time opponent and critic of the latter's policies which he saw as pro-Macedonian, voted for war. Demosthenes was not present for these debates, having been exiled for accepting a bribe from Harpalus (Plut. *Dem.* 26). He, however, after the Athenians voted for war, associated himself with the Athenian ambassadors who were seeking allies for the coming conflict, and was restored to citizenship by the assembly (Plut. *Dem.* 27). Unlike certain other Athenian politicians who were pro-Macedonian and fled to Antipater after the vote (Plut. *Dem.* 27.2), Phocion remained in Athens and even conducted the Athenian successful counterattack against the Macedonian Micion who landed at Rhamnous in Attica and had begun to pillage the countryside (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1–4).

With the Athenian populace clearly dreaming of their days of empire and glory, the assembly voted “to assume the responsibility for the common freedom of the Greeks and to liberate the cities ...” (Diod. 18.10.2–4). The cry of Greek freedom was in the air. In the Aegean, the island of Rhodes drove out its Macedonian garrison (Diod. 18.8.1). This rebellion, unlike the one that would consume the Greek mainland, succeeded, and the Rhodians became a “free” state, and even though on occasion they had to compromise some of their autonomy with respect to foreign policy, they were still able to maintain their independence until Roman power swamped both the island and the rest of the Hellenistic world.⁵⁰

On the mainland, Athens was able to forge quite a formidable coalition against Macedonia, which included most of the Greek world and certain of Macedonia's non-Greek neighbors as well, for the Athenians were not alone in their displeasure with Macedonian hegemony. The allied forces included most of the Thessalians, Oetaeans, Achaeans, Melians, Locrians, Phocians, Aenianians, Alyzaeans, Dolopians, Carystians, Argives, Sicyonians, Eleans, and Messenians; among foreign peoples, numbers of Illyrians and Thracians (Diod. 18.11.1–2). Indeed, about the only people to remain outside the coalition were the Spartans, soundly defeated by the Macedonians in 331, the Boeotians (Diod. 18.11.2–3), who had both benefited from Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335 and been chastened by that act, and, perhaps, the Euboeans other than the Carystians (Hyp. 6.11; Diod. 18.11.2). While the more than a decade of Macedonian domination was sufficient for most of the

allies to throw in their lot with the Athenians, certain states, like the Athenians themselves, had more specific reasons for joining. The Aetolians, for one, feared retaliation from the Macedonians for their destruction of the city of the Oeniadae in Acarnania and the exile of its inhabitants (Plut. *Alex.* 49.14–15; Diod. 18.8.6; cf. Diod. 17.111.3). This action likely occurred in 330 and represented a violation of the terms of the Peace of Corinth, by which all signatories declared “not to take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths, neither by land nor by sea; not to take any city or guard post or harbor, for war, of any of those participating in the peace, by any craft or contrivance ...” (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 374). While it might be claimed that Alexander was himself violating the terms of the peace by requiring the return of the Greek exiles, the point was that Alexander could do what he wished based on his power, in which case he could use the terms of the common peace in whatever way suited him.

With most of the Greek world arrayed against Macedonia, Antipater sought allies from the Macedonian commanders in the east. These requests went principally to Leonnatus and to Craterus (Diod. 18.12.1). With the Hellenic allies, united under the command of Leosthenes and having already defeated Antipater's Boeotian supporters near Plataea (Diod. 18.11.5), assembled at Thermopylae, Antipater, along with 13,000 Macedonian infantry and 600 cavalry, marched south to meet the threat, accompanied by the entire Macedonian fleet of 110 warships and the Thessalian cavalry. He left a subordinate, Sippas, in Macedonia with what Diodorus describes as a “sufficient” force, but ordering him to recruit as many more men as possible (18.12.2). The size of the allied force with the Athenian commander is not mentioned, but it was clearly far superior to that of the Macedonians. Leosthenes had, perhaps, enrolled as many as 8000 of the mercenaries at Taenarum (Diod. 18.9.1, 3), and these were joined by an additional Athenian force of 5000 citizen hoplites, 2000 mercenaries, and 500 cavalry (Diod. 18.11.3). There were 7000 Aetolians (Diod. 18.9.5) and as many as 7000 from the other allies present (cf. Diod. 18.12.4).⁵¹ The key to victory was, however, the desertion of Antipater's Thessalian cavalry allies (Diod. 18.12.3). This action left the Macedonian cavalry badly outnumbered and unable to protect their brethren in the infantry. The result was a Macedonian defeat in southern Thessaly. Moreover, likely due to this Hellenic superiority in cavalry, the Macedonians were unable to flee homeward, but rather entered the nearby city of Lamia, hoping to be relieved before the defeat on the battlefield became the loss of the war (Diod. 18.12.2–4; Hyp. 6.12). The Greeks, unable to achieve victory by direct assault, settled down to a siege. While the city was being surrounded by the construction of a wall and a ditch, their commander was killed by a sudden sortie from the city (Diod. 18.13.5; Just. 13.5.12; Plut. *Phoc.* 25). The loss of Leosthenes was serious, but the real blows to “Greek freedom” were administered in the Aegean.

In three naval battles, the Athenian fleet was defeated by its Macedonian counterpart. While the battle at sea was critical in this war, our main source, Diodorus, granted it but brief coverage. As a result, the actual number of battles is in dispute, as is their order, location, and importance.⁵² What does appear to be clear is that

a decisive battle occurred near the end of the Athenian year in late June of 322 (Ashton 1977: 10–11). Diodorus (18.15.8–9) refers to two or three naval defeats suffered by the Athenians at the hands of Cleitus, the Macedonian admiral, in the archon year 323/22. The ambiguity of his language leaves the number unclear. “Engaging with the Athenian admiral Euetion he [Cleitus] defeated him in two battles and destroyed a large number of enemy ships near the island called the *Echinades*” (emphasis added). The Parian Marble (FGrH 239 B F-9), an inscription discovered on the island of Paros relating events chronologically from the mythic kings of Athens to 264/63, when it was likely inscribed,⁵³ however, notes only one sea battle between the Athenians and the Macedonians, which the Macedonians won in 323/22, near the island of Amorgus in the eastern Cyclades. Additionally, two inscriptions (IG II² 398 and 493), while dated to later years (320/19; 303/2), do make reference to a naval battle near Abydos and have been associated with the Lamian War (Ashton 1977: 7 n. 52). While the ambiguity of whether there were two or three battles might seem to be solved by proclaiming that Diodorus simply had a lapse in clarity, there is a further problem. From the evidence of the inscriptions it would appear that at least one battle took place in the Hellespont and, according to Diodorus, there was another near the Echinades islands, which, however, are off the coast of western Greece, in the Ionian Sea. The battle near Amorgus then would be a third. However, a sea battle in the Ionian Sea would be very unlikely in a war that was concentrated in the Aegean. The solution appears to be to postulate that the third battle took place near the northwestern tip of Euboea, near the town of Echinus, whose nearby islands may in antiquity have been called Echinades (Geer 1947: 57 n. 1; Morrison 1987: 93).⁵⁴

If we accept that there were three battles, the difficulty remaining is to determine their order and significance. Since the sea battle off Amorgus came late in the Athenian archon year (Ashton 1977: 9–11) and the final land battle was fought at Crannon in early August of that same year (Plut. *Cam.* 19.6–7; *Dem.* 28.1; Schober 1981: 54, 66–8), with the defeated Athens being garrisoned around the middle of October (Plut. *Phoc.* 28.2; *Dem.* 28.1), the battle near Abydos likely occurred very early in 322 in an Athenian attempt to block any crossing by Macedonian forces coming from Asia. An Athenian fleet in the Hellespont also indicates that the Athenians must either have held on to territories in the region or had excellent relations with certain of the cities on the European side of the strait, perhaps Sestus (Cargill 1995: 29–30). Even though Lysimachus had been awarded the Chersonese along with Thrace in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7), it, like Thrace itself, had to be acquired by, at least, a show of force. There may even have been Athenian cleruchs still present in the area (Cargill 1995: 30). Given the nature of naval warfare in this period, it was impossible to blockade a coast by setting ships in the sea off that shore. A nearby base from which to launch interceptive attacks was necessary (see Anson 1989: 47–9). A fleet of rowed warships could not have operated for long periods far from shore. Warships, with their large crews and cramped quarters, could carry food and water only for one or, at most, two days; meals needed to be prepared off ship, and they had to sleep off ship as well. Too

much time spent on board in cramped conditions would lead to physical problems for the rowers. The most that could be done in a blockade was to have patrol ships in the channel to search out the enemy and then alert the fleet, which would attempt to assemble quickly enough from a nearby position to intercept the enemy.

After the arrival of Lysimachus in Thrace and his subsequent accommodation with Seuthes, the European bases would likely have no longer been available. But during the time of Seuthes' full independence the evidence suggests that good relations existed between the Athenians and the Thracians. In 330, the Athenians had honored Rheboulas, "the son of Seuthes [II?]" (Archibald 1998: 307). The battle near Abydus, then, is to be associated with the crossing of Leonnatus from his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia to Europe in the winter of 323/22. This would have occurred before any resolution of affairs in Thrace. The first battle between Lysimachus and Seuthes had resulted in a stalemate (Diod. 18.14.2–3), and it does appear that the Thracian king maintained a high degree of independence at least in the area of the upper Tonsus river long after (Lund 1992: 26–7). Seuthes is called king by Diodorus both in 323 and again in 313 (Diod. 18.14.1; 19.73.8).

Leonnatus' assistance to those besieged in Lamia came about, in part, as the result of the plans of the new regent in Asia. Perdikkas wanted to remove from power in Asia Minor those native rulers who had resisted or rebelled against Macedonian authority, or simply been bypassed by Alexander on his march. As part of this policy, Eumenes of Cardia, the former head of Alexander's chancellery and a past commander of a unit of the Macedonian elite Companion Cavalry,⁵⁵ was assigned the territories of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia at the conclusion of the Babylon settlement. These areas had been by and large bypassed by Alexander, and neither Cappadocia nor Paphlagonia was currently under Macedonian control. While Alexander had formally annexed the southern portion of Cappadocia (Arr. *Anab.* 2.4.1–2), Ariarathes, the then ruler of northern Cappadocia, had never submitted to Macedonian control (Diod. 18.16.1; Curt. 10.10.3; Plut. *Eum.* 3.4), and in the chaotic counterattack by Persian units retreating from the Battle of Issus in Asia Minor (Curt. 4.1.34–35; cf. Diod. 17.48.5–6), he had annexed all of southern Cappadocia (cf. Str. 12.1.3).⁵⁶ Paphlagonia, likewise, was not under Macedonian authority. Even though the Paphlagonian tribes had submitted to Alexander and been put under the jurisdiction of the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Anab.* 2.4.1–2; Curt. 3.1.22–3), in 323 they are also found under the authority of Ariarathes (Plut. *Eum.* 3.3–4). Consequently, while Eumenes was allocated these territories, they would first have to be conquered.

Perdikkas, in the name of the kings, ordered both Leonnatus and Antigonus to aid Eumenes in the acquisition of his satrapy (Plut. *Eum.* 3.3–4). The task was to be accomplished through the employment of a large mercenary army with significant Asian elements (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3.4). This was also the case with other forces leaving Babylon or being acquired on the march to or in the provinces of the newly assigned satraps. There were just not enough Macedonians left in the royal army in Babylon to be shared. As noted earlier, at the time of Alexander's death there were only 2000 cavalry and 13,000 infantry remaining in the royal army in Babylon

(Curt. 10.2.8). While Perdiccas had dispatched Pithon and 3800 Macedonians to the east (Diod. 18.7.3), these troops were to return to Babylon after suppressing the revolt (Diod. 18.7.9). There is no mention of the return to Perdiccas of any troops from the army of Leonnatus and Eumenes. Moreover, the two commanders had received more than 5000 talents for the Cappadocian campaign (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3.11). The force, indeed, would be substantial, but composed primarily of Greek mercenaries, of whom, despite Alexander's Exiles' Decree, there remained still an abundance in Asia. There may have been as many as 100,000 mercenaries who had at some point seen service with Alexander (Griffith 1935: 39). Craterus in 322 enlisted 4000 such mercenaries (Diod. 18.16.4), and in 318 Arrhidaeus, not the king, the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, raised 10,000 (Diod. 18.51.1). With 5000 talents, literally tens of thousands of mercenaries could be employed for a year or more.⁵⁷ The Persian coffers held in total, perhaps, as much as 200,000 talents.⁵⁸ More than enough to finance the forty years of warfare that ensued so soon after Alexander's death. While Perdiccas had few Macedonian veterans to give out, he did have vast sums available for the employment of mercenaries, in addition to his substantial Asian forces.

In the summer (perhaps as early as late June) of 323, Eumenes and Leonnatus departed Babylon, arriving no earlier than September and, perhaps, as late as November in Hellespontine Phrygia. Some time would have been spent in Leonnatus' province hiring mercenaries, organizing his satrapy, and in waiting for Antigonus, who, in fact, never came. But before the campaign could commence, various invitations came to Leonnatus to cross to Europe. Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia, arrived from Antipater and renewed that commander's earlier request for assistance (Diod. 18.12.1), now made more urgent by the current siege of Lamia (Plut. *Eum.* 3.6; Diod. 18.14.4–5; Just. 13.5.14). The impression given by our sources, primarily Plutarch, is that Leonnatus initially had no intention of relieving Antipater. But this was not the only such request he received. He was now in receipt of letters from Alexander's sister Cleopatra proposing marriage, if he would cross to Macedonia (Plut. *Eum.* 3.9). Leonnatus wished to use the marriage as a means of claiming the Macedonian throne. Alexander's mother Olympias was likely behind this proposal of marriage to Leonnatus for she was no supporter of Antipater (Diod. 17.118.1; Plut. *Alex.* 68.3), and appears to have had a great deal of influence with her daughter (Carney 2000: 120, 123–4; 2006: 65–7). Olympias and Antipater had a long-standing hostility (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.6–7), and while her famous son yet lived she had withdrawn from Macedonia and returned to her native Epirus (Diod. 18.58.3; Heckel 2006: 182). While the basis for this hostility is unknown, it is likely that it originated in Olympias' desire for power (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.6–7; Plut. *Alex.* 68.4), in whose pursuit she could be "ruthless and tenacious" (Carney 2006: 1). This was not a woman who chose to sit on the sidelines. As Alexander's mother and as a member of the royal Argead clan she commanded a great deal of respect, which she used to develop loyalists both in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Greek world. While most often, as a woman in the fourth-century Greek world, she had to operate formally through men, her power did not need to

be formalized (Carney 1995: 376–91); however, at one point during the struggles of the Diadochi, she became regent (*prostates*) for Macedonia in her own right (Diod. 18.49.4; cf. Just. 14.6.1),⁵⁹ commanding troops (Diod. 19.35.3, 50.1), appointing generals (Diod. 19.35.4), and administering justice (Diod. 19.11.8–9). Reportedly and likely apocryphally, Antipater on his deathbed had advised, “Never permit a woman [given the context an obvious reference to Olympias] to be *prostates* of the kingdom” (Diod. 19.11.9). Apocryphal or not, the implication is clear that this position was far more than some amorphous status.

From the relative chronology of Plutarch it would appear that the letters from Cleopatra arrived only after Leonnatus’ appearance in his province, since Plutarch (*Eum.* 3.5) indicates that the former royal bodyguard (*somaphylax*) (Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.5) and possible Argead relation, likely also apocryphal (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.12; Suda s.v. *Leonnatus*; Curt. 10.7.8), initially had every intention of aiding Eumenes. The ambitious Leonnatus, and, after the settlement in Babylon, the largely disappointed Leonnatus,⁶⁰ decided to seize the opportunity that now opened before him. In the winter, having first tried and failed to entice Eumenes to join in this adventure (Plut. *Eum.* 3.6–11), he crossed to Macedonia aided by the victory of the Macedonian fleet over its Athenian counterpart attempting to block such intervention. Eumenes fled back to Perdiccas in Babylon.

The naval victory in the Aegean must be the one noted in the inscriptions (*IG* II² 398 and 493) and indirectly in Diodorus (18.15.8–9). With Thrace in turmoil and the bulk of the Athenian fleet patrolling the Hellespont from an anchorage likely at Sestus seeking to block any attempt by the Asian Macedonians to help their colleague besieged in Lamia, a naval presence was essential for a successful crossing. It was then in the winter that a Macedonian naval victory permitted Leonnatus and his forces to cross to Europe. Even though the number and class of Athenian warships operating in the Aegean at the start of the conflict is disputed, being anywhere from 170 to 233 vessels, and the nature of these warships, either majority trireme or quadrireme,⁶¹ it was clearly superior to the force at Antipater’s disposal. Antipater had a fleet of 110 triremes, which was no match for the Athenian navy, and, consequently, it likely joined with the main Macedonian fleet under the command of Cleitus, which presumably had departed for the Hellespont from its base in Cilicia as soon as Antipater’s request for assistance had been sent in preparation for Craterus’ departure scheduled for the following year. Cleitus had accompanied Craterus from Babylon (Just. 12.12.8). His fleet in late 323 numbered 240 vessels (Diod. 18.15.8). Its mobilization was already underway before the beginning of the war in Greece, and its formation may have been at least partially responsible for Craterus’ initial delay in crossing to Macedonia, while Alexander yet lived. Craterus was preparing a fleet either to attack Athens over the Harpalus affair or in preparation for Alexander’s proclaimed western campaign (Diod. 18.4.4; Arr. *Anab.* 7.1.2; Curt. 10.1.17). Too much emphasis has been put on the supposed delay in responding to Antipater’s request for aid.⁶² The likelihood is that what is seen as delay is simply the effect of waiting for a clearer picture of events both in Babylon and in Greece to emerge, the distance

between Cilicia and the Hellespont (approximately 800–900 miles depending on route, or a 50–60-day march), and time for preparation (securing Cilicia and the Hellespont). With Alexander's death and the Babylonian settlement occurring in June, the full knowledge of these events would not have arrived in Cilicia before July. The famous Persian dispatch riders, given that the system described by Herodotus (8.98) was still in operation, would have taken at least ten days to travel from Babylon to Cilicia (Casson 1994: 53). Craterus' departure from Cilicia under the best of circumstances would have been delayed until the following spring.

In the Aegean, the combined Macedonian fleets of Antipater and Cleitus would, then, have been truly superior to the Greek force, as Diodorus indicates (18.15.8). The fleet must either have already defeated the Athenians prior to Leonnatus' arrival in the Hellespont, or shortly thereafter. In any case the warships were available to shepherd that commander and his army across to Europe. Neither Cleitus nor Craterus would have refused to assist a fellow Macedonian. At that time the empire was united under the authority of its kings and regent. Craterus' concern for the empire and his loyalty to the interests of Macedonia are patent. When he did leave for Europe, he left more than sufficient forces to protect the royal treasury and the province of Cilicia (Heckel 1982: 60–2; 2006: 30, 290). These forces readily obeyed the commands of Perdiccas, indicating that Craterus had no interest in securing Cilicia against the regent. Cleitus' force, after ensuring the successful crossing, remained at Abydos awaiting the arrival of Craterus, while Antipater's Macedonian fleet under the command of Micion likely returned to western Aegean waters, where it raided the coast of Attica from a base established near Rhamnous (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1–4). This latter Macedonian force was then defeated by the Athenians in a land battle. The fate of the fleet is not recorded, but it likely suffered at the hands of the Athenian ships that had survived their defeat in the Hellespont.⁶³ What ships did remain probably joined Cleitus. Much of Antipater's fleet had been made up of those ships which had been dispatched from the royal navy to transport and protect a consignment of treasure sent to Macedonia by Alexander (Diod. 18.12.2).

After crossing the Hellespont and entering Macedonia, Leonnatus recruited additional troops (Diod. 18.14.5), likely from those who had been initially left behind by Antipater to guard the country when he himself headed south into Thessaly (Diod. 18.12.2), bringing his relieving force up to 20,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry. He then marched to the relief of Lamia (Diod. 18.14.5). The Greeks immediately gave up the siege, but not the war. Sending all non-combatants to nearby Melitia, they moved quickly to intercept Leonnatus and his army before they could rendezvous with those of Antipater. In the ensuing battle the Thessalian cavalry proved critical again, and Leonnatus' force was defeated and its commander killed (Diod. 18.15.1–4; Just. 13.5.14; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.9). Antipater later brought the defeated troops into his army and retreated from Lamia by ways not easily accessible to cavalry, but he remained in Thessaly (cf. Diod. 18.16.5), where the Greeks under the command of Antiphrilos also remained (Diod. 18.15.5–7).

That summer Craterus crossed the strait, and the balance of power in Europe was quickly altered. Craterus willingly placed himself under Antipater's command

(Diod. 18.16.4–5). Antipater now led 40,000 heavy infantry, 3000 archers, and 5000 cavalry (Diod. 18.16.5); his opponents, 25,000 foot and 3500 cavalry. Diodorus (18.17.1–2) accounts for the lower numbers of Greeks as being the result of their previous victories over the Macedonians. They had come to despise their northern neighbors and many of the allies returned home to attend to unspecified “private matters.”⁶⁴ While these events were unfolding, Cleitus and the Macedonian fleet, having achieved the mission of securing Craterus’ passage to Europe, had moved from the Hellespont out into the Aegean, to seek and destroy the Athenian fleet. The two navies met near the island of Amorgus. The Macedonians then pursued the defeated Athenians into the Malian Gulf, where the *coup de grâce* to the Athenian navy was delivered.⁶⁵ This last naval victory was achieved shortly before the Macedonian land victory at Crannon in August of 322 (Plut. *Dem.* 28.1). Here, as previously, the Thessalians had prevailed over their Macedonian counterparts, but the sheer numbers of the Macedonian infantry proved victorious.

While the Battle of Crannon was not decisive on the battlefield, coming as it did on top of the naval defeats in the Aegean, it effectively brought an end to the war. The allied commanders contemplated waiting for their missing allies to join them to renew the struggle, but in the end decided to treat for terms (Diod. 18.17.6). They had hoped to do so as an alliance (Diod. 18.17.7). When, however, Antipater demanded that each city must sue for peace separately, the commanders withdrew their offer, and the Macedonian commander began the systematic reduction of the Thessalian cities. These now began to seek accommodations individually with Antipater, who granted them easy terms. Encouraged by the treatment of their Thessalian allies, many other states sought and received terms. Soon only the Athenians and the Aetolians remained (Diod. 18.17.7–18.1). The Macedonians now marched on Athens which, given the desertion of most of its allies, its crippled navy (Diod. 18.15.9), and the Macedonian control of the Hellespont in effect blocking access to its grain supply from the Black Sea, as demanded by Antipater, surrendered unconditionally (Diod. 18.18.3). The peace was secured, but it was not a lenient one, despite Diodorus’ claim (18.18.4) that the Macedonians treated the city “humanely.” Athens was garrisoned in early October (Plut. *Phoc.* 28.2; *Dem.* 28.1), and 12,000 lower-class Athenians were encouraged by Antipater to emigrate to a new settlement in Thrace (Diod. 18.18.4–5; Plut. *Phoc.* 28.7).⁶⁶ It is unknown how many actually took up the offer, but it likely was not many (Baynham 2003: 26). The new government was to be an oligarchy. While the dominant Greek political tradition of a sovereign assembly remained as the law-making body, the former Athenian tradition of that assembly being composed of all adult male citizens was now drastically altered. Only those citizens possessing at least 2000 drachmas (one-third of a talent) of property, in total approximately 9000 men (Diod. 18.18.5), would retain voting rights and the ability to hold office; those with less were disenfranchised, only retaining the private rights of citizenship (Diod. 18.18.4). Antipater demanded that the Athenian democratic leaders, principally Demosthenes and Hypereides, be surrendered, but they had already fled the city (Plut. *Phoc.* 26.2, 27.5; *Dem.* 28.2; cf. Paus. 1.8.2). The new Athenian delimited

assembly to assuage Antipater then condemned them to death (Plut. *Dem.* 28.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.13). Demosthenes committed suicide by taking poison (Plut. *Dem.* 29); Hypereides was less fortunate. He was captured, and before being executed had his tongue cut out (Plut. *Dem.* 28.4; *Mor.* 849A–B). The leaders of the new Athenian polity were Phocion and Demades; both were pro-Macedonian in their policies, but where Phocion was described as incorruptible (Plut. *Phoc.* *passim*), Demades was anything but (Worthington 1992: 271; contra Williams 1989: 19–21). The days of Athens as a Greek power were now over, as they were for the city-states in general (so Borza 1999: 59). After settling affairs in Athens, Antipater had proceeded into the Peloponnesus (cf. Plut. *Dem.* 28.4), where he was dealing with other Greek allies of the Athenians in the late war. Following this incursion into the Peloponnesus, Antipater and Craterus returned to Macedonia in the late fall or early winter, where Craterus married Antipater's eldest daughter, Phila (Diod. 18.18.8), and father-in-law and son-in-law now planned a spring offensive against the Aetolians (cf. Diod. 18.24.1).

Notes

- 1 Diodorus (20.20.1) lists his age in 310 as 17; Justin (15.2.3), 15.
- 2 Diod. 18.2.2.; Plut. *Mor.* 337D; Just. 13.2.11; 14.5.2; App. *Syr.* 52; cf. Badian 1964b: 264; Greenwalt 1985.
- 3 Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9; 5.3.6; 6.3.2; 7.25.2; Plut. *Alex.* 23.2; Diod. 17.16.3, 18.1; Just. 7.2.9–12; 9.4.1.
- 4 Dem. 19.192; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.1; 3.16.9; 5.3.6; 6.3.2; 7.25.2; Plut. *Alex.* 23.2; Diod. 16.91.4; 17.16.3, 18.1; Just. 7.2.9–12; 9.4.1; Athen. 13.572D–E.
- 5 *Schol.* Dem. *Olyn.* 1.5; Aristid. *Or.* 38.480; cf. Diod. 18.28.4, 19.52.5; Just. 9.7.11, 11.2.1; Athen. 4.155A; see Hammond 1970: 64–7.
- 6 On the traditional *hetairos* relationship, see Stagakis 1962: 53–67; 1970: 86–102; Heckel 2003: 197–225; Anson 2013b: 19–21.
- 7 The location is confirmed by the presence of a throne (Curt. 10.6.4).
- 8 On the position of chiliarch and its history, in general, see Collins 2001: 259–83; Meeus 2009b: 302–10.
- 9 On Alexander's marriages to Stateira and Parysatis, the daughter of the Persian king Artaxerxes III Ochus, see Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4.
- 10 Arr. *Anab.* 5.25.1–29.1; Diod. 17.93.2–95.2; Curt. 9.2.1–3.19; Plut. *Alex.* 62.
- 11 Curt. 10.2.12–4.3; Arr. *Anab.* 7.8.1–11.9; Diod. 17.109.1–3; Just. 12.11.1–12.12; Plut. *Alex.* 71.2–9.
- 12 On Macedonian royal polygamy, see Carney 2000: 23–7.
- 13 The two conspiracies connected to Alexander's new policies are those of Dimnus/Philotas in 330 (Curt. 6.7.1–11.38; Just. 12.5.2–3; Arr. *Anab.* 3.26.1–27.1, 5; Diod. 17.79.1; Plut. *Alex.* 49.3) and the Pages in 327 (Arr. *Anab.* 4.14.2; Curt. 8.7.1–6).
- 14 J.E. Atkinson (Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 182–3) correctly identifies this council as one of the *hetairoi*, but likely only of “a smaller group of trusted advisers.”
- 15 Bosworth 2002: 35–45; Martin 1983: 161–91.

- 16 Justin (13.1.2–8, 2.1) begins his history of the aftermath of Alexander's death by remarking that while the "barbarians" were grieved at the loss of their king, the Macedonians were delighted at the death of their leader. But, earlier, according to Justin (12.15.3), the Macedonians were in tears over the impending demise of their king. Moreover, he has Meleager in the meeting of the private *principes* nominating Heracles for the office (13.2.6–7). This last is certainly in error, given that in Justin's account (13.2.9–10) Meleager, in the same speech in which he makes the Heracles' suggestion, condemns any offspring from Roxane as unwanted because the child's descent would be from the ranks of the conquered.
- 17 Hammond estimates the number at less than 10,000 (1980: 245), and Bosworth (1988a: 267) suggests maybe as few as 8000, but there appears no good reason to question Curtius' Figure.
- 18 Clearly Arrhidaeus was a functioning human being whose diminished capacity may have been no more than mild to moderate retardation (Plut. *Mor.* 337D; Greenwalt 1985: 75–6; Carney 2001: 78–82).
- 19 The text reads Amissus, but see Heckel 1992: 148 n. 454; 2006: 102.
- 20 Carney (2006: 70) believes that the *prostasia* "was not a specific office but rather an undefined prominence and power." See Anson 1992; 2009; Meeus 2009b, for the arguments for *prostasia* referring to the regency.
- 21 However, see Meeus (2008: 57–8) for the argument that Meleager, Craterus, and Perdiccas were all three to be regents with different areas of responsibility.
- 22 Curtius states that 300 were put to death, but this number appears excessive and is likely a scribal error. Arrian (*Succ.* 1a.4) simply states that the prominent leaders were executed.
- 23 On the time of his birth, Curtius (10.6.9) states that Roxane was six months pregnant when Alexander died, but Justin (13.2.5) claims that she was eight. With no way to decide between Curtius and Justin, the birth could have occurred as early as the final settlement in Babylon or as late as September (Errington 1970: 58).
- 24 M.J. Fontana (1960: 127) argues that the phrase "the kings" originates with Hieronymus and that while Philip (Arrhidaeus) was alive, only he possessed the royal title (1960: 124–7). W. Schwahn (1931: 313; cf. Rosen 1967a: 99) declares that while both were royal, Philip was to rule until Alexander came of age. Only the so-called *Heidelberg Epitome* (FGrH 155 F-1.1) explicitly supports Schwahn's contention.
- 25 While Diodorus 18.23.2 could be taken to mean that Perdiccas had seized the *prostasia* of the kings from the absent Craterus (Rosen 1967a: 104; Heckel 2006: 98–9), this passage clearly refers back to those confusing days in Babylon before the final settlement was reached (see Anson 2004: 58; Meeus 2008: 74). Diodorus 18.2.4 and 18.3.1 are very clear that Perdiccas from the time of the final Babylon settlement held the regency alone. Throughout this period the actual power remained with those physically present in Babylon (Anson 1992: 42–3; Errington 1970: 54, 56–7; Heckel 1988: 20–1).
- 26 These last plans included the building of 1000 warships for a western campaign, construction of a road across North Africa, erection of six grand temples, establishing cities, and transplanting populations (Diod. 18.4.2–5; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.7).
- 27 Justin (13.4.5) states that Craterus was given control of finance.
- 28 On the Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace, see Archibald 1998.
- 29 Justin (13.5.1) states that the war started while Alexander was still alive, but see Heckel and Wheatley (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 123).
- 30 Dmitriev (2004: 379–80) claims that, since Alexander "allow[ed] the Greek cities to use their own laws with respect to those who wished to return," "this decree did not

interfere in the internal affairs of Greek cities and had no direct connection to the Lamian war.” Diodorus (18.8.6–7) makes it clear that both the Athenians and the Aetolians after the issuance of the decree remained at peace only through their fear of Alexander. Diodorus, also, however, makes it clear that the decree was only one aspect of what were believed to be the evils of Macedonian hegemony.

- 31 Harpalus was murdered by Thibron (Diod. 17.108.8.8; 18.19.2; cf. Paus. 2.33.4), who later attacked Cyrene (Diod. 18.19–21; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.16–18).
- 32 Plutarch says 200; Curtius, depending on the manuscript, lists either 120 or 190 ships.
- 33 On this identification and their previous service with Alexander, see Tarn 1948: 151–3; Anson 1981: 117–20; 1988: 131–3; Heckel 1982: 60–2.
- 34 For the distribution, see Diod. 18.3.1–3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.5–8; 1b.2–7; Curt. 10.10.1–4; Just. 13.5, 9–23; cf. App. *Syr.* 52–3.
- 35 Curtius 3.4.1 lists the name of the satrap as Abistamenes. It would appear these are two versions of the same name, rather than two different satraps (see Bosworth 1980b: 189).
- 36 Strabo (12.1.4) states that Cappadocia had been divided into two provinces prior to the Macedonian invasion.
- 37 Justin’s statement (13.4.14–15) that Lycia and Pamphylia went to Nearchus is in error. Nearchus had held these areas until 330 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6; 4.7.2), when they were transferred to the Phrygian satrap; this fact obviously is responsible for Justin’s confusion.
- 38 There is considerable disagreement with regard to Cleomenes’ actual title and powers in Egypt during Alexander’s lifetime. While Cleomenes may have ultimately been appointed satrap by Alexander (Seibert 1969: 43–4, 50), it is more likely that he simply became the de facto satrap of Egypt. Our sources state that Alexander had initially divided authority in Egypt among a number of officials, leaving no one in overall authority (Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.2–7). Cleomenes’ exercise of financial oversight and his apparent control of the grain exports from Egypt, much of which were being shipped to Greek markets ([Arist.] *Oec.* 2.2.33, 1352a16; Dem. 56.7), may have made him seem, from a Greek perspective, the supreme authority in Egypt. Alexander likely saw it as unwise to entrust such a wealthy and easily defensible region to one individual (Heckel 2006: 89).
- 39 On this incident, see Schober 1981: 27–32; Holt 1988: 84–5.
- 40 While numbers of rebels fled the battle without bothering to surrender, those who did surrender were executed. The text is very clear. Additionally, the so-called prologue to Troglus’ Book Thirteen states that all the rebels were killed by Python. The actual number killed, however, was likely about 3000, as suggested by both Schober (1981: 35–6, and n. 2) and Holt (1988: 88–90). There were still thousands of Greeks who remained in the area after the massacre (Holt 1995: 90–1).
- 41 This is true despite the remark attributed to Phocion by Plutarch (*Phoc.* 23.4) that the Athenians were short on the money needed for a long war. His other supposed claims that the Athenians had too few ships and too few men, especially, if rowers were being implied, rings truer.
- 42 Determining rates of inflation from the fifth through the fourth centuries is mostly guesswork, and while there are certain indications that it was high in the very early Hellenistic period, mercenary pay appears to have remained remarkably constant over the years (Loomis 1998: 241–2; Trundle 2004: 91–8). Of course, there were additional forms of remuneration besides regular pay, such as bonuses and plunder (Trundle 2004: 42–4, 166).
- 43 For the date, see Beloch 1967: 139–40; Sealey 1960: 185–6.
- 44 Even though the charge of bribery appears clear, Demosthenes had and has his defenders. See Paus. 2.33.2, Worthington 1985: 229–33.

- 45 On the chronology, see Mitchel 1964: 16. Worthington (1984: 142–4) argues, however, that Diodorus has confused the chronology (certainly always a possibility, see Anson 1986; 2002/3) and that Leosthenes' first approach to the Aetolians came only after the failure of their embassy to Alexander regarding Samos (142). His argument is that secret diplomacy was impossible in Athens (see following note).
- 46 Worthington (1984: 141–2) argues that such "secret" diplomacy was illegal and consequently did not take place. However, Cloché (1921) concluded that the council on occasion did engage in just such diplomacy. The Boulé controlled the access of foreign ambassadors to the assembly and most often selected the envoys who departed to foreign states on behalf of the Athenian government (Briant 1968).
- 47 Alexander once, when wounded, proclaimed that it was blood, not ichor, that flowed from his body (Plut. *Alex.* 28.3).
- 48 Later, Perdicas in the name of the kings would confirm Alexander's decision (Diod. 18.18.9).
- 49 The authenticity of this letter has been challenged (Rosen 1978: 20–5), but see Hamilton (1953: 151–5), who presents a convincing argument for acceptance.
- 50 On the Rhodians' often precarious independence, see van Dessel and Hauben 1977: 316–39; Berthold 1984: 36–199.
- 51 In a later battle, in which the Aetolian contingent was not present, the allied army consisted of 22,000 infantry (Diod. 18.15.2).
- 52 Two battles: Habicht 1997: 39; three battles: Morrison 1987: 93–6; Walek 1924: 28.
- 53 The Parian Marble, however, is not always accurate in its datings: see Anson 1986: 211–12; Bosworth 2002: 226.
- 54 Bosworth insists that Diodorus is not summarizing the entire war at sea, but only the hostilities "in a single area at a single time." He accepts Diodorus' placement of these battles in the Ionian Sea off the Echinades islands, arguing that these involved another theater of the war that to secure Oeniadae from the Aetolians. This is unlikely. Everything points to a naval war in the Aegean. The inscriptions refer to the Hellespont, Antipater was trapped in Thessaly; all the land battles occur in eastern Greece; there is an attack on Attica carried out by Antipater's admiral (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1–4); the major sea battle of the war is at Amorgus in the eastern Aegean.
- 55 On Eumenes' early career, see Anson 2004: 35–49.
- 56 Ariarathes in 322 is found in total control of Cappadocia (Diod. 18.16.1–3; 22.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.11; Just. 13.6.1–3; Plut. *Eum.* 3.4).
- 57 5000 talents amounted to 30 million drachma. If a mercenary was paid at a rate of even 2 drachma per day, 40,000 could be employed for a full year. Cyrus paid in 401 what then appeared an exorbitant sum of 30 drachma (1½ darics) a month (Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.21), which is about twice the average during the Hellenistic age (Griffith 1935: 296–301).
- 58 The treasury at Pasargadae in Media contained 6000 talents (Curt. 5.6.9); that in Cyinda, perhaps 20,000 (cf. Diod. 19.56.5); that in Susa, almost 50,000 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.7); that in Persepolis, 120,000 (Curt. 5.6.9; Diod. 17.71.1). Additionally, there were similar resources in Babylon and Ecbatana.
- 59 See Anson 1992: 40 for this conclusion. Carney (1995: 372–4) and Meeus (2009b: 301–2) believe that she was given the "regal status" (their interpretation of *prostasia* in this context) she had enjoyed during Alexander's lifetime, but the term used is the formal *prostasia*.
- 60 Of course, if the letters from Cleopatra had arrived very early, then the acquisition of Hellespontine Phrygia would have been desired as the springboard for an invasion

of Macedonia. However, the distribution of the satrapies occurred so soon after Alexander's death that it would have been impossible for the offer from Cleopatra to have arrived in time. Under the circumstances in the end it was an unforeseen boon.

- 61 Triremes were three-banked, rowed, warships, while quadriremes, although only two-decked, contained more rowers and were heavier ships. See Morrison (1987), who argues for the lower number of effective ships and the overwhelming majority quadriremes; Ashton (1977) for the higher figure for the total and a predominance of triremes. Diodorus (18.2.2) calls all 110 of Antipater's vessels triremes. The records of the Athenian naval curators, who each year presented an accounting of the ships available for service, show that in 324 there were available more than 400 warships of various sizes (*IG II²* 1629.783–812). However, there were insufficient crews to man all of these (Bosworth 2003: 14–15).
- 62 Including myself (Anson 2004: 74).
- 63 The Athenian navy was apparently even after its defeat still a formidable force, since it was still able to engage the Macedonian fleet under Cleitus later in the eastern Aegean.
- 64 Bosworth (2003: 17) believes that the Aetolians left to defend Oeniadae from a Macedonian naval assault, but see the following note.
- 65 Morrison (1987: 95), while postulating that Diodorus' reference to Echinades islands meant those off the northern coast of the Malian Gulf and not those in the Ionian Sea, inaccurately places this engagement before those in the Hellespont or at Amorgus.
- 66 That Antipater sent these colonists to Thrace should not be seen as evidence that Antipater enjoyed supervisory authority over Lysimachus in Thrace. See Meeus (2008: 65–6) for a refutation of such assumptions. It is also unknown how many actually accepted the offer of new homes in Thrace. Williams' (1985: 112) claim that Athens now lost one-third of its population, followed by Green (2003: 2), seems much inflated (Tritle 1988: 133; Habicht 1997: 44–5).

The Funeral Games Begin

These rebellions by Greeks both in the homeland and in the outer reaches of the empire were but preliminaries for the coming struggles between Alexander's former lieutenants. The empire had been built out of war and would splinter in the wars of Alexander's Successors, the Diadochs. Alexander was reported to have said, when asked to whom did he leave his empire, "To the strongest" (Arr. *Anab.* 7.26.3; Diod. 17.117.4).¹ This is clearly one of those prophecies issued after the events have occurred, but like so many such after-the-fact, apocryphal utterances it summarizes the events that followed Alexander's death quite accurately. Mary Renault titled her novel based on the death of Alexander and its aftermath *Funeral Games* (1981), and, indeed, these years do seem to be a long-drawn-out sacrifice to the memory of the dead conqueror.

While Craterus was moving north to go to the aid of Alexander's old regent in Macedonia, Perdiccas, with the collapse of his proposed Cappadocian campaign, gathered the bulk of the royal army and prepared to march west to install Eumenes in his satrapy. Leonnatus had moved to Macedonia where, instead of kingship, he found death. Antigonus, apparently without explanation, simply failed to provide assistance to Eumenes. The exact reasons for this refusal can only be surmised. It has been suggested that Antigonus may not have accepted the decisions in Babylon as binding (Billows 1990: 57); he may not have wished to help establish a potential rival in Asia Minor, or, he may have believed that Ariarathes' power had been seriously underestimated. Ariarathes in 322 was able to field an army of 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry (Diod. 18.16.2), and in the final analysis it took Perdiccas and the grand army two battles to defeat this force (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.11). This new satrapy could also be seen as limiting the power of Antigonus in Asia Minor,² as it was hoped the association of Cleomenes with Ptolemy would accomplish with respect to the latter in Egypt (Anson 1988a: 476; Billows 1990: 57). During the period from the Battle of Issus and the Persian attempt to retake Asia Minor in 333 to Alexander's death in 323, Antigonus and Ariarathes maintained at least a *de facto* peace. There is no record of open hostilities between them, and the two may have simply agreed to leave one another alone. The creation

of Eumenes' satrapy would certainly upset what had been for ten years the status quo in Asia Minor. It is still remarkable that Antigonus would not have at least put in the semblance of an appearance. Perdiccas represented the legitimate authority as the regent for the kings, and had control of the royal army. It would have taken omniscience to know that there would be in the future a breach between Antipater and Perdiccas that would save the reluctant satrap. It may simply be the case that Antigonus' pride was hurt (Billows 1990: 56–8). He had not been consulted in any of the major decisions reached in Babylon. He was simply to accept the decisions and implement orders from Babylon. One of the great testimonies to Alexander's ability as a leader was his skill in keeping control of what was an elite corps of aristocrats whose class prior to Philip II had most often controlled Macedonia. It is very likely that without Alexander many of these individuals began dreaming of that previous age.

Back in Babylon, Eumenes was made a member of Perdiccas' council (Plut. *Eum.* 3.12), and with the regent he returned to Asia Minor in the summer of 322.³ In Cappadocia, Ariarathes waited with his considerable forces; many of these troops were mercenaries (Diod. 18.16.2), perhaps Greeks, who had served Darius and who had escaped from the defeat at Issus (cf. Curt. 4.1.34–5). The presence of these mercenaries certainly made the task more difficult than Perdiccas had imagined, for it took two battles before the Cappadocian king was defeated (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.11).⁴ Ariarathes was captured and, along with numbers of his relatives, tortured, and executed (Diod. 18.16.3; App. *Mith.* 2.8).⁵ After the second victory Neoptolemus, a former hypaspist commander, was dispatched with part of the grand army to pursue the eastward-escaping Cappadocians and to take charge of his province of western Armenia (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4.1).⁶

After Cappadocia was subjugated, Eumenes was given full authority by the regent to appoint his friends (*philoî*) to positions of authority in the cities, as judges, garrison commanders, and treasurers (Plut. *Eum.* 3.14). The administration of the satrapies under the Diadochs continued many of the practices of Persian administration which had likewise been followed in the main by Alexander (Briant 1972: 44–5; 2002: 66–7). Alexander often divided responsibilities within the satrapy between the administrative office of satrap, garrison commanders, and treasurers. An example of Alexander's policy is seen in the case of Lydia. Alexander assigned the satrapy to Asander, while Pausanias was left in charge of the citadel of the capital Sardis with a garrison, and Nicias was to supervise the finances and the collection of tribute (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.7–8). While Alexander may have made these distinctions more pronounced than had his Achaemenid predecessors, it appears likely that the Persians had also practiced such separation of responsibilities, although, perhaps, with the satrap exercising greater supervisory authority (Anson 2013b: 142–3). Perdiccas apparently retained many of these separate jurisdictions established by Alexander. For example, Xenophilus was appointed commander of the citadel of Susa by Alexander (Curt. 5.2.16), and he was still in command of the citadel in 316 (Diod. 19.17.3). However, as in the case of Eumenes, Perdiccas may also have given broad authority to the satraps currently being appointed to regions outside of

Alexander's conquests, or to those who were to supervise areas that had rebelled and were now being reacquired. Eumenes was left entirely in charge of his satrapy, while Perdikkas and the royal army proceeded to Cilicia.

It would have been fall before Perdikkas left Cappadocia for Cilicia (Plut. *Eum.* 3.14–4.1; Diod. 18.22.1). While in Cilicia Perdikkas secured the allegiance of Alexander's former infantry guard, the 3000 hypaspists/argyraspids. These troops had been separated by Alexander from the main force at Opis and sent west with Craterus in 324. When Craterus departed Cilicia to join Antipater in Macedonia (Diod. 18.16.4), he had left these troops behind along with others to maintain order and to guard the treasury at Cyinda.⁷ Here, Perdikkas spent the winter of 322/1.⁸ In winter quarters, Perdikkas and his advisors began to make plans for the coming year. The regent's presence in Cilicia gave him access to the royal treasury and a prosperous land in which to refresh his troops (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.22). At this time Perdikkas' intentions were to secure unquestioned control of Asia Minor for the empire. Neoptolemus was campaigning in Armenia, and the regent planned to attack the rebels in Pisidia in the spring. While Perdikkas certainly wished to achieve greater cohesion in the empire, there is no evidence that he contemplated challenging Ptolemy in Egypt or Antipater in Europe at this time. Indeed, Perdikkas demonstrated no apparent interest in the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. If he had expected to invade Macedonia or to be attacked from Europe, he would have paid closer attention to this province. Since the departure of Leonnatus for Macedonia, there had not been a satrap in this region. At this point in time there was no movement to break up the empire or to divide it into a European part and a non-European one (Meeus 2008: 80–1).

Perdikkas, as part of his general campaign in Asia Minor, in the spring moved to secure Pisidia, where two cities continued to resist Macedonian authority, those of the Larandians and of the Isaurians (Diod. 18.22.1). These people had murdered the Cilician satrap Balacrus sometime late in Alexander's reign (Diod. 18.22.1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.2). There were, indeed, many regions in Asia Minor that had resisted Macedonian conquest and that remained independent during the long wars among Alexander's Successors. By 302, much of the area along the southern Black Sea coast had become the kingdom of Pontus under Mithridates Ktistes, a descendant of a noble Persian family (Diod. 20.111.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 4; App. *Mith.* 9; McGing 1986: 15). Armenia remained under the control of the family of Orontes, another prominent Persian (Heckel 2006: 185), in spite of Neoptolemus' activities in the region. Whatever Neoptolemus' authority was and however much of the region was ostensibly under his control, this authority ended with Neoptolemus' death in 320. Zipoetes maintained his power in Bithynia also throughout this period, even though he was likely forced to enter into an alliance with Antigonus and surrender hostages during the campaign of Antigonus' nephew, Polemaeus,⁹ in 314 (Diod. 19.60.3). His kingdom remained independent for two centuries (Memn. *FGrH* 434 F-1 12.4–5; Billows 1990: 440–2). Cappadocia, while made part of the Macedonian sphere in 322 after the defeat of Ariarathes and the installation of Eumenes as satrap, would also later

emerge as another independent principality under a descendant also named Ariarathes in the mid-third century BC (Diod. 31.19.5).¹⁰

As noted, Neoptolemus had been sent to western Armenia with a sizable force of Macedonians immediately after the defeat of Ariarathes (Plut. *Eum.* 4; cf. Diod. 18.29.4). The pacification of this region was critical to the security of Cappadocia, controlling as it did the main lines of communication, including the Royal Road, the great Persian highway connecting Persepolis and Susa in the east to Sardis in Lydia (Cook 1983: 26, 108). While the sources report Mithrenes, a Persian nobleman, was appointed satrap of Armenia by Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.5; Diod. 17.64.6; Curt. 5.1.44; Str. 11.14.15), and Curtius (6.3.3) reports that Armenia was acquired by the Macedonians, Justin (38.7) has a later ruler of the area proclaim in a speech that Armenia was never conquered by the Macedonians. Since Orontes, the holder of that office under Darius III (Bosworth 1980b: 315; Heckel 2006: 185), is later found in lawful possession of Armenia in 316 BC (Diod. 19.23.3), and Mithrenes disappears from the historical record, it is possible that Mithrenes was never able to take possession (Anson 1990: 125–6). He may have died in the attempt. Indeed, it appears that at some point after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela in 331, Orontes made his submission to the Macedonian king, who later reassigned him to Greater Armenia (Bosworth 1980b: 315; Anson 1990: 125–6). Western Armenia in all probability remained outside of both Orontes' and Macedonian control (see Anson 1990: 127), and may even have been annexed by Ariarathes.

Whatever the source of the problems, Neoptolemus' assigned task was a formidable one. In general, campaigning in Armenia could be brutal (Xen. *Anab.* 4.3–5; Plut. *Luc.* 32; Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.5–6), especially for an army deficient in cavalry, which apparently was the case with Neoptolemus' force (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4.3–4). Armenia had long been known for its fine horses and had supplied the Persians with 20,000 foals each year (Str. 11.13.7, 14.9; Xen. *Anab.* 4.5.24, 35–6). It is also apparent that Orontes, the satrap of Greater Armenia, provided no material aid to Neoptolemus. Indeed, Orontes later maintained a remarkable neutrality in the wars that were soon to arise among Alexander's former commanders (Heckel 2006: 185).

Perdiccas assigned Eumenes the task of rescuing the Armenian campaign, which had stalled in part due to the insubordination of the Macedonian forces under Neoptolemus' command (Plut. *Eum.* 4.1–3). Plutarch's statements suggest that, given the difficulty of the campaign, the troops had ceased to follow the orders of their commander and that individual had proven powerless to persuade them. Since Perdiccas did not remove Neoptolemus from Armenia and, indeed, later even put a degree of trust in him (cf. Diod. 18.29.2), this was not a case of Neoptolemus' insubordination, but that of his Macedonians. Many of these troops had been responsible for the troubles in Babylon over the succession. They were not docile new recruits, but hard-bitten veterans (see Roisman 2012). As a result of Neoptolemus' difficulties in Armenia, Perdiccas, while leaving him in his position there, subsequently did not place him in any other independent commands. He had proven to be an ineffective leader.

At first, Eumenes made little headway with either the troops or their commander (Plut. *Eum.* 4.3); indeed, it was probably during this operation that Neoptolemus uttered the statement in reference to Eumenes' long service in charge of the Macedonian chancellery (Anson 2004: 36–46), found in Plutarch (*Eum.* 1.6), that while he, Neoptolemus, “followed Alexander with shield and spear, Eumenes had followed the king with pen and writing tablet.” The Cardian dealt with the situation by raising a force of 6300 Cappadocian cavalry through the use of outright gifts and the promise of immunity from taxation (Plut. *Eum.* 4.3–4). Darius had used Cappadocian cavalry against Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.5, 11.7; Curt. 4.12.12), and Ariarathes had possessed 15,000 cavalry in 322 (Diod. 18.16.2). Eumenes' concessions to the Cappadocians and his confidence in their military ability secured for him a very loyal province. At the time of his death, even though Eumenes had not been in the area for almost three years, his mother, wife, and children were still resident in Cappadocia (Nep. *Eum.* 13.4). The loyalty of the native populations to those of Alexander's Successors who treated them with favor could be great, as was the case later with the Pisidians and Perdiccas' brother Alcetas (Diod. 18.46.2–47.3). Accommodating local elites was a policy followed by Alexander the Great himself to great effect (see Anson 2013b: 151–2). The addition of Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry “emboldened the Macedonians” (Plut. *Eum.* 4.4), and rekindled their enthusiasm for the campaign. There is no further word of difficulties in Armenia, and Perdiccas left Neoptolemus in that command (cf. Diod. 18.29.2; Plut. *Eum.* 5.2).

Perdiccas' campaign in Pisidia was much less taxing than the one in Cappadocia. Both recalcitrant cities fell after short and brutal struggles (Diod 18.22.2–7). The Isaurians in particular resisted tenaciously, and when such resistance was on the verge of being overcome, they set their city on fire and threw themselves into the flames. It is unclear what was the status of Pisidia after these cities were captured, but it would appear that Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother, was made general or satrap of the region. This commander is later found in Pisidia (Diod. 18.44.1).

With Armenia and Pisidia now brought under the control of the regent, Perdiccas remained in Pisidia and there took up the question of Antigonos. The latter had ignored the order from the kings and their regent to conduct Eumenes to his satrapy in 323. While insubordination was the likely charge, the actual charges are never specified. Diodorus (18.23.4) only states that the charges were “false and unjust”; Photius' Epitome of Arrian (*Succ.* 1a.20) gives no specifics or characterizations. Moreover, these allegations come approximately a year and a half after the incident involving Eumenes. Still Antigonos' only known offense was his lack of response to this call to help the Cardian acquire his satrapy (Briant 1973b: 155–6). It has been claimed that Antigonos was not charged with refusing to help Eumenes, but rather refusing to aid Antipater during the Lamian War (Fontana 1960: 328–9). However, no source indicates that Antigonos was ever asked to send aid to Europe. Diodorus (18.23.2–4) states that the “false and unjust” charges were the result of Antigonos discovering Perdiccas' ambition to seize the throne, but it is unlikely that this ambition had yet manifested itself. If Diodorus'

claim were true, it is difficult to explain Perdikkas' almost casual pursuit of Antigonos, if he were trying to silence him. It is likely that Diodorus through his radical abridging of his source has confused the initial call to Antigonos to answer charges with the later report attributing just such ambitions to Perdikkas. What is apparent is that Antigonos had established in the long years away from court in Phrygia, a semi-independent principality, controlling roughly two-thirds of Macedonian-held Asia Minor (Billows 1990: 46), and had established ties with many of his Persian and native neighbors (Anson 1988a: 471–7). The insubordination of such a powerful individual threatened the entire Babylonian settlement and the new government.

The Phrygian satrap was summoned to answer charges formally before King Philip and his council (cf. *Arr. Succ.* 1a.20; *Diod.* 18.23.4). The invitation was issued probably in the late spring of 321. Perdikkas' purpose was to force Antigonos to flee, since Antigonos would be difficult to move against militarily (Anson 1988a: 471–7). The regent was in no hurry. In the final analysis, he hoped to accomplish his purpose without having to invade Phrygia. Consequently, Antigonos was given time in which to respond (cf. *Diod.* 18.23.4) in the hope that the Phrygian satrap would flee. The regent's campaign in Pisidia must have alarmed Antigonos, since the main military road from the coast passed through Pisidia and continued to Celaenae, the Phrygian capital. Also, western Pisidia had been ostensibly under Antigonos' authority as well (Billows 1990: 46).

Also in the spring of 321, one of Antipater's daughters, Nicaea, accompanied by her brother Iolaus, arrived in Perdikkas' camp (*Arr. Succ.* 1a.21; *Diod.* 18.23.1; *Just.* 13.6.6). Perdikkas had requested her hand in marriage shortly after the settlement was reached in Babylon, and likely had sent her brother, Iolaus, one of Alexander's former pages, to Macedonia with the request (*Arr. Succ.* 1a.21). Antipater's preoccupation with the Lamian War had delayed his response. There is no evidence that the delay resulted from Antipater's dissatisfaction with the settlement reached in Babylon (Errington 1970: 60). There were ample concerns to keep Antipater occupied until at least the conclusion of the Lamian War, nor is there any evidence of such dissatisfaction. Antipater, despite his assigned joint command with Craterus (*Arr. Succ.* 1a.7), should have been pleased. After all, Alexander had ordered Craterus to replace him in Macedonia (*Arr. Anab.* 7.12.4), and those orders had been rescinded in Babylon (*Diod.* 18.4.1). Indeed, as part of Antipater's strategy for the new era without Alexander, he wished to create alliances with various Diadochs through marriages to his daughters: Phila, Nicaea, Eurydice, and one whose name is unknown. Phila married Craterus after the completion of the war in Greece (*Diod.* 18.18.7), and Eurydice at some point married Ptolemy (*Paus.* 1.6.8). Antipater and Craterus had returned to Macedonia late in the winter of 322/21, and had begun to make plans of their own. A full-scale invasion of Aetolia was to begin in the spring (*Diod.* 18.24.1–25.2). Further, it was decided that Craterus would eventually return to Asia (*Diod.* 18.18.7). Nowhere is it made clear in what capacity Craterus was to be accommodated in Asia. However, Hellespontine Phrygia had a vacancy; Antigonos had proven troublesome; later,

so would Menander in Lydia. Satraps were appointed by the authority of the king or his regent and were subject to reassignment, theoretically at any time. Consequently, there is no need to see Craterus' wish to return to Asia as an assault on the authority of Perdiccas (as Bosworth 1993: 427). He may even have been negotiating for some supervisory authority over Asia Minor. Perdiccas had moved west from Babylon because of the failure of Leonnatus and Antigonos to support Eumenes. At this time, the two Macedonians appeared determined to reach a peaceful understanding with the regent (Errington 1970: 61–2). Their shock shown later when Perdiccas' plans to invade Macedonia and seize the kingship became known (cf. Diod. 18.23.3) certainly suggests that there was no thought of hostility for the present or even in the near future on the part of Antipater and Craterus.

Antipater certainly had been scrupulously correct in his dealings with the regent. Shortly after the surrender of Athens at the close of the Lamian War, he had referred the question of Athenian possession of Samos to the kings (Diod. 18.18.6), i.e. to Perdiccas. The Samian exiles were subsequently restored and the island freed on "Perdiccas' order" (Diod. 18.18.9). Antipater had been, however, in communication with Ptolemy and these communications had led to an "understanding" (Diod. 18.14.2; cf. 18.25.4), and, perhaps, as noted, a marriage. Antipater was facing the threat from the southern Greek world and, moreover, had not been part of the negotiations and settlement made in Babylon. All of these arrangements with the other Diadochs may simply have been an attempt to join in a personal way the new order. Perdiccas, however, was himself clearly preparing for a time when relations with Antipater might sour. Perhaps, as early as in 322 (Errington 1970: 62–3), the regent was in contact with the Aetolians (Diod. 18.38.1) and in receipt of letters from the Athenian leader Demades which invited his intervention in Europe (Diod. 18.48.2). None of these communications were revealed to Antipater. Diodorus (18.25.4) by his sequencing of events suggests that Ptolemy may also have been the object of some unspecified plot at this early date, but it is more likely our author has confused his chronology and that this plotting refers to a later time (Diod. 18.26.1–2, 28.2–29.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.25). Whatever the purpose of these various communications among the Diadochs, the situation was to be dramatically changed by subsequent events.

Concurrent with Nicaea's arrival, Alexander's sister, Cleopatra, appeared offering herself in marriage to the regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.21; Diod. 18.23.1; Just. 13.6.4). This was likely more than just a coincidence. Leonnatus had received the offer of alliance and a daughter in marriage from Antipater, apparently just before the arrival of the matrimonial offer from Alexander's sister (Diod. 18.12.1).¹¹ Of the regent's councilors, Eumenes was the most vocal supporter of the marriage to Cleopatra (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.21). Many reasons could and have been given for Eumenes' endorsement of this marriage. It was in Eumenes' interest to discourage an alliance between his new patron and his old enemy Antipater. While the cause of this enmity is unstated, it likely stems from Eumenes' long-standing friendship with Olympias (Diod. 18.58.2–3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13.1; Nep. *Eum.* 6.3) and is related to her ongoing feud with Antipater. It is likely that the instigation for the Cleopatra

marriage proposal here again came from Olympias (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.21; cf. Just. 13.6.4). It has been suggested that Eumenes was behind Cleopatra's appearance (Errington 1970: 63). Even though Justin (13.6.4) implies that Perdiccas himself was responsible for Cleopatra's presence; this seems unlikely, given the description of the later debate over the two potential spouses. The presence of two possible marriage partners for the regent brought into the open a rift which had developed within the ranks of Perdiccas' councilors. This division may also be seen in the duplicitous dealings of the regent with Antipater, while acknowledging his authority yet secretly communicating with the Aetolians and the Athenian Demades. Eumenes supported the union with the royal family; the regent's brother Alcetas supported the marriage with Nicaea and thereby the alliance and the status quo with Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.21). Alcetas' faction believed that Perdiccas, in control of the royal army, the royal treasuries, and the kings, could wait on events. Antipater was old and might not live many more years. Leaving Antipater independent in Europe during his lifetime would then be the wisest thing to do, especially since there were others who were in the process of asserting their independence from the authority of the regent. Antigonus had not responded to the order to aid Eumenes, and more importantly Ptolemy was acting with a great degree of independence in Egypt. Moreover, a friendly relationship with Antipater would facilitate the acquisition of fresh recruits for the royal army from Macedonia. In fact, Justin (13.6.6) presents this as the motivation for Perdiccas' seeking the alliance in the first place.

Eumenes and unnamed others, however, argued that the dual monarchy was a farce, and that Perdiccas needed to be transitioning to rule in his own right. The marriage to Cleopatra would tie him to the Argead family and strengthen his position with Alexander's veterans. In the end, as before in Babylon when the kingship was offered to him by Aristonous, Perdiccas took the conservative course and followed the advice of his brother. However, while Perdiccas did marry Nicaea (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.21, 26; Diod. 18.23.3),¹² Cleopatra did not return to Europe but remained in Asia Minor, settling in Sardis (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.26). It is curious that Eumenes and Alcetas are the respective spokesmen for these two positions. There were associated with Perdiccas many commanders with more prominence, such as Seleucus, who served as the regent's military second-in-command (Just. 13.4.17; Mehl 1986: 23–4; Heckel 2006: 247), Antigenes, the commander of the argyraspids (Heckel 2006: 30), and Pithon, the satrap of Media and the commander of the mission against the rebellious eastern Greeks (Diod. 18.36.5). These commanders are omitted from our sources' accounts of the debate entirely. Of course, Alcetas was the regent's brother, but the prominence of Eumenes is curious. Obviously, Perdiccas had confidence in his loyalty and ability, and he had served as an officer in the elite companion cavalry that was under Perdiccas' overall command (Plut. *Eum.* 1.5; Nep. *Eum.* 1.6). They then did have a close association near the end of Alexander's reign. But his preference for the Cardian may reflect his lack of the same with respect to his more experienced and prestigious supposed subordinates. These other commanders did later prove to be disloyal, and, perhaps, there was some inkling of this already.

The arguments for the marriage to Cleopatra were strengthened by later events. Sometime after Perdiccas' union with Nicaea, Cynnane, a daughter of Philip II by Audata, one of his many wives, and the widow of Amyntas Perdicca, Philip II's nephew and Alexander's cousin, arrived in Asia demanding that her own daughter Adea be married to King Philip (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.22; Polyae. 8.60; cf. Diod. 19.52.5). Cynnane had raised a troop of her own and had forced her way out of Macedonia despite Antipater's attempt to block her departure (Polyae. 8.60). Perdiccas sent Alcetas north to intercept her. When her determination proved unshakeable, Cynnane was murdered on Alcetas' command (Diod. 19.52.5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.22–3; cf. Polyae. 8.60), but probably on orders from his brother (Errington 1970: 64; Anson 2004: 88 n. 43). The result was a riot by the royal army which forced Perdiccas to agree to the marriage. Adea now changed her name to Eurydice (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.23; Polyae. 8.60; Diod. 19.52.5). It has been suggested that Eurydice was a royal name taken at the time of a royal marriage by the new bride (Heckel 1978; cf. Bosworth 1980b: 282).¹³ It certainly was a common name of Macedonian royal women. In the case of Adea, her name may have been Illyrian; changing it to that of the mother of Alexander the Great's father, Philip II, would have emphasized her Argead connection and also followed her husband's change of name from Arrhidaeus to Philip, with both thus associating themselves with the monarch who had initially brought Macedonia to prominence (Badian 1982: 101).

The Cynnane episode was a major turning point for Perdiccas and his allies. It was now very clear to all that the regent's control of the army was not as he had supposed. His authority over the troops, gained in hard campaigning in Cappadocia and Pisidia, was now undermined. Certainly Adea/Eurydice compromised Perdiccas' control over King Philip. The incident with Cynnane demonstrated that the marriage to Cleopatra, despite the risks involved, was essential if the empire was to remain intact (cf. Just. 13.6.4).¹⁴ Eumenes, who had likely remained in contact with Cleopatra (Anson 2004: 89 n. 45), was ordered secretly to reopen negotiations concerning a marriage (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.26). Plans were now made for an invasion of Macedonia (Diod. 18.23.3, 25.3, 6). These plans would involve the very body of the dead Alexander. Initially, as decided by the *principes* in Babylon in the same meeting that had seen the distribution of the satrapies, likely in response to Alexander's own wishes, the former king's corpse was to journey to Siwah for final internment (Diod. 18.3.5; cf. 18.28.3), but Perdiccas now determined to accompany the dead king to Macedonia. After two years of construction, Alexander's ornate funeral carriage had begun its journey west, led by the Macedonian nobleman Arrhidaeus, leaving Babylon in early September 321 (Diod. 18.3.5, 28.2; Anson 1986: 212–17).¹⁵ The carriage had taken “almost exactly two years to complete” (Diod. 18.28.2). It was drawn by sixty-four mules, all outfitted with gilded crowns and jewel-studded yokes (Diod. 18.27.5). Therefore, while the carriage was completed by June of 321, it is unlikely that it began its journey until late August at the earliest, given that the hottest months of the year in Mesopotamia are July and August with a daylight mean of more than 100 °F. A departure in late

August, with the travel time being approximately three months, would place the carriage's arrival in the Syria in the winter of 321/20 (Anson 1986: 212–13).

The importance of the dead conqueror's body was that all things associated with Alexander were sources of authority with the Macedonian veterans. In 318, Eumenes and his forces formally worshiped the dead king (Diod. 18.60.5–61.3; Plut. *Eum.* 13.5–8; Polyae. 4.8.2). The propaganda value of returning Alexander's body to his homeland for Perdiccas, then, is obvious, although the assumption that possession of the body conferred legitimacy of rule is to give the corpse too much power.¹⁶ However, to arrive in Macedonia conveying the dead king, in the company of the kings, as Cleopatra's husband, and likely met by Alexander's mother, would have made Perdiccas invincible. With this change in policy, Perdiccas now likely responded to the earlier overtures from the Aetolians and the Athenian leader Demades (Diod. 18.48.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.14). It was at this time also that Eumenes began his ascendancy to the position of chief advisor to the regent. Eumenes' arguments for the inevitability of hostilities with Antipater and the importance of the marriage to Cleopatra now seemed proven.

In the winter of 321/20, Antigonus fled to Europe (Diod. 18.25.3–5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.24; [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-10, 11), where he found Antipater and Craterus in the midst of a winter campaign in Aetolia (Diod. 18.25.1–3). Since being initially summoned, Antigonus had given every indication that he meant to defend himself against the charges, but all the while he clandestinely had planned his flight to Europe (Diod. 18.23.3–4). Additionally, he had prepared for his eventual return to Asia by cementing his ties with Menander, the satrap in Lydia, and possibly with Asander in Caria (Heckel 2006: 57). While it has been argued that Asander and Menander remained loyal to Perdiccas until the successful crossing to Asia by Antipater and Craterus (Briant 1989: 189, 208, cf. 169),¹⁷ there is evidence which suggests that Menander, at least, was deeply involved with Antigonus in the plot to draw Antipater and Craterus to Asia. Diodorus (18.23.3) indicates that Antigonus was well informed of the intrigues involving Cleopatra and Perdiccas. Menander as satrap of Lydia was ideally situated to know of the activities involving Cleopatra, since she was then resident in Sardis. Moreover, when Antigonus returned to Asia early in 320 with but 3000 troops, both Asander and Menander joined him without hesitation (Arrian *Succ.* 25.1–2, 26). Perhaps, the two satraps also feared Perdiccas' "ambitions" (cf. Diod. 18.23.3; Hauben 1977: 92–3), or were simply reacting to Perdiccas' often heavy-handed administration. In addition to his actions against Antigonus, Menander, while remaining in command of the military forces in Lydia, was apparently made subservient to the authority of Cleopatra (Arr. *Succ.* 25.2).

A number of scholars have argued that Perdiccas was not personally ambitious; everything he did was to preserve the unity of the empire (Vezin 1907: 35–6; Fontana 1960: 64–5).¹⁸ Perdiccas' marriage to Cleopatra was, then, necessary to increase the regent's prestige and enable him to resist the forces of disintegration. It would appear difficult to defend all of the regent's actions on this basis, especially those against members of the royal family. He had countenanced Roxane's murder

of Stateira, one of Alexander's Persian wives (Plut. *Alex.* 77.6), and the murder of Cynnane. While it has been claimed that by these actions Perdiccas only wanted to prevent the emergence of a new dynasty from the descendants of Philip challenging Alexander's son, Alexander IV (Rathmann 2005b: 65), this argument does not explain his double-dealing with Antipater. While it is clear that Ptolemy was disloyal to the central government, having murdered Cleomenes, who had been appointed in Babylon as his second-in-command (Paus. 1.6.3), soon after his arrival in Egypt, and annexing the Greek city of Cyrene in Libya without authorization (Diod. 18.19–21), Antipater was not. As indicated earlier, Antipater deferred to the regent. Perdiccas' treacherous dealings with the Aetolians and with Demades did not serve the interests of centralization, only Perdiccas' personal ambitions. "Perdikkas' career is an unfortunate tale of lofty ideals combined with excessive ambition and political myopia" (Heckel 1992: 151).

Upon his arrival in Macedonia, Antigonus warned Antipater of Perdiccas' designs (Diod. 18.25.3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.24). He stated that Perdiccas would soon divorce Nicaea and marry Cleopatra as a preliminary to proclaiming himself king and invading Macedonia. Whatever proof Antigonus supplied, it was convincing. Antipater and Craterus immediately made peace with the Aetolians and began to prepare for an invasion of Asia (Diod. 18.25.3–5). It is difficult to believe that anything but the most damning evidence would have brought about this abrupt reversal of policy. Even though Antigonus and Antipater were formally "friends," Antigonus had supplied no help to Antipater in the Lamian War, and later when Antipater and Craterus did invade Asia they were prepared to acknowledge, much to the detriment of the Phrygian satrap, Eumenes' control of Asia Minor in return for an alliance (Plut. *Eum.* 5.6). The *philoí*, friends, were the descendants of the Macedonian *hetairoi*, or king's companions, described in the Introduction. This concept of formal friendship was retained in two relationships: the relationship of a superior with his advisors and lieutenants, and that among relative equals. In the first circumstance, while maintaining a sense of camaraderie, subordinates were clearly under the authority of their superior (Le Bohec 1985; Billows 1990: 281–2). In the second, these so-called friendships were little more than ritualized relationships in which those so joined were to render one another reciprocal services. In much the way in-laws through marriage are joined by the formal ritual of marriage, formal friendship established a relationship that bound people together, but as in such familial relations, they could easily break down into conflict and dispute (Herman 1987: 10–18, 29). Eumenes and Antigonus in 319 "renewed their friendship," with outward and physical signs of affection (Diod. 18.41.6; Plut. *Eum.* 10.5). Yet Eumenes required that Antigonus' nephew Polemaeus be given up as a hostage to ensure Eumenes' safe return from this conference with "his old friend" (Plut. *Eum.* 10.5). The cause of the break in the relations between Antipater and Perdiccas, then, had little to do with Antipater's trust in his so-called friendship with the Phrygian satrap. Antigonus must have brought to Macedonia irrefutable evidence of Perdiccas' plans to seize the monarchy. The source may well have been someone in Cleopatra's immediate circle who passed that evidence through the

conduit of Menander to Antigonus (Anson 2004: 92–3). The First War of the Successors was now about to commence.

Before proceeding to the narrative of these events, it is necessary to speak briefly about the chronology of these early years. Among the many difficulties in reconstructing the ancient past is arriving at a timeline of events. Ancients used many different chronological systems, when they even deigned to provide a clear chronological framework. Years in different places and at different periods began at different starting points, were commonly based on phases of the moon, and years were generally identified by reference to the name of some eponymous official or officials, or to specific regnal years. Our major narrative source for the period of the Diadochi down to the preliminaries to the Battle of Ipsus in 301, Diodorus, attempted to place his history within a chronological framework. His effort is then to be praised, however this praise needs to be severely muted. Years in Diodorus' narrative are indicated simultaneously by Athenian archon years, Roman consulships, and Olympiads. None of these had the same beginning or ending dates, so when Diodorus states that a year occurred when "Polemon was archon, and in Rome the consuls were Lucius Papirius ... and Gaius Iunius; and in the year the Olympic Games were celebrated for the one hundred and seven-teenth time" (Diod. 19.77.1), he is in actuality claiming to start the year in July of 312 (Polemon's date), or on the Ides of March of 313 (the start of the Roman year prior to 153 BC), or around the time of the summer solstice, the start of the Olympic Games in 312. Diodorus, moreover, frequently starts the year, despite his dating system, with the start of the campaigning year, typically in the spring.¹⁹ Dating by campaigning years and by seasons was apparently the system used by Hieronymus, Diodorus' major source for these years (Smith 1961: 283–90; Anson 1986: 209). For example, "when Democleides was archon at Athens," Antigonus moved from his winter quarters in Mesopotamia. It is clear from the narrative that he did not wait until the summer to leave his camp. Unfortunately, the other surviving narrative sources for these years are not especially helpful for chronology. While both Justin's abridgment of Pompeius Trogus and Photius' epitome of Arrian's *History of the Successors* tend to narrate events in a sequential fashion, neither presents a systematic chronology; nor for these years are Plutarch's or Nepos' relevant biographies more than occasionally useful chronologically.

For the years following Alexander's death to events in 309 BC, there are now three different chronological schemes adopted by modern historians. One, the so-called "Low Chronology,"²⁰ which dates most events one year later than the "High Chronology,"²¹ and a third, hybrid, system, that combines the aspects of each of the two preceding arrangements (Stylianou 1994: 71–84; Boiy 2007b). The determination of the timing of the events described in this chapter is hindered by the absence in Diodorus' often flawed chronology of any reference to two crucial years: 321/20 and 320/19. For these years, he provides none of his usual references: no archon years, consular years, Olympic years. However, unanimity concerning the sequence of events from Alexander's death down to the conclusion of the First Diadoch War is beginning to appear (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 163). There are certain

indications that for the years of the first conflict of the Successors the “Low Chronology” is the correct framework. Diodorus (18.36.7) notes that Perdiccas served as regent for three years before his death during his invasion of Egypt. Since Alexander the Great died on June 11, 323 (Depuydt 1997), a determination based on a surviving Babylonian cuneiform tablet, with the period of strife which followed his death lasting a week (Curt. 10.10.9; Bosworth 2002: 55), this would place Perdiccas’ death in the late spring or early summer of 320. This exact chronological reference to the length of Perdiccas’ regency, as well as the reference to the “almost exactly two years” associated with the building of Alexander’s funeral carriage, in all likelihood comes from Diodorus’ source (Anson 1986: 209–11), which for his Books 18–20 is believed to be Hieronymus of Cardia. Moreover, the date is confirmed by the Parian Marble, which places Perdiccas’ death in the Athenian archon year 321/20 (*FGrH* 239 B F-11). The Athenian year began in July. Additionally, the *Babylonian Chronicle of the Diadochs* (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 23–6),²² a fragmentary chronological listing of events, indicates that Perdiccas died early in the First Diadoch War, during the fourth year of the reign of Philip III, or 320/19. The Babylonian year began with the first new moon after the vernal equinox. The *Chronicle* (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 23) lists a battle between the king and the satrap of Egypt prior to the year 319/18, in the month of Aiaru, or Ajar, (Smith 1924: 140, 142, lines 3–4, 6; Grayson 1975: 115–16, lines 4–7; Del Monte 1997: 183, line 6), or May/June (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 34, 36).²³ Since there is only one time when King Philip III was in Egypt, the reference clearly is describing Perdiccas’ invasion of Egypt, one of the major operations of the First Diadoch War. While the year is not specified, line 26 makes reference to Philip’s fifth year, noting an event that takes place in a following year. There is no significant gap in the text here, so the events in line 23 must refer to that monarch’s fourth year. While Brian Bosworth (1992a: 75–9) has argued that Philip became king of Babylonia the year before Alexander’s death, this assumption has been shown to be incorrect and that Philip’s first regnal year in Babylonia is synonymous with the first year of this kingship as Alexander’s heir for his brother’s entire empire (Boiy 2000; Anson 2002/3: 376–80). Finally, the *Babylonian Chronicle* reports that Seleucus entered Babylon on November 14, 320 (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 24–5). He left for Babylon later in the same year as Perdiccas’ Egyptian expedition. While all three sources of these dating referents have limitations – Diodorus so often confused in his chronology; the Marble on occasion in clear error (Anson 2002/3: 376); and the *Chronicle* both fragmentary and without a definite provenance (Anson 2006a: 2–3)²⁴ – there is nothing in the narrative of events that would indicate that this chronology is suspect. Arguments for the high chronology with respect to this war, on the other hand, are based entirely on speculation: Philip being named the king of Babylonia in the year before Alexander’s death; Diodorus’ three years being an exaggeration. As will be noted later, however, this chronological controversy continues for subsequent events without any clear resolution.

While Perdiccas prepared to march in the spring of 320 to Macedonia and seize the monarchy, events taking place elsewhere were to alter these plans dramatically. During the winter of 321/20, Ptolemy, by prearrangement with Arrhidaeus, the

commander in charge of the transportation of Alexander's corpse from Babylon, and, perhaps, also in collusion with Archon, the satrap of Babylonia, who was subsequently removed by Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 24.3–5), intercepted the funeral cortège and diverted it to Egypt (Diod. 18.28.2–3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.25; 24–5: Str. 17.1.8). Arrhidaeus' reason for disobeying the regent is unknown. He may have wanted to fulfill Alexander's original desire, or he may have become aware of Perdiccas' grand intentions and wished to forestall them. Like Perdiccas, Ptolemy had also realized the value in possessing Alexander's body. Given Perdiccas' actions concerning Antigonus, Ptolemy may have decided that it was only a matter of time before the regent, with even stronger provocation, moved against him. When Perdiccas discovered Arrhidaeus' plan, he dispatched a force commanded by Polemon and Attalus to intercept the cortège (Arr. *Succ.* 24.1–4; 25), but this force was repulsed by Ptolemy and the funeral train continued on to Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.25), where the body in the winter of 321/20 was interred temporarily in Memphis with elaborate rites (Paus. 1.6.3). Alexander was subsequently entombed in Alexandria (Diod. 18.28.3), not in his preferred final resting place at Siwah.

Ptolemy's capture of Alexander's corpse was the culmination of a number of independent actions by that Diadoch. The satrap of Egypt had by the end of 322 emerged as a major power in the eastern Mediterranean. He had used the 8000 talents he found in the Egyptian treasury to hire mercenaries (Diod. 18.14.1). Besides the mercenaries, Ptolemy also inherited the 4000 troops and thirty triremes which Alexander had left behind in Egypt (Curt. 4.8.4; Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.3–5). He had murdered Cleomenes and may have already begun negotiations with the Cypriot kings (Briant 1989: 183 n. 2). In the late summer of 322,²⁵ he annexed Cyrene without the consent of the kings or their regent (Diod. 18.19–21; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.16–19; *FGrH* 239 B F-10). While Photius' Epitome of Arrian (*Succ.* 1a.5) states that both Egypt and Libya were awarded to Ptolemy in Babylon, Curtius (10.10.1) suggests that this reference to Libya referred solely to those peoples routinely under the sovereignty of satrap of Egypt, and not to an independent Greek city.

Like Alexander before him, Ptolemy also moved quickly to establish close ties with the true power brokers in Egypt, the priests (Müller 2009: 172–5). Ptolemy accepted all of the trappings of traditional Egyptian rule; he became pharaoh (Müller 2013: 204). Alexander had fostered close relations with the Egyptian religious establishment and Ptolemy had done the same.²⁶ As had Alexander the Great, Ptolemy created conditions that permitted established elites to thrive while the Macedonian pursued his own ambitions (Briant 2002: 842–4, 870, 1046–60).

Cyrene previously had been attacked by Thibron, the supposed Spartan friend and later murderer of Harpalus (Diod. 17.108.8; 18.19.2; cf. Paus. 9.7.3). Thibron had taken command of the 6000 or 7000 mercenaries who had followed Alexander's former treasurer to Crete (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.16; Diod. 17.108.6; 18.19.2), and associating himself with certain exiles from the North African city, defeated the Cyrenaeans in battle, seized control of the harbor, and began a siege of the city (Diod. 18.19.3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.16). The Cyrenaeans agreed to give him 500 talents and become his ally. Thibron now planned a campaign to subdue much of Libya. His plans began to go

awry when he had a falling out with one of his commanders who deserted to the Cyrenaeans and convinced them to renounce their treaty. As the fighting dragged on, the wealthy having been driven from the city by “the commons,” appealed to Ptolemy, who sent a fleet and an army (Diod. 18.20–21.7). The “democratic commanders” in the city joined forces with Thibron. In the ensuing battle, Ptolemy’s general Ophellas won a complete victory, capturing Thibron, and delivering control over the entire region to Ptolemy (Diod. 18.21.8–9). Near the end of the campaign, Ptolemy himself appeared and the annexation was complete (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.19).

Back in Asia Minor, even with the danger of invasion by the Europeans, Perdikkas’ council decided unanimously to change plans and launch an assault on Egypt (Diod. 18.25.6). While Perdikkas, with the bulk of the royal army and most of the officer corps, would proceed to Egypt, Eumenes, Alcetas, and Neoptolemus would be left behind to resist the expected invasion by Antipater and Craterus. Eumenes was given the overall command for the defense of Asia Minor (Diod. 18.29.1–3; Just. 13.6.14–15; Nep. *Eum.* 3.2; Plut. *Eum.* 5.2). Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and all the satraps in the area, were ordered to obey Eumenes during this current emergency (Diod. 18.29.2). While it might appear curious that Perdikkas would place Eumenes in command of so important a military operation, this decision probably reflects, in part, Eumenes’ activities in Cappadocia and Armenia. This would explain Diodorus’ claim (18.29.2) that Eumenes was chosen because of his skill as a general. He was not just reading back into the past Eumenes’ future exploits. Eumenes does have a few recorded military commands during Alexander the Great’s lifetime coming towards the end of the latter’s Asian expedition. He was put in charge of a unit of the companion cavalry in 324 (Plut. *Eum.* 1.5; Nep. *Eum.* 1.6), and is referred to as “general” by Plutarch during Alexander’s campaign in India (Plut. *Eum.* 1.5), but his first real combat experience likely was with Perdikkas in Cappadocia. Given the dearth of evidence for Eumenes’ military activities during Alexander’s reign, it is likely that Eumenes’ military skills were only clearly demonstrated during the Cappadocian campaign and later in Armenia. Of those left in Asia Minor, Eumenes’ selection for overall command was in part dictated by his previous standing with Alexander and his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the infantry and cavalry in Babylon. Perdikkas had been sufficiently impressed in the Cynnane episode with the residual loyalty of his troops to those associated with the great Alexander. Moreover, while Neoptolemus could also claim a connection to Alexander, Neoptolemus was a member of the Molossian royal house of Epirus, the family of Alexander the Great’s mother Olympias, and, therefore, a distant relative of Alexander’s (Heckel 1992: 300–1; 2006: 174), and had been at one time the commander of Alexander the Great’s hypaspists, the later argyraspids (Plut. *Eum.* 1.6), but his earlier difficulties in Armenia had undermined the regent’s confidence in him (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4.1). Alcetas’ position with the troops had been damaged by his involvement in the Cynnane affair. With most of the senior officers, along with the bulk of the royal army, on their way to Egypt, the choice of Eumenes was in part due to a lack of clear alternatives. Seleucus commanded the companion cavalry (Diod. 18.3.4); Antigones, the argyraspids (cf. Diod. 18.59.3; Arr. *Succ.*

1a.35; Anson 1981: 118–19); Aristonous accompanied Perdiccas and subsequently led the expedition against the Cypriot kings, who at the start of the war declared for Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 10.6), and Pithon, the son of Crateuas, held a prominent command as well (Diod. 18.36.5). In addition to Eumenes' connection to Alexander, his successes in Armenia, and his proven loyalty to Perdiccas, his selection was also influenced by his command of a large force of Cappadocian cavalry (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4.3–4).

In Asia Minor, the first line of defense was to be the Hellespont (Diod. 18.25.6, 29.1–3). Cleitus remained in command of the majority of the royal fleet (cf. Just. 13.6.16). While most of the transports and ninety warships sailed for Egypt under the command of Perdiccas' brother-in-law Attalus (Diod. 18.37.2–3), most of the battle fleet, which earlier under Cleitus had defeated the Greeks in the Lamian War (Diod. 18.15.8–9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11.3), sailed from Cilicia to the Hellespont, arriving in March or April of 320. While Cleitus' earlier service with Craterus in Asia and with both Craterus and Antipater in the Lamian War (Just. 12.12.8; Diod. 18.15.8; Plut. *Demetr.* 11.3) might make it appear surprising that Perdiccas would trust him with such an important command, Cleitus had returned with the fleet to Cilicia sometime after the war in Greece, and there had undoubtedly established good relations with the regent (Hauben 1977: 104–5). An inscription dated to 322/21 and honoring both Alcetas and Cleitus with Ephesian citizenship suggests that this relationship between Perdiccas and Cleitus was firmly in place (Keil 1913: 235 and 241). Given the latter's subsequent desertion, hindsight certainly indicates that it would have been wiser to have placed the Aegean fleet under the command of another. Even though there are few details relating to Cleitus' command, it appears certain that he was to coordinate his activities with Eumenes for the defense of the Hellespont. While it is not always safe to argue on the basis of what would be the most logical strategy, still, it would make a great deal more sense to associate immediately the fleet contingent under Cleitus with Eumenes' command. Preventing a crossing of the Hellespont without control of the strait itself would be impossible (see Anson 1989: 44–9); surely, Perdiccas and his advisors knew this. As noted earlier, ancient warships were too unseaworthy and their rowers' conditions on board too cramped, to stand off a coast in a blockade. In a so-called blockade, ships would be stationed on a friendly shore awaiting any sign of an attempt by an enemy to put to sea, and then scrambling aboard hurriedly in time to intercept them (Anson 1989: 44–9).

Eumenes, in conjunction with the Perdiccan fleet, would maintain control of the Asian coast of the strait. Cleitus, operating out of any of the eastern coastal cities of the Hellespont, could intercept ships attempting to make the crossing; those that got through could be dealt with by the forces under Eumenes' command, especially given Eumenes' superior cavalry. Moreover, in accordance with their agreement with Perdiccas (Diod. 18.38.1), the Aetolians, on Antipater's and Craterus' departure, invaded Locris and Thessaly, and defeated and killed Antipater's general Polyces. Later, however, Polyperchon, the general left in charge in Macedonia by Antipater, marched into Thessaly and defeated the Aetolians and recovered the region (Diod. 18.38.2–6; Just. 13.6.9).

If the defense of the Hellespont for some unforeseen reason failed, the land forces would fall back before the Europeans, preparing ambushes and in general harassing the invaders. There was no plan to stage a decisive battle in Asia Minor. The quality and the numbers of the forces accompanying Antipater and Craterus were far superior to the forces left in Asia Minor by Perdiccas (cf. Diod. 18.30.4–5). This secondary strategy was predicated on the initial Perdiccan advantage of distance. If for any reason the defense of the Hellespont failed, Perdiccas could still defeat Ptolemy in time to turn and catch Antipater and Craterus between his victorious army moving north from Egypt and his forces from Asia Minor trailing after the Europeans. In the eventuality of a successful crossing, Cleitus would interdict supplies, aid the Aetolians, and encourage others in Greece to renounce their allegiance to Antipater. With this strategy in place, Eumenes departed with his forces for the Hellespont, while Perdiccas left Pisidia and marched south. Indications in Diodorus (18.33.2, 34.7, 35.3) are that the Nile had begun to flood during Perdiccas' invasion, suggesting that the regent may have left Pisidia too late, or it is possible that Perdiccas spent some time in Cilicia dealing with issues that had become known while on the march, thus delaying his march south. Suspecting the loyalty of Philotas, the "friend" of Craterus and the satrap of Cilicia, the regent replaced him with Philoxenus, and, likewise, doubting that Arrhidaeus could have planned his betrayal of Perdiccas without the complicity of Archon, the satrap of Babylonia, Docimus was sent to replace him (Arr. *Succ.* 24.1–3). The two subsequently battled for control of Babylon, with Docimus the victor and Archon dying from his wounds (Arr. *Succ.* 24.3–5). Also, while in Cilicia, Perdiccas dispatched Sosigenes to transport troops under the command of Aristonous to Cyprus against Ptolemy's allies there (Arr. *Succ.* 10.6).

Antipater and Craterus planned to cross the Hellespont in April to take advantage of the growing season in Asia Minor (Engels 1978: 29), and avoid the winter storms that often continued into March in the Hellespont.²⁷ Perdiccas would arrive in Egypt more than a month before the Macedonian forces could rendezvous with Ptolemy. Even given the worst case scenario, Perdiccas and his advisors believed that Ptolemy could be dealt with long before Antipater and Craterus would arrive with reinforcements. The plan was good; its execution left much to be desired.

After Eumenes was placed in charge of Asia Minor with both Neoptolemus and Alcetas subordinated to his authority, the Cardian departed to take up the defense of the Hellespont (Diod. 18.25.6; 29.1–3). While sending most of his forces ahead, Eumenes with a small troop rode to Sardis with a proposal of marriage for Cleopatra from Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.26; 25.2–6), a proposal the sister of Alexander chose for the moment to decline. Only the *Heidelberg Epitome* (FGrH 155 F-4; Wheatley 2013: 21) states that the marriage took place. Diodorus (20.37.3), later recounting the death of Cleopatra, certainly implies that there was no marriage. She would wait for the outcome of the coming conflict. Unknown to the Perdiccans, at the same time Eumenes was heading to Sardis with Perdiccas' proposal of marriage, Antigonus, in command of ten Athenian warships and

3000 men, had landed in Caria (Arr. *Succ.* 25.1). As most likely prearranged, Asander in Caria and Menander in Lydia joined him. Menander, while remaining in control of the military forces in the region, had been supplanted as satrap by Cleopatra, who had been given the authority by the regent (Arr. *Succ.* 25.2). The latter surrendered Ephesus and apparently much of the Ionian coast to Antigonus (Arr. *Succ.* 25.2–6). Indeed, Menander, learning that Eumenes was in Sardis, sent the news to Antigonus in Ephesus. Antigonus counseled him to remain openly friendly and keep Eumenes in the city. Meanwhile, Antigonus hurriedly assembled his 3000 infantry and some cavalry and set out for Sardis. Warned by Cleopatra, Eumenes managed to escape (Arr. *Succ.* 25.2–4, 6–7), but Antigonus had achieved a notable success. Much of western Asia Minor had repudiated the regent. Even Philoxenus, only recently appointed governor of Cilicia by the regent, deserted the cause.²⁸ There would now be no hostile coast to impede a landing by the Diadochs from Macedonia. After his successes along the Asiatic coast Antigonus sailed to Cyprus and joined the pro-Ptolemaic faction there. (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.6, cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.30).

The desertions of Asander and Menander, while serious, were not as devastating as other defections that soon followed. Cleitus and the Aegean fleet deserted the Perdiccan cause soon after their arrival in the Hellespont. While the sources are silent on Cleitus' actions, his desertion to Antipater is certain. There is no evidence he ever contested Antipater's passage to Asia. Moreover, later Cleitus was rewarded with the satrapy of Lydia by Antipater (Diod. 18.39.6). Additionally, the long neglect of Hellespontine Phrygia after Leonnatus' departure, now proved costly. The Hellespontine cities, in response to overtures from Antipater, also went over to the invaders (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.26). Many of these Greek cities had acquired a special semi-autonomous status under Alexander which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was retained after his death (Badian 1966). A clear example of this status is the case of Cyzicus. In 318, the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and former cortège commander Arrhidaeus tried to strengthen his position in his satrapy by placing garrisons in the coastal cities (Diod. 18.51). Cyzicus successfully resisted and Diodorus (18.51.3) states that it did so in order to "maintain [its] freedom." The long absence of satrapal authority in the region would have heightened this sense of independence. These reverses forced Eumenes to abandon any attempt to block or even to hinder Antipater's crossing. The secondary plan of action now became the only option, and Eumenes reported the situation to Perdiccas. This report reached the regent in Cilicia. In response to the failure on the Hellespont, Perdiccas ordered anew Neoptolemus and Alcetas to obey Eumenes' commands for the operations in Asia Minor (Plut. *Eum.* 5.1–2), but problems were appearing even in the ranks of those who still remained loyal.

While Perdiccas' choice of Eumenes to lead the defense of Asia Minor made sense from the perspective of the common soldiers, neither of the Macedonian aristocrats, Alcetas or Neoptolemus, was willing to be commanded by Eumenes (Diod. 18.29.4; Plut. *Eum.* 5.2–3), a Greek and a former chief secretary, although

for a time the Armenian satrap gave indications of cooperation. Both had personal reasons to dislike Eumenes. It had been the Cardian Greek who had salvaged Neoptolemus' command in Armenia, and it was the same Cardian whose policy had prevailed over that of the regent's own brother. Alcetas, since he was opposed to the policy of not recognizing Antipater's power in Europe, may have hoped for a reconciliation with the Macedonian commanders (Errington 1970: 64 n. 108). However, much of the hostility rested on pure prejudice. Eumenes was not a member of the hereditary Macedonian nobility, he was a Greek, and had been for much of his career in their eyes a mere bureaucrat in a world of aristocratic *hetairoi* (see Anson 1980: 55–9; 2004: 247–51). These circumstances made both commanders jealous of Eumenes' preferment. They may also have feared confronting the popular Craterus in their anxiety that he might subvert the loyalty of their Macedonians (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 5.3). Eumenes' later measures to conceal from his troops the knowledge that Craterus was the opposing commander (Plut. *Eum.* 7.2–3; Nep. *Eum.* 4.4) show that the problem was indeed a serious one. Craterus had been treated virtually as a king by the Macedonians upon his return to his homeland (Arr. *Succ.* frg. 19 = Suda. s.v. *Craterus*). It is unlikely, however, that the troops serving with Neoptolemus and Alcetas were part of the contingent of veterans brought west by Craterus in 324 (as claimed by Hammond 1984: 56). Of the roughly 10,000 Macedonian veterans that Craterus had in Cilicia, he took 6000 of them with him to Macedonia (Diod. 18.16.4). Of the possible 4000 left behind, 3000 were the argyraspids (Anson 1981: 131–3; Heckel 2006: 30), who were on their way to Egypt with Perdiccas, leaving at most 1000 others. It is likely that these, given their earlier association with Craterus, were, along with the argyraspids, taken to Egypt.

While the decision to invade Egypt had been approved by consensus, placing Eumenes in charge in Asia Minor must have sparked bitter debate and rancor. Yet Perdiccas had used his authority to overwhelm the opposition, and, if the Hellespontine defensive line had held, it is probable that none of these latent difficulties would have manifested themselves. Clearly, Perdiccas lacked the necessary qualities of leadership so obviously demanded by the circumstances. He could not even get his own brother to obey his authority. His leadership style was clearly that of intimidation. When during the dispute in Babylon he was threatened with death by the agents of Meleager, he taunted and terrified them (Curt. 10.8.3). Under the pretext of a reconciliation, he had the leaders of the mutinous infantry in Babylon in 323 killed (Diod. 18.4.7; Curt. 10.9.18). Meleager was murdered shortly thereafter, charged with "plotting" against the regent (Diod. 18.4.7). Perdiccas had ordered his troops to execute all the Greeks who had rebelled in the upper satrapies on the news of Alexander's death (Diod. 18.7.5); Ariarathes after capture was tortured and impaled (Diod. 18.16.3; App. *Mith.* 2.8); the male Larandians of fighting age were all killed, the rest of the population enslaved (Diod. 18.22.2); Cynnane was murdered, in all probability on his orders. Alexander's former chiliarch was not a man to be crossed. Apparently, most acceded to his demands in his presence rather than incur his wrath.

Upon arriving in Asia, Craterus and Antipater sent appeals to both Eumenes and Neoptolemus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.26; Diod. 18.29.4). Eumenes was promised continued possession of his satrapy with additional lands and troops besides, and Craterus promised to reconcile him with Antipater (Plut. *Eum.* 5.6). Eumenes refused the proposal, instead offering to reconcile Craterus and Perdikkas (Plut. *Eum.* 5.7–8). Neoptolemus, however, was prepared to betray Eumenes to the Europeans (Diod. 18.29.4; Plut. *Eum.* 5.4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.26–7). He had moved from his previous location either in Pisidia or in Armenia to join Eumenes ostensibly to confront the invaders. When Eumenes ordered him to comply with Perdikkas' orders, his treachery was discovered. Neoptolemus drew up his phalanx in battle array (Plut. *Eum.* 5.4). Nepos (*Eum.* 5.1) mistakenly places the ensuing battle at or near the Hellespont (accepted by Billows 1990: 65; Hornblower 1981: 6 n. 11, 30 n. 43), but Diodorus' (18.37.1) placement "near Cappadocia" is to be preferred. Nepos is most likely reflecting the original location of Eumenes' forces (Diod. 18.29.3). But, with the collapse of the defense of the Hellespont, Eumenes had retreated even before the crossing had taken place. It is difficult to know the location of the respective forces, but most likely Eumenes and Neoptolemus fought in Phrygia, and most likely in May.

In the ensuing battle, Eumenes' infantry was defeated, but his cavalry secured the victory (Diod. 18.29.4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 5.5–6; Just. 13.8.4).²⁹ Neoptolemus had either permitted his infantry to pursue in a disorderly manner or they had followed their own inclinations, allowing Eumenes' cavalry, already victorious over the enemy's horse and in possession of Neoptolemus' camp, to attack the scattered soldiers. While many were killed, the majority laid down their weapons and swore an oath to serve Eumenes; only Neoptolemus and 300 horsemen escaped (Diod. 18.29.5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 5.5–6). Eumenes now sent word to Perdikkas of his victory and of his acquisition of most of Neoptolemus' army; the news reached Perdikkas shortly after his arrival in Egypt and before any actual hostilities had commenced (Diod. 18.33.1).

After his defeat Neoptolemus fled to Craterus and Antipater.³⁰ While he asked that both come to his aid, he intimated that because of his popularity Craterus would be sufficient (Plut. *Eum.* 6.1–3). As a result, it was decided that Craterus with the bulk of the Macedonian forces would attack Eumenes; Antipater would continue on to Egypt with the remaining troops (Diod. 18.29.6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 6.4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.27). With 20,000 infantry, primarily Macedonians, and more than 2000 cavalry, Craterus advanced into eastern Phrygia or, perhaps, Lycaonia (Diod. 18.37.1; Plut. *Eum.* 6.4). Eumenes now decided to change the agreed-upon strategy, which had been to avoid battle. With the forces of the Europeans divided and with his superior cavalry, Eumenes determined to meet Craterus in battle. His Cappadocian cavalry had proven both loyal and efficient (Diod. 18.29.4–5). While, with the division of the enemy forces, Eumenes' infantry was now equal in numbers to that of Craterus, it was certainly not equivalent in quality. Moreover, due to Craterus' popularity, Eumenes concealed from his Macedonians the name of their opponent. He announced that Neoptolemus and an otherwise

unknown Pigres³¹ were coming against them after enrolling new native forces (Plut. *Eum.* 6.7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.27; Nep. *Eum.* 3.4–5).

When the armies were drawn up for battle and Eumenes saw that Craterus was occupying the right wing, he placed two squadrons of foreign cavalry, commanded by Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus and Eumenes' Persian brother-in-law,³² and Phoenix of Tenedos on his left (Plut. *Eum.* 7.1). No Macedonians were to face Craterus. Eumenes also gave these commanders strict orders to launch their attack as soon as the enemy came into view in order to make sure that this deception was not discovered until after the battle. Eumenes himself with his *agema*, his elite personal guard of 300 horsemen, held the right wing opposite Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 7.1–2; cf. Diod. 19.27.2, 28.3). Each Diadoch would eventually establish his own military units paralleling those of the royal army, with cavalry companions and infantry hypaspists. In 316, Eumenes is listed as having in his army a personal corps of hypaspists, distinct from Alexander's former hypaspists, the argyraspids (Diod. 19.28.1, 40.3–4), and companion cavalry (Diod. 19.28.3). Antigenes and the satrap Persis, Peucestas, had their own personal cavalry guards (Diod. 19.28.3), Antigonos, his own hypaspists (Polyaen. 4.6.8), Leonnatus, had his own personal cavalry guard, his *agema* (Suda s.v. *Leonnatus*), and Alcetas, "his hypaspists and pages" (Diod. 18.45.3). The institution of the pages was borrowed from the Persians and introduced by Alexander's father, Philip II (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1). These young men had guarded the king while he slept, mounted the king on his horse, attended him in the hunt (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.4), guarded him while he dined (Curt. 5.1.43; cf. 8.6.5), and during their final year as pages, served with the king in combat (Hammond 1990: 266). The institution came to serve under Philip II and Alexander the Great as a sort of school for future military commanders (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.6). While often referred to as *paides*, boys, it is clear that they were recruited as young men, not children (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.2.35, 6.2, 8, 25). Hammond (1990: 266) reasonably asserts that one became a page at roughly 14 years of age and graduated to other responsibilities by one's eighteenth birthday. These basic personal institutions of the Macedonian national monarchy were being created to serve each of Alexander's Successors.

As soon as the opposing force came into view, Eumenes launched his attack. This sudden assault caught Craterus by surprise, for he had been led to believe by Neoptolemus that Eumenes' Macedonians would desert. With this prospect in view, Craterus had assumed that at the very least Eumenes would be hesitant to force the issue. Both cavalry forces rode well in advance of their respective infantries. In the first collision of forces, Craterus was killed.³³ With his death, the cavalry wing under his command was quickly crushed and fled back to the phalanx. Several different versions of Craterus' death are preserved in the sources. In Arrian (*Succ.* 27), Craterus is killed by Paphlagonians, but in Plutarch (*Eum.* 7.5) the deed is done by a Thracian. In Plutarch's account (*Eum.* 7.4, 8), the dying Craterus is tearfully pitied by Eumenes.

Eumenes' right was also victorious, with Eumenes killing Neoptolemus in single combat, also related in dramatic terms by our sources (Diod. 18.30.4–5; Arr. *Succ.*

1a.27; Plut. *Eum.* 8.2). This victory occurred just ten days after his initial defeat of Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 8.1). Eumenes now sent Xennias, a Macedonian veteran (Heckel 2006: 271), to the surrounded enemy, who were not disheartened and in close array awaited Eumenes' expected attack. Xennias informed the Macedonians that Eumenes would not challenge them with his phalanx, but using his cavalry and light-armed troops, he would prevent them from gathering provisions (PSI 12.1284). The enemy phalanx was now invited to join Eumenes, an invitation they readily accepted (Diod. 18.32.2; Nep. *Eum.* 4.3). With their surrender, Eumenes gave them permission to forage for supplies in the nearby villages. These Macedonians, however, after they had collected sufficient supplies, deserted and by forced marches reached Antipater and continued with him toward Egypt (Diod. 18.32.3–33.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.27; Nep. *Eum.* 4.3).

If the news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus had arrived sooner, the entire history of the post-Alexander era might have been dramatically altered; Perdikkas might have emerged supreme, the successor of Alexander and the ruler of the vast Macedonian empire, with the inauguration of a new royal family. The regent, however, was slain in a mutiny of his own officers two days before the report of Eumenes' great victory over Craterus arrived (Plut. *Eum.* 8.2). Diodorus (18.37.1) states that the report came immediately after Perdikkas' death. His death occurred no later than early July 320.

Perdikkas' campaign in Egypt had been a disaster almost from its inception. Upon entering Egypt the regent assembled the troops and recited the charges against Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.28). Alexander late in his reign often called together such meetings whenever he sensed that the army needed encouragement. Errington (1978: 89–90) has called these meetings tests of the commander's authority before he asserted his power. The need for such assemblies is the mark of soldiers who have been too long on campaign, and who have begun to take on the corporate mentality of mercenaries (Anson 1985: 311–12). Mercenaries from the Greek world tended to resolve issues involving their interests by assembly. This was certainly true of those who accompanied Cyrus in his attempt to seize the throne of Persia from his brother in 401 BC and recorded by Xenophon in his *Anabasis*.³⁴ Another characteristic was seen in Neoptolemus' defeated force taking employment with Eumenes. That Craterus' Macedonians did not follow suit is testimony to their continued national character. While this force may have included troops who had served with Alexander and returned to Macedonia with Craterus, it is likely that the bulk of the force were those recruited more recently in Macedonia. It is unlikely that Antipater would have brought back to Asia many of the veterans whose loyalty might be conflicted when in contact with their old officers and colleagues.

It is unclear what led to Perdikkas' calling of this assembly of his troops. It could easily have been grumblings about a campaign to fight another Macedonian commander and many of their former comrades-in-arms. Moreover, the text states that Ptolemy personally defended himself against Perdikkas' charges, which suggests that, perhaps, the satrap or some spokesperson for him instigated the

meeting. Even though the “many” did not accept Perdiccas’ rationale for the war, Perdiccas continued the campaign anyway. Perdiccas was not violating any law or custom when he ignored the wishes of his troops. Macedonia was historically an autocracy (see the Introduction above, and see Anson 2013b: 13–82, 126–9, 160–1) and Perdiccas was the regent, and the campaign was technically being carried out in the name of the kings, i. e., by King Philip III, the new monarch who owed his position to these very soldiers. If Perdiccas was responsible for the assembly, hoping to create enthusiasm for the coming campaign, it was a mistake. Even with his army’s grumblings, he decided to continue his march regardless; he had no choice. While Perdiccas was certainly risking a reaction similar to that which forced him to accede to the marriage of Philip and Eurydice, the former Adea, it is doubtful that he could be reconciled with Ptolemy. Moreover, Antipater was on his way south and to turn around now could have placed Perdiccas and his forces between two armies. The soldiers, however, loyal to their king and his regent, continued on to Egypt. If Perdiccas had enjoyed success in the campaign, the complaints and lack of confidence would have been replaced by enthusiasm and renewed loyalty to their commander.

Perdiccas’ invasion, however, stalled at the Nile. He was unable to make a crossing near Pelusium and incurred heavy losses attempting to do so (Diod. 18.33.6–36.1). Moving to Memphis, again his army failed to force a crossing, and this time 2000 men were lost (Diod. 18.36.1). Indeed, as suggested earlier, Perdiccas may have arrived too late in the year, for there is evidence that the Nile flood had already begun. The crossing was hindered by the depth of the water and its rate of flow (Diod. 18.34.7). During the actual campaign in Egypt, even though many of the common soldiers had expressed their dissatisfaction with “threatening shouts” after the second disastrous attempt to cross the Nile (Diod. 18.36.4), in the final analysis it was their commanders, approximately 100 of them, who, even after Perdiccas had given gifts and made promises to them, plotted his demise. Those directly involved in the assassination were the senior commanders: Pithon, Antigenes, and Seleucus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.29; Diod. 18.36.4–5; Paus. 1.6.3; Nep. *Eum.* 5.1). This murder took place either during a cavalry engagement with the forces of the Egyptian satrap (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.30) or in the tent of the regent (Diod. 18.36.5). It also appears likely that Ptolemy had been in communication with the plotters prior to the assassination (Errington 1970: 65–6). The Egyptian satrap was welcomed in the Perdiccan camp the day after the murder, and participated in a gathering of the conspirators to decide future action (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.30). He also presented gifts to the kings and proclaimed his loyalty to them (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.30). In the council with the army leaders, it was decided that Arrhidaeus, who had transported the body of Alexander to Egypt, and Pithon, who had led the expedition against the rebellious Greeks in the upper satrapies, would become co-regents for and guardians of the kings. Also, the council determined that Ptolemy should address the assembled army the following day (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.3) to explain the actions of the conspirators, to acquire at least the troops’ acceptance of the act, and to allay any fears they may have had regarding the Egyptian satrap’s attitude towards them (Diod.

18.36.6–37.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.30). With supplies running short, he assured the troops that they would have all they needed in abundance (Diod. 18.36.6). The speech was a great success. So appreciative were the soldiers that most wished to proclaim the satrap the new regent, but Ptolemy, true to the understanding reached in his conference with the conspirators, used his newly found influence to secure the office for Arrhidaeus and Pithon “without a dissenting voice” from the army (Diod. 18.36.7).³⁵ Ptolemy may have been reluctant to accept the office because he perceived either the transitory nature of the current appointment, with Antipater and Craterus, whose death was not yet known, approaching, or that the regency and guardianship were themselves ephemeral.

Even though in Photius’ epitome of Arrian (*Succ.* 1a.30) the same council that chose Arrhidaeus and Pithon to be the new regents also condemns the supporters of the former regent, this appears to be the result of radical abridgement. In Diodorus (18.37.1), where the account is fuller, these condemnations are the spontaneous result of the news of Craterus’ death arriving near the end of the assembly being addressed by Ptolemy. The troops had become enraged over the death of the popular commander (Diod. 18.37.1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 8.3). While the assassins may have hoped to reach some settlement with these still powerful individuals, the army now passed a sentence of death on all Perdiccans, both those present and those absent.³⁶ Even Perdiccas’ sister Atalante, the wife of Attalus, was slain; Eumenes, Alcetas, and Attalus were among those condemned in absentia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.39; Diod. 18.37.3).

The army with the kings and new regents proceeded north to rendezvous with Antipater. The troops got as far as Triparadeisus in northern Syria.³⁷ Here, by late August or early September,³⁸ what had been for some time general insubordination in the ranks became mutiny. Eurydice, the wife of King Philip, was its focus. She had become Philip’s wife through the support of these same troops and her influence with them was considerable. Under this pressure Pithon and Arrhidaeus abdicated in favor of Antipater, who was not present, but near (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.31–2; Diod. 18.39.1–2). The new arrangement worked for a short period of time, but not for long. When Antipater finally arrived, agitation had broken out anew. Eurydice was again at its center, but various Perdiccan elements were also present, notably Attalus recently arrived from Tyre (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.33, 39; cf. Diod. 18.39.3–4). The troops were upset over arrears in pay (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.32; Polyæn. 4.6.4). In the rioting Antipater was almost killed, but was saved through the intervention of Antigonus, himself only recently returned from Cyprus, and Seleucus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.32–3, 39; Diod. 18.39.4; Polyæn. 4.6.4). Antigonus convinced the soldiers to be patient and that their money would be forthcoming (Polyæn. 4.6.4). This concern with money is one more example of the increasingly mercenary tendencies of the army serving in Asia. With order restored, an assembly of the army was called, in which Antipater’s regency was ratified (Diod. 18.39.4; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.33). The new regent, in concert with the other leaders, distributed the satrapies anew and organized a campaign against the surviving Perdiccans (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.35–8; Diod. 18.39.6). Antigonus was given the command of the royal army, consisting of most of Perdiccas’ old forces, the possession of the

kings, and was to operate in Asia against the remaining Perdiccans (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38; Diod. 18.39.7–40.1; Just. 14.1.1). Certain deletions were made from the force given to Antigonus. Antigones and 3000 “rebellious Macedonians” (clearly the argyraspids; see Anson 1981: 118–19) were sent to convey treasure from Susa to Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38), ostensibly to help finance the coming campaign, but likely to separate them from the rest of the army; Arrhidaeus was given 1000 Macedonians (cf. Diod. 18.51.1), and presumably certain other commanders received troops as well.

Many scholars have questioned Antipater’s grant of such powers to Antigonus given the latter’s later actions, especially in light of Antipater’s own suspicions (Diod. 18.39.7) and those of his son Cassander (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.43). But Antigonus had proven to be loyal, capable, and – at Triparadeisus – a life-saver (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.33). He had served Antipater well and had requested the command against Eumenes. Antipater did initially place certain checks on Antigonus’ authority. Antigonus’ friend Menander was not reinstated in Lydia (Arr. *Succ.* 1.37; Diod. 18.39.6), and Cassander was made chiliarch, or second-in-command and attached to Antigonus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38, 42; Diod. 18.39.7). It is even possible, now with the death of Craterus, that the new regent wished to designate Antigonus as his successor (Billows 1990: 69–70). Antipater was 76 years old (Suda s. v. Antipater) at this time and did die the very next year. Moreover, initially the kings were put in Antigonus’ possession (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38). While Antipater had many sons, when it did come time to pass on his power, none of them received the regency from their father. While so many of Alexander’s Successors followed the Conqueror’s lead and put their personal ambitions ahead of their homeland, Antipater and Craterus remained loyal Macedonians, their homeland first, their interests second (Anson 2012a; 2013b: 129).

With Perdiccas’ death, their own condemnation by the Macedonian army in Egypt, and the charge to Antigonus to use the royal army to eliminate them, the remaining supporters of the former regent faced a very precarious future. While little is known of the actions of other Perdiccans, Eumenes’ activities are described rather fully. When he learned of the calamity in Egypt, he informed his men. Those wishing to leave were given permission (Just. 14.1.1–2). Eumenes, and likely all who still remained of Perdiccas’ associates, maintained that the regent had been murdered and that the kings had been seized by those disloyal to Alexander’s family and memory; in short, the remaining Perdiccans were the true loyalists to the Argead house (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.5, 12). Such a belief was essential to retain the loyalty of their Macedonian troops. In Aeolis, near Mount Ida, when Eumenes took the horses he needed for his cavalry from the royal herd, he presented his request as from a legitimate royal official, and gave the overseers a receipt for the number taken (Plut. *Eum.* 8.5). In the winter of 320/19, again likely reflecting what was occurring elsewhere, when letters were sent into Eumenes’ camp offering a reward of 100 talents and various other honors to whomever would carry out the death sentence enacted by the army in Egypt, Eumenes’ Macedonians became incensed and designated a thousand of the leading soldiers

as a bodyguard for their commander (Plut. *Eum.* 8.11; cf. Just. 14.1.9–10).³⁹ Eumenes rewarded his loyal Macedonians by distributing to them “purple caps and military cloaks,” gifts usually bestowed by kings on their favorites (Plut. *Eum.* 8.12). Personal and unit loyalty to a popular commander, along with lingering ethnic identity and residual ties to the Argead monarchy, would for a time save the day for the remaining Perdiccans.

Eumenes, however, was careful not to rely exclusively on his legitimist claims. Soon after the news of the disaster in Egypt reached him, Eumenes had moved his troops to the Hellespont where he forced the local population to pay them (Just. 14.1.6; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.5). Later, he plundered territories loyal to his enemies to remunerate his troops.⁴⁰ Eumenes’ various actions had the desired effect; his army stood by him in the immediate crisis and he now confidently prepared for the coming struggle. Eumenes even plundered Hellespontine and western Phrygia while Antipater and Antigonus were present, but the latter two remained inactive (*Göthenburg Palimpsest* fo. 72^r 14–73^v 11;⁴¹ Plut. *Eum.* 8.9–11). Eumenes’ operations here brought him into great esteem even among the soldiers of his enemies, who began to despise their overall commander, Antipater (*Göthenburg Palimpsest* 72^r 14–73^v 8), who was reluctant to confront Eumenes.⁴² Eumenes, on the other hand, actively sought an engagement with Antipater on the plains of Lydia, where he could use his cavalry to good advantage. His activity, along with the inactivity of his enemies, raised his standing among his Macedonians, but a victory over the new regent would have not only solidified this standing even further, but likely would have brought most of Asia Minor under his authority, with his legitimacy confirmed by victory.

Without a victory, such as that achieved against Craterus and Neoptolemus, Eumenes had to seek legitimacy elsewhere. Eumenes went to Sardis to try to gain Cleopatra’s active support (Arr. *Succ.* 1.40; Plut. *Eum.* 8.6; Just. 14.1.7–8). But, with Antipater so near, Cleopatra requested that Eumenes withdraw (Plut. *Eum.* 8.7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.40; Just. 14.1.7). Eumenes had hoped to use Cleopatra to strengthen the loyalty of his soldiers to him (Just. 14.1.7–8). Given that some of these Macedonians may have been among those who supported Eurydice’s marriage to King Philip, this would have been a smart move. The support of any member of the royal family at this point would have been beneficial (Carney 2000: 126; Anson 2004: 121 n. 18). While Eumenes may not have achieved his overall aim, Cleopatra may have empowered him to distribute those items associated with royalty, “the purple hats and military cloaks,” to his troops (Hornblower 1981: 162). He did give out such items (Plut. *Eum.* 8.12), but even if Cleopatra was connected to the event, it is far more likely that Eumenes simply made the claim of her endorsement of the act (Bosworth 1992b: 72–3; Schäfer 2002: 101–2), or that Perdiccas or even King Philip himself had so empowered him, prior to their departure for Egypt.

While not actively engaging the surviving Perdiccans personally, Antipater did detach a force under the command of Asander to invade Pisidia, but these troops were defeated by Alcetas and Attalus, who had joined Alcetas after the riot at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.41). Asander subsequently rejoined Antipater and

Antigonos, and continued on to his recently reassigned satrapy of Caria (cf. Diod. 18.39.6; 19.62.2). This reluctance to face Eumenes was due to two factors: Eumenes' superior cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 8.6) and the questionable loyalty of the newly acquired royal army. These troops had rebelled against Antipater at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1.32–3, 39), and later at Abydus, just prior to their return to Europe with Antipater, they rebelled again (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.44–5). The trouble at Abydus was, as it had been at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.32; Polyæn. 4.6.4), over pay. While at Triparadeisus there were other issues involved, including devotion to the royal family in the person of Eurydice and King Philip (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.32–3; Polyæn. 4.6.4; Diod. 18.39.2–4), and, perhaps, even a lingering loyalty to their previous Perdiccan commanders (Errington 1970: 70), still the overriding issue in both of these incidents, the unifying theme, was money. Besides, Antipater clearly had no long-term interest in Asia. His invasion had been to forestall Perdikkas' contemplated assault on Macedonia. He was apparently in a great hurry to return home. All indications are that Antipater did not wait for spring, but departed for Macedonia before the end of winter (Bosworth 1992a: 59). He left for Europe as soon as he could and did not involve himself further in the affairs of Asia. He died in the summer of the following year (Diod. 18.48.1, 4, 50.1; Plut. *Eum.* 12.1).

In response to Cleopatra's entreaty, Eumenes had left Lydia, ultimately retiring to southern Phrygia where he would be in close proximity to the other Perdiccans in Pisidia. Here, after his campaign of harassment in Hellespontine and western Phrygia (Plut. *Eum.* 8.9–11; *Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 1–10), Eumenes spent the winter of 320/19 at Celaenae (Plut. *Eum.* 8.7–9), Antigonos' satrapal capital (Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.3; Diod. 18.39.6). Prior to the new regent's return to Macedonia, Antigonos and Antipater had camped separately, although not at too great a distance from one another (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.42–3). There had apparently been growing friction between the two commanders. Even though Antipater showed a great reluctance to engage the remaining Perdiccans in Asia Minor himself (*Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 4–10), Antigonos was apparently criticized for following the lead of the regent for doing likewise (*Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 10–14). He had requested the command against the forces still loyal to the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1.38), but had done little against them. Further conflict was provided by Antigonos' chiliarch, Antipater's son, Cassander, who warned his father against the new general in Asia (Arr. *Succ.* 1.42). Antipater summoned Antigonos, and after consultation new arrangements were made. Antigonos would remain as royal general in Asia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.43), but the kings and Cassander would accompany Antipater to Macedonia; 8500 Macedonians from Antipater's original infantry force and a substantial cavalry contingent as well would be exchanged for the bulk of the remaining veterans from Alexander's expedition now serving Antigonos (Arr. *Succ.* 1.44).⁴³ It is unknown how many of the veterans returned to Macedonia with Antipater, even though the exchange of forces was likely roughly equal (Billows 1990: 72–3). Of the roughly 13,000 Macedonian infantry and 2000 cavalry that were in Babylon at the time of Alexander's death plus as many as 4000 additional Macedonians left in Cilicia by Craterus when

he returned to Macedonia, the argyraspids had been sent with Antigenes to Susa, and it is known that at least 3000 additional veterans likely from Perdiccas' invading force had remained with Antigonus after Antipater's departure. During the winter of 320/19, 3000 Macedonians under Holcias deserted Antigonus, possibly seeking to join Alcetas in Pisidia (Polyaen. 4.6.6). From a base in the mountains these troops engaged in pillaging raids throughout Lycaonia and Phrygia. The incident is not dated by Polyaeus beyond stating that it occurred in the winter, but this must have been the winter of 320/19. This appears clear since Alcetas was still present in Asia Minor. The following year he would be assassinated (Diod. 18.44.1–46.7). Moreover, the incident was resolved only after Antipater had returned to Macedonia. Antigonus' subordinate Leonidas after the capture of the renegade force took them to Macedonia (Polyaen. 4.6.6). If Antipater had been still in Asia, he would have had these troops added to the force of veterans that the regent was ready to return to Macedonia. After the departure of Holcias and his 3000 Macedonian veterans, the number of remaining soldiers from the grand army of Alexander left in Asia would have been small.

The revision in the arrangement between Antipater and Antigonus strengthened the latter militarily. In the first place, the kings, Eurydice, and most of the soldiers who had brought them to power would no longer be able to intrigue with the Perdiccans. Secondly, the troops brought in 320 to Asia from Macedonia by Antipater and now given to Antigonus were not the jaded, independently minded, often insubordinate, and occasionally murderous veterans of Alexander's campaigns. Of course, they were not the expert warriors that had served the great Alexander either. These Macedonians gave Antigonus a considerable advantage over all of his rivals. Many of these soldiers had fought with Craterus, and after their defeat and surrender to Eumenes had nevertheless returned to Antipater, displaying a fidelity to their overall commander. Antigonus was now in a position to pursue his goal of ridding Asia of former Perdiccans without serious concerns regarding the loyalty of his own forces to their former commanders.

For Eumenes the winter did not bring such welcome results. While in winter quarters, Eumenes had sent envoys to Alcetas and to the other Perdiccan leaders who had joined that commander in Pisidia, suggesting strongly that they unite their forces and make war on Antigonus in common (*Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 11–F72^v 6; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.41; Plut. *Eum.* 8.8). As noted, after Perdiccas' assassination, Attalus had initially fled to Tyre, which served as a collecting point for many supporters of the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.39; Diod. 18.37.3–4). He joined in the short-lived agitation at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1.32–3), and later, with the other Perdiccans who joined him, and with additional forces recruited in Phoenicia, mounted an unsuccessful attack on Rhodes before joining Alcetas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.39; cf. Diod. 18.45.3), bringing with him an army of 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.39), along with the 800 talents acquired in Tyre (Diod. 18.37.4). Docimus, who at Triparadeisus was replaced as satrap in Babylon by Seleucus, and Polemon, Attalus' brother, also joined Alcetas in Pisidia (Arr. *Succ.* 24.3; Diod. 18.39.6, 45.3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.8). Clearly the Perdiccan forces were still

formidable. From Plutarch (*Eum.* 8.8), it would appear that the various commanders came together in Celaenae to discuss the situation. In the end, however, the negotiations proved fruitless; neither Eumenes nor Alcetas was willing to concede the chief command. Apparently Alcetas himself did not exercise authority without difficulties being raised by his fellow commanders in Pisidia. Plutarch (*Eum.* 8.8) reports that in their negotiations with Eumenes, Alcetas, Polemon, and Docimus all sought the chief command. This jealousy and rivalry had divided the Perdiccans at the time of Antipater's invasion and it now divided them again. This contentiousness was endemic and would prove disastrous. Later, in 317 (cf. Diod. 19.16.1), a number of imprisoned Perdiccans, including Attalus and Docimus, overpowered their guards, and while Docimus urged that they escape into the countryside immediately, others counseled that since the fortress was strong and well supplied, they remain and await aid from Eumenes (Diod. 19.16.1–3).⁴⁴ Indeed, these same commanders spent so much time disputing what action to take in this instance that the option of escape disappeared, and they remained trapped in their prison by Antigonus' troops (Diod. 19.16.3). Docimus, who had wished to escape into the countryside all along, did escape by a secret route, which he then betrayed to the besieging troops. His former prison companions were subsequently killed, while he passed into the service of Antigonus, apparently through the intervention of the latter's wife Stratonice (Diod. 19.16.4–5). The united Perdiccan armies would have been much superior in numbers to the forces of Antigonus; they would also have been more experienced. In 319, Eumenes possessed 20,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry (Diod. 18.40.7; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 9.3), and Alcetas 16,000 foot and 900 horse (Diod. 18.45.1). Antigonus must have had roughly two-thirds as many infantry as his opponents' combined forces, and was much inferior in cavalry.

The failure of the Perdiccans to cooperate emboldened Antigonus. He left his winter quarters actively seeking Eumenes. Eumenes had himself already left Celaenae and was encamped in Cappadocia (Diod. 18.40.1), where he wished to make full use of his cavalry on the plains. Although his troops had remained loyal in the wake of the disaster in Egypt, during the winter one of Eumenes' commanders, Perdiccas, deserted with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Eumenes recaptured the deserters, put the leaders to death, and pardoned the common soldiers, redistributing them among the other units (Diod. 18.40.1–4). While Eumenes' earlier stratagem of plundering his rivals' satrapies had alleviated his difficulties in paying his forces, this procedure had only delayed the problem. Eumenes was cut off from access to the wealth of Asia. Even though he maintained that he, not Antigonus, represented the legitimate authority in Asia, the various "royal" officials of Asia took their orders from King Philip. Antigonus, as the royal general in Asia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38; Diod. 18.39.7, 40.1), had access to the treasuries of Asia; the surviving Perdiccans did not. The various garrisons placed with their own commanders in various cities and as guardians of the various treasuries proved to be most loyal to the official government of the kings. Now, that government was represented by Antigonus and these commanders and forces deferred to him as the official royal representative.

The resources of the other Perdiccans were now also extremely limited, and maintaining armies was an expensive proposition. Attalus and Alcetas presumably still had some financial resources left over from Attalus' acquisition of 800 talents at Tyre (Diod. 18.37.4). But it was Antigonus who had the financial resources, and he was quick to take advantage of them. He made "great promises" to Apollonides, a commander of Eumenes' mercenary cavalry. Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry remained loyal; his wife and children remained in Cappadocia throughout Eumenes' campaigns (Nep. *Eum.* 13.4). While Eumenes raised 6300 Cappadocian and Paphlagonian (a Paphlagonian had killed Craterus [Arr. *Succ.* 1a.27]) cavalry for the Armenian campaign, these troops were not mercenary soldiers. They were land owners who were rewarded for their services by the remission of taxes and gifts of horses and other honors (Plut. *Eum.* 4.3), not with pay (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.9–10). Patronage was the means of securing loyalty from native peoples. This was a practice that was followed by Alexander himself. One of the secrets to Alexander's success was his ability "to create the conditions for a balance between his own ambition and the [indigenous] nobility's desire not to perish in the turmoil" (Briant 2002: 870). Eumenes' remaining cavalry were part of the "considerable army" given to him by Perdiccas in 320 (Diod. 18.25.6). Mercenary cavalry played a prominent role in Eumenes' battle against Craterus and Neoptolemus; "he arrayed against Craterus not a single Macedonian, but two troops of 'mercenary' horse" (Plut. *Eum.* 7.1).

Apollonides agreed that during the coming battle he would desert (Diod. 18.40.5–8; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 9.3). Eumenes had moved to a position at Orcynia in eastern Cappadocia where the ground was highly suitable for cavalry maneuvers (Plut. *Eum.* 9.3).⁴⁵ Antigonus advanced against him with more than 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and thirty elephants (Diod. 18.40.7); a sizable portion of his forces had been left behind to guard against any attack by the Perdiccans in Pisidia. He had been given 8500 Macedonian infantry and perhaps as many as 2000 cavalry by Antipater before the regent crossed to Europe, but only 5000 Macedonian infantry accompanied him in his pursuit of Eumenes (Diod. 18.40.7). Additionally, even though the majority of the old royal army returned with Antipater, certain elements from Perdiccas' old forces, including cavalry, elephants, and Greek and Asiatic infantry, were retained by him as well. While the core of these armies was Macedonian, the majority of the forces were Asian and mercenary forces. Later, against Alcetas, Antigonus possessed 40,000 infantry (Diod. 18.45.1), and even though Antigonus had acquired many of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen (Diod. 18.41.4), Eumenes only had 20,000 foot (Diod. 18.40.7) and his forces had suffered 8000 deaths, most of which must have been infantry (Diod. 18.40.8). The difference in the infantry numbers at Orcynia and in the battle against Alcetas therefore represents troops who were detached to watch the other Perdiccans while Antigonus dealt with Eumenes (so Tarn 1969 [1953]: 471; Engel 1971: 228; Billows 1990: 75 n. 43). These likely included 40 elephants (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.43), 10,000–15,000 infantry, and perhaps 2000 cavalry.

Opposed to Antigonus, Eumenes had approximately 20,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. In the course of the battle, Apollonides, as prearranged, deserted; 8000 of Eumenes' men were killed and his entire supply train captured (Diod. 18.40.6–8; Plut. *Eum.* 9.3; Just. 14.2.1).⁴⁶ Apollonides, however, did not long survive his treachery. He was later captured by Eumenes' forces and hanged (Plut. *Eum.* 9.3). This was but a minor victory in the midst of an overwhelming defeat. Most of Eumenes' troops who survived the debacle enrolled with their conqueror (Diod. 18.41.4; cf. Diod. 18.41.1; Plut. *Eum.* 10.1). After his defeat Eumenes marched rapidly toward Armenia, where he hoped to replenish his army (Diod. 18.41.1). Part of Armenia may have remained loyal as a result of his campaigning in that area in 322 and 321. He probably also wanted to make contact with Orontes, the satrap of Armenia Major. Antigonus' now superior cavalry, however, made Eumenes' movements difficult. Even though Antigonus' infantry had fallen behind Eumenes' retreating force, his cavalry continually forced the latter to engage in rearguard actions (Nep. *Eum.* 5.2). Desertion was also a problem for Eumenes, with Antigonus enrolling the deserters (Diod. 18.41.1; Just. 14.2.3). With escape becoming impossible, Eumenes dismissed most of his remaining forces and, with 600 men, retreated into the fortress of Nora located somewhere in the foothills of the northern Taurus mountains, just south of the Cappadocian plain (Diod. 18.41.1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 10.1; Nep. *Eum.* 5.3; Just. 14.2.2–3).⁴⁷ Entering the fortress with a larger force would have accelerated and aggravated the hardships of a siege, and Eumenes reasoned that he might under those circumstances be surrendered to the enemy (Just. 14.2.3). Eumenes' flight into Nora occurred in the late spring of 319 (Anson 1977: 251–6). Nora was a small but virtually impregnable bastion, little more than 1200 feet in circumference, perched on the top of a mountain and well fortified. In addition, it contained sufficient supplies for Eumenes and his party to endure a long siege (Diod. 18.41.2–3). After Antigonus surrounded the fortress and began the construction of double walls, ditches, and palisades, he invited Eumenes to a conference (Diod. 18.41.6; Plut. *Eum.* 10.2–11.3). While the two renewed their former friendship, Eumenes refused to attach himself to Antigonus as a subordinate. Instead he demanded that he be reinstated in his satrapy and cleared of all charges (Diod. 18.41.6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 10.6). Eumenes' demand that all charges against him be dismissed (Diod. 18.41.7) clearly refers to the condemnation of him by the army in Egypt, and the true nature of that assembly is clear in that, apparently, there was no need for these charges to be appealed to another such assemblage. Antigonus forwarded this request not to the royal army, but to the regent Antipater (Diod. 18.41.7; Plut. *Eum.* 11.1). Plainly both Eumenes and Antigonus saw such decisions as royal prerogatives, as they had traditionally been in Macedonia (see the Introduction above; Anson 1985: 303–16; 2013b: 26–42).

After leaving sufficient troops to maintain the siege, Antigonus moved in seven days by forced marches into Pisidia to meet the remaining Perdiccans (Diod. 18.41.7, 44.1; Polyae. 4.6.7). Diodorus reports that this march was completed with all of his forces. The only way this could be true is if most of his army had

already begun their march to Pisidia while the pursuit of Eumenes continued with only cavalry and light-armed troops. Given that the force that defeated Eumenes contained elephants (Diod. 18.40.7), such rapid movement with the entire army from Nora to Pisidia would have been impossible. With part of the army already left behind to deal with a possible attack from Alcetas, and with most of the heavy infantry, including elephants, proceeding to join their counterparts near Pisidia immediately after the battle, the remaining force of cavalry and light infantry could pursue Eumenes, implement the siege, and move rapidly to Pisidia. In Pisidia, Antigonos' army now numbered 40,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry (Diod. 18.45.1; cf. 18.40.7, 50.3), which included part of Eumenes' former force (Diod. 18.40.8–41.1).

In the Pisidic *Aulon*, an unidentified pass just south of the southern branch of the Persian Royal Road, the two opposing armies met and the last major Perdiccan force was defeated (Diod. 18.44–7; Polyæn. 4.6.7). According to Polyænus, Antigonos surprised his enemy and captured the camp with most of Alcetas' infantry still arming themselves for battle. Antigonos offered terms, and his former enemies now became part of his ever-expanding army. In Polyænus, this was a victory "without a battle." Diodorus, however, presents a different scenario, and is to be preferred. Here, while the element of surprise is also attested, its results are not so overwhelming. It leads to Antigonos seizing the heights above the camp, not securing a painless victory (Diod. 18.44.2). Antigonos' attempt to catch the Perdiccan army unawares was betrayed by the trumpeting of his elephants. This allowed Alcetas and his fellow commanders to organize an attack on the heights, giving their phalanx time to form for battle. Despite a gallant effort in which many casualties were suffered on both sides, the Perdiccan attempt was defeated. Victorious in this engagement, Antigonos launched 6000 of his cavalry into the gap between Alcetas' now defeated cavalry and his phalanx, preventing the two from joining. Now, Antigonos launched his own phalanx down from the ridge and onto the enemy. The Perdiccans, as a consequence of these separate actions, found themselves attacked on the flanks and rear by the enemy's victorious cavalry and in the front by Antigonos' elephants and far more numerous infantry. The remaining Perdiccan forces only contained 16,000 infantry and 900 cavalry. Antigonos' victory was complete. He obtained the surrender of almost the entire surviving enemy force through negotiation, and enrolled these units into his now immense army (Diod. 18.45.4). Not long after this battle Antigonos' force had grown to 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (Diod. 18.50.1, 3).

Attalus, Docimus, and Polemon, and many other former allies of Perdiccas, were taken captive (Diod. 18.45.3) and held in that prison from which they later launched their abortive escape attempt. Alcetas, who had long cultivated the Pisidians, escaped into the Pisidic fortress of Termessus (Diod. 18.45.3–46.3),⁴⁸ but was subsequently betrayed and committed suicide (Diod. 18.46.7). When the body was turned over to Antigonos, he maltreated it for three days before abandoning it and Pisidia. Alcetas' supporters amongst the Pisidians, then, recovered his corpse and performed the proper rites (Diod. 18.47.3). The particular hatred

shown by Antigonos toward Alcetas, but not the other Perdiccan commanders, is curious. Perhaps Alcetas had been especially insistent that Antigonos be removed from his satrapy in 322, or perhaps it was simply the familial connection to Perdiccas. Antigonos now went into winter quarters at Celaenae in the fall of 319 (Diod. 18.52.1). The First War of the Successors had ended; it would not be the last.

Notes

- 1 Curtius (10.5.5) says to the “best” man.
- 2 See Anson (1988: 471–7) for an assessment of Antigonos’ power in 322.
- 3 Diod. 18.16.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.11; Plut. *Eum.* 3.12; App. *Mith.* 2.2; Just. 13.6.1. Clearly this campaign took place in 322. Diodorus (18.16.4) states that Perdiccas’ invasion of Cappadocia and Craterus’ crossing to Europe, which occurred before the Battle of Crannon (cf. Diod. 18.16.4–17.8; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 28.1), were roughly contemporaneous. The Battle of Crannon took place in early August (Schober 1981: 54, 66–8). Leaving in April/May, and taking approximately three months for the journey, Perdiccas likely arrived in Cappadocia in time to take advantage of the harvest which occurred there in late July and August (Engels 1978: 37). His rate of travel was slowed by the presence of elephants to between 9 and 12 miles per day (Engels 1978: 155; Proctor 1971: 34). That elephants were present is not definite, but they were part of Alexander’s army and are found later with Perdiccas in Egypt (Diod. 18.35.1, 4), making their presence on the regent’s march to Cappadocia probable.
- 4 While Diodorus 18.16.2 suggests that only one battle took place, Diodorus’ abbreviation has compressed two battles into one.
- 5 Photius’ statement (*Bibl.* 382–388B = Diod. 31.19.4) that Ariarathes fell in battle is in error (cf. Hornblower 1981: 40–3).
- 6 Diod. 18.16.2–3; 31.19.5; Plut. *Eum.* 3.12–13; Just. 13.6.1–3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.12. Scholars dispute whether Neoptolemus was officially a satrap or a general, and, by whatever title, what his mission was in that region. While an emended Dexippus (Arr. *Succ.* 1b.6) would make Neoptolemus satrap of Armenia, no other source supports this contention. Diodorus (18.29.2) in 320 calls Neoptolemus *hegemon*, leader, not satrap. There is little doubt that the actual satrap of Armenia at this time was Orontes. Western Armenia, however, had been a separate province from Greater Armenia under the Persians (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.4; cf. Str. 11.12.3–4; 14.1, 5; Joseph. *AJ* 2.252). According to Curtius (4.12.10, 12; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.5), there were two contingents of Armenians at the Battle of Gaugamela: “the Armenians who are called Lesser” and from the “nation of Greater Armenia.”
- 7 See Chapter 2; Tarn 1948: 151–3; Anson 1981; 1988b; Heckel 1982: 60–2.
- 8 No source gives any indication of the ending of 322.
- 9 Also, Ptolemaeus or Ptolemy (Plut. *Eum.* 10.3). While there is debate over the spelling of the name, Polemaeus is used here in preference to Ptolemaeus, the transliteration of the Greek for the more frequently used English Ptolemy, primarily to avoid confusion with respect to references to Ptolemy the satrap of Egypt.
- 10 For the date, see Bengtson 1937: 77–8.
- 11 In this passage Diodorus mistakenly refers to Leonnatus as Philotas, but the reference to the latter as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia makes the individual indicated clear.

- 12 Justin (13.6.6–7) inaccurately states that they were never married.
- 13 Denying that the name had such a designation: Badian 1982; Carney 2000: 33, 280–1 n. 113.
- 14 This is a point properly emphasized by Michael Rathmann (2005b: 78). Whatever may have been the extent of the regent's ambitions, one was always to hold Alexander's legacy intact.
- 15 Justin 13.4.6 states that this is King Philip Arrhidaeus who is accompanying the body: this is an obvious error.
- 16 As Schubert 1914: 180–1; Erskine 2002: 171; Schäfer 2002: 59–60.
- 17 Briant (1989: 161), however, had earlier stated that Asander and Menander knew of Antigonos' proposed flight but did nothing to hinder it. Fontana (1960: 169 n. 6; cf. Billows 1990: 59, 403) argues that both were allied to Antigonos before he fled to Macedonia.
- 18 Rathmann (2005b: 65, 78) recognizes Perdiccas' desire to maintain the integrity of the empire, but is undecided if this was as altruistic as Vezin and Fontana maintain.
- 19 For example, 11.27.1; 11.91.1–2; 12.51.2 and 53.1; 13.44.6 and 54.1; 13.96.5 and 103.3, 104.1; 14.17.12 and 19.1; 14.35.1 and 7; 14.88.2–3 and 90.1; 14.99.1 and 100.5; 15.12.1 and 14.1; 15.65.2 and 71.1; 15.73.4 and 75.1.
- 20 Followed by Manni 1949; 1951: 67–73; Errington 1970: 75–7; 1977; Billows 1990: 64–80; Anson 2002/3.
- 21 Followed by Beloch 1967 [1927]: 237–41; Bosworth 1992a; 1992b; and most recently by Romm 2011: xiv.
- 22 For the most recent edition and translation see Finkel and van der Spek 2013. Other editions include: Del Monte 1997: 183–4; Grayson 1975: 115; Smith 1924: 140, 142.
- 23 Finkel and van der Spek (2013) read the word accepted by other commentators as Aiaru as "same month."
- 24 This cuneiform tablet was discovered in the British Museum and, while thought to be from Babylon and generally regarded as a copy of a lost original dating from the early third century BC, its actual origin and age are unknown.
- 25 The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B F-10) places the annexation in 322/21. According to the relative chronology of both Diodorus and Arrian, summer or fall of 322 appears the most likely time. Diodorus brackets his account between the start of Perdiccas' war with Ariarathes (18.16.1) and his attack on the Pisidian cities (18.22.1). Arrian apparently placed the episode between the war with Ariarathes and Perdiccas' intriguing against Antigonos and the arrival of Nicaea and Cleopatra offering the regent marriage (*Succ.* 1a.11, 20).
- 26 Burstein (1991: 139–40) and Collins (2008: 46–59) claim that Alexander was never officially enthroned, but he did assume the titulature of pharaoh (Anson 2013b: 104).
- 27 The sailing season typically opened March 10 (Casson 1995 [1971]: 270) putting the crossing likely in April.
- 28 While this is nowhere stated, Antipater subsequently reappointed him to the satrapy of Cilicia (*Arr. Succ.* 1.34; *Diod.* 18.39.6), making it almost a certainty that he must have deserted the Perdiccan cause soon after Perdiccas appointed him.
- 29 Both Briant (1989: 223–4 n. 13) and Bosworth (1978: 229–37) have argued that the papyrus fragment *PSI* 12.1284, from Arrian, refers to Eumenes' battle with Neoptolemus, not to Eumenes' later victory over Craterus and Neoptolemus, which is the ascription of most scholars (for example, see Latte 1950; Wirth 1965; Thompson 1984; Billows 1990: 66 n. 27). Briant's and Bosworth's claim is refuted, however, by Plutarch's description of the battle (*Eum.* 5.4–5). In the fragment the hostile phalanx

- is drawn up in a tight battle formation and remained intact, but in Plutarch, Neoptolemus' soldiers are scattered in pursuit of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen. In the later battle between Eumenes and Craterus, it is clear that Craterus' forces are drawn up and remained in formation (Diod. 18.32.1).
- 30 Justin (13.8.5) names the allies as Antipater and Polyperchon, rather than Antipater and Craterus. Polyperchon had been left in charge of Macedonia (Diod. 18.38.6).
- 31 Pigres is a name of likely southwestern Asian origin, with the individual here mentioned likely being a cavalry commander assigned to Neoptolemus by Perdiccas (Anson 2004: 108 n. 108).
- 32 Eumenes was married to his sister Artonis (Plut. *Eum.* 1.7; Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6).
- 33 Arr. *Succ.* 1a.27; Diod. 18.30.5–32.2; Plut. *Eum.* 7.3–7; Nep. *Eum.* 4.1–2; Just. 13.8.8; Diod. 18.31–32.2; *PSI* 12.1284.
- 34 Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.2–6, 9–20, 4.12–16; 3.2.1–39; 5.1.1–14, 4.19–21, 5.7–24, 6.1–12, 21–37, 7.3–26; 6.1.14, 25–33, 2.4–12, 4.10–14, 17–19, 20–2, 6.11–19, 29–30, 37; 7.1.24–35, 3.2–6, 10–14, 6.7–41.
- 35 Photius, in his epitome of Arrian's *Successors*, makes no mention of the army assembly and has all decisions reached in the conference of the conspirators and Ptolemy. Diodorus, on the other hand, makes no reference to a conference. Here, both accounts are assumed to be accurate, with the radical nature of the abridgements in the two surviving sources being responsible for the seeming inconsistency.
- 36 Arr. *Succ.* 1a.30; Diod. 18.37.2, 59.4, 62.1; Plut. *Eum.* 8.2; Nep. *Eum.* 5.1; App. *Syr.* 53; *Mith.* 8; Just. 13.8.10.
- 37 While Triparadeisus has not been positively identified, it was most likely in the valley of the Orontes river in northern Syria (Schlumberger 1969).
- 38 If Perdiccas' death occurred no later than early July, then the march from Egypt to Triparadeisus in northern Syria where the royal army rendezvoused with Antipater (Diod. 18.39.1) would have taken approximately two months; the distance is roughly 650 miles and the army was encumbered with elephants.
- 39 According to Justin (14.1.11), Eumenes came forward and claimed responsibility for the letters. This aspect of the incident is unlikely. If it were correct, why would Eumenes' men still believe there was a need for a bodyguard?
- 40 Throughout the Hellenistic age similar expedients were common (see Launey 1950: 734–5).
- 41 The palimpsest is a parchment document believed to have originally contained a fragment of Arrian's lost history of the *Successors*, which was preserved by being erased and overwritten. Given modern techniques, much of the original Arrian text has been uncovered. See Dreyer 2007: 251–5 for the most current edition and translation.
- 42 Bosworth 1992a: 76–7; 1992b: 60) believes that there was “active campaigning” between Antipater and Eumenes in Asia Minor. The evidence suggests otherwise. The *Gothenburg Palimpsest* (fos. 72^r 14–73^v 11) implies that Antipater and Antigonus did nothing to interfere with Eumenes.
- 43 While Photius (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.43) states that Antipater gave Antigonus 8500 cavalry as well as 8500 infantry, the cavalry figure must be an error (Errington 1970: 71 n. 149). Later, even after acquiring additional horsemen, Antigonus' cavalry total was still only 7000 (Diod. 18.45.1). Clearly some cavalry were given to him, but probably fewer than 2000, not 8500.
- 44 Awaiting the arrival of Eumenes appears peculiar, since they thought the time was ripe to escape because Antigonus was heading east to the upper satrapies. Eumenes had

headed east even before Antigonus. However, there is some evidence that Eumenid loyalists in Cappadocia were contesting Antigonus' commander Menander's occupation of the Cardian's old province (see Chapter 5).

- 45 The actual site of Orcynia is unknown, but it was likely somewhere in eastern Cappadocia (cf. Diod. 18.40.6).
- 46 Polyaeus 4.6.19, in all likelihood, referring to this battle (see Billows 1990: 75–6), states that Eumenes' phalanx fled before any advance against Antigonus as the result of an Antigonid ruse. According to Polyaeus, Antigonus arranged for a soldier, while envoys from Eumenes were present, to announce, "the allies are here." Antigonus then dismissed the delegation and led out his army the next day, drawing up his phalanx with its front twice as long as usual. This description, if indeed, referring to this battle, cannot be reconciled with the descriptions in Diodorus and Plutarch and must be then rejected as erroneous.
- 47 While there have been many suggested locations for Nora (Ramsay 1923: 8; Talbert 2000: 63, E4; Schneider 1995: 17–20), the site remains unknown.
- 48 For a description of the ancient fortress, see Arr. *Anab.* 1.27.5–6 (cf. Str. 14.3.9).

The End of a Dynasty

The Perdiccan cause, whatever it had truly stood for, was now dead along with its leader. Antipater and the kings had gone on to Macedonia; Antigonus, their general in Asia, had killed, captured, or trapped the last of the prominent followers of the new age's first regent. Perdiccas' regime had lasted barely three years (Diod. 18.36.7). The new one would survive for even less.

Antipater, after a protracted illness, died in the late summer of 319 (Diod. 18.48.4; 47.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; *Eum.* 12.1).¹ He was 77 years of age (Suda s.v. *Antipater*). The new regent was not Antipater's eldest son Cassander, nor any of his six sons (Heckel 2006: 35), but Craterus' old second-in-command, Polyperchon, who had accompanied that commander to Cilicia and then to Macedonia (Diod. 18.48.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12.1). He had remained in charge of the country when Antipater and Craterus had crossed to Asia to attack Perdiccas (Just. 13.6.9), and was held in high regard by the Macedonians (Diod. 18.48.4). While Diodorus states that Antipater appointed the new regent, and this was the true nature of the selection, officially it must have been Philip III who chose his regent. Cassander was made chiliarch, or Polyperchon's official second-in-command (Diod. 18.48.4–5). Antipater's death and this slighting of his eldest son would see the beginning of the second war over Alexander's inheritance.

The news of Antipater's death reached Antigonus after his brief siege of Termessus, while he was on his way to Celaenae to enter winter quarters, following his very successful campaigning season (Diod. 18.47.4, 52.1). All of Asia now appeared to be his for the taking (Diod. 18.47.5, 50.1–3). It is clear from Antigonus' first silent refusal to obey the then regent Perdiccas that he did not view the empire as having the status of a state to which he owed allegiance. He had been virtually abandoned by Alexander in 333 and had operated independently for over a decade during that ruler's lifetime. The only real question is the extent of Antigonus' ambition at this time. It probably did not extend beyond Asia Minor, but that ambition had likely been kindled by his appointment as royal general. Later events would spark larger hopes. For now, Antigonus and his counselors prepared for the coming campaign year in which those satraps in western Asia unfavorable to

the royal general would be replaced and new alliances would be formed with other principal players.

During the winter, Antigonus received an important fugitive, Antipater's son Cassander (Diod. 18.54.3).² Since the nobles and the army commanders in Macedonia supported Polyperchon (Diod. 18.49.1, 54.2), even though Cassander wished to challenge his father's decision to award the regency to Polyperchon, he did not attack the new regent openly. However, during the fall Cassander privately gathered support (Diod. 18.49.2). Given that Polyperchon had strong backing in Macedonia, Cassander was forced to seek allies elsewhere. He, therefore, sought alliances with "other commanders and cities," who had been allied with, or "friends" of, his father (Diod. 18.49.3). His supporters in Macedonia he sent secretly to the Hellespont in preparation for his own flight from Macedonia (Diod. 18.54.2).

Outside of Greece, he sent envoys to Ptolemy to renew their friendship and to secure an alliance (Diod. 18.49.3, 54.3). Cassander asked that Ptolemy send a fleet to his aid (Diod. 18.49.3). While there is no evidence that Ptolemy complied, it is clear that some arrangement was reached (Diod. 18.54.3). To understand Ptolemy's actions, it is necessary to return to his suggestion at the original meeting in Babylon that a ruling council be created as opposed to choosing a single successor for the Conqueror. Polyperchon now represented centralized imperial authority. Cassander, at least judging from his later actions, did not. Antipater's son wished to establish himself as the legitimate ruler of Macedonia (Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 124–36; 2010), and whatever other parcels might come his way. His ambitions, like those of the other Diadochs, were personal. Their rivalry was not that of the heads of national states, but rather conquerors holding spear-won lands as their own personal possessions. For a time this rivalry would be played out under the fiction of serving the kings.

When all was arranged, Cassander fled to Antigonus. Our sources state that Cassander believed that Antigonus, who owed his command in Asia to Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38; Diod. 18.39.7), and whose eldest son Demetrius, the future Poliorcetes or "Besieger of Cities," was married to Phila, one of Cassander's sisters and the former wife of Craterus (Diod. 19.59.3–6), would out of loyalty support Cassander. It is difficult to believe that Cassander was so naïve that he thought that Antigonus would simply endorse the son out of loyalty to the dead father. Antigonus would remember that Cassander had denounced him to Antipater before the latter crossed back to Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.42). The truth is that Cassander, who had suspected Antigonus' ambitions back in 320, realized that Antigonus might welcome a conflict in Macedonia and Greece. Cassander's arrival would have convinced Antigonus and his advisors that with very little effort on their part a war in Europe could be fomented which would eliminate any possible interference from that quarter in their plans for Asia.

Before Antigonus could launch his spring offensive, however, Arrhidaeus, the former regent and current satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, learned of Antigonus' intentions and began to secure his satrapy against attack; cities throughout the province were strengthened with garrisons (Diod. 18.51). When the autonomous

Greek city of Cyzicus³ refused to cooperate with the satrap (Diod. 18.52.3), Arrhidaeus without warning launched an attack on the city early in 318.⁴ The attack was poorly executed and proved unsuccessful. When Antigonus heard of the assault, he set out for the coast with 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry (Diod. 18.52.1). While arriving after the siege had been abandoned, Antigonus still accused Arrhidaeus of attacking an allied city without provocation and preparing to rebel against legitimate authority (Diod. 18.51.7–52.3). Arrhidaeus was ordered to surrender his province and retire to a single city (Diod. 18.52.3), but the satrap refused and prepared to resist. Part of his forces he detached and sent to relieve Eumenes in Nora (Diod. 18.52.4). There is no indication in the sources as to the fate of this expedition, but it is likely that it was intercepted by forces loyal to Antigonus before it reached Cappadocia.

Antigonus detached part of his army and left them to carry on the campaign against the recalcitrant satrap; these succeeded in driving the latter into the city of Cius, where they placed him under siege (Diod. 18.72.2). Antigonus himself proceeded still early in the year to Lydia where he planned to depose the satrap Cleitus (Diod. 18.52.5). Prior to Antigonus' arrival, Cleitus had secured many of his cities with garrisons and then with the royal fleet, which he still commanded, fled to Macedonia where he revealed Antigonus' activities to Polyperchon (Diod. 18.52.6). Antigonus captured Ephesus on his first assault, and by the end of spring or early in the summer of 318 he had conquered all of Lydia (Diod. 18.52.7–8). It must have been about this time that Antigonus sent Cassander back to Greece with 35 ships and 4000 mercenaries (Diod. 18.68.1; cf. 18.54.3). With these forces Cassander sailed to Piraeus in May 318 (Diod. 18.68.1).⁵

In line with his "great expectations," Antigonus had opened negotiations with Eumenes, offering terms that were quite generous. Depending on how early in the year the attack on Cyzicus was, it is possible that Arrhidaeus' actions may have precipitated Antigonus' offer of friendship and alliance to Eumenes (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 175), but it is likely that these negotiations began earlier during the winter. Eumenes would receive a satrapy, presumably Cappadocia (Diod. 18.50.4).⁶ In exchange Eumenes was "to share in [Antigonus'] own undertakings" (Diod. 18.53.5; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12.2–3; Nep. *Eum.* 5.7). With the news of the death of Antipater, there was no apparent alternative to an alliance with Antigonus. Therefore, "at the approach of spring" (Nep. *Eum.* 5.7), Eumenes swore an oath of loyalty to Antigonus and was released from Nora (Diod. 18.53.5). Plutarch (*Eum.* 12.2–4; cf. Nep. *Eum.* 5.7; App. *Syr.* 53) paints quite a different picture of the circumstances surrounding Eumenes' release from that presented by Diodorus. According to Plutarch, Eumenes changed the wording of the oath of loyalty proposed by Antigonus, so that he swore allegiance to the kings and Olympias as well as to Antigonus, thereby obtaining his release without compromising his loyalty to the kings and the royal family. The theme of Eumenes' loyalty to the royal Argead family is one that permeates our sources (Diod. 18.53.7, 57.4, 58.2–4; 19.44.2; Plut. *Eum.* 1.4, 3.14; Nep. *Eum.* 6.5, 13.3) and likely originates with Hieronymus (Anson 2004: 1–11). Eumenes' career certainly had begun and

had risen as a result of royal patronage. Eumenes, using a connection between his father and Philip II (Plut. *Eum.* 1.3; cf. Nep. *Eum.* 1.4), and after having been exiled from his home city of Cardia (Plut. *Ser.* 1.5), joined Philip, becoming that monarch's personal secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1.4; Nep. *Eum.* 1.5). Eumenes was a *hetairo*s of both Philip and Alexander (Nep. *Eum.* 1.6; Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4–6; Diod. 17.107.6; 20.109.7).⁷ As a non-Macedonian aristocrat, he was compelled throughout his early career to be an Argead loyalist, and later, with the death of Perdikkas, it was a theme he would continue to rely on in his quest for power.⁸

The tale of the altered oath supports our sources' general picture of Eumenes' loyalty, but it is false, much as the general picture of Eumenes' unbridled loyalty to the royal family is likewise also untrue. There was no changed oath. It would have freed Eumenes from Nora, but it would have left him in straitened conditions and facing a renewed battle with the powerful Antigonus.⁹ Like Plutarch's earlier description of Eumenes' refusal to surrender to Antigonus "so long as I am master of my sword" (Plut. *Eum.* 10.4), this episode appears overly theatrical, and like certain other passages, these anecdotes may originate with Duris of Samos' more embellished history. Eumenes would trick his "friend," but would never violate an oath! Diodorus (18.53.5; 19.44.2) makes no reference to a changed oath, and this is not the result of careless abridgement on that author's part. The accounts in Plutarch and Diodorus differ in other significant ways. The causes for and the timing of the subsequent renewal of hostilities between Eumenes and Antigonus are not the same in the two sources. In Plutarch (*Eum.* 12.7), Antigonus sends a force against Eumenes as soon as he learns of the altered oath; in Diodorus (18.58.4–59.1), Antigonus moves against Eumenes only after the latter's alliance in the summer with Polyperchon.¹⁰ Moreover, Diodorus (18.58.4; cf. 19.44.2) states that after the receipt of the request for the alliance from the new regent "[Eumenes] decided not to take orders from Antigonus." The implication here is clear. Eumenes must at some point have been taking such orders. Strabo (14.5.10), additionally, reports that Eumenes "revolted" from Antigonus; and Pompeius Trogus apparently stated that "the war was renewed by Eumenes" (*Prol.* 4). Besides, the terms offered by Antigonus were basically the same as those demanded by the Cardian shortly after the siege began, and which demands contained no references to the kings or Olympias (Diod. 18.41.6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 10.6). Eumenes had endured being besieged for a year with no help forthcoming from any quarter. Justin (14.2.4) states that Antipater sent aid, but this is an obvious mistake for Arrhidaeus (Bosworth 2002: 100 n. 7; Anson 2004: 134 n. 62). Antigonus, after establishing the siege and hearing Eumenes' terms, had forwarded the matter to Antipater (Diod. 18.41.7). Later, likely after the defeat of the remaining Perdikkas, Eumenes had sent Hieronymus, the future historian, to Antipater in the hopes of obtaining some aid, but that was not forthcoming. It is unknown if Hieronymus ever even reached Macedonia. He is later found in Antigonus' camp, suggesting that he may have been captured attempting to reach Antipater (Diod. 18.50.4; Anson 2004: 134). Eumenes, having exhausted all methods of escaping his confinement

(Nep. *Eum.* 5.7), after almost a year under siege, would have welcomed the offer from Antigonus as an unexpected reprieve.

From the spring, when he was released, until that summer when he formed an alliance with the new regent, Eumenes served the interests of Antigonus. Eumenes was probably to join Antigonus in the late summer. Diodorus (18.53.6) vaguely mentions that Eumenes was, after his release, but before his alliance with Polyperchon, preparing for a campaign, probably Antigonus' proposed offensive to reorder the satrapies of Asia, replacing those governors who were not personally loyal to himself (Diod. 18.50.5).

In Macedonia, after Cassander's departure for Asia, Polyperchon and his advisors discussed various options to counter this threat to the regent. They knew that in addition to possible alliances with Ptolemy and Antigonus many of the Greek cities were either held by garrisons placed there by Antipater or in the control of governments loyal to Antipater's house (Diod. 18.55.2). Indeed, soon after his father's death, and before news of his disloyalty to the regent became known, Cassander, in his capacity as chiliarch, replaced Menyllus, the Macedonian garrison commander in Munychia, the fortified hill dominating the Athenian harbor of Piraeus, with Nicanor,¹¹ an individual personally loyal to the former regent's son (Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; cf. Diod. 18.64.1). Polyperchon's council decided to meet the threat posed by Cassander's loyalists in Greece by issuing in the name of King Philip III a decree calling for a restoration of "the peace and the constitutions that our father Philip [II] established ... preparing peace and such governments as you enjoyed under Philip and Alexander" (Diod. 18.56.2–3). As Diodorus (18.55.4–56.8, 64.3) relates, even though not specifically noted in the decree itself, this decree meant the restoration of democratic governments and a return of those specifically exiled by Antipater in the Spartan and Lamian wars (Diod. 18.8–17; Just. 13.5; Plu. *Phoc.* 23–6; Paus. 1.25.3–5; Hyp. 6.1–20). This arrangement was based on that inaugurated by Alexander the Great's father, Philip II, who put forth the decree establishing the famous League of Corinth in 337, in which the cities then were to retain their traditional governments, i.e., those in existence "when they took the oath concerning the peace" ([Dem.] 17.10; *IG II*² 329, lines 12–14). While this proclamation mirrored many of the features of Philip's League of Corinth, this was not a re-creation of that former alliance (Poddighe 2002: 187; contra: Dixon 2007: 151–78). The decree does not mention "freedom" or "autonomy" specifically, even though these concepts are found in the subsequent correspondence with the Greek cities (Diod. 18.64.3–5, 66.2, 69.3–4; Plut. *Phoc.* 34.4). Certainly, demands made in the accompanying correspondence that the former oligarchs be executed and democratic governments installed would violate any pretense of autonomy. The emphasis on democratic governments was also absent from the original League's charter. In the formal oath setting forth the terms of the 337 alliance, the governments of the states in existence when the oath was sworn were to be maintained in power against outside attack and inside revolution (Tod 1950: 224–5; Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 372–4). Then, a great many of the governments that were to be upheld were oligarchies, and many of these had come into power through the

actions of the Macedonian monarch prior to the establishment of his league (Roebuck 1948). Moreover, there is never any mention of a league in the new decree, no league council made up of representatives from the Greek cities having legislative authority as had existed in Philip's original organization. The new decree was an appeal to those who had been disfranchised by Antipater, especially after the Lamian War, and intended to eliminate the garrisons imposed by that former regent, which now likely supported his son Cassander. Much of the phrasing, the references to Philip II and Alexander the Great, may have been meant more for a Macedonian audience than for a Greek one. In his contest with Cassander, Polyperchon could not let it appear that he was compromising Macedonian interests. The appeal to democratic interests in the Greek cities calls attention to one of the great struggles that often dominated the internal politics of the Greek city-states. Most of these states at one time or another were convulsed by violent revolutions between those who wished to limit the government to those who possessed property and those who believed that all male citizens, regardless of wealth, should be enfranchised. These divisions within the Greek world were in the main responsible for the large numbers of exiles floating about the Hellenic world, many of whom sought their livelihood as mercenaries. Philip II, in his struggles to dominate the southern Greek city-states, was most often opposed by those states with democratic governments, primarily Athens. He therefore favored oligarchic governments. His son Alexander, while following his father's policy of supporting oligarchies on the Greek mainland, found himself an advocate of democratic government with respect to the Greek communities in the Aegean and in Asia Minor. This curiosity of an autocrat favoring democracy becomes understandable in light of the Persian support of oligarchies or even tyrannies. Since the empire Alexander was seeking to conquer was favored by the Greek oligarchic governments in these locations, the Macedonian king would support their rivals (Anson 2013b: 130–1). The Greek democrats in the Aegean island communities and in Asia Minor were willing to live with the irony.

The new decree would then return the governments of the Greek cities to what they had been before Alexander left for Asia (Diod. 18.56.3). Since after the Lamian War oligarchies were installed in most of the former democratic states such as Athens, this would entail the restoration of democratic institutions where Antipater had overturned them (Diod. 18.55.2–4). As also promulgated in the original understanding, all now were to pass laws ensuring that “no one shall engage either in war or in public activity in opposition to us [the kings]” (Diod. 18.56.7). This decree was issued in the winter of 319/18. The decree gave the cities until the thirtieth day of the Macedonian month of Xandicus, late March/early April (see Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 26, 36; Samuel 1972: 140–1, 143) for full implementation (Diod. 18.56.5). While the time to the deadline might appear to be short, it clearly was meant to be. If the absent Cassander's powers in Greece were to be short-circuited, this would need to take place before the refugee's allies could rally to his cause. Moreover, the decree was announced to representatives from the Greek cities already present in Pella, who were immediately sent to

promulgate the decree in their respective cities. Polyperchon also wrote personal letters to many Greek cities ordering them to exile or execute those who had led their states as Antipater's allies (Diod. 18.57.1).

What the document makes very clear is that the changes from the original provisions of the League of Corinth and the rule of Philip II and Alexander III were the policies of Antipater and that he, and by implication his family, were responsible for all the suffering that had then ensued. The decree also obscured the differences in the policies of Philip and those of his son Alexander, subsuming all the changes since 337 under the aegis of the former Macedonian regent Antipater (Poddighe 2013: 226–38). Moreover, this decree in essence proclaimed that anyone who had interfered or who continued to interfere with the original settlements of the two previous monarchs was an enemy of all Greeks, and thereby the decree was a call to arms against those who continued to enforce these violations (Dmitriev 2011: 114).

With respect to the critical Greek city of Athens, not only was the democracy to be restored but, sweetening the deal, Samos was again to be Athenian (Diod. 18.56.7). In his letter to the city, Polyperchon declared that King Philip “ordered that all Athenians were to take part in the administration of the city” (Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1). Nothing is stated specifically in the decree or in the letter with respect to the various Macedonian garrisons established throughout Greece, but the Athenians and others certainly thought that these were to be eliminated by the terms of the new proclamation (Diod. 18.64.1, 5; cf. Diod. 18.55.2, 65.1). When Nicanor refused to evacuate Munychia, the Athenians called upon the kings and their regent “to send them aid *in accordance with the edict that had been issued concerning the autonomy of the Greeks*” (Diod. 18.64.3; emphasis added).

The effect of the decree and letters on Athens was immediate. The constitution imposed on Athens by Antipater had banned from voting or holding office those possessing less than 2000 drachmas of property (Diod. 18.18.4–5). As many as 12,000 Athenians may have left their homeland under compulsion (Diod. 18.18.5; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 28.7; Green 2003: 2). Those still in Athens but without full political rights were now joined by increasing numbers of returning exiles, who referring to the decree, demanded a full restoration of their former status (Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2). When Nicanor, with a promised safe-conduct from the Athenian leader Phocion, attempted to address the Athenians, he was nearly seized, with the Athenians berating Phocion for not taking the Macedonian garrison commander into custody. Nicanor later, by promising much, prevented the Athenians from taking action. During this delay he strengthened his hold on Munychia and even seized the Athenian harbor of Piraeus (Diod. 18.64.2, 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 32; Nep. *Phoc.* 2.5). The plan to capture the latter apparently had been revealed to Phocion by informers, but he told the informers that he did not believe the allegation and promised to assume all responsibility (Nep. *Phoc.* 2.4–5). Later, he did not call out the army to recover the lost port, and when the people armed themselves, he refused to lead them (Nep. *Phoc.* 2.5). Given the Athenian's later action, fleeing to Polyperchon's son Alexander, and not to Nicanor, Phocion

may not have been a party to the Macedonian's action, but rather a victim of Cassander's agent's duplicity.

After the issuance of this proclamation regarding the Greek cities, Polyperchon also wrote to Olympias, inviting her to return to Macedonia to take charge of her grandson (Diod. 18.57.2). He had written to her immediately after becoming regent (Diod. 18.49.4), but she had hesitated so long as Cassander remained in Macedonia (cf. Diod. 18.57.2). With the second request, she wrote to Eumenes to seek his advice, likely checking with one she trusted about the new regent from someone who knew him on campaign (Anson 2004: 141–2). He was after all her old enemy Antipater's choice. This was likely not her first correspondence with the Cardian. As suggested earlier, Cleopatra's offer of her hand to the then regent Perdiccas in 321 probably resulted from correspondence between Eumenes and Olympias. Eumenes had remained in contact with Cleopatra after her settling in Sardis, carrying to her Perdiccas' marriage proposal in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 25.2–6; 26), and himself meeting with her after Perdiccas' death in Egypt (Plut. *Eum.* 8.6–7).

To offset Cassander's alliances with Antigonus and Ptolemy, Polyperchon opened communications in the name of the kings with Eumenes in Cappadocia as soon as he learned of his release from Nora (Diod. 18.57.3–4, 58.1; Plut. *Eum.* 13.1; cf. Anson 2004: 142–5). Eumenes was offered either a share in the guardianship, if he decided to march to Macedonia, or to remain in Asia as “the supreme general in Asia” (Diod. 18.58.1). The title, “Strategos Autocrator” (supreme general) of Asia was that given to Antigonus for his campaign against Eumenes (Diod. 18.50.1; cf. 18.39.7, 40.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38). That commander's authority, therefore, had at the time of this offer to Eumenes been officially superseded. If Eumenes accepted the offer from the new regent, he would be at least theoretically the supreme authority in Asia, with all the satraps, generals, garrison commanders, and treasurers there officially subject to his commands. Along these same lines, letters would also be sent to the argyraspids, then in Cilicia, as well as to the treasurer of the royal treasury in Cyinda, commanding them to place themselves under Eumenes' authority (Diod. 18.58.1). The argyraspids had been separated from the royal army at Triparadeisus and under the command of Antigenes, their leader under Perdiccas, and the newly appointed satrap of Susiane (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.35), sent to transport some of the vast treasure then in Susa to Cyinda in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.38). The wealth which was housed in Cyinda after the transfer from Susa was enormous.¹²

Although appointed satrap of Susiane at Triparadeisus, Antigenes apparently never governed this province directly (Heckel 2006: 30). It is possible that those in charge of the city of Susa and its treasury may have assumed authority over the satrapy. In 331, Alexander had left Archelaus, the son of Theodorus, as general (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9; Curt. 5.2.16–17), and either Mazurus (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9) or Xenophilus as commander of the citadel of Susa (Curt. 5.2.16). Indeed, Xenophilus is found commanding both the citadel and the treasury in 316 (Diod. 19.17.3, 18.1, 48.6). These individuals would be answerable to the royal government and not the local satrap (Anson 2013b: 141–5). Another very real possibility is that Peucestas,

the satrap of Persis, assumed authority over Susiane (see Tarn 1969 [1953]: 477), although this is never attested by any source.¹³ After the return from Susa, the argyraspids and their commander Antigenes, who came to share his command with an otherwise unknown Macedonian named Teutamus, remained in Cilicia.¹⁴

All of these efforts show considerable diplomatic skill on the part of Polyperchon and his advisors. His call for a restoration of the Greek exiles and the reestablishment of the previous governments was to counter the power Cassander would possess with the oligarchies established by his father. Unfortunately, Polyperchon, due primarily to his failures militarily, was unable to capitalize on this goodwill. By associating Olympias in the rule, the regent strengthened his connection to the Argead family and thereby his hold on Macedonia. Her influence was powerful enough that Nicanor was shaken by her demand in 318 that he surrender Munychia to the Athenians (Diod. 18.65.1). With Olympias, however, there was also a downside. Her actions upon returning to Macedonia turned much of the country against her and her sponsor, Polyperchon. Perhaps, because Eumenes was well aware of her tendencies, he had advised her to remain where she was in Epirus and not to return to Macedonia (Diod. 18.58.4). Polyperchon's offer to Eumenes was designed to open a second front in Asia. The choice might appear an unlikely one, given that Eumenes had agreed to follow Antigonos and had only recently been freed from Nora. But, there was no one else to choose. The choice needed to be someone who had been closely associated with Alexander, seen as having the tested ability to command, and having the *auctoritas* to challenge Antigonos, Polyperchon's most serious threat in Asia.

Eumenes' favorable response to the offer from the new regent is a clear testimony to the Cardian's ambitions. Just as the appointment as "supreme general in Asia" whetted Antigonos' desire to carve out a vast domain in Asia, so it did for Eumenes as well. As Plutarch observed nineteen centuries ago, Eumenes was not satisfied with a subordinate role (Plut. *Comp. Eum. et Sert.* 2.3). This sudden turnaround in Eumenes' fortunes intrigued Diodorus, who appointed fate a major role in world history (Sacks 1990: 24–35, 42–54). "All wondered at the incredible fickleness of Fortune ... for who, taking thought of the inconstancies of human life, would not be astonished by the alternating ebb and flow of fortune?" (Diod. 18.59.4–5).¹⁵ In a few short months, Eumenes had gone from being besieged to being a major player in the funeral games.

In the summer of 318, as soon as Antigonos discovered Eumenes' change of allegiance, he sent an army commanded by Menander to Cappadocia, forcing Eumenes to flee to Cilicia with only 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry. Antigonos' goal was either to surprise him in Cappadocia, or to separate him from the resources of his former satrapy, where he still enjoyed wide support (Schäfer 2002: 64–5, 113; Anson 2004: 81 n. 13). It needs to be recalled that Ariarathes in 322 fielded an army of 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry (Diod. 18.16.2), and it took Perdikkas and the grand army two battles to defeat this force (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.11). In Cappadocia, Menander remained to prevent any return by that region's former satrap (Diod. 18.59.1–2). Antigonos did not pursue Eumenes himself,

but remained in Hellespontine Phrygia preparing to cross to Europe with a sizable force in support of his ally Cassander (Diod. 18.72.2). At this critical juncture, Eumenes was not the major concern. However, the need for Antigonos to invade Europe evaporated in the summer of 317 ([Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-13), when a land and sea victory in the Bosphorus secured for his ally Cassander control of the sea, and, for himself, security on his western flank (Diod. 18.72.3–9).

The events leading to the aforementioned victory began in May of the same summer (318) that Eumenes was gathering forces in Cappadocia after his release from Nora. Cassander at this point in time left Asia for Athens. There his supporter Nicanor had been holding out against the Athenians and was in difficulties due to the arrival in the spring of Polyperchon's son Alexander with an army (Diod. 18.65.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1). His father and the kings,¹⁶ with additional forces, were to follow later. In Athens, the king's decree had created chaos. Numbers of those previously exiled, many of whom had accompanied Polyperchon's son Alexander to Athens, had flooded the city and assumed their places in the meetings of the assembly (Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2). Adding to the upheaval were the disingenuous motives of the newly arrived Macedonian commander. He wished to take possession of Munychia and Piraeus himself (Diod. 18.65.3; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1). He had been advised soon after his arrival by Phocion, among other Athenians, that it would be prudent to hold on to the fortifications until the final defeat of Cassander (Diod. 18.65.4), advice which accorded with his own, and clearly his father's, inclinations. As a result, Alexander negotiated "in private" with Nicanor, not permitting any Athenians to attend the sessions (Diod. 18.65.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.3). Within Athens itself, a radical democracy was soon in place, with the so-called government of the 9000, the oligarchy imposed by Antipater, abolished and its leaders condemned to death or exile. New leaders were elected (Diod. 18.65.6). Those forced into exile, including Phocion, fled to Alexander to plead their case. They were well received by the young commander (Diod. 18.66.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.4–7), and with favorable letters from the son to his father, they continued on to Phocis, where Polyperchon and the kings were currently located. Arriving at the same time was an embassy from the restored Athenian democracy, led by the new democratic leader Hagnonides. Polyperchon clearly had made up his mind that Phocion was too closely connected to the old regime. Dinarchus of Corinth (although he spent most of his life in Athens as a politician [Worthington 1992: 3–9]), who had accompanied his friend Phocion to plead with Polyperchon, was arrested on the spot, tortured, and executed, without being permitted to say a word in his own defense (Plut. *Phoc.* 33.8). At one time, he had been Antipater's chief representative in the Peloponessus (Suda s.v. *Deinarchus*). In addition to the connection of those in charge of the previous Athenian government to the Antipatrid family, Polyperchon also needed to demonstrate that his decree was not mere lip service. He had to show his support for the "traditional" government of Athens, i.e. the democracy (cf. Diod. 18.66.2). As a result, even though Phocion had shown a willingness to work with the Macedonians in general, and was not tied to any particular group of Macedonians, Polyperchon turned him over to the democratic leaders.

With Nicanor in control of Piraeus and Munychia, and the government of Athens being in the hands of the democrats, Phocion was expendable. For practical political reasons the new Athenian government was the only possible ally for Polyperchon in the given situation. Through an alliance with the new government he at least had access to the rest of Attica, with the hope that the Athenians and the Macedonians working together could dislodge Nicanor. For the purpose of cementing this alliance Phocion was sacrificed, despite what were generally perceived by all parties as his previous services to Macedonia.

Phocion and those who had joined him on the embassy were arrested and turned over to the Athenians to decide their fate. They were tried before the assembly and condemned (Diod. 18.66.4–67.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 34–6). Phocion drank the hemlock and died early in May (Diod. 18.67.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 37.1–5; Nep. *Phoc.* 3.3–4.4). Not long after these events, Cassander arrived in Piraeus with 35 warships and 4000 soldiers given him by Antigonos (Diod. 18.68.1). Antipater's son, then, occupied the harbor, while Nicanor maintained the garrison in Munychia. Polyperchon now left Phocis and with his army of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000 allies, 1000 cavalry, and 65 elephants, and camped near the harbor. Diodorus (18.68.3) reports that, since the regent was short of supplies and believed that the siege would be long, he left part of the army under the command of his son Alexander to continue the siege and proceeded with the larger part of his forces into the Peloponnesus to accelerate the process of deposing those regimes imposed by Antipater and likely now loyal to Cassander. Diodorus (18.69.3) states that Polyperchon met with delegates from these southern Greek cities, and while this is not directly confirmed, probably did so in the city of Corinth on the isthmus (Dixon 2007: 160–1). Corinth was a convenient meeting place and this was an Isthmian year, when biennial Isthmian panhellenic games were held at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia, outside of Corinth. Most of the Greek cities would have representatives present. Here, while the presence of the regent, the kings, and so many Macedonians did encourage many of the cities in the peninsula to overthrow their existing oligarchic governments and massacre the supporters of these regimes (Diod. 18.70.3–4), Megalopolis remained staunchly in alliance with Cassander, and prepared to withstand a siege (Diod. 18.69.4–70.3).

In Asia, after Eumenes arrived in Cilicia, Antigenes and Teutamus, the commanders of the argyraspids, in obedience to the letters from the kings and Olympias, marched northeast to join him (Diod. 18.59.3). These very same troops with the other Macedonians present in Egypt had condemned Eumenes and the other Perdiccans. This willingness of the argyraspids now to support Eumenes is again evidence of the remaining latent power of the Argead monarchy and also the brief and ephemeral nature of the army assembly. With the call from the kings and regent, the argyraspids joined the very individual they had earlier condemned. Neither the regent, nor the kings, issued a pardon; the sentence was simply ignored. Eumenes, with the forces that had come with him from Cappadocia and the argyraspids, then moved on to Cyinda.¹⁷

Even though Antigenes and Teutamus promised to cooperate fully with Eumenes, and the argyraspids had as a body greeted Eumenes with friendship and enthusiasm (Diod. 18.59.3; Plut. *Eum.* 13.3–4), this was to be a troublesome relationship between the Cardian and his new allies. The argyraspids represented a curious blend of Macedonian nationalism and mercenary characteristics (Anson 1991). They responded to the call from their kings and his regent as loyal Macedonians, yet these troops often acted as if they were an autonomous city-state (Nussbaum 1967: ix, 2–3; Davies 1993: 187). These troops displayed the typical qualities of mercenaries (Parke 1933: 207–8): a distinct lack of fidelity to any authority other than their own immediate commanders and themselves; the military camp was their home, containing their families and all their worldly goods; and a transcending loyalty to successful and generous paymasters. This evolution from national army to mercenary force had begun in earnest during the reign of Alexander the Great himself. After Darius' death in 330, Alexander increasingly made use of mass meetings both to instill enthusiasm in his troops and to test his authority (Errington 1978: 86–91). There was also the tendency of mercenaries to discuss issues involving their interests by assembly. This was certainly true of those who accompanied Cyrus on the *Anabasis* recorded by Xenophon, and after the death of Alexander, this same mercenary attribute manifested itself in the assemblies that gave Arrhidaeus the throne and condemned the surviving Perdiccas to death. It should be noted also that in the revolts of the "Greeks" in Bactria and Sogdiana in 326/25 and again in 323, issues were resolved by voting assemblies (Curt. 9.7.5, 8, 10; Diod. 18.7.2).

These general characteristics of the troops who had long served in Asia were exemplified by the argyraspids and their commanders. Antigenes had participated in the assassination of Perdiccas in Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.35; Diod. 18.39.6; cf. Diod. 18.36.4), and the argyraspids at Triparadeisus had been separated from the army given to Antigonus because of their mutinous behavior (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.35, 38). Their commanders were not pleased with the subordinate role now ordered for them (Plut. *Eum.* 13.4; Just. 14.2.8–9; cf. Diod. 18.60). Eumenes was, therefore, immediately faced with a serious threat to his authority, which had to be met with a certain amount of delicacy. He needed these Macedonians. As noted, the bulk of the army left in Asia on Alexander's death was Asian in origin, the true professionals, however, were the Macedonians who had long served the Conqueror.

This challenge to his authority was met in part by relying on a tactic that had worked well for him in Babylon. Eumenes told Antigenes and Teutamus, both Macedonian aristocrats, that as a Greek his only concern was the defense of the royal family. This was an interesting claim since he had for more than a year been resisting both the kings' regent and their general in Asia. Furthermore, he claimed that no office was in prospect for one who was not a native-born Macedonian (Diod. 18.60.3). The truth was quite obviously otherwise. By decree of the kings Eumenes was royal general in Asia and satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia. Yet the claim did have some substance. Eumenes, as a non-Macedonian, likely could not have the ambitions attributed to Perdiccas, and that were now beginning to be

ascribed to Antigonus (Diod. 18.47.5, 50.1, 5, 52.6–7, 57.3; Plut. *Eum.* 12.1). This appeal to his non-Macedonian heritage was just plausible enough to assuage their fears that Eumenes would usurp the authority of these Macedonian commanders. Of course, common Macedonian troops had shown no reluctance in accepting Eumenes as their commander even after his condemnation in Egypt. For the present, Eumenes found himself in dire need of the veterans commanded by these Macedonian nobles, and needed to convince them of his limited ambitions. As part of this effort, Eumenes refused to accept the personal gift of 500 talents offered him by the kings (Diod. 18.60.2).

These efforts alone, however, proved insufficient. Both Antigenes and Teutamus continued to challenge Eumenes' authority. To control these commanders Eumenes decided to invoke the mystical presence of Alexander.¹⁸ Proclaiming that in a dream he had seen their former king in full regalia, presiding over his council and actively administering the empire, Eumenes declared that in the future a conclave of commanders would be held in a tent in the presence of a throne, with replicas of Alexander's diadem, scepter, and armor, all manufactured from the Cilician gold, placed on it. These objects were not Alexander's actual regalia (see Errington 1976: 140–1). The original royal objects were most likely given to the new king, Philip III, and taken with that monarch by Antipater to Macedonia.¹⁹ In the morning before each meeting, the commanders would offer incense and do obeisance as before the shrine of a god. After this ritual the meeting would be held in the tent as if in Alexander's presence. Orders would be issued in Alexander's name, and during the deliberations everyone would be placed symbolically on an equal footing before the throne (Diod. 18.60.5–61.3; Plut. *Eum.* 13.5–8; Polyae. 4.8.2). Eumenes' cult of Alexander is the only indisputable example of an essentially military cult in the Hellenistic era (Launey 1950: 945–6, 951). Indeed, Eumenes' innovation never caught on in the other Hellenistic armies and died with that commander's final defeat (Launey 1950: 947, 950–1). It is possible that a similar ploy may have been behind Ptolemy's proposal made in Babylon shortly after Alexander's death that the empire be ruled by a council meeting in the presence of Alexander's throne (Curt. 10.6.15; Errington 1970: 75). Why Eumenes did not inaugurate something similar in 320, when the surviving Perdikkans were arguing over the chief command, is hard to guess. Presumably, he simply did not think of it.²⁰

Eumenes, however, did not by these expedients ever relinquish his command (Diod. 18.63.4). By placing himself visually on a par with his fellow commanders, he was able to make them more agreeable and so secured a measure of goodwill from them. Whether the commanders believed in the cult can only be surmised, but it is likely that amongst the common soldiers the cult was accepted (Picard 1954: 5). Clearly the Macedonian troops were superstitious. There were annual lustrations, and most of the gods were regularly invoked for protection or victory (Launey 1950: 882, 921–2, 951). Acceptance of Alexander's cult would have been especially likely in light of the prestige Ptolemy acquired through the acquisition of Alexander's corpse (Diod. 18.28.4–5). With regard to the attitude of the commanders, Diodorus 18.61.3 does state, "as their reverence for the king grew

stronger, they were all filled with happy expectations, just as if some god were leading them." Such possible reverence notwithstanding, it is unlikely any would have opposed the resultant increase in their own prestige through the use of this new procedure for deliberations. In any case, most often Eumenes' opinions were followed (Nep. *Eum.* 7.3). He did, after all, have the letters from the kings, the regent, and Olympias, access to the treasuries of Asia, and control of his mercenaries and Cappadocian cavalry.

While not accepting the personal gift of 500 talents from the royal treasury, Eumenes did use the treasure in Cyinda to hire large numbers of mercenaries to supplement his forces. Despite Diodorus' (18.61.5) statement that in "little time" Eumenes collected a considerable army, it is evident that this process took months, continuing until late in the year. His friends were sent throughout Pisidia, Lycia, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Cyprus, recruiting soldiers (Diod. 18.61.4). Since Eumenes was offering a high rate of pay, many prospective mercenaries came from the Greek mainland itself (Diod. 18.61.5). By the close of the year Eumenes had collected a force, excluding the argyraspids and those who had accompanied him from Cappadocia, of 10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (Diod. 18.61.4–5).

Back in Greece, Cassander's arrival in Athens had thrown the Greek mainland into chaos. Adding to the confusion was Polyperchon's failure to bring to heel the city of Megalopolis (Diod. 18.70–72.1). Under the leadership of Damis, who had served under Alexander in Asia and had been appointed the city's *epimeletes* (guardian) by Antipater (see Heckel 2006: 102), the Megalopolitans successfully resisted all assaults. As before in Athens, Polyperchon decided in the late summer or early fall of 318²¹ to leave a small besieging force, while he proceeded back to Macedonia to prepare for a possible invasion from Asia (Diod. 18.72.1).²² Cleitus and the fleet were ordered to leave the vicinity of Attica and proceed to the Hellespont to block any such attempt (Diod. 18.72.2).

While Antigonus remained concentrated on the Hellespont, in the summer of 318, another Diadoch was more concerned with the presence of Eumenes in southwest Asia Minor. With the death of Antipater, there were a number of Macedonian commanders who apparently decided to increase their holdings. Eumenes' presence in this general area threatened Ptolemy's recent acquisition of both Syria and Phoenicia. Ptolemy seized these lands from the lawful satrap Laomedon, whom he briefly imprisoned, in the spring of 318 (Diod. 18.43; [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-12). The Egyptian satrap had also garrisoned the Phoenician cities with forces loyal to himself (Diod. 18.43.1–2). With all threatened by the presence of Polyperchon's ally, and Ptolemy associated with Cassander and Antigonus, the satrap of Egypt sailed to Zephyrion, a port in Cilicia near Cyinda,²³ and from there continually sent his own commanders to the argyraspids attempting to undermine their support of the Cardian (Diod. 18.62.1). Ptolemy's envoys attempted to sabotage Eumenes' authority by reminding Alexander's old guard of their earlier condemnation of him in Egypt. Moreover, Ptolemy had on four occasions during the reign of Alexander commanded all or part of the hypaspists/argyraspids (Arr. *Anab.* 3.27.5; 4.24.3, 8–10, 29.1–2; 5.23.7). In addition to his calls

for the argyraspids to repudiate Eumenes, Ptolemy also protested to the garrison commanders in Cyinda concerning their granting Eumenes access to the royal funds. All of these attempts to subvert the loyalty of Eumenes' troops and allies failed. Similar attempts by the agents of Antigonus also failed (Diod. 18.62.3–4). Antigonus had sent Philotas, the former governor of Cilicia, with a letter to be read to the "Macedonians" in Eumenes' army (Diod. 18.62.4). These Macedonians would have been primarily, if not exclusively, the argyraspids. The Cardian had emerged from Nora with 500 "friends" (Diod. 18.53.7), some of whom may have been Macedonians, but his army had surrendered the previous year to Antigonus (Diod. 18.41.4). In the letter, Antigonus ordered that Eumenes be seized and put to death. If this was not done, Antigonus threatened war. Philotas was accompanied by thirty "meddling and talkative persons" who made contact with Antigenes and Teutamus and attempted to organize a plot against Eumenes. When the letter was read, the Macedonians were thrown into a state of confusion; the soldiers wished to obey the kings, but feared a war with Antigonus (Diod. 18.63.3). While the letter was still being discussed, Eumenes arrived on the scene. After he read it, he urged the troops to ignore Antigonus, who, he declared, had rebelled against the kings, and follow the royal decree ordering them to serve him. For the moment the argyraspids remained loyal to Eumenes (Diod. 18.63.3–5). The kings, Olympias, and the regent Polyperchon, had all written that they were to serve Eumenes (Diod. 18.62.1–2). For the present at least among these Macedonians the old traditions of loyalty to royal authority held. Their identity was tied to their service to the kings; the unit had been the royal infantry bodyguards of both Philip II and Alexander the Great. It is interesting to note, however, that these provocateurs were permitted access to the camp and apparently were also permitted to depart freely. This was certainly another example of the argyraspids' corporate identity. While they served Eumenes as loyal Macedonians, this was a loyalty that could be changed in an instant, if that was their consensus.

The significance of these Macedonians would not appear to be commensurate with their numbers in Eumenes' army. As noted, the forces under the command of the royal general were more than 15,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry (Diod. 18.59.1, 61.5). Of these, the 500 cavalry and many of the 2000 infantry who accompanied him from Cappadocia were likely native Cappadocians (Schäfer 2002: 65, 123); after the argyraspids, the remaining 10,000 infantry were mercenaries (Diod. 18.61.4–5). Admittedly, the argyraspids had been the best unit in Alexander's army; they had anchored the Macedonian phalanx and had been used on numbers of separate military operations requiring expertise in other aspects of warfare and skill in the use of a variety of weaponry (Markle 1977: 323, 329; Anson 2010a: 82–4). These abilities certainly made them the best troops that Eumenes possessed in an army that in terms of numbers was far outdistanced by the forces of Antigonus. However, their importance, and hence their power, also derived from the aura of legitimacy they gave Eumenes. That commander now had in addition to the letters from the king, the regent, and Olympias, the title and authority of royal general in Asia, but also the support

of Alexander the Great's old elite infantry guard, the argyraspids. With so many virtually independent satraps, garrison commanders, and imperial treasurers, owing their power and independence to their professed allegiance to the "kings," these aspects of royal authority were essential for Eumenes if he was to build a coalition that could challenge Antigonus.

Eumenes, in the late fall or winter of 318, ordered his soldiers to break camp, and he led them into Phoenicia (Diod. 18.63.6), where, using part of the Cyindian treasure, he planned to gather a fleet to help Polyperchon secure control of the Aegean. He occupied the northern section easily. Ptolemy, who had seized the area in the spring of 318, did not try to block his advance. Here, in Phoenicia, with the use of his newly acquired war chest, Eumenes assembled a considerable number of Phoenician ships under the command of the Rhodian and former Perdiccan admiral, Sosigenes (Polyaen. 4.6.9).²⁴ Since it is doubtful that Ptolemy would have permitted large numbers of warships to be captured by Eumenes, it is likely that the bulk of the Phoenician fleet not operating in the northern Aegean had sailed with the satrap back to Egypt, making it necessary to construct a fleet from whatever resources were still available. Later in 314, when Antigonus invaded Phoenicia, he had to build a fleet, since the Phoenician fleet had retreated to Egypt with Ptolemy (Diod. 19.58.2–6; Billows 1990: 112). It is likely that Ptolemy had withdrawn the navy in a similar fashion to forestall its falling into Eumenes' hands in 317. As a result, Sosigenes and the newly created fleet only set sail in the summer of 317, stopping in Cilicia on their journey north (Polyaen. 4.6.9).²⁵

At about the same time Eumenes' fleet set sail from Phoenicia, the royal fleet under the command of Cleitus was defeated by Antigonus in the waters near Byzantium. Cassander's fleet commander, Nicanor, who had been placed in overall command of both Cassander's and Antigonus' fleets, had previously engaged the royal Macedonian navy, losing a significant number of his ships either to destruction or capture (Diod. 18.72.3–4; Polyaen. 4.6.8). Polyaenus states that the battle was lost due to the inexperience of Nicanor, who got his fleet caught in an unfavorable current.²⁶ The remaining ships fled to Chalcedon. It was in the evening of this disaster that Antigonus arrived on the scene. He ordered the crews of the remaining sixty ships to be ready to do battle. He summoned from his ally Byzantium across the Bosphorus whatever ships they had available suitable for transport and ferried across the channel numbers of archers, slingers, and other light-armed troops (Diod. 18.72.6). At dawn the light-armed troops attacked the beached enemy fleet, causing panic. Nicanor, who had put to sea earlier in the night, now, with ships loaded with marines, fell upon the enemy ships. The previous defeat now was redeemed in an overwhelming victory from which only the enemy commander escaped (Diod. 18.72.5–8; Polyaen. 4.6.8). Cleitus was subsequently killed by those loyal to Lysimachus while attempting to flee across Thrace (Diod. 18.72.9; Polyaen. 4.6.8). The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 13) dates the engagements to the archon year 317/16. As a result of these battles, the Athenians abandoned their alliance with Polyperchon and, in the summer of 317, opened negotiations with Cassander. Peace was concluded after several

conferences on the following terms: the government would once again be an oligarchy, with those eligible to vote in the assembly restricted to the possessors of at least “ten mina” (1000 drachma) and the government would be overseen by an Athenian of Cassander’s choosing. The individual chosen was Demetrius of Phalerum. While the Athenians were now to become his allies and their government overseen by his agent, Cassander promised that the Athenians would have complete control of their revenues and territory, with the exception of Munychia, which at the conclusion of the current war would be returned (Diod. 18.74).

The numerous failures of Polyperchon, not only turned the Athenians to Cassander, but “most” of the Greek cities that had after the decree moved to support the regent now made their peace with Cassander (Diod. 18.74.1). In the midst of these successes, Cassander launched an invasion of Macedonia in the late summer of 317. Clearly there would have been rumblings of dissatisfaction with the regent in his homeland, as there were throughout the Greek world. Cassander hoped to build on Polyperchon’s recent defeats and his own and his allies’ successes. This campaign is not described, but only hinted at in our sources. Diodorus 19.35.7 (cf. 18.75.1) states that Cassander had acquired some of Polyperchon’s war elephants “in his previous expedition into Macedonia.” The reference comes in Diodorus’ description of what then must be the second invasion of Macedonia by Cassander that occurred in the following year. Justin (14.5.4–5) likewise, in describing the second invasion of 316, alludes to an earlier invasion (Just. 14.5.4–5). This first invasion has led to a great deal of speculation with regard to the location of Polyperchon. Where was he when this invasion took place? Justin (14.5.1) states that the regent was returning from Greece, but it is unclear in this section whether this statement refers to the first or to the second invasion. The epitomator may even have collapsed events to the point that the reference is to Polyperchon’s return from the Peloponnesus that preceded the sea battles in the Hellespont (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 195–6). Justin had ignored events in the Greek world since the death of Perdiccas and only returned to them in 14.5.1. It has also been suggested that Polyperchon had crossed to Hellespontine Phrygia in order to ensure that the debacle in the Hellespont would not be followed by an invasion from Asia of Macedonia (Paschidis 2008: 233–46), but given that Lysimachus controlled Thrace and Nicanor the sea, and that the Macedonians were likely apprehensive, this appears doubtful, although certainly not impossible. With Antigonos engaged against Eumenes and Lysimachus not in a position to invade Macedonia (Lund 1992: 56), Polyperchon may have believed himself free to cross to Asia. The most plausible scenario, however, is that Polyperchon was in Macedonia at the time of the first invasion. Cassander attempted to follow up Antigonos’ victory in the Hellespont with a quick dash to Macedonia, and that, while he enjoyed some initial success, as the capture of part of the war elephants would suggest, he still had to retreat back to Greece. Cassander’s first invasion, although obviously repulsed, given the need for the subsequent one, was to have serious ramifications. It then took place in the late summer of 317, soon after the collapse of the democracy in Athens.

While Eumenes' fleet under the command of Sosigenes was still in Cilicia on its voyage to the Hellespont to assist Polyperchon, and was apparently unaware of the events that had taken place in the north, Antigonus' victorious squadrons appeared. Sosigenes' Phoenician commanders immediately seized much of the fleet treasury and deserted to the enemy (Polyaen. 4.6.9). With the naval victory over Cleitus and the acquisition of Eumenes' fleet, Antigonus was now the undisputed master of the sea. Sosigenes escaped the desertion of his fleet (Polyaen. 4.6.9) and disappears from the historical record (Heckel 2006: 253). There was now no longer any great danger of Polyperchon interfering in western Asia, and Antigonus shifted his attention to Eumenes. After his naval victory, Antigonus selected from his army 20,000 light-armed infantry and 4000 cavalry (Diod. 18.73.1), and set out rapidly for Phoenicia. The rest of his forces were to follow. Eumenes, in late September of 317, quickly departed Phoenicia and moved east with the intention of making contact with the governors of the eastern satrapies (Diod. 18.72.2). His only option after Antigonus' great victory in the Hellespont was to seek new allies in the east.

With Antigonus dominating Asia Minor and his ally Ptolemy, Egypt, and with the path west cut off, Eumenes' only opportunity lay in the east. Eumenes' 15,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry (Diod. 18.61.3) would be no match for Antigonus' superior forces. After his defeat of Alcetas in Pisidia, Antigonus' army contained 10,000 cavalry and 60,000 infantry (Diod. 18.50.3), of which the latter may have included close to 30,000 heavy infantry (cf. Diod. 19.27.1, 29.2–5). Eumenes had no choice but to hope that the satraps in the east would respond to the letters from the kings and the regent ordering them to obey the royal general "in every way" (Diod. 19.13.7). Having trusted Eumenes once, Antigonus was not likely to trust him again (cf. Diod. 19.44.2). Eumenes and his army, therefore, marched rapidly through "Coele Syria" (the Bequaa Valley) and into Mesopotamia (Diod. 18.73.2–3). Here, Eumenes was joined by Amphimachus (Anson 2004: 158 n. 33), the satrap of Mesopotamia and Arbelitis (Diod. 18.39.6).²⁷ The union with Amphimachus eliminated any supply problems Eumenes might have encountered in Mesopotamia. Indeed, prior to this alliance Eumenes may have planned on following Alexander's course, bypassing Mesopotamia proper and traveling along the northern bank of the Tigris and proceeding directly to Susa. While this latter route was longer, it passed through areas with a steppe climate, as opposed to the desert climate along the Euphrates, thus providing fodder for the animals. With ready access to supplies, Eumenes took the more direct path east.

Eumenes advanced into Babylonia with 15,000 infantry and 3300 cavalry (Diod. 18.73.4). Upon his arrival he sent emissaries to Seleucus, the satrap, and to Pithon, the satrap of Media, who was then in Babylon, requesting in the name of the kings that they join him (Diod. 19.12.1). Neither accepted. Their refusal in one sense might appear unusual. Of the two commanders approaching from the west, Antigonus would appear to be the clearer threat, having already replaced satraps with his personal allies in Asia Minor. Of course, he did have the more impressive force, and Seleucus' and Pithon's involvement in the death of Eumenes' then patron Perdikkas may have made them leery of cooperating with someone who might

consider revenge for their betrayal and murder of the former regent (Diod. 18.36.5; Nep. *Eum.* 5.1). Antigonus may even have appeared a less dangerous interloper, because of his stated purpose to suppress Eumenes. Moreover, his power base was back in Asia Minor; those who supported him now might benefit later with extended satrapies in the east.

Pithon's presence in Babylon at this time was the result of his failed attempt to gain power over the upper satrapies (Diod. 19.14.1–3). After his brief tenure as a joint regent, Pithon had been appointed satrap of Media at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18.39.6), and subsequently had tried to assert his authority over all the provinces east of Babylonia. Diodorus 19.14.1 declares that Pithon had been declared general of the upper satrapies. While such a position is not mentioned earlier by this author in his account of the distribution of satrapies at Triparadeisus (18.39.6), nor is it referenced in Photius' summary of Arrian (*Succ.* 35), it is possible that at the meeting the now former co-regent Pithon had been given the task of removing all former Perdiccas from these provinces (Goukowsky 1978: 307 n. 82), or, perhaps, given a supervisory command over those satrapies east of Babylonia (Bosworth 2002: 104). However, the simplest and most probable explanation for Pithon's "generalship" is that Pithon reclaimed the command he had held under Perdiccas in 323 (Heckel 1988: 74 n. 7; 2006: 195–6), even though at that time the position had been only temporary and, with the crushing of the Greek revolt in the upper satrapies, the command ended and the troops and their commander returned to Babylon (Diod. 18.7.3). The Median satrap was likely given, in compensation for the loss of the regency, a contingent of heavy infantry to complement the forces he could raise in his province. His colleague in this short-lived regency, Arrhidaeus, is later found with a force of 10,000 mercenaries, 1000 Macedonians, 800 cavalry, and 500 Persian bowmen and slingers (Diod. 18.51.1). It is very likely that at the least 1000 Macedonians and 500 Persians were separated from the royal army and given to Pithon in compensation for his lost regency. However, whatever the basis of this claimed authority, Pithon had put to death Philotas, the general of Parthia, and placed his own brother Eudamus in the latter's place (Diod. 19.14.1). This murder caused all the other satraps in the area to join forces (Diod. 19.14.2). Their combined army, under the overall command of Peucestas, the satrap of Persis (Diod. 19.14.4), had defeated Pithon (Diod. 19.14.2). Following his defeat, Pithon retreated back to Media and from there, not long before the arrival of Eumenes and his forces, to Babylon, where he encouraged Seleucus "to share in his expectations" (Diod. 19.14.3). Pithon's operations and the resulting war with the satraps must have taken place recently. Diodorus (19.13.7, 14.4; cf. 19.15.1) states that when Eumenes later arrived in Susiane he found that the forces of the up-country satraps were still united from their previous actions against Pithon. That Pithon was offered sanctuary by Seleucus suggests that Seleucus must not have been adverse to Pithon's actions, and they now acted in concert with respect to rejecting Eumenes' overtures (Diod. 19.12.2). This cooperation may have originated in the plot that resulted in Perdiccas' death in 320. Moreover, since both were assigned satrapies in the east at Triparadeisus, Seleucus a satrap for the first time and Pithon

reconfirmed in Media, it is likely that the two journeyed to their assigned satrapies together. Although there is no such reference in our sources, it is also possible that Pithon assisted Seleucus in expelling the previous satrap, who had been appointed by Perdiccas (Mehl 1986: 40). Officially, Seleucus responded to Eumenes' request by asserting his allegiance to the kings, but declaring that he would not support someone who had been condemned by the Macedonians (Diod. 19.12.2).

Failing to secure an alliance, Eumenes and his army continued beyond Babylon, encamping in the "Carian villages" (Diod. 19.12.1), located about 20 miles to the northeast of the city. Eumenes did, however, enjoy a notable success during his passage through Babylonia. The commander of one of the two citadels in Babylon, loyal to the letters from the kings and regent, gave his support to Eumenes, but the two forces were unable to make contact (Anson 2007: 195–7; see Chronology section at the end of this chapter; contra Boiy 2010). For their part Seleucus and Pithon sent an envoy to Antigenes and the argyraspids, requesting that they remove Eumenes from his command, a request that was ignored (Diod. 19.12.3). Seleucus had even commanded the argyraspids under Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 5.13.1, 4; Heckel 2006: 246), but, as in the case of Ptolemy's earlier appeal to these same troops as a former commander, these troops remained loyal to Eumenes. While in winter quarters Eumenes sent the letters given him by the kings and the regent to the satraps and generals of the upper satrapies (cf. Diod. 19.13.7).²⁸ In Susa, Eumenes planned to summon the forces of the upper satrapies already alerted to his presence, and also collect funds from the royal treasury there (cf. Diod. 19.15.5).

Seleucus and Pithon attempted to halt his passage through Babylonia to give Antigonos time to arrive on the scene. An ancient canal was opened and the area through which Eumenes and his forces were moving was flooded (Diod. 19.13.1–4).²⁹ The spring was the time of the year when the flooding rivers would be at their swiftest and highest levels. Even though Eumenes' entire camp was surrounded by water, the ships that had been collected to cross the Tigris river were used to transport the army to safety (Diod. 18.73.3; 19.12.5). Failing in their purpose, Seleucus proposed a truce whereby he would concede the crossing, if Eumenes would evacuate Babylonia. While giving up his own efforts to stop Eumenes, Seleucus did send messengers to Antigonos in northern Mesopotamia, where he had wintered (Diod. 19.15.6; cf. 18.73.3), informing him that Eumenes had passed successfully through Babylonia (Diod. 19.13.5).

Once across the Tigris, Eumenes passed into Susiane. Here he sent envoys again to the up-country satraps ordering them to join him with their armies (Diod. 19.13.6–7). Unknown to Eumenes, the satraps were mobilized and had left winter quarters themselves in response to his first summons. Even before Eumenes could reach Susa they joined him with their forces (Diod. 19.15.1, 5). There was now added to the troops brought east by Eumenes, 8700 infantry, most of whom were light-armed, but also including 3000 men "of every origin equipped for service in the Macedonian array" (Diod. 19.14.5); 10,000 Persian archers and slingers, 4600 cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19.14.2–8).³⁰ However, the division in Eumenes'

command, which had been troublesome before, was now compounded by the addition of Peucestas and his forces and allies. While these governors were willing to join Eumenes, there was again rivalry concerning the overall command of the army (Diod. 19.15.1; Plut. *Eum.* 13.5). Peucestas argued that because of his high standing with Alexander, having been one of the elite *somaphylaces*, the large contingent of troops he led, and his leadership of the forces of the upper satrapies, he deserved the chief command. Antigenes argued that the right to choose belonged to "his Macedonians" alone, meaning the argyraspsids (Diod. 19.15.1–2). To prevent the rivalry for command from destroying the newly combined army, making them all an easy prey for Antigonos, Eumenes encouraged his new allies to join with his previous forces in the Alexander Tent. The proposal met with immediate approval (Diod. 19.15.3; Plut. *Eum.* 13.10–13; Nep. *Eum.* 7.2). While theoretically, as at Cyinda, democracy was to rule this council of the commanders, Eumenes still was the royal general of the kings with access to the royal treasuries (cf. Diod. 19.15.5).

In late May of 316, the army arrived in Susa where, using the royal treasury to which he alone had official access, Eumenes paid his troops six months' wages. He also gave 200 talents to Eudamus,³¹ the satrap of India, for the maintenance of his 120 elephants and to win his favor. Each of the other satraps had to provide for his own troops (Diod. 19.15.5). Eumenes, in consequence, was the paymaster for only that part of the army which had followed him east, but through his gifts to other commanders, many others were likewise obligated to him. Eumenes remained in Susa for a considerable time refreshing his troops.

Antigonos left winter quarters in northwestern Mesopotamia early in the spring in hopes of catching Eumenes before he could rendezvous with the forces of the up-country satraps (Diod. 19.15.6). But when he learned that Eumenes had already joined with the satraps he slowed his pace, rested his troops, and enrolled additional ones. During the winter the rest of his forces, including his heavy infantry and his war elephants, had joined him. When Antigonos arrived in Babylon, likely in late May or early June, he arranged for common action against Eumenes with Seleucus and Pithon. After incorporating their forces into his own, he proceeded to cross into Susiane (Diod. 19.17.2). With the overwhelming number of troops under his direct command, Antigonos, unlike Eumenes, did not face any rivalry from his new allies. Pithon and Seleucus, in light of their inferior numbers, were clearly subordinates.

When Eumenes learned of the approach of Antigonos, he ordered Xenophilus, who commanded the citadel and the treasury in Susa, not to give any assistance to Antigonos (Diod. 19.17.3). In company with the other commanders, he marched for four days to the Pasitigris river, the modern Karun, where he wished to await the enemy (Diod. 19.17.3). The river was not fordable, and after having crossed it by means of a pontoon bridge, Eumenes prepared to await the arrival of Antigonos behind this natural barrier.

Antigonos reached Susa in July of 316. The time is fixed by Diodorus' (19.18.3) reference to the "season of the rising of the dog star," which corresponds to the

latter part of July (Bickerman 1968: 144). He appointed Seleucus satrap of this country in addition to his satrapy of Babylonia, and gave him troops to besiege the citadel, where Xenophilus and his forces remained loyal to Eumenes as the representative of the kings. Antigonus, however, with the rest of his army pushed on after the enemy. On this march the heat was so oppressive that Antigonus was forced to travel at night, but despite this precaution he still lost many men (Diod. 19.18.2). In this region of Iran the temperature in the day is typically in the high 90s low 100s, or higher, with the night temperature only dropping about 10–15° (Naval Intelligence Division 1945: 591–2, 595–6; Ganji 1968: 223–5). On reaching the Coprates river, the modern Dez, which flows south into the Pasitigris, Antigonus made preparations for a crossing.³² This river was approximately 400 feet in width and possessed a swift current (Diod. 19.18.3). As a result, it could not be forded but required that the army be ferried across, which Antigonus began to do using small boats acquired from those living along the river. In this manner, roughly 9000 soldiers had crossed (Diod. 19.18.4) when Eumenes, alerted by scouts, appeared with a force of 4000 infantry and 1300 cavalry and attacked those troops who had crossed to the eastern shore and were scattered about seeking provisions (Diod. 19.18.2–4; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14.3). Eumenes' forces fell on these unsuspecting troops and routed them easily. Many drowned attempting to flee back across the river. Few escaped back to Antigonus; 4000 were taken prisoner, and likely added to Eumenes' forces (Diod. 19.18.5–7). With Eumenes firmly entrenched on the opposite shore of the Coprates, Antigonus regarded the crossing as impossible and set out for Ecbatana (modern Hamadan) in Media (Diod. 19.19.2), Pithon's satrapy, where he could replenish his forces and also gain funds from the treasury in the city. From Ecbatana he could avoid the river and easily descend into the upper satrapies.

There were two roads to his Median destination. The first was a long, forty-day journey, through the hot plain, but the second was much shorter through the mountains (Diod. 19.19.2). Antigonus had already lost additional troops on his march away from the failed river crossing (Diod. 19.19.1) and was not about to suffer longer in the heat. He consequently proceeded to march his army on the shorter, more mountainous route north. While shorter and cooler, this road led through the territory of the Cossaeans. It was not easy for an army to follow this course without the consent of these mountaineers. They had exacted payments from the Persian kings whenever they passed between Ecbatana and Babylon. They attempted a similar extortion from Alexander the Great in the winter of 324/23, but Alexander attacked them and forced their submission (Arr. *Anab.* 7.15.2–3; Diod. 17.111.4–6; Plut. *Alex.* 72.3). Antigonus may have wished to emulate Alexander's ferocity for the benefit of his recently defeated troops. Diodorus (19.19.4) states that Antigonus "regarded it as beneath his dignity" to pay tribute to these people. It is also possible that the Cossaeans were allies of the satrap of Persis, Peucestas (cf. Olbrycht 2013: 169). In Babylon in 323, prior to Alexander's death, Peucestas led a force containing units from this region (Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.1). After suffering heavy casualties, eight days after he had set out Antigonus and his

troops fought their way through to Ecbatana, arriving in August (Diod. 19.19.6–8; cf. 19.19.2). Diodorus (19.20.1) relates that in “forty days” Antigonus’ army had met with three disasters: the march from Babylon to Susa and the deaths due to the heat, the battle on the Coprates, and the crossing of the country of the Cossaeans. As a result of these various calamities, there was much dissatisfaction in the army (Diod. 19.20.1). Antigonus eliminated the danger by mingling with his troops and making supplies available in abundance. Unlike Eumenes, the majority of Antigonus’ troops were loyal to him personally. Moreover, most of his Macedonians were not the jaded veterans of Alexander’s campaigns, but those given him by Antipater before that commander’s return to Europe, nor, unlike Eumenes, was he beholden to subordinate commanders who had significant loyal forces of their own. In Media, Antigonus did partially offset his losses by sending Pithon out to recruit 2000 additional cavalry; Pithon also acquired more than 1000 horses and a large number of baggage animals whose numbers had been severely diminished by the recent ordeals (Diod. 19.20.1–4; cf. 19.27.1).

Antigonus’ retreat to Media created an opportunity for Eumenes and his allies. If the army turned to the west, they might secure Asia Minor and perhaps obtain support from Polyperchon in Macedonia. The satraps and generals of the upper satrapies, however, wished to remain in the east; they feared to leave their lands, lands now very much threatened by Antigonus. After it became clear to Eumenes that he was not going to dissuade those who wished to remain, he gave way (Diod. 19.21.1–2). A divided army would fall prey to Antigonus as the previous divided Perdiccan forces had. As before, the nature of Eumenes’ command compromised that commander’s ability to deal effectively with promising circumstances. Eumenes now reluctantly led his army to Persepolis. It is tempting to speculate on what would have been the result of a return to Asia Minor. It is likely that the one place where such a return might have proven pivotal was Macedonia.

In Europe, after Cassander was repulsed in his invasion of Macedonia in the summer of 317, Polyperchon, concluding that he needed to shore up his support, again invited Olympias to return to Macedonia, and, this time, she came. She returned to Macedonia as guardian for the young Alexander, her grandson (Just. 14.5.1; Diod. 18.11.1; cf. Diod. 18.49.4, 57.2, 65.1). Polyperchon would retain his guardianship of Philip, but would relinquish similar authority over Alexander IV to Olympias (Diod. 18.49.4; Just. 14.6.1). Moreover, Olympias was acknowledged as having superior power through the bestowal on her of the *prostasia*, the regency (Diod. 18.49.4; Euseb. *Chron.* 231; Anson 1992: 40–1; 2009: 284–5, and chapter 2). While Polyperchon was away in Epirus preparing to escort personally the former king’s mother to Macedonia, Eurydice announced that her husband, King Philip III, had dismissed Polyperchon and that she had taken over the regency, ordering the now proclaimed former regent to turn over the Macedonian army to Cassander (Just. 14.5.1–3; Diod. 19.11.1). Polyperchon was notified by letter (Just. 14.5.3). Philip was ill and may not have been aware of his wife’s activities (Just. 14.5.2). Eurydice likely feared that Olympias would favor her grandson at the expense of Philip and hence limit even further Eurydice’s authority (Carney 2006: 72–4).

When she seized the regency, the royal wife had also sent emissaries into the Peloponnesus to Cassander requesting that he come to Macedonia as quickly as possible (Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.3), and a letter explaining the change was also sent to Antigonus (Just. 14.5.3), although it is curious that, if this was indeed true, there is no notice of it being used as propaganda against Eumenes. However, Eumenes later fabricated a letter supposedly written by the satrap of Armenia, the Persian Orontes, that reported that Cassander was dead and that Polyperchon had crossed to Asia and was already advancing into Cappadocia (Diod. 19.23.1–3). Even though Diodorus supplies a different reason for the letter, it is possible that Antigonus had received the letter from Eurydice and did attempt to influence Eumenes' commanders (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 200). The fabricated letter would then be an attempt to counter this claim.

Cassander, occupied in the Peloponnesus and having been repulsed the previous year, did not respond, but Polyperchon did. There was apparently, although our knowledge of Cassander's operations is based on little more than brief notices, an ongoing contest between Cassander and Polyperchon's son Alexander, and perhaps earlier with Polyperchon himself, that had been underway for some time in the Peloponnesus (cf. Diod. 19.35.1). Justin's (14.5.1) reference to Polyperchon returning from Greece might suggest that the regent was engaged with his son in this campaign and from there proceeded to Epirus to retrieve Olympias, but see the earlier discussion of this controversial passage. After Eurydice's announcement, Polyperchon, who was now in Epirus and acting in concert with Aeacides, the king of Epirus, invaded Macedonia with Olympias and Alexander IV (Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.9).³³ He apparently had taken Roxane and the young Alexander IV with him (Diod. 19.11.1). Alexander is later found to be betrothed to Aeacides' daughter Deidameia (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.3). The presence of the young king and his mother in Epirus may have been to arrange this future marriage and the current alliance.

Eurydice and Philip's army, in the presence of Alexander the Great's mother and son, deserted to Polyperchon (Diod. 19.11.2–3). Philip was captured immediately; Eurydice shortly thereafter (Diod. 19.11.3). In Macedonia, Olympias now took charge of the kingdom. She appointed generals (Diod. 19.35.4), commanded troops (Diod. 19.35.4–5, 50.1, 8), dispatched orders to garrison commanders (Diod. 19.50.8), and administered justice (Diod. 19.11.8–9).³⁴ As one of her first acts, she immediately took control of the captured Eurydice and Philip III, and after maltreating them for "many days," saw to their deaths (Diod. 19.11.5–7; Just. 14.5.9–10; Ael. *VH* 13.36). Diodorus 19.11.5 (cf. Just. 14.5.10) states that Philip died a year and four months after his accession, which would put his death in October, but a cuneiform text dates a lunar eclipse as occurring on the 27th of the ninth Babylonian month (December), with a brief notice of "Philip," which has suggested to some that this reference may be to the king's death (*Astronomical Diaries* 2001: 7, no. 2V¹²; and commentary, p. 8; cf. van der Spek 2013a). Moreover, it is very likely that the king's death was not immediately revealed.³⁵ The *Chronicle of the Diadochi* (BCHP = BM 34660, Obv. 18–19) still lists Philip III as king in the spring of 316, as does a contract from the Babylonian city of Uruk

dated that same summer (Boiy 2000: 118 and n. 15). These dates may reflect, however, the uncertain nature of the political situation in Babylon (Del Monte 1997: 186). After executing the royal couple, Olympias murdered 100 prominent Macedonians as “friends of Cassander,” including that commander’s brother Nicanor (Diod. 19.11.8). Her hatred of the family of Antipater even carried over to those already dead. The tomb of another of Cassander’s brothers, Iolaus, was destroyed. Olympias associated this young man with an alleged poison plot that supposedly killed Alexander (Diod. 19.11.8).

When these acts became known, and apparently all were known to him before he acted, Cassander, who was in the Peloponnesus conducting a siege of Tegea, immediately curtailed these activities and hurried to Macedonia (Diod. 19.35.1). When Diodorus (19.35.1) summarizes the events leading to this invasion, he gives the false impression that everything happened virtually at the same time, i.e., Cassander learned of Olympias’ return to Macedonia, the deaths of Eurydice and Philip occurred, and even that the desecration of his brother’s tomb took place. These atrocities likely occurred over months, not weeks or days. Moreover, given the initial favorable reaction to Olympias’ return with the total collapse of Eurydice’s coup, Cassander was unlikely to attempt another invasion of Macedonia. But, with the subsequent atrocities and the apparent disgust of the Macedonians at these, such an invasion became more likely to garner success. Even after Cassander made the decision to invade, there were still delays. First, he had to settle affairs with the Tegeans, then, finding that the Aetolians, “wishing to please Olympias and Polyperchon,” had blocked Thermopylae, he gathered boats from Euboea and Locris and sailed to Thessaly around the pass (Diod. 19.35.2). The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 14) dates Cassander’s “return to Macedonia” in 316/15, as does Diodorus (19.17.1). Cassander’s invasion, then, occurred in the summer of 316. Also, supporting this date is the apparent lack of any knowledge of the collapse of Polyperchon’s Macedonian regime in the east. Antigonus had moved in August of 316 (or in 317 by the high chronology) to Ecbatana (Diod. 19.19.6–8; cf. 19.19.2). If Cassander, as many have assumed (recently, Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 202), successfully invaded Macedonia in the fall of 317, given that Ecbatana was a major Median city on the “Great East Road,” a main communication line (Cary 1949: 192), this news would have reached Antigonus in a matter of weeks. Yet news of Cassander’s successful invasion of Macedonia appears to have been unknown to either Antigonus or Eumenes up to and including their final confrontation. None of our sources makes reference to such knowledge.

Once in Macedonia, Cassander divided his forces, sending an army under his general Callas into northeast Thessaly to confront Polyperchon, and another under Deinias to oppose Aristonous, who was acting on behalf of Olympias, and to occupy the passes leading into Macedonia. Cassander proceeded to the coastal city of Pydna, where Olympias had fled, and began a siege of that city (Diod. 19.35.3–36.1). While the siege of Pydna was in its infancy, Aeacides organized a relief force, but most of the Epirote army did not wish to be involved in the campaign and when given the option of going home by their king, they did so.

With a much smaller force, the king and his adherents were defeated by Cassander's general Atarrhias (Diod. 19.36.2–3). Those who had returned to Epirus prior to the battle overthrew Aeacides and made an alliance with Cassander (Diod. 19.11.1–2, 36.4–5; Paus. 1.11.3–4; Just. 14.5.9). He was replaced on the Epirote throne by “the sons of Neoptolemus,” Aeacides’ uncle, with Cassander’s commander Lyciscus becoming “the guardian and general of Epirus” for the young boys (Diod. 19.36.5; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 2.1). Aeacides’ own infant son, the future king of Epirus, Pyrrhus, barely escaped with his life and found refuge with the Illyrian king Glaucias, with whom he lived for the next twelve years (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 3.1–6; Just. 17.3.17–20). Polyperchon’s army subsequently deserted him, and the war in Macedonia now became to all intents and purposes the siege of Pydna (Diod. 19.36.6; Just 14.6.2) and the defense of Amphipolis and its surrounding area by Olympias’ loyalist Aristonous (Diod. 19.50.7).

While these events were transpiring in Europe, Eumenes and his forces arrived in Persis, where the army, thanks to Peucestas’ attentions, lacked for nothing (Diod. 19.21.1–22.2; Plut. *Eum.* 14.3). These actions were part of that satrap’s quest for the supreme command (Diod. 19.23.1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14.4). According to Diodorus, to offset Peucestas’ growing influence, Eumenes now presented the previously mentioned fabricated letter supposedly from the Persian Orontes, a personal friend of Peucestas, reporting that Cassander was dead and that Polyperchon had crossed to Asia and was already advancing into Cappadocia (Diod. 19.23.1–3).³⁶ This was a very dangerous game in which Eumenes was engaged, nor was rivalry over the chief command Eumenes’ only problem. Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, was charged with conspiring with Antigonus, and a unit of cavalry was sent into Arachosia, seizing the satrap’s baggage and forcing him to flee (Diod. 19.23.4). While Diodorus (19.23.4) suggests that these actions were designed to intimidate Peucestas, since Sibyrtius was one of his friends, there is circumstantial evidence that the charge was legitimate. Sibyrtius was later confirmed in his satrapy by Antigonus (Diod. 19.48.3).

While Eumenes was in Persis, Antigonus in the fall left his camp in Ecbatana and set out for Persis. Antigonus and his forces had spent considerable time in the Median city recuperating from their earlier losses. When Eumenes learned of Antigonus’ advance, he immediately broke camp, believing that the time was right for a confrontation with his adversary. The two armies drew within a day’s march of one another in the Median district of Paraetacene (Diod. 19.34.7), located to the north of Pasargadae between the Zagros Mountains and the central desert (Bosworth 1980b: 334). Neither side wished to initiate the action, for both had taken up defensive positions separated by a river and a ravine (Diod. 19.25.2). Under these circumstances, even though the armies came to be encamped a mere 600 yards from one another, and carried out skirmishing and plundering raids against one another, no large-scale action was launched by either side. In the midst of this stalemate, on the fifth day after both armies had first sighted one another, Antigonus sent envoys into Eumenes’ camp urging the satraps and the argyraspids to desert their overall commander. He promised the satraps that they would retain

their provinces, and to all he offered great rewards. While the satraps may have been enticed, they did remember that Pithon was Antigonus' ally. Moreover, the argyraspids paid no attention to these offers, and, in fact, threatened the emissaries (Diod. 19.25.2–7).

That same night deserters reported that Antigonus had given orders to break camp during the night. While the deserters did not know Antigonus' destination, Eumenes guessed that it had to be the neighboring region of Gabene. Since it was late in the year, he knew that Antigonus would be seeking an unplundered area, rich in provisions, and easily defended for his winter quarters. Gabene was the only such area in the vicinity, and it was but three days distant (Diod. 19.26.1–2). In consequence, Eumenes was anxious to occupy this region before Antigonus. He therefore paid certain mercenaries to pretend to desert to the enemy. They were to report that Eumenes was planning a night attack on Antigonus' camp. Since Antigonus believed them, he postponed his departure and drew up his forces for battle. Eumenes now broke camp and moved his army towards the desired region (Diod. 19.26.3–4; Polyæn. 4.8.3). When Antigonus discovered from his scouts what had taken place, he hastily led his forces after Eumenes in a forced march. Eumenes, however, had a significant head start, which Antigonus soon realized was too great to overcome. He therefore devised his own stratagem (Diod. 19.26.5–6). While Antigonus instructed Pithon to continue with the infantry at a regular rate of march, with his cavalry he pursued Eumenes at top speed. At daybreak he overtook Eumenes' rearguard as they were descending from some hill country. Antigonus occupied the now evacuated ridges and made his forces clearly visible to the enemy. Eumenes mistook, as intended, Antigonus' cavalry for his entire army, and drew up his forces for battle. While Eumenes and his troops awaited the expected assault, the rest of Antigonus' army rejoined the cavalry (Diod. 19.26.7–9).

After his infantry arrived, Antigonus prepared his forces for battle and marched down into the plain. Antigonus' army contained 28,000 heavy infantry, 10,600 cavalry, 65 elephants (Diod. 19.27.1, 29.2–6), and probably approximately 15,000 light infantry.³⁷ While it is unknown how many of Antigonus' forces were Asian, of the enumerated units in his army, 3500 cavalrymen are specifically mentioned, but there likely were many others included in his 8000 heavy infantry of mixed origins. Many of these may have been remnants of the royal army Antigonus had inherited at Triparadeisus (Bosworth 2006: 15). Eumenes' forces numbered 35,000 infantry, of which 17,000 were heavy infantry, 6300 cavalry, and 125 elephants (Diod. 19.28.4).³⁸

In the battle formation, Eumenes' best troops were stationed on the right side of his line, the place of honor for both Philip II and Alexander the Great. Here were the argyraspids and Eumenes' own personal hypaspists, with both units under the command of Antigenes and Teutamus. These personal guards of Eumenes were not Macedonians, but likely a mixed force, predominantly mercenaries, selected from those who had joined him in Cilicia. The cavalry on the right wing were also elite units, led by Eumenes himself (Diod. 19.28.1, 3–4, 29.1). Eumenes' entire

phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops (Diod. 19.28.2), with the right cavalry wing curtailed by an additional corps of elephants (Diod. 19.28.4). When Antigonus saw this arrangement, he stationed his light cavalry on his left under the command of Pithon (Diod. 18.29.1–3). These were drawn up in open order and were to avoid any frontal action, but rather attack Eumenes' right flank (Diod. 19.29.1–2). Their purpose was to engage and occupy the enemy, rather than strike any decisive blow. Antigonus placed his heavy cavalry and his 8000 Macedonian heavy infantry on his own right (Diod. 19.29.3–5). Antigonus and his son, the 20-year-old Demetrius (Wheatley 1997), commanded the cavalry on this wing (Diod. 19.29.4). Like Eumenes, Antigonus placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the animals with him and his cavalry on his right (Diod. 19.29.6). With his army thus disposed, Antigonus advanced obliquely downhill on the enemy, with his right wing leading the way.³⁹ He counted on crushing Eumenes' left before his own left was destroyed (Diod. 19.29.7).

At first, Antigonus' plan was successful. Pithon's troops initially caused great confusion on Eumenes' right and inhibited this wing's advance (Diod. 19.30.2), but Eumenes reinforced his right with additional lightly equipped cavalry from his left wing, with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothills (Diod. 19.30.3–4). Elsewhere Antigonus' heavy infantry was also driven back (Diod. 19.30.5, 10). Eumenes' left wing held against Antigonus' attack, and the latter now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him to retreat to the hills, Antigonus saved himself and his army from this potential disaster. As Eumenes' phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes' left. Antigonus charged through this break, easily routing the forces there under Eudamus' command. With his left threatened, Eumenes had to recall his victorious right wing. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up on the higher ground of the foothills (Diod. 19.30.9–10). Skirmishing went on well into the night, but without any further major engagement. By midnight both armies were too exhausted to continue (Diod. 19.31.1–2). Eumenes wished to march back to the site of the previous battle to gain control of the dead and thus claim victory, but his troops were anxious to return to their baggage train and Eumenes acquiesced (Diod. 19.31.3). Eumenes was afraid to force the issue for fear that, given the rivalry for leadership in his camp, he might jeopardize his hold on the supreme command (Diod. 19.31.4). Antigonus, however, had no such fears. In the battle, Antigonus' forces suffered the loss of 3700 infantry, including light-armed forces, and 54 cavalry, with 4000 wounded. Eumenes' troops lost only 540 infantry and very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to 900 (Diod. 19.30.9–31.5; cf. 19.37.1; Polyae. 4.6.10). The battle, fought in late October or early November of 316,⁴⁰ was a defeat for Antigonus and his forces. After claiming victory by securing the battle site and the bodies, he was forced to retire into Media, while Eumenes occupied the original objective of Gabene (Diod. 19.34.7; Plut. *Eum.* 15.3). Antigonus even detained the emissary from Eumenes who had come to recover the bodies of the

fallen from Eumenes' force in order to give his wounded and baggage a head start on the journey in case the Cardian wished to pursue his retiring army (Diod. 19.32.1–2). It was Antigonus' action at the end of the battle and his superior discipline that saved his forces from what might have been a decisive defeat.

After his retreat to Media, Antigonus evaluated his situation. His formerly superior forces were now inferior to those of Eumenes. He now decided to launch a surprise attack. This move was precipitated by reports that Eumenes was not encamped in a single location, but that his army was scattered as much as six days' journey apart (Diod. 19.37.1; Plut. *Eum.* 15.4–5; Polyae. 4.6.13). The explanation for the separate camps offered by our sources was a resurgence of insubordination in the army (Plut. *Eum.* 15.3; Nep. *Eum.* 8.1–4), but insufficient supplies may also have played a part (cf. Nep. *Eum.* 8.3).⁴¹ To effect the surprise Antigonus determined to lead a forced march through the desert. Gabene was a twenty-five-day march from Antigonus' camp in Gamarga, if a route through inhabited country was taken, but through the desert wastes of the Dasht-i Kavir, a journey of only nine or ten days (Diod. 19.34.8; Nep. *Eum.* 8.4; cf. Diod. 19.37.3). The desert way, while shorter, was not traveled because it was without water or grass (Polyae. 4.6.11; Diod. 19.34.8; Nep. *Eum.* 8.5; Plut. *Eum.* 15.5), but a march along the roads which traversed inhabited country would be easily observed and reported to Eumenes, who had anticipated the possibility of a winter campaign and had stationed troops along this route (Polyae. 4.6.11). Eumenes had not, however, considered it necessary to guard the desert approaches. In addition to its dearth of water or grass, in the winter the temperatures were often below freezing (cf. Diod. 19.37.5–6).⁴²

Antigonus' army set out into the desert about the time of the winter solstice (Diod. 19.37.3). Antigonus ordered that while fires might be used during the day, they would have to be extinguished at night so that they would not be seen from the hills. But after five days, the bitter cold of the desert night became too severe and the soldiers built fires at night as well. These, as Antigonus had feared, were observed by the mountain villagers and reported to both Eumenes and Peucestas (Diod. 19.37.4–6; Polyae. 4.6.11, 8.4; Plut. *Eum.* 15.7; Nep. *Eum.* 9.1, 3). When Peucestas heard the news, he was afraid that Antigonus would arrive before the whole army could be assembled. He was days away and it would take longer to gather their army and prepare for battle. Consequently, he wished to withdraw the army to safety in the most distant part of Gabene (Diod. 19.38.1). In a meeting of the satraps and generals there was general panic (Nep. *Eum.* 9.2; Plut. *Eum.* 15.8). Eumenes stemmed the chaos by proposing to delay Antigonus by a ruse. The satraps and generals now began to gather their forces as rapidly as possible (Plut. *Eum.* 15.10; cf. Nep. *Eum.* 9.2). Eumenes directed the commanders of those units directly under his personal command to collect their troops and bring with them fire vessels. These troops then dispersed along the mountains which fringed the desert, setting fires each evening in exposed areas to create the illusion of a camp to those approaching across the desert (Diod. 19.38.3–4; Polyae. 4.8.4; Nep. *Eum.* 9.3–5; Plut. *Eum.* 15.11). The fires were seen by Median shepherds and reported

to Pithon, who informed Antigonus. When Antigonus learned of these sightings, he held up his march, since he believed his plan had been betrayed to Eumenes and an army awaited him on the desert's fringe. He now turned aside and went into the inhabited areas bordering the desert to refresh his troops before confronting what he believed to be Eumenes' fully assembled and fresh forces (Diod. 19.38.5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 15.11–12; Nep. *Eum.* 9.5–6; Polyæn. 4.8.4). The delay in Antigonus' advance gave Eumenes' forces time to assemble.

Both armies now prepared for battle (Diod. 19.39.6). Antigonus, here as in the earlier conflict in Paraetacene, placed his cavalry on the wings and extended his elephants across the whole front. His army was smaller than previously, with only 22,000 heavy infantry, 9000 cavalry, 65 elephants, and an unknown number of light infantry (Diod. 19.40.1). As before, Antigonus strengthened his right. When Eumenes learned that Antigonus with his son Demetrius had taken their place on the right with his best cavalry, he drew up his army placing his best troops and himself on his left wing, facing Antigonus. In all Eumenes' army consisted of 36,700 infantry, of which probably still close to 17,000 were heavy infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 114 elephants (Diod. 19.40.2–4). Despite Eumenes' losses at Paraetacene, his infantry increased in numbers prior to the Battle of Gabene. The explanation probably lies in reinforcements arriving during the winter from Persis. The respective strategies for the battle were designed to take advantage of the strengths in each force. Antigonus planned to use his superior heavy cavalry stationed on his right to win the victory, while the center and left held their ground (cf. Diod. 19.40.1). Pithon, as at Paraetacene, commanded Antigonus' left. Philip, satrap of Bactria, commanded Eumenes' weaker cavalry on his right wing. It appears from the course of the battle that both Pithon and Philip had been ordered to refrain from any large-scale engagement (cf. Diod. 19.42.7). Eumenes placed his hope for victory on his phalanx and especially the argyraspids (Diod. 19.40.2; Plut. *Eum.* 16.6).⁴³

Prior to the battle "most" of Eumenes' fellow-commanders, led by Antigenes and Teutamus, decided that after defeating Antigonus they would eliminate their commander (Plut. *Eum.* 16.1–3, 6; cf. Diod. 19.41). Even though the plot is not mentioned by Diodorus, includes the usually loyal Antigenes (Diod. 18.62.6; 19.12.2, 17.4, 21.1) as one of the main conspirators (Plut. *Eum.* 16.1), and though it is clearly an exaggeration that most of the commanders were involved (Bosworth 1992b: 70), the story appears to be genuine (Anson 2013a; Schäfer 2002: 158). At this point it is unknown how much information regarding activities in Europe had filtered through to the armies on the Iranian plateau, but if any news concerning the death of King Philip or Cassander's successes in Macedonia had become known, Eumenes' influence would have been severely undermined (cf. Bosworth 2002: 150). Our sources are silent on these matters, suggesting that, perhaps, none of it was known. In any case, the desire for chief command by the leaders of the argyraspids is clear from the moment they joined Eumenes (Diod. 18.60–61.3), and Peucestas had never fully acknowledged Eumenes' supremacy. Moreover, Antigenes' loyalty to Eumenes was based primarily on self-interest (Diod. 18.62.6–7).

Certainly, the purpose of the plot was not to benefit Antigonus. The conspirators planned on assassinating Eumenes after their forces had defeated Antigonus (Plut. *Eum.* 16.3). The plan, then, was to eliminate both Antigonus and Eumenes, leaving the field clear for the conspirators. The absence of any mention of such a plot in our main narrative source, Diodorus, most probably results from that author's abbreviation of his source. Certainly many of Eumenes' commanders were displeased with his popularity with the troops (Plut. *Eum.* 16.1–2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 18.1), and they must have realized that after the battle a victorious Eumenes would, at the least, cease to treat them as equals. With the probable addition of Antigonus' defeated forces, plus those troops already directly under his authority, Eumenes' power would be preponderant. When the plot was revealed to Eumenes through informants, the Cardian found himself in a very difficult position. He contemplated flight to the west, but in the end decided to await events (Plut. *Eum.* 16.3). A victorious and wary Eumenes could turn the tables on the conspirators after the battle. If the conflict ended in defeat, he would flee to the west with whatever forces still remained loyal to him (Anson 2013a: 104, 105–6). In any case, Eumenes alerted his closest advisors to the danger, made up his will, and destroyed all his papers which might be used against his correspondents (Plut. *Eum.* 16.4–6).

The Battle of Gabene began with an engagement by the elephants, followed by the cavalries stationed on the Antigoniid right and Eumeniid left (Diod. 19.42.1, 7). Since the plain was large and barren because of the high salt content of the soil, the fighting raised a cloud of dust which obscured the battlefield. When Antigonus observed these conditions, he sent units of his cavalry to capture Eumenes' camp, while Pithon engaged in diversionary activity to keep his counterpart Philip from observing this action. These troops rode around the enemy's flank unnoticed, and easily defeated those guarding Eumenes' camp (Diod. 19.42.3; Polyæn. 4.6.13; Plut. *Eum.* 16.10–11; Just. 14.3.3). In the battle itself, Antigonus' cavalry on the right defeated Eumenes' left. This victory was achieved primarily because Peucestas retired at the start of the enemy's onslaught. Because the dust generated by the troop movements obscured the battlefield, 1500 other troops, not realizing the circumstances, followed Peucestas in his flight (Diod. 19.42.4). After these withdrawals, Eumenes' left was overwhelmed. With his defeated forces he retreated behind his phalanx to his right wing (Diod. 19.42.4). While defeated on the left in the cavalry battle, Eumenes' infantry swept all before it. Once again it was the skill of the argyraspids that brought victory. In the course of the infantry battle 5000 of the enemy were slain, while only 300 of Eumenes' men, and none of the argyraspids, fell (Diod. 19.43.1; Polyæn. 4.6.13; Just. 14.3.5). After Eumenes' withdrawal to his right wing, Antigonus sent half of his cavalry under Pithon's command against the argyraspids, who were now without cavalry support. Under this attack the Macedonians formed a square and withdrew safely from the battlefield (Diod. 19.43.4–5).

The battle had ended much as the previous one, in a relative stalemate. Eumenes attempted to collect all of his remaining cavalry and renew the battle, but Peucestas refused to join him and only retreated further. Since night was approaching,

Eumenes was forced to withdraw (Diod. 19.43.2–3). That evening all of the satraps and commanders took counsel together. The satraps believed it was necessary to retreat as rapidly as possible, but Eumenes declared that they should stay and renew the fight. The phalanx had been victorious, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Moreover, their cavalry had not been significantly reduced (Diod. 19.43.6). The argyraspids, however, since their baggage had been taken with the capture of the camp and with it their children, wives, relatives, and the loot of a decade's service in Asia (Plut. *Eum.* 9.6; Just. 14.3.3, 6–7, 10), ignored both suggestions (Diod. 19.43.7). As a result, the meeting broke up without a decision being reached as to any future course of action (Diod. 19.43.7; Polyæn. 4.6.13; Just. 14.3.3, 6–7, 10).

With the dissolution of the meeting, Teutamus immediately sent an embassy to Antigonus to treat for the lost baggage (Plut. *Eum.* 17.1).⁴⁴ Antigenes is not mentioned and was likely not a party to this action. Antigonus responded that he would not only return what he had seized, but would provide additional rewards as well, if the argyraspids would surrender both the elephants and Eumenes to him. When Teutamus presented Antigonus' terms to the argyraspids, they agreed to deliver Eumenes, and he was seized and placed under guard (Diod. 19.43.8–9; Plut. *Eum.* 17.2–4; Polyæn. 4.6.13; Just. 14.4.1). Eumenes had planned for victory or defeat; it apparently never occurred to him that this battle might end as had the previous one in Paraetacene, with no clear victor.

The argyraspids were now true mercenaries; the loyalty to their kings and country, and even to the memory of Alexander, was all bartered away for their possessions. On the third day after his seizure, while he was being led to Antigonus, Eumenes requested an opportunity to speak to the army. Permission was granted, and Eumenes berated the argyraspids for their treachery. Despite the general sympathy of the majority of the troops (Plut. *Eum.* 17.6–18.1; Just. 14.4.1–14), no challenge was raised against the argyraspids (Plut. *Eum.* 18.1–2), so great was their reputation. With Eumenes' surrender, most of the satraps fled; Peucestas and certain others surrendered to Antigonus (Polyæn. 4.6.13). Among those who surrendered and henceforward served Antigonus faithfully was Eumenes' fellow-countryman, the historian Hieronymus (Diod. 19.44.2). Certain of Eumenes' former allies were executed (Diod. 19.44.1, 48.2). Antigenes was put in a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19.44.1), likely confirming his lack of involvement in the surrender of Eumenes, and he may even have been turned over to Antigonus along with Eumenes as part of the bargain to gain back the argyraspids' possessions (Anson 2013a: 105). As it was to turn out, it was not only Eumenes who was bartered away for these soldiers' possessions, but the future of the argyraspids themselves (Roisman 2012: 242). One thousand of the most troublesome were given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, who was commanded by Antigonus to see to their destruction. Diodorus (19.48.4) declares that these 1000 were those most responsible for Eumenes' betrayal. The rest of this infamous unit were divided up and sent to various remote garrisons (Polyæn. 4.6.15; Diod. 19.48.3). The argyraspids, this last true vestige of Alexander the Great's Macedonian army, were now scattered to the winds.

With respect to Eumenes, while Antigonos might have wished to acquire his adherence, he had little faith in the latter's promises, given that Eumenes had violated his oath of allegiance to Antigonos after his release from Nora (Diod. 19.44.2; cf. Nep. *Eum.* 10.3). Besides, Antigonos' own Macedonian troops wanted the death of the man who had caused them so much suffering (Diod. 19.44.2; Nep. *Eum.* 10.4, 12.2–4). Therefore, even though his own son Demetrius pleaded for Eumenes' life, Antigonos had him put to death in January of 315 (Diod. 19.44.2–4; Plut. *Eum.* 18.6, 19.1; cf. Nep. *Eum.* 12.4). The time of Eumenes' death is fixed by the following: Antigonos left his camp to cross the desert to Gabene about the time of the winter solstice (Diod. 19.37.3); his march to Gabene took nine days (Diod. 19.34.8, 37.3), Antigonos arrived in Gabene only a few days before the battle (Diod. 19.39.2–6), Eumenes was betrayed almost immediately thereafter, with his own death following about ten days later (cf. Nep. *Eum.* 12.3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 18.3–19.1). With the death of Eumenes, Antigonos returned to the area around Ecbatana and spent the remainder of the winter there (Diod. 19.44.4).

During this same winter, Olympias remained under siege in Pydna, but “at the approach of spring,” with famine becoming acute after the long siege (Just. 15.6.5), even to the point of cannibalism (Diod. 19.49.4), and with no sign of relief, the former regent and guardian of the young Alexander surrendered to Cassander on the condition that her life would be spared (Diod. 19.50.1–5; Just. 14.6.5; Polyae. 4.11.3). While his actual authority is unclear, Cassander was acting as regent. However, given that his position was owed to his success on the battlefield and little else, and his title subsequently was General “until Alexander [IV] would come of age” (Diod. 19.105.1), he decided to hold a trial of Olympias before the “Macedonians, rather than execute her himself.” The trial was to be little more than show and an attempt to distribute the responsibility more widely for what would be the murder of Alexander the Great's mother and the grandmother of Alexander IV, and the guardian, *prostates*, of the kingdom (Anson 2008b: 139–40). Diodorus (19.52.4) states that Cassander planned to kill the young Alexander and his mother and seize the kingship, “but for the present wished to see what the people were thinking about the destruction of Olympias.” Prior to this “trial,” Cassander secured the murder of Aristonous, Olympias' commander in Amphipolis. Even though he had defeated a force sent against him by Cassander, when ordered to surrender by Olympias after her own submission to Cassander, he had done so (Diod. 19.51.1; cf. 19.50.7), his previous standing with Alexander the Great, however, made him, in the eyes of Antipater's son, a danger (Diod. 19.51.1). Cassander was clearly very insecure in his new authority. Previously, when Nicanor, his naval commander and the individual who had held Munychia and seized Piraeus for him, began to put on airs after the naval victory in the Hellespont in 317, Cassander, “fearing treachery,” after another farcical trial, had him killed (Diod. 18.75.1; Polyae. 4.11.2).

While no specific charges are listed against Olympias, the likely one was regicide. Cassander further took pains to make sure that those who hated Olympias would be present to accuse her, and that she would be given no opportunity to

defend herself (Diod. 19.51.2; Just. 14.6.6). The assembly then either voted to convict Olympias, or, while leaning toward a guilty verdict, was adjourned. Then, either after her conviction or during the adjournment, Cassander encouraged Olympias to escape to Athens, "fearing that the Macedonians would change their minds and free her" (Diod. 19.51.3–4). He could then claim to have killed a fleeing prisoner. Olympias, however, stated that she wished personally to defend herself before "all the Macedonians" (Diod. 19.51.4). Olympias' remark concerning "all the Macedonians" confirms that only a select group of Macedonians actually met to consider her guilt (Carney 1994: 373). In the trial of Nicanor, Cassander clearly only convened those troops with him in Attica (Polyaen. 4.11.2).⁴⁵ In the end it was Cassander who saw to Olympias' execution (Diod. 19.51.5; Just. 14.6.9). While there is some disagreement about who actually carried out the execution, all sources are consistent that her slaying had been ordered by Cassander (Diod. 19.51.5; Just. 14.6.11; Paus. 1.11.4, 25.6; 9.7.2; cf. Diod. 17.118.2). Cassander immediately after the death of Olympias had Alexander IV and his mother Roxane placed under guard in Amphipolis (Diod. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13; 15.2.3 – Justin, however, mistakenly calls the imprisoned Heracles and Barsine), and ordered that the king be treated as a commoner. In 310, by Cassander's order, both mother and king were murdered (Diod. 19.105.2; cf. Just. 15.2.5; Paus. 9.7.3). Murdered not long after was Heracles, Alexander's son by his mistress Barsine (Diod. 20.28; Just. 15.2.3; Paus. 9.7.2). With the death of Alexander the Great's sons the Argead dynasty came to an end. But its true denouement had come in 315, with the sequestering of King Alexander IV. There was no love lost between Cassander and the memory of Alexander the Great. Cassander had been sent to Babylon in 324 to respond for his father to charges of treason by the king (Plut. *Alex.* 74.2–6). There is clear evidence that Cassander and Alexander did not get along (Plut. *Alex.* 74.2–6; *Mor.* 180 F).

Chronology from Spring 318 to Spring 315

With respect to the chronology of the years following Eumenes' release from Nora down to his death, there is considerable debate. The key element concerns the year in which Eumenes departed Phoenicia, either in 318 according to the "high chronology" or in 317, by the "low." Those proposing a mixed chronology, while accepting the low's determination of the year of the death of Perdikkas and the meeting at Triparadeisus, support the high for the great campaign between Antigonus and Eumenes. After Eumenes' departure for the east, Diodorus (19.12–19.34, 37–44.4) narrates his progress up to and including his death, which occurred approximately a year and a half later during the winter of either 317/16 or 316/15, with a fair degree of precision. The time of Eumenes' flight to the east then becomes critical for the chronology of this period. Diodorus places Eumenes' flight in the archon year 318/17 (Diod. 18.58.1), however, he clearly begins this year in the spring of 318 with Eumenes' release from Nora (Diod. 18.58.1), and in Europe soon after Cassander's flight to Asia during the winter of 319/18.

Diodorus' archon year 317/16 (19.2.1) begins in Macedonia with Eurydice's seizure of the regency (19.11.1), which must have occurred in the fall 317, given that Philip III was murdered sometime between October (19.11.5) and late December of 317 (*Astronomical Diaries* 2001: 7, no. 2 V' 12'), and in Asia with Eumenes in winter quarters (Diod. 19.12.1). Diodorus, then, has continued his archon year 318/17 to the fall of 317. Diodorus then concludes his archon year 317/16 with Eumenes in Susiane refreshing his troops (19.15.6) in the spring before his confrontation with Antigonus on the Coprates river sometime in July at the "rising of the Dog Star" (19.18.2–3). Diodorus places the battle after the start of his new archon year, 316/15 (19.17.1). Thus, he places the battle in the summer of 316. Diodorus' dating then clearly supports the low chronology. This archon year begins with Antigonus leaving his winter quarters in Mesopotamia (19.17.2), and Cassander hastening to Macedonia after the death of Philip III (19.35.1), and continuing through the winter and spring (19.46.1, 50.1), and into the summer (19.47.1–48.8, 51.6–54.4). 315/14 (19.55.1) then begins in the summer of 315.

The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B F-13) dates the sea battle between Nicanor and Cleitus in the Hellespont in 317/16, an event which preceded Eumenes' flight from Phoenicia. Malcolm Errington (1977: 494, 496) assigns the sea battles in the Hellespont to July of 317. If one accepts the Marble's dating, then July is the latest month in which the battles could have occurred in 317. The Athenian archon year began in July. Gullath and Schober (1986: 352) place the battles simply in the summer of 317. Lara O'Sullivan (2009: 38) places these naval operations in the north in "late 318." Given the evidence of the Marble, these campaigns must have occurred in the summer of 317. However, it is to be noted that the Marble omits all reference to the archon year 318/17.

Additional chronological references are provided with respect to the career of Demetrius of Phalerum, Cassander's agent in Athens. He is reported to have served in this position for "ten years" (Diod. 20.45.5; Str. 9.1.20) and was deposed in 308/7 ([Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-20; Plut. *Demetr.* 8.3–5; Diod. 20.45.1), which occurred after Antigonus' son Demetrius' entrance into the city, an event most likely taking place in May or June, hence, 307. The Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 20) places "his [Demetrius of Phalerum] legislation," that which created this moderate oligarchy, in 317/16. Diodorus (18.74.3), likewise, places Demetrius' rule in Athens as beginning in 317. The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 12) additionally begins the rule of Agathocles in Syracuse in 316/15; Diodorus in his archon year 317/16 (20.3.1). Diodorus 19.1.10, however, states that the time between Agathocles accession as "general with absolute power" (Diod. 19.9.4) and the Battle of Himera (Diod. 19.108.2–110.1) was a period of seven years. This battle occurred in the "season of the Dog Star" (Diod. 19.109.5), therefore in July, and Diodorus' following year 310/9 (20.3.1) begins with the aftermath of the battle and includes a reference to a solar eclipse, which occurred on August 15, 310 (Diod. 20.5.5; misdated to 312/11 by the Parian Marble [*FGrH* 239 B 16]; for the date, see Stephenson 1997: 348). The Battle of Himera then took place in July of 310; the "period of seven years" thus began in the summer of 317. All of these references support the low chronology.

Diodorus' (19.91.2) reference to the flight of Seleucus from his satrapy of Babylon to Egypt (19.55), as part of Antigonus' acquisition of the east after his defeat of Eumenes, has been claimed to support the high chronology. Diodorus reports that this flight occurred after he had been satrap for "four years." Since Seleucus was appointed satrap of Babylonia at the Triparadeisus meeting in the late summer of 320 (see Chapter 3) and entered the city on November 14, 320 (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 26–7), this would put his later flight from Babylon in either the late summer, from the date of his appointment at Triparadeisus, or in the fall of 316, from the time of his actual occupation; the later date more clearly fits the context of Diodorus' narrative. It is reasonably clear that Seleucus fled from Babylon in the late spring. Using the November start of the time period, then, if the year of his flight was 316, as claimed by those supporting the high chronology, the actual time period from arrival in and departure from Babylon was roughly three and a half years; if in 315, as in the low, about four and half. This claimed evidence for the high chronology, then, is clearly not as decisive as some have claimed (Stylianou 1994: 83–4; Meeus 2012: 77–8).

As noted above, while the Parian Marble does not specifically mention Eumenes' departure from Phoenicia, it does place Cleitus' sea victory over Nicanor in 317/16. This victory was followed by Antigonus' defeat of the former victor, which in turn precipitated Eumenes' flight east, and by the implied dating of the Marble this occurred in the summer, perhaps then in June or early July of 317 (Anson 2006a: 4–6, 8). The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 14) dates Cassander's "return to Macedonia" in 316/15, as does Diodorus (19.17.1). Given that Diodorus presents events from the time of Eumenes' departure for the east in a clear chronological manner, Eumenes' death occurred in January of 315, not in the previous year's first month.

Moreover, Diodorus' narrative correlates the deaths of Eumenes and Olympias. Diodorus (19.50.8, 52.4) remarks that when Olympias surrendered Eumenes' death was not yet known. By the evidence in Diodorus, the death of the mother of Alexander the Great clearly took place in 315, since sometime after her death in the spring (cf. Diod. 19.50.1), Cassander entered Boeotia and reestablished the city of Thebes in "the twentieth year" since its destruction by Alexander the Great (Diod. 19.54.1). The destruction of Thebes occurred in late September of 335 (Bosworth 1980b: 92; 1988a: 33), or in the archon year 335/34. The Parian Marble dates the restoration in the archon year 316/15 (*FGrH* 239 B F-14), as does Diodorus (19.17.1; cf. Diod. 19.55.1), which corresponds with the restoration being in "the twentieth year." The third-century AD author Eusebius [Porphyry] (*FGrH* 260 F-3.4), in his *Cronica*, records Olympias' death in the first year of the 116th Olympiad, or 316/15. Since the Olympics took place at the height of summer and it is clear that Alexander's mother was murdered in the spring, the year must have been 315 by this source's determination.

Other evidence from Babylonian cuneiform tablets or Idumaeian ostraca has called forth support for both the high and the low chronological schemes. Both of these sources date by regnal years. The *Babylonian Chronicle* (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 33–4) states that in October of the seventh year of King Philip III, a "royal" army, operating

near the city of Babylon, secured possession of one of the Babylonian citadels. This would place the action in 317, since Philip had become king in June of 323 (Boiy 2000; Anson 2002/3: 376–80, Chapter 2). Officially the only “royal” army operating in this area during this time would have been that of Eumenes of Cardia. However, there are problems with this identification. It is very clear from Diodorus’ narrative that Eumenes never occupied the city, and it has been questioned who exactly controlled these “royal forces.” Was it the current royal general in Asia, Eumenes (Anson 2012b), or the previous occupant of that office, Antigonus (Boiy 2010)? Since the year is clearly 317, as indicated in the Babylonian tablet, then, if the former, Eumenes began his flight from Phoenicia in 317; if the latter, in 318, since Antigonus arrived on the scene in the year following Eumenes’ arrival. The fragment does make reference to King Philip (III) under whose auspices Eumenes held his command. Moreover, this fact was not unknown in the region. Eumenes carried with him letters to be delivered to satraps and garrison commanders, including those in Babylon, explaining his commission (Diod. 19.13.7). In the refusal by Seleucus to join with Eumenes, there was apparently no attempt to refute Eumenes’ commission. At least, no such argument is put forward in the sources. Seleucus proclaimed his desire to be of service to the kings, but refused to obey Eumenes because of that commander’s earlier condemnation by the assembled troops in Egypt after the assassination of the first regent and Eumenes’ close ally, Perdiccas (Diod. 19.12.2). Tom Boiy argues, however, that Antigonus had been the royal general previously and that these royal troops are therefore his. In this reconstruction of events, this conflict took place after Eumenes’ departure and involved some of Antigonus’ troops. The “royal” troops were then those left in Babylon by Antigonus, who for some unspecified reason came into conflict with forces loyal to the satrap Seleucus, in essence a war between the troops of the new allies (2010: 8–11). Antigonus is not listed as deploying any troops in Babylon, and, in fact, adds the bulk of Seleucus’ forces to his own for the upcoming campaign against Eumenes (Diod. 19.17.2, 27.1), who had moved with his troops out of Babylonia prior to the arrival of Antigonus (Diod. 19.13.5). It is more likely that the commander of one of the two citadels in Babylon (Diod. 19.100.7; Plut *Demetr.* 7.2),⁴⁶ held under a separate authority, had accepted Eumenes as the true representative of the kings and for a time resisted Antigonus and the Babylonian satrap. Alexander the Great in Babylonia had divided authority between the governor and a separate commander in at least one citadel in the city of Babylon (Curt. 5.1.43; Diod. 17.64.5; Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.4). Even though this is nowhere clearly stated, this division of authority likely continued. In 311, there was a separate commander in the Babylonian citadel, when Seleucus returned to Babylon after having been forced to flee by Antigonus (see next chapter). While Babylonia and the city of Babylon welcomed his return, Diphilus, the commander of one of the citadels in the city, resisted and Seleucus had to storm the citadel (*BCHP* 3, Rev. 6–8; Diod. 19.91.3–4). Such divisions of authority during the Successor period are also found in the satrapy of Cilicia where Cyinda was under an independent commander (Diod. 18.62.2), and in the satrapy of Persis with regard to the city of Susa and its

treasury (Diod. 19.17.3; cf. Curt. 5.2.16). Both of these commanders, in, respectively, Cyinda and Susa, obeyed the commands of Eumenes, who clearly for them represented the true royal authority in Asia. What then likely took place and what *BCHP* 3, Obv. 33–4 is referencing is that the citadel commander declared for the party of the kings and regent, and their “royal general,” i. e. Eumenes, but with Seleucus in control of the city he was unable to join forces with the Cardian, and was only able for a time to maintain an independent authority within the city. The letters from the kings had been sufficient to ensure obedience to Eumenes from the commanders in Cyinda and Susa. Both clearly recognized who represented the true royal authority in Asia. It is likely that this was also the case in Babylon.

With the discovery of large numbers of ostraca, currently over 1700, from the area of Idumaea, now part of southeastern Israel and southwestern Jordan, and possibly produced at a royal storehouse in Makkedah (Lemaire 1996: 1, 21; 2006: 414), additional, albeit again controversial, material has been added to the debate. A critical number of these ostraca make reference to Antigonus. With no ostraca so far discovered that are recorded as Antigonus 1 or 2, but a good number dated Antigonus 3, this chronology, it is claimed, reflects that of Babylonia where Antigonus’ theoretical first year corresponds with 317/16 (Porten and Yardeni 2008: 245–9), but dated contemporary documents begin only with Antigonus 3. Other dated ostraca appear to correspond with the Babylonian regnal dating of monarchs of the late Achaemenid and early Hellenistic era (Boiy 2007b: 90–1; Porten and Yardeni 2008: 238). If this chronological identification is accepted and it is not assumed that these Antigonid dates relate to a separate Idumaeian chronology (so Lemaire 1996: 42–5; 2002: 199–201; Anson 2005: 265–6), then Antigonus 3 becomes 315/14 (Boiy 2007a: 204–5; 2007b: 91).

In Babylon, there was confusion over dating items with respect to regnal years which resulted in multiple systems. Years were dated by Philip III for a year past his death (Philip 8, or 316/15), corresponding to a first year for Alexander IV, and the third year of Antigonus (Boiy 2007b: 24–5). The third year reference postdates the beginning of his reign, then, to 318/17, corresponding to Philip 7, this monarch’s true last year 317/16, and Alexander IV, 2 (Boiy 2000: 116–21; 2006: 47–8; 2007b: 24). As noted in the earlier narrative, King Philip III died sometime after mid-October and perhaps as late as December 317. Antigonus’ presumed first year would then correspond with his arrival in Babylon in pursuit of Eumenes. The Babylonian year began during these years in April (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 36). Thus, this first year would reflect Antigonus’ arrival in Babylon sometime after April 8, 317, and before April 20, 316 (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 36). Antigonus was in winter quarters in Mesopotamia when the news that Eumenes had joined with the forces of the upper satrapies reached him. He proceeded to Babylon at a leisurely pace (Diod. 19.15.6). The battle at the Coprates river occurred at the time of “the rising of the Dog Star” (Diod. 19.17.3), which occurred, perhaps, on July 23 (Bickerman 1968: 144).

With regard to the ostraca, it has been claimed that the appearance of documents dated Antigonus 3 (315/14) in Idumaea reflects both Antigonus’ physical presence

in the area and also the Idumaeen adoption of Babylonian dating (Boiy 2007a: 204–5). However, the reference to the third year of Antigonus may simply reflect the adoption of this Babylonian dating, and not that commander's physical presence in Idumaea. The calendar throughout the former Persian Empire, with the notable exception of Egypt, had most often been based on the Babylonian calendar (Bickerman 1968: 24). Since documents in Babylonia were being dated by reference to Antigonus' "third year," but not his first or second, if the Idumaeans were following Babylonian chronological practice and not a system of their own, then this dating may have been initiated *pro forma* at a slightly later time than in Babylon (the earliest date from July of 315), but reflecting the Babylonian year. In both Babylon and Idumaea, the first surviving contemporary references to Antigonus are to his third year, 315/14 (Boiy 2007b: 25), the year in the low chronology when Seleucus fled from his satrapy. With the departure of Seleucus, Antigonus became the ruler of Babylonia (App. Syr. 53). This correlation between 315/14 and events would appear conclusive. In the high chronology, all of these events would have to have taken place in 316/15 and their acknowledgment delayed until the following year. If the Idumaeen and Babylonian chronological systems are connected then it was Antigonus' defeat of Eumenes, the acquisition of the upper satrapies, and the occupation of Babylon that influenced the dating in both Babylon and Idumaea. Moreover, the Diadochs down to Antigonus' arrival in Upper Syria were not at war, so dating by the new and former "general in Asia" would not have been seen by the Idumaeans as a hostile act with respect to the current ostensible holder of the region, Ptolemy. The evidence, then, supports the deaths of Eumenes and Olympias in 315, and the start of the Third War of the Successors in 314.

Notes

- 1 Antipater was already dying when Demades arrived on a mission from Athens (Diod. 18.48.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 30.4–6; *Dem.* 30.3–4). Demades did not leave Athens earlier than mid-June 319 (see Errington 1977: 488 and n. 35 [*IG* II² 383b]). Antipater's death then occurred in the summer, with the news reaching Antigonus in the late summer (Billows 1990: 80; Bosworth 1992a: 80; Boiy 2007b: 148). This dating corresponds to the Parian Marble's date of 319/18 for the death of Antipater (*FGrH* 239 B F-12).
- 2 The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B F-12) places Cassander's flight before Arrhidaeus' siege of Cyzicus, which occurred very early in 318 (Diod. 18.52.1–3).
- 3 Most of the Greek cities of Asia were given a limited autonomy under the ultimate authority of the king, not his satrap (Badian 1966: 55).
- 4 The assault was, even by Hellenistic standards, very early in the year. Antigonus and his army were still in winter quarters when news of the attack reached Celaenae (Diod. 18.52.1; cf. 18.50.1).
- 5 Even though Diodorus (18.54.3) states that after Cassander's arrival in his camp Antigonus "immediately" gave Cassander an infantry force and a fleet, it is very clear that these forces were not officially turned over to the latter until much later. Cassander's

first port of call was to be Athens and he did not sail there until after Phocion's death in May 318 (Plut. *Phoc.* 37.1).

- 6 While Diodorus 18.50.4 only says a "greater satrapy" than he had controlled, Eumenes, after his release, remained in Cappadocia (Diod. 18.53.6). Nicanor, who was appointed satrap of Cappadocia at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.37; App. *Mith.* 8), may never have physically acquired the province (Billows 1990: 409). Nothing is known of his activities after his appointment unless this is the same Nicanor who in 312 shows up as an Antigonid general in Media (Diod. 19.92.1), as is claimed by Billows (1990: 409), but not accepted by Heckel (2006: 178).
- 7 For Eumenes' early history, see Schäfer 2002: 39–51; Anson 2004: 35–49.
- 8 According to Nepos (*Eum.* 13.3), when Eumenes died the last hope of the Argead dynasty was lost. This is a theme picked up by modern historians as well (most completely: Vezin 1907: 18, 125–8). For a much less positive view of Eumenes' motivation, see Schäfer (2002: *passim*, and 15–18, 61) and Anson (2004: *passim*, and 49, 75–6, 145, 258).
- 9 Schäfer (2002: 119–21) and Dixon (2007: 166–7) support the altered oath, arguing that Eumenes did have some promise of assistance from Polyperchon prior to his release, but the evidence is otherwise. See Anson 1977: 251–6, for a detailed refutation of the altered oath.
- 10 For the chronology, see the chronology section at the end of this chapter.
- 11 Heckel (2006: 175–8) lists twelve different Nicanors from the period, suggesting that the correct one is number 4, Nicanor, the son of Balacrus (Heckel 2006: 177; 2007).
- 12 Simpson (1957b: 504) suggests that it may have contained around 20,000 talents. There were still 10,000 talents left when Antigonus took over the treasury in 315 (Diod. 19.56.5). Eumenes later attempted to send part of the treasure by ship to Macedonia and Polyperchon, but the crews deserted (Polyaen. 4.6.9; cf. Diod. 18.73.1).
- 13 Antigones and Peucestas in their later meeting in 316 in Susiane exhibited hostility toward one another which might have resulted from Peucestas' usurpation of Susiane. However, Diodorus (19.15.1–2) lists a different cause for their differences.
- 14 On the career of Antigones in general, see Heckel 1982; 1992: 308–13; 2006: 30–1). Nothing is known of Teutamus until 318. He was likely a Macedonian nobleman and a high-ranking officer in Alexander's hypaspist corps (Berve 1973 [1926]: 372 [#744]; Heckel 1992: 316–17), who may have been appointed at Triparadeisus by Antipater to keep a watchful eye on Antigones (Heckel 2006: 262). Bosworth (1992b: 66–7) believes that Teutamus was satrap of Paraetacene. Diodorus (18.62.7) refers to "satrapies" with respect to both Teutamus and Antigones. "Satrapies," however, may be an error arising from Diodorus' abbreviation of his source. Whether Teutamus had been awarded a satrapy at Triparadeisus, and whether that satrapy was Paraetacene, must remain undetermined.
- 15 This translation is from the Loeb Classical Library edition (Geer 1969: 175).
- 16 Only Philip is mentioned by name (Plut. *Phoc.* 33.8, 11–12; Nep. *Phoc.* 3.3), but both kings were apparently present (Diod. 18.68.2).
- 17 The actual site of Cyinda has not been identified, but it was somewhere between Soli and the mouth of the Cydnus (Simpson 1957b: 503; Bing 1973: 346, 348).
- 18 Nepos (*Eum.* 7.2) inaccurately places the initiation of the Alexander Tent in Susiane in 316. Diodorus (19.15.3), also, repeats this incident in Susiane as if it had not occurred previously. However, Diodorus' earlier account (18.61) is replete with details fixing the location at Cyinda (the use of the royal treasury) and the chronology to 318 (Diod. 18.61.3–4). Plutarch (*Eum.* 13.4) dates the incident before Eumenes' departure

for the upper satrapies, which occurred in 317 (see chronological section at the end of this chapter).

- 19 In Diodorus' (18.60.3–61.3) description of the creation of the "Alexander Tent" the availability of the Cilician gold is twice referenced (18.60.6 and 61.1).
- 20 This cult was entirely Greek, not Asiatic (as Schäfer 2002: 25–32). Persian or other Asiatic aspects would have been resented by the very troops Eumenes was most interested in placating, the Macedonians.
- 21 Polyperchon did not leave Attica until after both the execution of Phocion (May) and the later arrival of Cassander in Piraeus (Diod. 18.67.6–68.1). Cassander's arrival occasioned the appearance of the regent in Attica (Diod. 18.68.2). There followed a number of seaborne operations between the fleets of the two (Diod. 18.69.1–3). It was only some time later that he moved to the Peloponnesus (Diod. 18.69.3), where he met with the delegates from the various cities in Corinth (Diod. 18.69.3). The siege of Megalopolis then took place in the summer and, perhaps, into the fall of 318 (see Anson 2004: 140 n. 80).
- 22 With respect to Polyperchon's destination when he left Megalopolis, Diodorus only says that he had "more necessary business" elsewhere. Given that Cleitus was sent to the Hellespont at roughly the same time to prepare to stop any crossing from Asia (Diod. 18.72.2), Macedonia would be the likeliest terminus.
- 23 Zephyrion is the modern town of Mersin, which is 30 miles west of Adana (Stillwell 1976: 999–1000).
- 24 Sosigenes had commanded part of the Perdiccan fleet in Aristonous' expedition to Cyprus in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 24.6; Heckel 2006: 253).
- 25 The chronology for events beginning with 318 is controversial; see the chronology section at the end of this chapter.
- 26 The current in the Bosphorus can run at 7 knots; normal maximum is between 4 and 5 (Ștefan and Romanescu 2010:182).
- 27 Amphimachus is referred to in Arrian (*Succ.* 35) as the brother of the king. Bosworth (2002: 113 and nn. 59 and 60) believes that he was related through Arrhidaeus' mother Philinna, the result of an earlier marriage, but see Heckel 2006: 22.
- 28 Diodorus (19.13.7) states that, in the spring of 316, Eumenes "had already sent to the commanders of the upper satrapies the letters from the kings." The obvious time for the dispatch of these letters would have been the previous winter.
- 29 In a summary statement, Diodorus (18.73.3) mistakenly places these operations near the Euphrates; however, he later makes it very clear that they occurred along the Tigris (19.12.3).
- 30 Peucestas, the satrap of Persis, commanded 10,000 Persian archers and slingers, 3000 heavy infantry, 600 Greek and Thracian cavalry, and 400 Persian horsemen; Tlepolemus, the satrap of Carmania, 1500 infantry and 700 cavalry; Sibyrtius, satrap of Arachosia, 1000 infantry and 610 cavalry; Androbazus, general for Oxyartes, the satrap of Paropanisadae, 1200 infantry and 400 cavalry; Stasander, the satrap of Areia and Drangiana, 1500 infantry and 1000 cavalry; and Eudamus from India with 300 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19.14.5–8). The total given by Diodorus does not equal the sum of the listed individual commands. Diodorus' total may reflect in some fashion the addition of the forces of Amphimachus, the satrap of Mesopotamia.
- 31 This is not Python's brother, Eudamus, the son of Crateuas (see Heckel 2006: 120).
- 32 Plutarch (*Eum.* 14.3) mistakenly places the battle between Eumenes and Antigonos on the Pasitigris, but it is very clear that it actually occurred on the Coprates (Diod. 19.18.3–4).

- 33 Aeacides was the son and apparent heir of his father Arybbas, but in 342 his father was deposed through the intervention of Philip II, and Olympias' brother Alexander became king (Diod. 16.72.1; Just. 8.6.7–8; 17.3.14–15). With Alexander of Epirus' death in Italy in 331, Aeacides became king (Liv. 8.24.5–13).
- 34 On Olympias' authority in Macedonia, see Anson 1992: 39–43.
- 35 Bosworth (1992a: 62–3) is correct that Errington's assumption (1977: 483) that Eumenes' forces knew of Philip's death prior to Eumenes' own demise is unlikely.
- 36 This fabrication Paschidis (2008: 245) believes was based on a very real invasion of Asia Minor by Polyperchon in 317. See earlier discussion.
- 37 While Diodorus only enumerates the heavy infantry, in his description of Antigonus' battle order, it is known that he initially entered Mesopotamia with 20,000 light infantry (Diod. 18.73.1), but by this point in time, even with additional recruitment, the losses suffered prior to his arrival in Media, had likely significantly reduced this number. With respect to cavalry the total given in Diodorus 19.27.1 does not agree with the total of the individual detachments set forth in Diodorus 19.29.2–6.
- 38 Diodorus' summary figures for Eumenes' forces do not agree with the totals for the enumerated units (Diod. 19.27.2–28.4).
- 39 On the tactics and course of the battle, see Kromayer and Kahnes 1931; Devine 1985a.
- 40 The Battle of Paraetacene could not, then, have been fought earlier than late October, and no later than early November. Both armies entered winter quarters shortly after the battle and not long before the winter solstice (Diod. 19.37.3).
- 41 On the supply problems in this part of Iran, see Engels 1978: 78–9; Bosworth 2002: 142).
- 42 The later Parthian kings did not dare encamp in the open in winter because of the severity of the cold (Plut. *Ant.* 40.2); on the desert fringe the mean minimum temperature in December is 29°F (Naval Intelligence Division 1945: 592).
- 43 For a full analysis of the tactics, see Devine 1985b.
- 44 Justin (14.3.11) reports that the argyraspids went to Antigonus and offered to surrender Eumenes without the knowledge of their officers.
- 45 It is possible that Nicanor was tried before the Athenian assembly, but unlikely (Heckel 2007: 410 n. 32).
- 46 On the two citadels of Babylon, see Reade 2000: 205–7.

“War, both the King and Father of All”¹

With the deaths of Olympias and Eumenes in 315, the Second War of the Successors came to an end. These deaths sealed the fate of the Argead dynasty. Both Olympias and Eumenes had very vested interests in backing the young Alexander IV. Olympias was the grandmother and guardian of the young man, who after the murder of Philip III was the sole king of Macedonia. While she could never be the official ruler in her own name, as the regent she was in fact in charge at least until Alexander came of age and proved himself capable of ruling. Eumenes had backed the ambitions of Perdiccas to seize the monarchy, so the theme in our surviving sources of his steadfast loyalty to the Argead dynasty is clearly suspect, but after the death of his patron and his own defeat in Asia Minor, his career, like that of Olympias, was tied to the mystique of Argead rule. With their deaths, only the now minor figure of Polyperchon had any real need of the sons, legitimate and bastard, of Alexander.

Antigonos, after dispatching Eumenes, had moved to secure the east. Of those who had served with Eumenes, Antigenes, Eudamus, the otherwise unknown Celbanus (Diod. 19.44.1), and likely also Stasander (Heckel 2006: 255) and Amphilochus (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 219) had been executed shortly after the battle. The now infamous argyraspids were divided and sent to various distant outposts, with the most truculent being given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, who was told to see to their destruction (Polyaen. 4.6.15; Diod. 19.48.3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 19.3).² While in winter quarters in Media, Antigonos learned that his ally in the previous campaign, Pithon, was attempting to subvert the army. Promising to make him general of the upper satrapies, Antigonos tricked him into coming into his presence, where he was condemned by that commander's advisory council and executed (Diod. 19.46.1–4). The Mede Orontobates was appointed in his place as satrap of Media (Diod. 19.46.5; Billows 1990: 413). Additionally, Antigonos made Hippostratus, one of his Greek commanders, general over the upper satrapies with a contingent of at least 3500 mercenaries (Billows 1990: 393). This was the very command that had been dangled before Pithon to secure his capture. Antigonos and his forces left winter quarters shortly

after Pithon's execution and proceeded to Ecbatana, where he took possession of the royal treasure stored there. From Ecbatana he continued into the satrapy of Persis, where the inhabitants acknowledged him as king and "Lord of Asia" (Diod. 19.48.1). While on the march into Persis, two of Pithon's collaborators, likely Macedonians who had served with Alexander, Meleager and Menoetas,³ revolted and collected 800 of the remaining adherents of both Pithon and Eumenes, but failing to attract the support of the Medes, were cornered and either killed or captured by the forces under Hippostratus (Diod. 19.46.5–47.4). This commander of the upper satrapies may himself have died during this operation, for Nicanor, an Antigonid general, is subsequently found in charge of the upper satrapies with the title of general, and Hippostratus disappears entirely from the historical record (Diod. 19.100.3; Billows 1990: 393).⁴

Most of the other satraps in the region who had not been part of Eumenes' coalition were simply confirmed in their satrapies. With the death of Antigenes, Susiane was assigned to Aspisas, "a native" (Diod. 19.55.1). Peucestas, despite his surrender to Antigonos and his acceptance of that commander's authority, was thought to be too popular with the Persians and was replaced with Asclepiodorus (Diod. 19.48.5). This popularity with the native population also led to the replacement of Seleucus in Babylonia. In contrast to the case of Peucestas, Antigonos desired to force Seleucus to flee from his satrapy so that he could avoid having to replace another popular governor. His cashiering of Peucestas had caused a degree of discontent, which was met by the new *de facto* ruler of Asia with repression (Diod. 19.48.5). Therefore, even though Seleucus, like Peucestas, honored Antigonos as a king and feasted the entire army, the new Lord of Asia demanded that the Babylonian satrap give a full accounting of his finances. Seleucus resisted on the basis that his satrapy had been given him by the authority of the kings and he was, as a result, not required to respond to these demands. As the argument grew more heated, Seleucus, with fifty friends, fled west to Ptolemy, who graciously received the fugitive (Diod. 19.55.2–56.1).

With the death of Eumenes and the departure of Polyperchon from Macedonia, the new political configuration had Ptolemy still entrenched in Egypt with his power extending from Cyrene in Libya all the way to Syria. In the eastern Mediterranean, he also controlled Cyprus through alliances with the kings there (Arr. *Succ.* 10.6; cf. Diod. 19.59.1, 62.5), and many of the Aegean islands were also his allies (cf. Diod. 19.62.9). Asia, from Asia Minor to the borders of India, appeared to be firmly under the control of Antigonos. Macedonia, with the many failures of Polyperchon, seemed now to be stabilized under the authority of Cassander. Only Greece was still in turmoil, with an ongoing struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon. The former regent, after the debacle in Macedonia, had retreated to Aetolia; he still retained allies, especially in the Peloponnesus.

Cassander had adopted the formal title previously held by his father in Macedonia during the reign of Alexander the Great (Diod. 18.22.1), that of general, but he was also preparing for a future when he could become king in his own right (Diod. 19.52.1). Having imprisoned Alexander IV and his mother Roxane, and having

been responsible for the death of Olympias, he was anxious to offset these actions, so damaging to the royal family, by securing some connection to the Argead clan, and by behaving as a traditional king of Macedonia. Soon after the death of Olympias, Cassander married Thessalonice, a daughter of Philip II by the Thessalian Nicesipolis (Diod. 19.52.1; cf. Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3). By this marriage Cassander became King Alexander IV's uncle and thereby a natural choice for regent (Adams 1983: 27).

In addition to establishing a connection to the Argead house through marriage, Cassander acted as king. He formally entombed Philip III and Eurydice (Diod. 19.52.5), a custom usually undertaken by the royal successor.⁵ He founded a city and named it after himself, Cassandreia, in the Chalcidic peninsula (Diod. 19.52.2), and one after his Argead wife, Thessalonice, on the Thermaic gulf, Thessalonica (Str. 7, frg. 21). In southern Greece, he refounded Thebes (Diod. 19.53.2), which had been destroyed by Alexander the Great in 335. A revived Thebes looking to Cassander as its new founder, along with his control of Athens, made Cassander a formidable power in central Greece.

Cassander's creation of Cassandreia and Thessalonica was by no means unique. The Diadochs as a group were city founders (Cohen 1978; Billows 1990: 293–305; 1995: 146–82). Traditionally in Macedonia this was again a royal prerogative. Philip II had created cities, as had his son Alexander. In the case of these monarchs the cities served multiple purposes. They were used to secure frontiers or local populations that were deemed troublesome. Philip II had used these foundations along with his distribution of land to formerly landless Macedonians to create a loyal class of small landowners who would supply his new Macedonian infantry and provide a loyal base for his creation of a Macedonian nation under the sovereign authority of the monarchy. In this manner he overcame the divisions that the landed aristocracy had traditionally represented (Anson 2008a; 2009b: 88–98; see also the Introduction above). For Alexander and his Successors, cities were a means of holding captured territory against neighboring tribal, nomadic peoples, as a means to secure captured regions from internal revolutions by the conquered (Brodersen 2001), and to safeguard important transit points, as apparently was Seleucus' first foundation, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris (Kuhrt 1996: 44). Even though Alexander's purpose in founding these communities was first and foremost military, with each foundation possessing a core of veteran soldiers, most often mercenaries, they were typically located so that they would be self-sufficient and well placed for commercial activity. The remark most often associated with Alexander's foundations by Arrian is that they would "become large and prosper" (Arr. *Anab.* 3.1.5; 4.1.3; 6.21.5). Of course, cities, especially those named after the ruler, or some member of that family, or for some achievement by the founder (*Nicaea*, from *nike*, victory, for example), advertised that leader's power and authority, and would trumpet through the ages the name or accomplishments of the founder. In the area of city-founding, Seleucus was the great heir of Alexander. He is reported to have founded over fifty communities, naming nine of them after himself (App. *Syr.* 57). Even if this number of foundations is significantly reduced

(Tcherikover: 1973 [1927]: 174–5), the total still surpasses that of any other Diadoch. The breadth, both in terms of territory and of ethnicities, of the lands brought ultimately under the control of Seleucus during his lifetime was likely responsible for this policy of establishing loyalists in strategic locations throughout these lands.

While these foundations in most respects were established for reasons similar to those of Alexander the Great, in one area they more closely followed the purposes of his father Philip II. Whereas Alexander settled spent and wounded troops, along with the many mercenaries formerly in Persian employ that were being swept up as Alexander moved through Asia, the Diadochs were often settling in communities soldiers who had been actively recruited for service in their competing armies. Most often land was being given in return for military service (Griffith 1935: 157–9; Billows 1995: 132–7). These troops were then on a form of active duty, similar in many respects to those of the American National Guard, but unlike the Guard, they also provided pockets of supporters in the midst of often hostile populations and secured strategic locations within the ruler's domains. Colonization also could accommodate the large numbers of exiles and mercenaries floating through the Greek world, and promote commerce and trade. But, the primary use of these colonies was, as it had been for Philip and Alexander, military.

With respect to these foundations' local governments, these communities were modeled on the Greek city-state. They were peopled by many of the local, indigenous, population, but politically dominated by those of Greek and Macedonian extraction. Moreover, while there is little evidence of major cultural interaction between the separate cultures (Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 144–9; Cohen 1995: 69–70), in Asia and Africa these communities did serve as pockets of Hellenism in foreign lands. Most often Hellenistic rulers treated the Greek/Macedonian communities in much the same way as had Philip and Alexander. They enjoyed a great deal of local autonomy, but always under the overall control of the ruler, who might interfere at any time (see Anson 2013b: 133–8). The relationship with those communities and peoples of Asian or Egyptian origins would likewise follow the pattern established by the great Alexander (Briant 2002: 852, 869–70), which validated local elites and tied the ruler to these others through structures which reflected local practice (van der Spek 1987; Sherwin-White 1987: 22–9; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 144–5). With respect to existing social structures, the Successors typically supported and worked through them (Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 144).

With the victory of the allies, Cassander, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Antigonus, in the Second Diadoch War, peace would appear to have settled on the lands of Alexander's legacy. Eumenes was dead and Polyperchon on the defensive in Aetolia and the Peloponnesus (Diod. 19.52.5–53.1, 54.3–4). This apparent peace was, however, ephemeral, only a lull in an ongoing storm. Antigonus, after arranging affairs in the east, returned to Asia Minor, arriving in Cilicia “after the setting of Orion” (Diod. 19.56.5), November 22, 315 (for the month and day, see Bickerman 1968: 144), settling in winter quarters in locations near the Cilician community

of Malus, near the mouth of the Pyramis (Ceyhan) river (Curt. 3.7.5). While there he arranged for 10,000 talents in the treasury in Cyinda to be brought to him (Diod. 19.56.5). The next spring (314), as he was entering upper Syria, envoys from his allies in the previous war came to him demanding for their commanders a share of the fruits of Antigonus' victory, claiming that they had all contributed to the triumph (Diod. 19.57.1; App. Syr. 53). Hellespontine Phrygia was to be given to Lysimachus, all of Syria to Ptolemy, Babylonia to Seleucus, and Cappadocia and Lydia⁶ to Cassander. There was also to be a division of the treasure acquired by Antigonus, which by one estimate amounted to 45,000 talents, an astronomical 1200 tons of silver and gold (Hammond and Walbank 1988: 151). Antigonus' response was predictable, although it appears to have caught those making the demands by surprise. Antigonus told the emissaries to tell their masters to make ready for war (Diod. 19.57.1–2).

With respect to the demands, those of Ptolemy and Lysimachus were specious at best. Neither, as far as can be told from our sources, had any serious role in the recent war. Lysimachus did see to the death of Cleitus after Antigonus' naval and land victory in the Bosporus; Ptolemy apparently had removed the remainder of the Phoenician navy to Egypt before Eumenes could acquire it, delaying the relief force the Cardian was later to send to aid Cleitus and Polyperchon, and thus, perhaps, permitting the Antigonid victory to take place while the Eumenid fleet was still sailing north (see the previous chapter). The Egyptian satrap had also unsuccessfully attempted to dislodge Eumenes' Macedonian forces from that commander through persuasion before their march east. Of all the allies, the one with the best claim was Seleucus. He had resisted Eumenes' overtures and had been an Antigonid ally in the struggle with the Cardian, but was ultimately rewarded by being forced to flee from his satrapy of Babylonia. Cassander presents a curious case. His commander Nicanor and his navy did participate in the Bosporan campaign, although initially not very successfully. However, Cassander had subsequently driven Polyperchon from Macedonia. Moreover, after the death of Olympias, and after his marriage to Thessalonice, his founding of Cassandreia, and the formal entombing of the bodies of Philip III, Eurydice, and Cynnane in the late summer of 315, Cassander raised the Macedonian levies and proceeded south, intending “to drive Polyperchon's son Alexander from the Peloponnesus” (Diod. 19.52.1–53.5). During this campaign he refounded the city of Thebes (Diod. 19.53.2, 54.1; [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-14). In this campaign, prior to his return to Macedonia for the winter, he also, in the Peloponnesus, acquired Argos and all of Messenia except Ithome, and established a force of 2000 soldiers to guard the southern entrance to Megara (Diod. 19.54.3–4). The Second War of the Successors had ended with total victory in Asia and the enemy in full retreat in Europe, with Cassander responsible for most of the successes in Europe.

There is, however, another area where Cassander may have engaged in the war effort and that might explain his claims to Asian lands. Diodorus (19.57.4) notes that there was an army loyal to Cassander, under the command of Asclepiodorus, not the Antigonid commander of the same name, operating in northern

Cappadocia even before the demands were issued to Antigonus. Since Cassander and Antigonus were ostensibly allies and the Third Diadoch War had not yet officially broken out, this is a curious situation. Menander, after his attempt to intercept Eumenes, had remained in Cappadocia with an army (Diod. 18.59.1–2), perhaps, as “general” of Cappadocia (Billows 1990: 403). Now, it has been suggested that Cassander had already begun the war and was not waiting for a response to the coalition’s demands (Billows 1990: 108). This is certainly possible, but unlikely. That Cassander’s force would be attacking an ally, and doing so far from his base in Macedonia, is odd. The most likely explanation, although there is no evidence for this supposition, is that forces loyal to Eumenes (for the loyalty in general of the Cappadocians to Eumenes, see Schäfer 2002: 64–5, 113; Anson 2004: 81 n. 13) had attacked and, perhaps, even killed Menander. That commander disappears from the record after his appointment to Cappadocia in 317. Cassander was then securing Asia Minor for the coalition. Another possibility, as noted in the last chapter, is that in the late spring or summer of 317, Polyperchon had launched an invasion of Asia Minor (Paschidis 2008: 233–46). This then also would account for the presence of Cassander’s army in Asia. Eumenes did produce in 316 that fictitious letter reporting that Polyperchon had killed Cassander and had crossed to Asia to aid Eumenes (Diod. 19.23.2–3; Polyæn. 4.8.3). The letter, then, while a forgery, may have been based on certain known facts if the hypothesized invasion by Polyperchon did take place. Cassander’s first invasion of Macedonia might then have occurred during a time when Polyperchon was busy elsewhere. While this scenario of an offensive in Asia by the then regent is possible, especially given our lack of information regarding Polyperchon’s activities in 317, noted earlier, it would appear doubtful. Polyperchon did not command the Aegean, nor was he in alliance with Lysimachus, who controlled the land approaches to the Hellespont, thus making it difficult either to launch an invasion, or to return from one, successfully. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that Polyperchon would have been operating so far from Macedonia in Cappadocia, with Cassander in Greece. This does, then, remain an intriguing possibility, but a doubtful one. In any case, once the demands were refused, the nature of Cassander’s operation in Cappadocia changed from the support of an ally to the annexation of these territories.

Antigonus realized the extent of the coalition that was being raised against him and reacted immediately. Agesilaus, a long-time Antigoniad adherent (Billows 1990: 364), was sent to Cyprus to persuade the kings of the Cypriot cities to support Antigonus; two more diplomats, Idomeneus⁷ and Moschion, went on a similar mission to Rhodes. In Cyprus, Agesilaus enjoyed limited success, convincing the kings of Citium, Lapithus, Marion, and Ceryneia to conclude a treaty of friendship with Antigonus. However, the majority of the kings of Cyprus, including Nicocreon, the king of the most powerful city, Salamis, remained loyal to Ptolemy (Diod. 19.59.1). That Antigonus did not send forces directly to Cyprus suggests strongly that his goal was to force Ptolemy to send troops to retain control of the island, thus diverting his attention from elsewhere. Ptolemy’s fleet, the appropriated Phoenician navy, made the Egyptian dynast a powerful force in the Aegean.

Polemaeus,⁸ one of Antigonus' nephews, moved into Cappadocia with an army of at least 8300 infantry and 600 cavalry (cf. Diod. 19.68.6) to relieve the siege of Amisus on the Black Sea, which was then under attack by Cassander's general Asclepiodorus (Diod. 19.57.4, 60.2). Once this task was achieved he was to proceed to the Hellespont to block any attempt by Cassander to join his forces in Asia with fresh Macedonian troops (Diod. 19.57.4). Antigonus also sent Aristodemus of Miletus, one of his oldest and closest friends (Billows 1990: 369–70), to the Peloponnesus with 1000 talents to raise a force of mercenaries and to establish an alliance with Polyperchon and his son Alexander (Diod. 19.57.5; Simpson 1957a: 371). After his retreat from Macedonia, Polyperchon had established a power base in the Peloponnesus, holding, amongst other communities, the important cities of Patrae, Sicyon, and Corinth (Diod. 19.54.3–4, 66.3, 67.1). Antigonus himself proceeded to Phoenicia to "put together a fleet," since he had few ships and his enemies had many. His fleet, which had defeated Cleitus in the Hellespont, had during his absence in the east been acquired by Ptolemy and Cassander (Diod. 19.58.1–2, 5).

Antigonus' energy at the start of the war stands in sharp contrast to the seeming lethargy of his opponents. The latter appear to have expected their ultimatum to be their initial bargaining position which would then be followed by negotiations (Billows 1990: 110–11 and n. 38). Antigonus' response appears to have caught them by surprise. They initially are found in most circumstances simply reacting to Antigonus' initiatives. In Antigonus' campaign in Phoenicia, only Tyre resisted, perhaps because it alone had a Ptolemaic garrison (cf. Diod. 19.61.5). Before beginning a siege of that city in the spring of 314, Antigonus called together the kings of the other chief Phoenician cities, now his allies, and his commanders in Syria to begin the construction of his new fleet. This fleet would be essential for the implementation of a full blockade on the city, and also to counter his enemies' naval forces in the Aegean. Shipyards were established at Tripolis, Byblus, and Sidon, with two additional ones in Cilicia and Rhodes (Diod. 19.58.2–5). Diodorus (19.58.3) reports that 8000 men alone were employed to cut down the trees and trim the timber, with 1000 draught animals to haul the lumber from the forests of Lebanon to the building sites. While the siege of Tyre was in progress, Antigonus, after having left a force behind to continue operations against the holdout Phoenician city, moved further south and captured the cities of Joppa and Gaza, both of which he garrisoned. He then returned to the ongoing siege of Tyre (Diod. 19.59.2).

Elsewhere in Asia, Polemaeus swept aside the force operating in Cassander's interests in Cappadocia and proceeded from the relieved Amisus along the Black Sea coast. Here he also enjoyed great success, making alliances with Dionysius, the tyrant of Heracleia Pontica, an independent Greek city dominating much of the central Black Sea shore of Bithynia, with the king of Bithynia himself, Zipoites, and with the independent Greek cities of Astacus on the Sea of Marmara and Chalcedon on the Bosphorus. Polemaeus also thwarted an attempt by Seleucus, leading a Ptolemaic fleet of 100 warships, to seize the Ionian coastal city of Erythrae (Diod. 19.60.2–4; 62.4). On his way to the Ionian city Seleucus had attempted

to intimidate the forces besieging Tyre by sailing past knowing that Antigonus was powerless to interfere, thus clearly demonstrating to all of Antigonus' allies Ptolemy's domination of the sea (Diod. 19.58.5–6). Antigonus saw how disheartened his allies were at the sight of the Ptolemaic fleet sailing with impunity, and he now accelerated the construction of his fleet with a sense of urgency and commitment. He promised his allies that "in that very summer" he would take to sea with 500 warships (Diod. 19.58.5). Seleucus' naval expedition was seen by Antigonus as so serious that he wrote to Polemaeus ordering him to gain control quickly of the coast of Asia Minor (Diod. 19.60.3). After his failure to acquire Erythrae, Seleucus proceeded to Cyprus to join the Ptolemaic forces there (Diod. 19.62.4).

By the close of the campaigning year of 314, with the major exception of Caria, whose satrap Asander, even though related in some fashion to Antigonus (Arr. *Succ.* 25.1) and previously his ally in the war against Perdiccas, was becoming increasingly anxious over Polemaeus' operations in nearby Lydia, Antigoniid forces were in nearly complete control of Asia Minor, and with the exception of Tyre, which remained under siege, Antigonus controlled the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean from Cilicia to Gaza.

In Greece, likewise, all proceeded successfully for Antigonus. Aristodemus sailed to the Peloponnesus and there hired 8000 mercenaries. He met with Polyperchon and his son Alexander and established an alliance between them and Antigonus (Diod. 19.60.1). After the debacle in Macedonia and Cassander's successful invasion the previous year, the invitation from Antigonus must have appeared as a gift from the gods. Even though Polyperchon had proven himself by the standards of his day to be a poor commander, indecisive and often dilatory, and unfortunately for Antigonus these traits were shared by his son Alexander, there was a dearth of possible allies in Greece who commanded armies. In Greece, there was just not a host of options. In the new alliance, Polyperchon was to be the general of the Peloponnesus, and Alexander was to sail to Antigonus at Tyre to ratify the agreement formally (Diod. 19.60.1).

Cassander learned of Aristodemus' arrival in the Peloponnesus only after the latter had collected his large army of mercenaries and made the alliance with Polyperchon (Diod. 19.63.3). Cassander's first reaction was to attempt to lure the former regent away from his alliance with Antigonus by means not specified in our surviving sources, but these incentives may have been similar to those later offered by the new ruler in Macedonia to Polyperchon's son, including military assistance and alliance (cf. Diod. 19.64.2–3). When these overtures were refused, Cassander brought his army from Macedonia, through Thessaly, and into Boeotia, where he spent some time helping the resettled Thebans rebuild the walls of their city, and finally, in the fall of 314, he moved into the Peloponnesus (Diod. 19.63.3–4). Here, he enjoyed great success. While not acquiring Corinth itself, he did take Cenchreae, the Corinthian port on the Saronic Gulf, and from there moved into Arcadia, where he captured Orchomenus through treachery. He installed a garrison there and permitted his supporters in the community to butcher Polyperchon's adherents, even though they had taken sanctuary in

the Temple of Artemis (Diod. 19.63.5). Somewhere in the Peloponnesus, perhaps in Orchomenus, Cassander spent the winter of 314/13. Diodorus unfortunately takes no notice of this winter.

In Phoenicia, Alexander arrived at Tyre in the fall of 314 (Anson 2006b: 232) and formally entered into a pact of friendship on behalf of himself and his father with Antigonus (Diod. 19.61.1). Shortly after Alexander's arrival, Antigonus summoned a "general assembly" of the soldiers and "the people dwelling there." Here he accused Cassander of the murder of Olympias and excoriated his ill treatment of King Alexander IV and Roxane. Additionally, Antigonus declared that Cassander had taken Thessalonice in marriage by force, and that he was undermining Macedonia by undoing Alexander the Great's destruction of Thebes and Philip II's obliteration of Olynthus by his creation of Cassandreia and peopling it with many displaced Olynthians (Diod. 19.61.1–2). When the assembly assembled, as Antigonus had hoped, reacted with rage, he introduced a decree that Cassander should be considered an enemy unless he destroyed the two cities, returned Alexander IV and Roxane to the Macedonians, and acknowledged Antigonus as the rightful regent. The decree continued that all Greek cities were to be free and autonomous and without foreign garrisons (Diod. 19.61.3). He then put these proposals, commonly known as the "Tyre Proclamation," to a "vote of the soldiers," who approved them overwhelmingly. Antigonus now sent out messengers carrying copies of the decree far and wide, in the hope that, as Polyperchon before him had attempted to do, ultimately unsuccessfully, through his decree of 319/18, the promise of freedom and autonomy would lead to the active participation of the Greeks in the war on Antigonus' behalf. Apparently many island cities decided to break free, primarily from their association with the Athenians. Lemnos (cf. Diod. 19.68.3), Delos, and Imbros likely took advantage of the proclamation to declare their independence (O'Sullivan 1997: 112). They were encouraged by the appearance of an Antigonid fleet provided by the Rhodians (cf. Diod. 19.61.5, 62.7, 64.5). Rhodes, an independent city since the death of Alexander (Diod. 18.8.1), was allied with Antigonus and very supportive of his proclamation of Greek freedom (cf. Diod. 19.77.3; van Dessel and Hauben 1977: 326–7; Berthold 1984: 61). A Lemnian decree, dated by reference to the Athenian archon Nicodorus (314/13) (IG XII. 8, 18), honoring the Antigonid admiral Dioscorides for his actions, likely refers to this liberation. This particular Antigonid nephew had joined his uncle in Tyre in the summer of 313, bringing with him eighty warships from the Hellespont and Rhodes (Diod. 19.62.9). It would appear that after these ships were constructed they had begun to implement Antigonus' policy of "freedom" for the Greeks even before their rendezvous with Antigonus at Tyre. Antigonus' support of King Alexander IV, it was hoped, despite all the evidence to the contrary, would convince the satraps that Antigonus was not a threat to the monarchy and hence to their positions, or to the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities. He would be the one true savior of all Greeks from the rapaciousness of his fellow Diadochs (Diod. 19.61.4–5).

Perhaps the most interesting part of the proclamation is Antigonus' claim to be the new regent. It has been argued very plausibly that Polyperchon conveyed this

authority to Antigonus as part of their agreement (Heuss 1938: 149 n. 1; Rosen 1967b: 78–81; Billows 1990: 114). This is also the implication of the now former regent receiving the title of general of the Peloponnesus from his new ally in Asia (Diod. 19.60.1). It has been noted that in his actions since the demise of Eumenes, Antigonus acted as if he were for all intents and purposes, at least in Asia, the regent for the young Alexander (Billows 1990: 114). However, since he was seeking an effective alliance with Polyperchon, Antigonus certainly would not have publicly seized the regency from him. Moreover, this official transfer of authority would give Antigonus some quasi-legal claim to the office. After all, it had been handed on to Polyperchon, likely in the name of King Philip, by Antipater, who had received it at Triparadeisus ostensibly from the assembled Macedonian army (Diod. 18.39.4; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a.33). Alexander was now given 500 talents and sent back to the Peloponnesus to rejoin the fight (Diod. 19.61.5). While it is nowhere stated, it appears clear that Antigonus spent the winter in the vicinity of Tyre.⁹ This would then be the same winter that Cassander spent in the Peloponnesus after his operations in Arcadia.

Receiving no help from outside, in the summer of 313 Tyre was forced by starvation to capitulate. The siege had lasted a year and three months (Diod. 19.61.5). The Ptolemaic soldiers present in the city were given a safe conduct to depart with their possessions. The response of Ptolemy to Antigonus' activities in this area could, with understatement, be described as passive. He sent no reinforcements to Tyre. The troops freed were those who had been placed there before the siege began. Similarly, he did not intervene to protect Gaza. He did, however, respond to the Antigoniid proclamation at Tyre, publishing a similar decree of his own, indicating that he too was in favor of Greek freedom and autonomy (Diod. 19.62.1).

This claim of support for the freedom and liberty of the Greeks had echoed through the past and would continue to do so through almost the next 200 years. Promised by the Spartans to the members of the Athenian empire during the Peloponnesian War, guaranteed in the King's Peace of 387, and endorsed by Philip II in his Peace of Corinth, the Romans were later to "free" the Greeks right into their expanding empire. Ptolemy, while proclaiming his desire to maintain the freedom and liberty of the Greeks, had taken over Cyrene and had garrisoned that city and also many of the surrounding communities (Diod. 19.79.1). While the general Greek public probably did take these proclamations somewhat seriously, it is difficult to believe that their leaders truly did so. The latter simply took advantage of whatever benefits might be forthcoming as the result of playing along with the charade. But the charade could not be avoided. For the proclaimer of "freedom," it gave an excuse to attack any city in alliance with the enemy in the name of freedom. For the Greek cities, it gave different groups within these communities powerful allies in their struggle for internal control. "Freedom and autonomy," then, was a slogan whose meaning was clear. It was a "sound bite" to excuse war and revolution in the name of a broad philosophical ideal. For a time, however, Antigonus ordered his commanders in Greece to be scrupulous in the application of Greek freedom (Diod. 19.74.1), so that he might be able to stand out

in stark contrast to Cassander. By not imposing garrisons in the cities, Antigonus sought to gain his immediate aim in the early stages of this war to spark strife in Greece to occupy Cassander and to forestall any interference from that quarter in Asia. Antigonus also wished to gain access to the many mercenaries and potential mercenaries in Greece to fill the ranks of his army (Billows 1990: 189). While he was the most consistent in his propaganda supporting Greek freedom and autonomy, he was in fact reestablishing Alexander the Great's strategy with respect to the Greek cities, borrowed in the main from that of the Persians. This form of independence was in reality "a sign of belonging to a sovereign" (Ruzicka 1997: 131). As with Alexander, the grantor of freedom and autonomy could and often did interfere. While letters were sent from Antigonus to Scepsis and other Greek cities promising their "freedom and autonomy" (Austin 1981: 58 [OGIS 5]), he later forced, against their will, eight cities in the Troad, including Scepsis, to form the new community of Antigoneia Troad (Str. 13.593, 597, 604; Cohen 1995: 146), and when, nine years later in 305, Rhodes refused to supply Antigonus with ships for an attack on Egypt, his son Demetrius began the famous siege of Rhodes (Diod. 20.82.1–88.9, 91.1–100.1; Paus. 1.6.6; see Berthold 1984: 61–77). The freedom game was played in the context of the usual combat within almost every Greek city between those wanting a more open franchise (the "democrats") and those wishing for a limitation on voting rights based on the ownership of property (the "oligarchs"). Philip II, whose great opponent was democratic Athens, favored oligarchies; his son Alexander, favored oligarchy in the mainland of Greece, but democracy in those cities formerly under Persian supported oligarchies or tyrannies (Anson 2013b: 130–1). The autocrat proclaiming democracy may seem paradoxical but it made great political sense. My enemies' enemies are my friends. Cassander, like his father Antipater, favored oligarchies; Antigonus in consequence became a champion of democracy.

While the siege of Tyre was still ongoing, Cassander, leaving winter quarters in the vicinity of Orchomenus the following spring, led his army into Messenia, but finding Messene, at the foot of Mount Ithome, still garrisoned by Polyperchon, he returned to Arcadia and his allied city of Megalopolis. Diodorus concludes his account of Cassander's operations in the Peloponnesus with Cassander presiding over the Nemean Games (Diod. 19.63.3–64.1) in August 313, after which he returned to Macedonia (Diod. 19.64.1).

Once Cassander and his army had withdrawn from the Peloponnesus and returned to Macedonia, Alexander and Aristodemus launched a campaign to drive out the garrisons loyal to their enemy in the Peloponnesus, proclaiming their desire to restore freedom to these communities (Diod. 19.64.2). Cassander typically garrisoned his erstwhile Greek allies. Antigonus' commanders made a point of not following suit. Having left Alexander to continue the campaign in the south, Aristodemus moved north into Aetolia with his force of mercenaries, where he secured an alliance for Antigonus with the Aetolian League (Diod. 19.66.2). This federated collection of cities had long been hostile to Macedonia.¹⁰ While they had not joined the coalition that opposed the Macedonians at Chaeronea in

338 (Dem. 18.237; Paus. 10.3.3; Tod 1950: 231–2; Arnush 2000: 300), the relationship between the two peoples had soured after the death of Philip II. The Aetolians had joined in the rebellion against Macedonian hegemony sparked by the Thebans in 335 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4, 10.2), and the Aetolians were a major player in the Lamian War (Diod. 18.8.17, 11.1, 13.3; 9.1; and see Chapter 2 above). They had also attempted to block Cassander's march south at the pass of Thermopylae in 315 (Diod. 19.53.1).

When Cassander learned of the renewed activities in the south, he sent Prepelaus, one of his military commanders, to Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, offering an alliance, stating that he would give him command of the Peloponnesus, and supply him with troops (Diod. 19.64.2–3). In the late summer of 313, Alexander made the alliance. Our source Diodorus (19.64.5) states that what Cassander had now given him was what the son of Polyperchon had long sought. Aristodemus, when he learned of Alexander's desertion of the Antigoniid cause, moved back to the Peloponnesus from Aetolia. Here he relieved the siege of Cyllene, a community on the border of Achaëa and Arcadia, which Alexander was conducting. Departing from proclaimed policy, Aristodemus left a garrison "to protect the town." From there the Antigoniid commander advanced into Achaëa where he also enjoyed success, including freeing the city of Patrae, without leaving a garrison (Diod. 19.66.2). After the Antigoniid commander returned to Aetolia, Alexander, while attempting to restore his control in the region, was assassinated (Diod. 19.67.1). In one of the more interesting sequels to a commander's death, Alexander's wife, Cratesipolis, took control of her husband's army and established her rule over the city of Sicyon (Diod. 19.67.1–2), and later over Corinth as well (Diod. 20.37.1), both of which she held until 308 (Diod. 20.37.1; Polyæn. 8.58), when she surrendered both cities to Ptolemy, perhaps in hopes that he would add her to his many wives (Mahaffy 1895: 48; Carney 2000: 229). Macedonian women, such as Cynnane, Olympias, and Eurydice, unlike their sisters in southern Greece, were often powerful forces in the course of political and military events.

With Aristodemus occupied in the south dealing with the defection of Alexander, Cassander took advantage of a border war between the Aetolians and their western neighbors the Acarnanians to inflict some damage on his enemies in Aetolia and also strengthen Macedonia's borders. Forging an alliance with the Acarnanians, he persuaded them to abandon their separate villages as too vulnerable to attack and to settle the population in three of the larger Acarnanian communities, Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium. Having succeeded in strengthening his new ally and leaving an "adequate force" to defend them, Cassander moved his campaign to the Adriatic to secure his western flank. These lands that bordered on the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic served as a bridge between the Successors' world and the Greek cities of Sicily and southern Italy. They included a number of Greek city-states, but also the tribal peoples of Illyria, the northern neighbors of the Epirotes, and the indigenous peoples of Sicily and Italy. Not long before Cassander's campaign in the northwest, the Illyrians had attempted to capture Apollonia, but the city was rescued by an unlikely savior, Acrotatus, the son of one of the Spartan

kings, Cleomenes.¹¹ This individual had made himself unpopular in his native land by vigorously protesting a decree that granted those who had been defeated along with Agis in his battle against Antipater and the Macedonians in 331 full citizen rights. Typically, defeated Spartans lost these rights.¹² Such a stigma would have then afflicted a sizable segment of the already dwindling Spartan male population. Disliked and in danger at home, Acrotatus was an individual in search of adventure abroad, and in the spring of 313 he got his opportunity. Envoys from the Sicilian city of Acragas arrived badly in need of a competent military commander to lead the Sicilian opposition against the expansionism of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles (Diod. 19.70.1–6). Agathocles had seized control of the premier Greek city in Sicily in the summer of 317 (cf. Diod. 18.1.1, 75.3).¹³ On his way to his command in Sicily, Acrotatus was blown off course and arrived at Apollonia. The Spartan refugee relieved the siege and even arranged a peace between Glaucias, king of the Taulantians, an Illyrian tribe controlling much of the land west of Epirus, and the Apollonians before continuing on to Sicily where his cruelty and bloodlust, along with his lack of success, alienated his employers, and he had to flee back to Sparta (Diod. 19.70.7–71.5).

These lands along with Epirus accorded ready access to Macedonia and had been dangerous in the past. An Epirote army had attempted to intervene to defend Olympias, and the Illyrians in the past had on several occasions invaded Macedonia with devastating results. It was an invasion by the latter that brought Philip II, Alexander the Great's father, to the throne, when the Illyrians entered Macedonia, defeated a Macedonian army, and killed the Macedonian king, Perdiccas III, Philip's brother (Diod. 16.2.4–6). A more powerful individual, not on his way to Sicily but actively hostile to Cassander, could have used these lands as a base for operations against both Cassander and Macedonia. Even though Cassander at this time had an alliance with Epirus and his commander Lyciscus was officially "guardian and general" of the realm (Diod. 19.36.5), Epirus, along with the Greek city of Corcyra and the tribal Illyrians, remained dangerous both to the interests of Cassander and to those of Macedonia in general. Cassander in particular did not wish to see any strengthening in Illyrian power. He took Apollonia on the first assault, and passed into the territory of Macedonia's northwestern neighbor Illyria, where he defeated Glaucias, the Illyrian king, and established peace with him on the understanding that the Illyrians were not to attack Macedonia or any of Cassander's allies. Then, after securing the city of Epidamnus on the western coast of Epirus with a garrison, he returned to Macedonia in the fall of 313 (Diod. 19.67.3–7, 68.2; Just. 15.2.1–2).

That a Spartan commander with limited resources could engage actively in this political arena was symptomatic of this period. Earlier Thibron had shown what an adventurer with cash and mercenaries could accomplish. Certainly with the break-up of the old army of Alexander, loyalty became a personal bond. Rarely after the death of Eumenes could a commander claim allegiance from his forces by appeals to a Macedonian heritage or to the kings. Service with the great Alexander brought prestige, but money, personal reputation, and

especially success, the hallmarks of prominent mercenary commanders, brought loyalty from the rank-and-file.

While Cassander actively resisted Antigonus' activities in Greece, Ptolemy, as noted, had done little during the first campaigning season of the war. He did not send relief forces to either Tyre or Gaza, and his only operation in Asia during 314 was that conducted by Seleucus, who failed to intimidate Antigonus' allies in Phoenicia and unsuccessfully besieged Erythrae. At some point, in response to Antigonus' diplomatic initiative in the spring, it appears he had sent 3000 troops to Cyprus (Diod. 19.62.3), but the timing of the dispatch is unknown, other than that it occurred after the Tyre Proclamation. In the winter of 314/13 Ptolemy, however, had secured an alliance with Asander in Caria (Diod. 19.62.2). Asander was apprehensive of Polemaeus' intentions. Asander also very likely had a separate alliance with Cassander. This would have been brokered during the time Antigonus was in the east and Cassander's forces were operating in Asia Minor. As a result, while Asander had an alliance with Cassander prior to his agreement with Ptolemy, he was not technically at war with Antigonus. He is not listed as part of the initial coalition that formed in early 314. In this same winter of 314/13, the Carian satrap, in league with the Athenians, made an unsuccessful assault on an Antigoniid ally, the island of Samos (O'Sullivan 1997: 110–13; 2009: 263; Anson 2006b: 230–1). The combination of Carian satrap and Athenians in an attack on this island was a natural pairing. Threatened by Polemaeus, with the island's excellent harbor well positioned for an attack on Caria, its possession by a friendly power was certainly in Asander's interests. As for the Athenians, Samos had been in their possession until 320 (see Chapter 2) and they longed to get it back. Moreover, Samos was likely an ally of Antigonus at this time (Habicht 1957: 169–70), and hence an enemy of Cassander's, who was then controlling Athenian affairs. The evidence for this expedition comes solely from two fragments of an official decree(s) enacted by the Athenian Assembly relating to Asander and Athens. *IG II² 450* records honors bestowed on Asander by the Athenian people on the 11th of Gamelion during the archonship of Nicodorus, i.e., in early February 313.¹⁴ This unsuccessful attack on the island's independence would have solidified Samos' staunch support of Antigonus (Habicht 1957: 169–70; Shipley 1987: 171; Billows 1990: 118 n. 45).

In the summer of 313, Ptolemy sent his brother Menelaus with an army of 10,000 men and a fleet of 100 warships to Cyprus (Diod. 19.62.2–4).¹⁵ After consultation, the Ptolemaic commanders present on the island decided to divide their forces. Polycleitus, the fleet commander sent with Menelaus, was to proceed to the Peloponnesus with fifty ships to aid in the campaign against the coalition of Antigonus' general Aristodemus and Polyperchon. However, when Polycleitus arrived at Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth, and discovered Alexander's change of allegiance, he sailed to Pamphylia and Cilicia. There finding that Antigonus' commander Theodotus was sailing from Lycia to Caria, accompanied by a land army marching under Perilaus, he arranged a successful ambush on both land and sea. The Antigoniid army and fleet were captured. Theodotus was

wounded and later succumbed to his injuries; Perilaus was captured. The victorious Polycleitus then sailed back to Cyprus and then on to Egypt. Perilaus and certain others were subsequently released by Ptolemy when requested to do so by Antigonus. Ptolemy then met with Antigonus at a point east of the Nile delta to discuss peace, but nothing came of the encounter for Antigonus was not willing to agree to Ptolemy's demands (Diod. 19.64.4–8). The terms discussed are not specified, but after Polycleitus' victory, it is doubtful that Ptolemy's demands were much altered, if at all, from the original ones which brought on the war, i.e., Ptolemaic possession of Phoenicia and Syria.

Myrmidon, the Athenian, who commanded the 10,000 mercenaries sent with Menelaus to Cyprus, was to take his force to Caria and aid Asander, who was currently under attack by Antigonus' general Polemaeus (Diod. 19.62.5). This force is not heard of again in our sources, and it is clear, given the dire straits in which Asander is later found, that Ptolemy's relief force was at the least ineffective. Seleucus and Menelaus remained in Cyprus in support of Ptolemy's Cypriot ally, Nicocreon, the king of the city of Salamis (Arr. *Succ.* 10.6). These forces managed to retake certain of the cities that had deserted Ptolemy for Antigonus (Diod. 19.62.6), but a number of the Cypriot kings remained loyal to Antigonus (Diod. 19.62.5). In Macedonia, after his campaign in the west, Cassander learned late in the year of Polemaeus' invasion of Caria (Diod. 19.68.2), and sent an army with Prepelaus to aid Asander. In Caria, this force arrived after Polemaeus had already settled his army in winter quarters, it being late in the year 313. Polemaeus had recently lost his father and was attending to his funeral. Prepelaus sent a subordinate, Eupolemus, with 8000 infantry and 200 cavalry to lay an ambush for the returning Polemaeus. Apparently, soon after Eupolemus' dispatch, Polemaeus learned of the plan from deserters. Taking 8000 infantry and 300 cavalry, he surprised Eupolemus' camp about midnight. Eupolemus and his army surrendered (Diod. 19.68.5–7). Since Eupolemus is later found as Cassander's "general in Greece" (Diod. 19.77.6), he must have been released from custody, and even though nothing is said of this army, it is likely these troops were enrolled among the troops of Polemaeus. As seen, this was the typical pattern of behavior, the repatriation of captured commanders and the appropriation of captured soldiers.

In Phoenicia, after the fall of Tyre and the completion of a fleet totaling 240 warships, Antigonus dispatched fifty ships to the Peloponnesus, sending the remainder of the fleet, under Dioscorides, to secure the Aegean (Diod. 19.62.6–9). This expedition would lead to the creation of what is termed the "Nesiotic League," or the "League of the Islanders" (Billows 1990: 118). While the evidence for this association comes entirely from inscriptional evidence (see in particular, *IG* XI 4.1036), with no mention of its existence in our literary sources (Buraselis: 1982: 180–88; Merker 1970: 141; Constantakopoulou 2012: 51–2), its creation fits well with Antigonus' earlier proclamation issued at Tyre during the previous fall, guaranteeing the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks. Also, given the attempt in the winter of 314/13 by Cassander along with his subject ally Athens to gain control of Samos, and given the traditional dominance of Athens in much of the

Aegean, this proclamation by Antigonus would have resonated with the islanders. At some point a federation with a common council of the free and autonomous islanders was created, allied with Antigonus, and celebrating a festival in honor of the latter as founder of the association, known as the Antigoneia (*IG XI* 2.1542, 4.1036).

Dioscorides, in the summer of 313, used his fleet to repel an Athenian attempt to regain control of the north Aegean island of Lemnos (cf. *Diod.* 19.68.4). Demetrius of Phalerum, the “guardian” of Athens and the firm ally of Cassander, had dispatched twenty ships to attack the former Athenian possession. On arriving at Lemnos, the Athenian commander, Aristotle, called on Seleucus to join him from Cyprus with additional ships. The Lemnians, however, refused to break their alliance with Antigonus, and the allied commanders now pillaged the countryside and began a siege of the city. While the siege was well underway, Seleucus sailed to Cos, which was allied with Ptolemy, but perhaps was experiencing some unrest due to Antigonus’ “freedom” offensive (*Diod.* 20.27.1). Learning of the departure of Seleucus and his forces, Dioscorides (*Diod.* 19.62.9; Billows 1990: 381–2) attacked the Athenians, capturing most of the ships and their crews (*Diod.* 19.68.1–4).

When Antigonus learned that Cassander had sent forces to Asia in support of Asander, in the winter of 313, he left his son Demetrius behind in Syria and marched north with a force of 10,000 mercenaries, 2000 Macedonians, 500 Lycians and Pamphylians, 400 Persian archers and slingers, 5000 cavalry, and 43 elephants. In view of Demetrius’ youth (he was 22 years of age),¹⁶ several experienced commanders were assigned to counsel him (*Diod.* 19.69.1; *Plut. Demetr.* 5.2; *App. Syr.* 54); among these were Nearchus, Alexander the Great’s former fleet commander (Heckel 2006: 172), and Pithon, the son of Agenor, the satrap of Babylonia (*Diod.* 19.56.4, 69.1). Since it was late in the year, Antigonus encountered snows in crossing the Taurus and entered winter quarters in Celaenae in Phrygia. While there, he ordered his fleet in Phoenicia to sail to the Hellespont. On their way they encountered thirty-six ships of Cassander’s fleet sailing from Pydna which they defeated, capturing the ships and the crews (*Diod.* 19.69.2–3). So ended the year 313, Antigonus wintering in Celaenae, Demetrius in Syria, Cassander in Macedonia, Ptolemy in Egypt.

The following year saw a flurry of activity. Sometime very early in 312, Asander agreed to terms with Antigonus. By this agreement he was to surrender his army to that commander, free all the Greek cities of Caria, but remain satrap of Caria as Antigonus’ subordinate. This agreement lasted but a few days before Asander repented his action and sent envoys to Ptolemy and Seleucus begging for help. This double dealing probably forced Antigonus to leave his winter quarters sooner than he had planned. He ordered Caria to be attacked by land and sea. Medius, a mercenary commander from Larisa, was to command the fleet, and Docimus, the former Perdiccan and satrap of Babylonia, the army. These individuals captured the citadel of Miletus by siege and “restored the city’s autonomy” (*Diod.* 19.75.1–4) in February of 312. The list of *stephanephoroi*, eponymous Milesian officials drawn from the senior members of the sacred singers and dancers (Sherk 1990: 251),

records the Antigonid liberation of the city during 313/12, which in Miletus began in March 313 (Milesian *stephanephoroi* list no. 123 = Ditt. *Syll.* 3 322). With both Polemaeus and Antigonus assaulting the cities loyal to Asander, in short order the cities of Caria were made “subject to Antigonus’ authority,” but apparently garrison-free (Diod. 19.75.5–6). At about the time Caria was submitting to Antigonus’ authority, envoys arrived from the Aetolians and the Boeotians seeking formal alliances (Diod. 19.75.6). With respect to the latter, even though Cassander had consulted with the Boeotians concerning the refounding of Thebes and had received their consent (Diod. 19.54.1), it would appear that such acquiescence was the result of Cassander’s presence with an army. Earlier the Boeotians had supported the Macedonians in the Lamian War (Paus. 1.25.4; Hyp. 6.11), because they feared that, if the Athenians and their coalition won, the Athenians would restore Thebes (Paus. 1.25.4), the very action that Cassander had taken (Diod. 19.53.2).

Also, in the late spring of 312, Antigonus opened negotiations with Cassander to secure peace “in the Hellespontine area,” but nothing came of this (Diod. 19.75.6). The major cause of concern was the growing power of Lysimachus. Up to this point our sources have been silent with respect to Lysimachus’ activities. While arguments from silence are dangerous, it does appear that he was too pre-occupied with securing his own base to launch any operations outside of Thrace. It is suggested that his role in the coalition was the limited one of controlling the Hellespont to prevent a crossing (Lund 1992: 59–60; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 112). This may well be true. Lysimachus was to this point not a major player. His inclusion in the coalition may have resulted from the foreseen danger of an alliance between the holder of Thrace and Antigonus. Lysimachus’ minor role is clear in the initial demands the respective generals and satraps made on Antigonus. Lysimachus was to receive Hellespontine Phrygia, while the others were to receive far more substantial holdings. Events, however, in the winter of 313/12 and the following spring, when a number of Greek communities in the Pontic region led by Callantia drove out their garrisons and formed an alliance to secure their autonomy against Lysimachus’ claim of authority (Diod. 19.73; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 113; Lund 1992: 40–43; Andrews 2010: 44–46), were to change the junior status of Lysimachus. The cities in revolt were Greek cities located on the western shores of the Black Sea. They formed treaties with the neighboring Scythians and Thracians and had established good relation with the other Greek colonies in the area. While Lysimachus quickly recovered two of the main cities in revolt, Odessus and Istria, his attack on Callantia was less successful. The Callantians were joined by their allies among the Thracians and the Scythians. Lysimachus intimidated the Thracians into changing sides and the Scythians were severely defeated. The former bodyguard of Alexander the Great now began to besiege Callantia, but Antigonus sent an army and a fleet to aid the beleaguered people of the besieged city. Even though Seuthes joined in the attack on Lysimachus, the latter was able to defeat all of these forces separately and soundly, even killing Antigonus’ commander and capturing most of that commander’s force (Diod. 19.73.4–10). After what was a long siege, and after many of its inhabitants had

migrated at the invitation of Eumelus, the "king of the Bosphorus," to a region that the king allotted to them (Diod. 20.25.1), Callantia surrendered in 310 (Diod. 20.25.2).¹⁷ Lysimachus through this war not only secured his own satrapy, but promoted himself in the eyes of his fellow Successors as a force with which to be reckoned.

After his failure in the Hellespont against Lysimachus, Antigonus transferred both his attention and his forces to Greece. Telesphorus (possibly another Antigonid nephew [Billows 1990: 435]), in the late spring or early summer of 312, was sent to the Peloponnesus with fifty ships and a force of infantry to "free the cities." With the exception of Corinth and Sicyon, this commander proceeded to liberate all of the cities that still adhered to Polyperchon (Diod. 19.74.1–2). Polemaeus, with a force of 5000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 150 warships under the command of Medius, was now sent from Asia by Antigonus to be in overall command of the forces in Greece (Diod. 19.87.3). Landing in Boeotia, he fortified Salganeus, a town which controlled the northern entrance to the Euripus Strait. From his Boeotian allies, he added 2200 infantry and 1300 cavalry to his force, and with this combined army proceeded to his ultimate goal, Chalcis, the only Euboean city still garrisoned by forces loyal to Cassander (Diod. 19.77.2–4). Cassander was also operating in Euboea, besieging the city of Oreus. An earlier attempt to relieve the siege by Telesphorus had been unsuccessful (Diod. 19.75.7–8), but with the assault on Chalcis by Polemaeus, Cassander gave up the attack on Oreus and moved his forces to Chalcis (Diod. 19.77.5). Chalcis was strategically vital, dominating the narrowest part of the Euripus channel and offering ready access to both Boeotia and Attica. It later came to be regarded as one of "the Three Fetters of Greece" (Polyb. 18.11.3–7), strongholds that the later Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia regarded as essential to controlling the Greek peninsula. The other two were the city of Corinth and its citadel the Acrocorinth, which controlled the Isthmus of Corinth and hence access to and from the Peloponnesus, and Demetrias, founded in 294/93 by Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Monophthalmus, on the northern shore of the Gulf of Pagasae, which gave ready access to Thessaly.

During Cassander's operations on Euboea, his general and younger brother, Philip (cf. Paus. 1.11.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 2.1–2), had been actively engaging the Aetolians. While Philip was in the midst of plundering Aetolian territory, however, Aeacides, the former king of Epirus, returned to his kingdom and raised a large army. Aeacides had become king in 331 on the death of his cousin Alexander I, but had been driven from the throne by his disgruntled subjects over his strong support of his benefactor, Polyperchon, during the capture of Macedonia by Cassander (see Chapter 3). Philip moved immediately against Aeacides to forestall his joining with the Aetolians. He defeated the force, but the Epirote king and the Epirote survivors succeeded in linking up with the Aetolians, though to no avail. Philip followed up his first victory by subsequently defeating the combined army of his enemies, killing a great many in battle, including the Epirote king. So terrified by their defeat were the Aetolians that they abandoned their cities and fled into the mountains (Diod. 19.74.3–6).

With Cassander fully engaged on Euboea, and another Macedonian army in Aetolia, Antigonus saw an opportunity to seize Macedonia. He summoned Medius from Greece back to Asia and immediately set off for the Hellespont. Cassander, however, discovered the plan, and returned to Macedonia to counter any invasion, leaving another brother (Paus. 1.15.1), Pleistarchus, in command of the garrison in Chalcis. On his way north, he captured Oropus on the border between Boeotia and Attica, renewed his friendship with the Thebans, and arranged a truce with the other Boeotians. Arriving at the Propontis, Antigonus requested an alliance with the Byzantines, who on the advice of Lysimachus decided to remain neutral in the conflict. Lysimachus' operations earlier in the year in western Thrace, where he had defeated both the Thracians and an Antigoniid force, must have magnified the Thracian satrap in the eyes of the Byzantines, who now abandoned their previous alliance with Antigonus for this declared neutrality (cf. Diod. 18.72.6). Antigonus, realizing that Cassander was back in Macedonia, and with winter approaching, abandoned his enterprise and entered winter quarters possibly in Hellespontine Phrygia (Diod. 19.77.5–7).

Even though Antigonus had not achieved his grand design of capturing Macedonia, his operations in Greece had flourished.¹⁸ When Cassander returned to Macedonia, Polemaeus succeeded in capturing the city of Chalcis, which in line with Antigonus' propaganda he did not garrison. Polemaeus also took Oropus by siege and turned the fortress over to the Boeotians. Afterwards the Antigoniid commander formed alliances with the Euboean cities of Eretria and Carystus, and proceeded to enter Attica. His presence encouraged the Athenians to force Cassander's governor Demetrius of Phalerum to form a truce with the Antigoniid general and to send envoys to Antigonus about an alliance. From Attica, Polemaeus returned to Boeotia, where he captured the Theban citadel, the Cadmea, driving out Cassander's garrison, and thus "freeing" Thebes. His grand march through central Greece next took him to Phocis, where he succeeded in driving all of Cassander's garrisons out of the region by the fall of 312, and subsequently on to Locris, where he began a siege of Opus (Diod. 19.78). This campaign was amazingly successful. With the great exception of Athens, virtually all of central Greece had been brought into alliance with Antigonus. The Peloponnesus had, through the efforts of Telesphorus, also joined the Antigoniid alliance, with certain notable exceptions, in particular Sicyon, Corinth, and Megalopolis.¹⁹

During the fall, however, a problem appeared within the Antigoniid command. Antigonus' admiral Telesphorus, who was camped near Corinth, became jealous of Polemaeus' seeming preferment and success and decided to seek his own fortune. Antigonus relied heavily on his family and in particular his sons and nephews. Unfortunately, his nephews on occasion became upset with Antigonus' preference for his sons or, as in this particular case, a rival nephew. The very personal nature of these politics at this time made changes in loyalty one-dimensional. There was as yet no Diadochan state (except Macedonia), nor dynasty, to which populations or subordinates could be devoted. Armies were now mercenary and hence tied to their paymasters. Telesphorus took advantage of both aspects of this new

world. He enlisted those soldiers and commanders who were his loyalists and as such would support this independent enterprise, but he also sold his ships to raise money to retain their loyalty. Subsequently, he marched to Elis, where he was admitted due to his previous tie to Antigonos and the inhabitants' lack of knowledge of his revolt. Here he seized and garrisoned the citadel, plundered the sacred treasury at Olympia, and began hiring mercenaries. This action was very reminiscent of the actions of the Phocians in 356–46, when they plundered the treasuries at the sacred site of Delphi to finance their wars (Buckler 1989). Polemaeus now was forced to leave a small besieging force at Opus, and with the bulk of his troops move to Elis. He seized the citadel and leveled it so that it could not be used by a garrison in the future. He restored their freedom to the Eleans and the treasure to the sanctuary. Not only had he freed Elis from a rogue Antigonid commander, but he also coaxed Telephorus to return to the fold (Diod. 19.87). He then returned to the siege of Opus, which likely fell soon after his return (Billows 1990: 124), and where he prepared to spend the winter.

The summer and fall of 312 also witnessed activities in the northwest of the Greek peninsula (Diod. 19.78.1). The people of Corcyra freed Apollonia and Epidamnus, dismissing Cassander's garrisons under a truce. This city, noted for its strategic position in the Ionian Sea (Isoc. 15.108), clearly wished to remain free of Macedonian power. It had joined with Athens prior to Chaeronea and the imposition of the League of Corinth by Alexander the Great's father (Dem. 18.237), and had likely, like Rhodes (Diod. 18.8.1), broken whatever connection it had with the Macedonians after Alexander's death. Corcyra does not appear on either side during the Lamian War, maintaining its independence until 303 when it was captured by the Spartan adventurer Cleonymus (Diod. 20.104.4, 105.3), the brother of Acrotatus (cf. Diod. 20.29.1), who, as seen, had involved himself in this same area in 313. While Apollonia remained free and autonomous, Epidamnus was given over to the Illyrians (Diod. 19.78.1). An attempt by Cassander to restore his control of Apollonia failed, and the Corcyraeans then freed the Leucadians from the Macedonian's garrisons (Diod. 19.89.3). In Epirus, with the death of Aeacides, the throne passed to Alcetas (II), the younger brother of his predecessor (Paus. 1.11.5), who immediately renewed hostilities with Cassander, but in the end the two formed an alliance and Cassander returned to Macedonia and entered winter quarters (Diod. 19.88.1–89.2).

"In this same summer" of 312 (Diod. 19.79.1), the people of Cyrene revolted from Ptolemy, freeing their city and putting the garrisoned citadel under siege. The Egyptian satrap sent an army under Agis, an otherwise unknown commander, who retrieved the situation, recapturing the city (Diod. 19.79.1–2). With the revolt crushed, Ptolemy himself now took an army to Cyprus and attacked the kings still in alliance with Antigonos (Diod. 19.79.3–80.2). Once these were subdued and the cities on the island were his (Diod. 20.21.1), he left Nicocreon, the king of Salamis, in charge of the army, and sailed across to northern Syria. There he sacked two cities and sailed on to Cilicia, where he captured the community of Malus, selling the inhabitants into slavery, and plundering the

surrounding countryside, before returning to Cyprus, and subsequently to Egypt (Diod. 19.79.4–7, 80.3). When Demetrius, stationed near Gaza, learned of Ptolemy's activities in Cilicia, he left Pithon behind as general in charge of the region, leaving with him the elephants and the heavy infantry. The son of Antigonos, along with the cavalry and light-armed infantry, now hastened north to intercept the Egyptian ruler while he was still in Cilicia. He arrived only after Ptolemy had returned to Cyprus and, having accomplished nothing, returned to his former location near Gaza (Diod. 19.80.1–2; Plut. *Demetr.* 5.2). It was now late in the fall of 312 (cf. Diod. 19.80.5).

Back in Egypt, at the urging of Seleucus, Ptolemy decided to confront the 22-year-old Demetrius (Plut. *Demetr.* 5.2), and began marching his army north (Diod. 19.80.3). Demetrius summoned his troops from their winter quarters and prepared to confront the satrap of Egypt and his ally Seleucus. The advisors that Antigonos had left with the young commander advised him not to take the field. Demetrius, however, was anxious to show his ability. Ptolemy marched across Sinai with an army of 18,000 infantry, including mercenaries and a "great number" of Egyptians, some armed, most support personnel, 4000 cavalry, but no elephants. Demetrius prepared to meet his opponents to the south of the city of Gaza. He and his associated commanders led a force of 11,000 heavy infantry, consisting of 8000 mercenaries, 1000 Lycians and Pamphylians, and 2000 Macedonian phalangites; 4400 cavalry, 2150 light-armed infantry, and 43 elephants (Diod. 19.82).²⁰

In the battle, Demetrius commanded the left wing with 2900 heavy and light cavalry, 1500 light infantry, and 30 elephants; his right contained 1500 mostly light cavalry. The infantry phalanx of some 11,000 was deployed in the center, with 13 elephants in front, interspersed with 650 light-armed troops. Demetrius ordered his right wing to refuse battle until the issue had been decided on the left. Initially, Ptolemy had placed the majority of his cavalry on his left, but learning of Demetrius' deployment, he transferred himself and Seleucus, along with 3000 heavy cavalry, to his right wing. To deal with Demetrius' elephants, Ptolemy placed a screen of archers, javelin men, and men equipped with caltrops, spikes connected to chains to be thrown in front of the elephants. Ptolemy's center consisted of his infantry phalanx, with his left wing protected by only 1000, probably light, cavalry. Demetrius' right wing was, then, far superior to that of his enemy's left, but, as per the plan, never fully engaged during the battle (Diod. 19.83.1–3).

The battle opened with the two strong cavalry wings attacking one another. While the cavalry battle on this flank was progressing, those in charge of Demetrius' elephants advanced to the attack. The elephants were stopped by the light-armed infantry, who attacked the elephants with the caltrops, javelins, and arrows. The ultimate result was that Ptolemy's forces captured all of the surviving elephants. The defeat of the elephants caused a general panic among Demetrius' cavalry, which began to flee the battle in large numbers. The battle ended in a rout. Five hundred,²¹ mostly cavalry, were dead, and 8000, primarily infantry, captured. This battle was the only major confrontation between the forces of the principal antagonists during this entire war (Diod. 19.83.4–85; Plut. *Demetr.* 5.1–3; Just. 15.1.7).

After the conflict Demetrius retreated with the remnants of his forces to Tripolis in Phoenicia, and then to Cilicia, summoning troops from garrisons throughout the area to augment his now very depleted army. Ptolemy acquired Gaza the very night after the battle (Diod. 19.84.7–8), and subsequently was able to occupy Phoenicia, including the ports of Sidon and Tyre (Diod. 19.85.5–86.1–2). Having collected what forces he could, Demetrius had moved from Cilicia back to Upper Syria. Ptolemy, still encamped in Phoenicia, sent his general Cilles with an army to dislodge his beaten opponent. Demetrius learned of the enemy's approach and also that the force was carelessly encamped, and proceeding rapidly by forced march with light-armed troops caught the enemy by surprise in the early morning hours. He captured the army without a battle and made Cilles his prisoner. The latter, along with his staff, was subsequently repatriated to Ptolemy (Diod. 19.93.1–3; Plut. *Demetr.* 6.2–7), possibly in recompense for the Egyptian satrap's similar generosity after the Battle of Gaza with respect to commanders captured from Demetrius' force (Diod. 19.85.3; Just. 15.1.7–8). After this success, which Demetrius believed retrieved his previous defeat (Diod. 19.93.2),²² he wrote to his father urging him to come immediately. Antigonos was in winter quarters in Celaenae when the request reached him. He quickly left his base and within a few days joined his son in Syria. When Ptolemy learned of Antigonos' arrival, he determined to retreat back to his safe haven of Egypt. However, before leaving the coast of the eastern Mediterranean he razed a number of the cities he had captured, including Gaza, which stood on the threshold of Egypt. Antigonos regained possession of that important coast without striking a blow (Diod. 19.93.1–94.1).

While Ptolemy may have feared that his rival would launch an immediate assault on Egypt (cf. Diod. 19.93.5), Antigonos decided instead to attack the Nabataean Arabs, who inhabited the northern and eastern regions of Sinai and the southwestern part of the Arabian peninsula. While the area was rich in bitumen or asphalt, which was useful in waterproofing, caulking, and, in Egypt, embalming, and was a nexus for the incense trade (Hammond 1959), an economic motive for the invasion would appear unlikely. Diodorus (19.94.1) only states that the Nabataeans were "hostile to his [Antigonos'] interests," and it would appear that this campaign was in reality a preliminary to an attack on Egypt itself (Billows 1990: 130). The Nabataeans carried on regular trade with Egypt and knew the desert regions well (Str. 16.4.24). Athenaeus, "one of Antigonos' friends," with 4000 light-armed infantry and 600 cavalry, was sent to raid Petra, the chief Nabataean city, and take hostages. While enjoying initial success, he was subsequently defeated due to his "carelessness and indifference," and although it is not stated, given his absence from the subsequent historical record was likely killed (Diod. 19.94.1, 95.2–7). When the Nabataeans protested to Antigonos, he disavowed the expedition, stating that Athenaeus had made the attack contrary to his orders. By this subterfuge, Antigonos hoped to lull the Arabs into a false sense of security, leaving them unprepared for another surprise attack. Even though the Nabataeans were relieved, they did not entirely trust Antigonos and placed watchmen on the hills to warn of any future incursions. Antigonos, when he

believed that the Arabs had been completely deceived, sent his son Demetrius with another army of 4000 foot and 4000 horse. Demetrius' advance was spotted by the lookouts and reported to their brethren. After his surprise attack was exposed, the Nabataeans offered to become the friends of both he and his father. Hostages and gifts were given, and Demetrius retreated from Nabataea (Diod. 19.96–98.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 7.1). For this agreement he was rebuked by his father, who stated that these actions made the Nabataeans more independent than before. A following military operation also failed (Diod. 19.100.1–2). News from the east soon had Antigonos more concerned with his eastern holdings than with the recalcitrant Nabataeans.

After the victory at Gaza, Seleucus requested that his benefactor the Egyptian satrap give him forces for the reconquest of Babylonia (Diod. 19.86.5). Ptolemy outfitted him with a small force of 800 infantry and 200 cavalry. Despite the small numbers and the apprehension of his supporters, Seleucus was convinced of his eventual success. He had been popular in Babylonia before his flight and he assumed he would be so on his return (Diod. 19.90). His confidence may have been strengthened by Antigonos' often heavy-handed approach to dealing with the eastern provinces. While the evidence is not abundant, there are certain indications of his bad behavior. Antigonos did not approve of governors who were popular with the local population. The most obvious case involves his replacement of the popular Peucestas in Persis (Diod. 19.48.5). Peucestas had not done anything disloyal after his surrender to Antigonos at the conclusion of the Battle of Gabene, and, in fact, remained a faithful supporter of Antigonos and the latter's son Demetrius throughout his subsequent career (see Heckel 2006: 205). When the removal of Peucestas was vigorously protested, one of the leading dissenters, a prominent Persian, was executed (Diod. 19.48.5). Also suggestive of possible earlier actions by Antigonos is his behavior in Babylonia during his later campaign there from 310 to 308. He had apparently adopted a scorched earth policy (*BCHP* 3, Rev. 24–7). The loyalty of those in the east to Seleucus may also have been a reflection on his Iranian wife, Apama (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6; Plut. *Demetr.* 31.5). Seleucus had married her during Alexander the Great's grand marriage ceremony in 324, when the king arranged for himself and approximately eighty of his companions (*hetairoi*) to marry Persian aristocratic women (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4–7; Plut. *Alex.* 70.3; Just. 12.10.9; Diod. 17.107.6; Curt. 10.3.11–12). While there is no hard evidence, it is likely that most of the bridegrooms repudiated their Persian brides after Alexander's death (e.g., Green 1990: 319; Brosius 2003: 176–8; but note Meeus 2009a: 236),²³ thus making Seleucus' marriage to a Persian princess more significant in the eyes of his Asian subjects. Apama's ethnicity was likely seen by the indigenous peoples in the east as a sign of empathy with them.²⁴ There is evidence, however, of some local hostility toward Seleucus. The Persian priests, the "Magians," when asked by Seleucus to indicate the propitious day and hour for beginning the construction of the city Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, reported the wrong hour "because they did not want to have such a stronghold built against themselves" (App. *Syr.* 58). However, their opposition may have been simply to

having a potential economic rival in their midst. Seleucus, also at a later time, did pillage the Temple of Anahita in Ecbatana (Polyb. 10.27). In spite of such incidents, Seleucus was clearly preferable to his rival Antigonus in the eyes of the local people (Diod. 19.91.3–4).

While traveling through Mesopotamia early in 311, Seleucus acquired those Macedonians settled in the area of Carrhae, who were likely soldiers discharged by Antigonus in 315 on his way back to Asia Minor (Billows 1990: 301–3) and settled in this area (Diod. 19.91.1). When he entered Babylonia in the spring of 311, he was enthusiastically greeted by the inhabitants, who remembered him as “a generous satrap” (Diod. 19.91.2). One of the commanders, Polyarchus, left in Babylonia by Antigonus, also went over to Seleucus, along with the 1000 soldiers under his command. Those troops still loyal to Antigonus joined with Diphilus, the commander of one of the citadels in Babylon, to resist both Seleucus and the inhabitants of the city. Seleucus stormed the citadel and, with its capture, he secured his former satrapal capital (*BCHP* 3, Rev. 6–8; Diod. 19.91.3–4). Nicanor, Antigonus’ “general” of the east, gathered a force from both Media and Persis, totaling 10,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, mostly Persian, to confront Seleucus. Against this considerable force, Seleucus had but 3000 infantry and 400 cavalry. But while Nicanor was encamped and maintaining an inadequate guard, Seleucus fell upon his army at night and routed them (Diod. 19.92.1–4). Most of the Persian troops deserted to Seleucus, in part “because they were offended by the previous conduct of Antigonus” (Diod. 19.92.4; cf. Diod. 19.48.5). Nicanor after his defeat sent an urgent message to Antigonus informing him of what had occurred, and then attempted to organize new forces. When Antigonus received the letter sometime after the conclusion of the Nabataean campaign (Diod. 19.100.3), he sent Demetrius in the late summer or fall of 311, with an army of 5000 Macedonian infantry, 10,000 mercenary foot soldiers, and 4000 cavalry. But, before Demetrius arrived, and before Nicanor could assemble a sufficient army, Seleucus invaded Media and defeated these forces, killing their commander (Diod. 19.100.3; App. *Syr.* 55, 57). With the final defeat and death of Nicanor, Seleucus secured control of Media and Susiane (Diod. 19.92.5).

When news of Demetrius’ arrival reached Patrocles, the commander left in Babylonia while Seleucus was in the eastern provinces, he abandoned the city of Babylon after having urged the civilian population also to flee. Demetrius therefore entered a virtually deserted city except for its two citadels. The first was captured without difficulty; the second resisted with greater persistence. Demetrius therefore left Archelaus, “one of his friends,” to continue the siege with 5000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, while he returned hurriedly to the west. Antigonus had ordered his son to return quickly so that they could proceed together into winter quarters near the Mediterranean (Diod. 19.100.4, 7).

During this winter (311/10), four of the antagonists in the war reached a settlement, with Antigonus, Cassander, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, basically recognizing the boundaries that existed between them at the start of the conflict. An agreement had been made, perhaps as early as the late summer, between Antigonus,

Cassander, and Lysimachus, but only with Ptolemy in the winter. A letter from Antigonus to the city of Scepsis (Bagnall and Derow [OGIS 5] 1981: 11–12) makes it clear that an agreement had first been made with the Europeans (OGIS 5, lines 25, 35), and only subsequently with Ptolemy (lines 30, 35). The earlier peace created a serious dilemma for the ruler of Egypt. With both Cassander and Lysimachus out of the war, Ptolemy would have stood alone against Antigonus in the west (Billows 1990: 113–14). Seleucus and Polyperchon were now the odd men out (Mehl 1986: 120–4; Billows 1990: 132).

This war may seem to have ended in a draw, but that was in reality not the case. While Cassander retained Macedonia, at least officially until Alexander IV should come of age; Lysimachus, Thrace; and Ptolemy, Egypt, Arabia, and Libya, Antigonus was recognized as the "leader" of, or the "first" in, all Asia. (Diod. 19.105.1). All parties agreed to respect Greek "freedom and autonomy" (Bagnall and Derow [OGIS 5, lines 54–5] 1981: 12; Diod. 20.19.3), which had long been part of Antigonus' policy. The peace, even though the Greek cities were not directly involved in the negotiations, strengthened Antigonus' claim to be protecting their interests. Ptolemy had relinquished his demand for the eastern coast of the Mediterranean from Egypt to northern Syria, and had abandoned his ally Seleucus. In western Asia, Antigonus now controlled Caria and with his alliances with the independent dynasts on the Black Sea, he had secured control of Asia Minor. He also had made serious inroads in Greece, where he had many allies. However, he had lost substantial territories in the east, where Seleucus was later to emerge as a major player in what continued to be the ongoing struggle for power among the Diadochs. There was also one final indirect result of this war: the end of the Argead dynasty that had ruled Macedonia since the eighth century. In the treaty, Cassander had been recognized as "general in Europe" until Alexander IV, who was then 13, came of age. To avoid the eventuality of the young man either himself demanding his kingdom or the demand coming from the Macedonians, Cassander had both Alexander and his mother Roxane secretly murdered by their jailor, probably sometime in the spring of 310, although the murders did not become known until the summer (Diod. 19.105.2; Just. 15.2.5; Trog. 15; [Heidelberg *Epitome*] FGrH 155 F-2.3; Paus. 9.7.2). There is no evidence of protestations from the other Diadochs. There is, however, evidence of some confusion in the minds of the Successors as to how they were to proceed. In Babylon, for example, some records continued to be dated with reference to the regnal years of Alexander IV down to 306/5 (Boiy 2000: 121). Most of the Diadochs for the next few years simply retained their former titles. Diodorus (19.105.3), however, records that all felt a great sense of relief. Yet if this were true, it is surprising that none immediately stepped forward to proclaim their own kingship (Gruen 1985: 254). Alexander's remaining son, the illegitimate Heracles, in 309, suffered a similar fate at the hands of Polyperchon, but only after the former regent first attempted to use the young man in a bid to return to power in Macedonia (Diod. 20.28.1–3).

With the peace of 311/10, often referred to as the "Peace of the Dynasts," our major source, Diodorus, apparently began to lose interest in the continuous yet

inconclusive warfare taking place among the Diadochs, and began to concentrate more on the history of his native Sicily and the exploits of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles. Symptomatic of this changing emphasis is the complete omission from Diodorus' narrative of the year 310 of the expedition that Antigonus led to the east against Seleucus.²⁵ Demetrius' campaign had not produced any lasting results, and Antigonus was forced to attempt to regain his former holdings himself. The only clear evidence for this expedition survives in the cuneiform tablet, the *Babylonian Chronicle of the Diadochs* (BCHP 3, Rev. 14–41; cf. Polyaen. 4.9.1). Fighting between Antigonus and Seleucus began in earnest in the summer of 310, and continued in some fashion until at least August 309, followed by Antigonus' return to the west in 308. During his absence his western holdings were left in the charge of his sons Philip and Demetrius (Wheatley 2002: 31–3). In the war in the east, Seleucus was able to more than hold his own, perhaps even winning a direct confrontation with Antigonus, although this is unclear in our fragmentary source, so that in the end, after having devastated Babylonia (BCHP 3, Rev. 25–31), Antigonus was unable to secure the region and returned to Asia Minor. After the departure of this antagonist, Seleucus proceeded to consolidate his holdings and to acquire Bactria, Carmania, Areia, and Drangiana, even campaigning in India against the Indian prince Chandragupta (App. Syr. 53, 55; Just. 15.4.11–12; 41.4.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 7.2; Pliny *NH* 6.21.63). He subsequently made peace with the latter, surrendering his claimed Indian possessions for 500 war elephants (Str. 15.2.9; 16.2.10; App. Syr. 55; Plut. *Alex.* 62.4).²⁶

In addition to the ongoing war in the east with Seleucus, despite the peace, sporadic conflict continued in Greece, in Asia Minor, and in the Aegean. But, the peace did hold off war on a large scale in the west until 307. Polyperchon remained in the Peloponnesus, mostly inert but continually plotting his return to Macedonia. His current plan was to use Heracles, Alexander the Great's bastard son, who was then 17 years of age,²⁷ as his entrée back to power.²⁸ He convinced the young man and his mother, the Persian Barsine, to come to him from Pergamon, a Greek city in western Anatolia, with his promise to place this son of Alexander on the Macedonian throne. They likely arrived in the fall of 310. After their arrival, the former regent began a campaign encouraging all of those who had a grievance with Cassander to help in the restoration of the "rightful king" to his throne. The Aetolian League joined in the undertaking, as did many others. By the late fall of the year there had assembled an army of 20,000 infantry and at least 1000 cavalry (Diod. 20.20.3–4). Over the winter the former regent raised money for the campaign and sent agents into Macedonia to subvert the people from their loyalty to Cassander (Diod. 20.20.4). Since his propaganda achieved great success, it is clear Alexander IV's death was already known. Polyperchon brought his forces into Epirus where, soon after, Cassander also arrived with his army. Since the Macedonians were not opposed to Heracles, Cassander, fearing that his troops might desert him, opened negotiations with the former regent. Cassander argued that, if Polyperchon's plan succeeded, the young king would be controlled by

others, but, if Polyperchon would murder the young man, he would become general of the Peloponnesus and a "partner in everything in Cassander's realm." His estates in Macedonia would be restored, and Cassander would give him 4000 Macedonian infantrymen and 500 Thessalian cavalry. Polyperchon agreed to the alliance, and murdered the last of Alexander's heirs (Diod. 20.28.1-3; [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B 18). Of the other contenders in the European theater, Lysimachus' siege of Callantia was apparently concluded successfully in this year (cf. Diod. 20.25.1-2, 112.2), or perhaps in the previous year (Rathmann 2005a: 458).

Elsewhere in Greece, in the spring or early summer of 309, Polemaeus, Antigonos' nephew and overall commander of his forces in Greece, rebelled and formed an alliance with Cassander, claiming that his uncle had not honored him sufficiently (Diod. 20.19.2). This desertion likely resulted from Antigonos' preference for his two sons, Philip and Demetrius, over this very talented nephew. While the evidence is circumstantial it would appear that he left his sons in overall charge of his possessions when he launched his attack on Seleucus (cf. Diod. 20.19.3-5). The loss of Polemaeus was significant both because of his position in Greece and as a result of his previous operations in Asia. Many of those in charge in Asia Minor from Cappadocia west were individuals who had been placed in their positions by this commander. The satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Phoenix, was one of his "friends," to whom Polemaeus now sent additional soldiers with which to garrison the cities (Diod. 20.19.2). Ptolemy, noting that garrisons were now being inserted into these Greek communities, and even though this was the result of Polemaeus' rebellion, charged Antigonos with breaking the treaty, and sent an army north which captured cities in western Cilicia that had been allied with Antigonos. In the summer of 309, Ptolemy left Egypt for Lycia, where he captured the cities of Phaselis and Xanthus, then, sailing on to Caria, he captured the city of Caunus. After these successes, he sailed to the island of Cos, where he summoned Polemaeus to a meeting. Antigonos' rebellious nephew left Chalcis to meet the ruler of Egypt. This potential alliance, however, collapsed when Polemaeus attempted to subvert Ptolemy's commanders with gifts, and was forced to drink hemlock. Ptolemy proceeded to win over the forces previously loyal to their now dead commander and these were distributed throughout his ranks (Diod. 20.27). He then spent the winter of 309/8 in Caria (cf. Diod. 20.37.1). Much of this activity by Ptolemy was conditioned by Antigonos' absence in the east. Ptolemy also attempted to renew his former alliance with Lysimachus and Cassander. Antigonos' younger son Philip proceeded with an army to the Hellespont to deal with Phoenix, and Demetrius with another force entered Cilicia. Both areas were soon back comfortably in the Antigonid alliance (Diod. 20.19.3-5; Plut. *Demetr.* 7.4). Ptolemy's actions were the result of his dissatisfaction with the peace. Deserted by his allies and not yet knowing of Seleucus' successes in the east, he believed he had no choice but to end hostilities. Now, however, with Seleucus prospering and Antigonos absent, he was ready to take up where the last war had left off. Ptolemy himself sailed with a force to Cyprus, where he succeeded in ensuring that the entire island was completely under his authority ([Parian

Marble] *FGrH* 239 B 17). Learning that King Niococles of Paphos was secretly in alliance with Antigonus, Ptolemy through his agents forced the king's suicide, which was then followed by the deaths of his entire family, including the king's wife, Axiothea, who committed suicide, but only after murdering the couple's daughters (Diod. 20.21.2; Polyae. 8.48; cf. *FGrH* 239 B 17). So concluded the year 309.

The following spring saw Ptolemy again active in the Aegean, sailing from Myndus in Caria through the islands, where he separated Andros and likely many other cities from their alliance with Antigonus, and with his large fleet proceeded to the Greek mainland. Here, he acquired Sicyon and Corinth from Cratesipolis (Diod. 20.37.1; Polyae. 8.58). The Egyptian satrap clearly was hoping to beat Antigonus at his own game, and gain the support of the Greeks through a "Greek freedom" program of his own. He likely wished to recreate the former League of Corinth with himself as its leader (Billows 1990: 144–5 and n. 18; Dixon 2007: 173–4 and n. 63). Ptolemy had planned on "freeing" more Greek cities, but the Peloponnesians who had agreed to assist him in these endeavors failed to contribute the forces that they had promised, and Ptolemy returned to Egypt (Diod. 20.37.1–2). Ptolemy had issued his own proclamation of Greek freedom soon after Antigonus' Tyre declaration (Diod. 19.62.1), but the Egyptian satrap's declarations were much less well received. The fact that he garrisoned both Sicyon and Corinth prior to his withdrawal from Greece (Diod. 20.37.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 15.1; Suda s.v. *Demetrius*) only confirmed Greek doubts concerning his commitment to Greek freedom. It is very possible that this return to Egypt was triggered by Antigonus' return from his failed attempt to unseat Seleucus (Wheatley 2002: 45–6). In Diodorus, the juxtapositioning of Ptolemy's retreat with Antigonus' presence in the west does make this a real possibility (cf. Diod. 20.37.3–6). However, other than the order of Diodorus' narrative, there is no stated evidence supporting this supposition, especially since Diodorus makes no mention of Antigonus' eastern expedition.

After his inability to remove Seleucus, Antigonus returned sometime in the summer of 308. His arrival in the west was soon followed by the death of Alexander's sister Cleopatra. She had been sought in marriage by many of the Diadochs: Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3.9–10), Perdiccas (Diod. 18.23.1), and more recently by Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and perhaps even by Antigonus (Diod. 20.37.4). That Antigonus sought her hand in marriage might appear a rational objective for one who did not have other close ties to Alexander the Conqueror and the Argead family, especially now that the entire male line was no more. However, of the Successors he appears to have invoked the name of Alexander the least. While in control of many of the mints, coins issued under his authority were simply continuations of the long-standing Alexander coinage, without making any connection between the Conqueror and himself (Mørkholm 1991: 61). His desire to marry Cleopatra cannot be refuted, but appears doubtful. Antigonus had sufficient laurels on which to rest: his successes on the battlefield were sufficient to ensure his reputation and claims on authority. Moreover, Diodorus (20.27.4) also states

that Cleopatra's hand was sought by Cassander, but this is very unlikely. Cassander had ordered the murder of Olympias, Cleopatra's mother, in 315, and was already married to Thessalonice, the daughter of Philip II (Diod. 19.52.1; cf. Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3).

Cleopatra had frequently quarreled with Antigonus, but had apparently remained in Sardis over the past decade, having arrived there in 321 seeking a marriage with the then regent Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.21; Diod. 18.23.1; Just. 13.6.4). During the years of Antigonus' dominance she appears to have been kept under close scrutiny (Diod. 20.37.5). The current disagreement was likely over a recent proposal of marriage from Ptolemy (Diod. 20.37.3). He had been operating in the vicinity. In any case, her departure was prevented by Antigonus' commander in Sardis, who was later ordered by Antigonus to murder her, which he did (Diod. 20.37.3–6). Antigonus attempted to conceal his involvement by accusing "certain women" apparently connected to her entourage with the Macedonian princess' death. He did give her a lavish royal burial (Diod. 20.37.6).

With respect to the Diadochs, the only other event of 308 recorded by Diodorus that even tangentially concerns them is the campaign of Ptolemy's commander in Cyrene, Ophellas, who was associated with Ptolemy's acquisition of the city in 322. Apparently this individual had greater ambition than simply remaining as the overseer of the Libyan city. In 308, he was approached by Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, concerning a joint operation against the Carthaginians in North Africa (Diod. 20.40.1–2; Just. 22.7.4).²⁹ The Syracusan claimed that he only wished to have a fellow Greek in charge of North Africa and that he was fully content with Sicily. Ophellas quickly consented and through a family connection in Athens began to assemble a large force for the campaign. He had married Euthydice, an Athenian descendant of the famous victor at Marathon, Miltiades (Diod. 20.45.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 14.1). There may also have been close diplomatic relations existing between Demetrius of Phalerum and Ptolemy. When the "Guardian" of Athens was finally forced to leave the city in 307, he departed to Egypt and not to Macedonia and Cassander (Diod. 20.45.4). Ophellas set off against the Carthaginians with 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, 100 chariots, and many light-armed troops (Diod. 20.40.3–41.1). Not long after his arrival, Agathocles betrayed him, killing the commander and taking control of his army (Diod. 20.42.3–5; Just. 22.7.5–6; Suda s.v. *Demetrius*; s.v. *Ophellas*).

With the start of the new campaigning year (307), Antigonus sent his son Demetrius out into the Aegean with instructions to free all of the Greek cities, beginning with Athens (Diod. 20.45.1–5). The campaign is described by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 8.1–2; cf. *Mor.* 182E–F) as a noble deed designed to garner glory and honor for the father and the son; to spend "the vast wealth which they together had amassed from the barbarians ... upon the Greeks." While Demetrius may have seen the noble aspects of the campaign and Antigonus no doubt hoped that this was to be the view of those soon to be "freed," the father was interested in the practical results. Due to Polemaeus' betrayal and his own absence in the east, much of Greece was now allied to and garrisoned by Cassander and Ptolemy.

Antigonus' previous gains now for the most part were lost. Demetrius was sent with 5000 talents and a fleet of 250 warships from Ephesus. When he arrived in the Saronic Gulf before Piraeus at the beginning of June (Plut. *Demetr.* 8.5), he launched an immediate assault on the main harbor. He caught the Athenians unawares by separating twenty of the fastest warships from the fleet and having them sail past Piraeus as if making for the island of Salamis. The Athenians took the ships to be Ptolemaic vessels on their way to Corinth. At the last moment the ships changed course rapidly and entered and secured the harbor for the rest of the fleet that was waiting at Cape Sunion (Polyaen. 4.7.6; Plut. *Demetr.* 6.6–8; Diod. 20.45.2). At this time Demetrius issued a proclamation stating that he had come to set the Athenians free, expel Cassander's garrison, and "restore to the people their laws and their ancient form of government," i.e., democracy (Plut. *Demetr.* 8.7; Diod. 20.45.2; Polyaen. 4.7.6). With the fall of the harbor, the Athenians and Antigonus' son opened negotiations. The now former "guardian" of the Athenians, Demetrius of Phalerum, was given a safe conduct and fled to Ptolemy in Egypt by way of Thebes.³⁰ Only the fortress of Munychia resisted, and this fell after a two-day siege (Diod. 20.45.2–4; Plut. *Demetr.* 9). Megara was also "liberated" by Demetrius, with the Megarians bestowing unspecified but "noteworthy honors" on their savior (Diod. 20.46.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 9.5). In addition to their freedom, the Athenians were also given over 200,000 bushels of grain, which was then in short supply, likely due to the imposition of a blockade of the Hellespont by Cassander's ally Lysimachus; also given was timber sufficient for the construction of 100 warships, and the Aegean islands of Imbros and Lemnos, which had been secured by Antigonus when Cassander was in control of Athens (Diod. 20.46.4; *IG II²* 1492b, lines 5–12, 27–31, 40–2).

"The Athenians, having recovered their freedom, decreed honors to those responsible for their liberation" (Diod. 20.45.5). These honors included gold statues of Antigonus and Demetrius in a chariot near the statues of the supposed earlier liberators of the Athenians from tyranny, Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Thuc. 1.20), gold crowns, being hailed as kings (Plut. *Demetr.* 10.4), having their names inserted as two new tribes in those of the ten Cleisthenic tribes, annual games in the "saviors'" honor, having their names along with those of the gods woven into the ceremonial garment fashioned before the Panathenaic festival and draped on the statue of the goddess Athena, and the consecration of an altar to the "saviors," along with a dedicated priesthood (Diod. 20.46.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 10.4–7).³¹ The last clearly amounts to formal worship. Despite occasional lapses, the worship of living men by the Greeks only began in earnest late in Alexander the Great's lifetime (Anson 2013b: 114–20). Earlier there are but few examples of such behavior. "Altars were erected and sacrifice offered as to a god" to Lysander by a number of island cities, specifically Samos, "liberated" at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War from Athenian suzerainty (Plut. *Lys.* 18.3–4); Agesilaus is recorded as refusing similar honors offered by the Thasians (Plut. *Ages.* 25; *Mor.* 210D; Flower 1988: 123–34); Dion in the middle of the fourth century BC received "heroic honors" from the Syracusans (Diod. 16.20.6; Plut. *Dion*; contra: Badian

1996: 42–3), and, perhaps, Alexander the Great's father Philip was honored by cities his forces had liberated from the Persians (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 408, line 5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.11). The key to understanding what was taking place in Athens is that these were meant as extravagant honors for what were considered to be extraordinary conferred benefits; there was no real sense that these individuals were immortal beings. These "mortals were simply sharing 'some of the gods' divine prerogatives" (Green 1990: 402).

That this practice was rare prior to Alexander the Great was the function of two factors. The first was that, prior to the emergence of such powerful individuals as Philip and Alexander, there were few who could bestow such large benefactions; second, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, had twice tested the might wielded by such individuals and been beaten. Gods were powerful beings who could confer enormous benefits or inflict equally severe punishments, much as our new savior-generals. The confidence of the Greek city-states in being able to control their own destiny was now at a low ebb and destined to remain so. Benefactors or "saviors" were now becoming essential for the maintenance of any sense of autonomy. After Antigonos' son Demetrius' later unsuccessful siege of Rhodes (305–4), the Rhodians, grateful for the support that had been provided by Ptolemy, proclaimed him savior (*soter*) of the city and sent a delegation to the Oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya seeking permission to worship the Egyptian ruler as a god. The response from the oracle was favorable and the worship was initiated, with the creation within the city of a sacred precinct, the Ptolemaeum (Diod. 20.100.3–4).

Elated by his son's quick success in Athens, Antigonos wrote ordering him to summon ambassadors from the Greek cities "to consider in common what was advantageous for Greece" (Diod. 20.46.5). Antigonos hoped to enhance the belief that he was the only Diadoch truly interested in Greek freedom. Demetrius even attempted unsuccessfully to bribe the Ptolemaic garrison commanders in Sicily and Corinth to free these cities (Plut. *Demetr.* 15.1). This impromptu meeting would be followed five years later by the official foundation of a new Hellenic League at Corinth and the proclamation of Demetrius as *hegemon* of the Greeks, the very title held previously by Philip II and his son Alexander with respect to the League of Corinth (Plut. *Demetr.* 25; IG IV² 1.68; Austin 1981: 77–8).

In the spring of 306, Demetrius was ordered by his father to sail to Cyprus and wrest that island from the Ptolemaic forces holding it (Diod. 20.46.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 15.12). On his way he summoned the Rhodians to join him, but they refused, desiring to maintain their neutrality in the struggle between the two Diadochs (Diod. 20.46.6). Demetrius continued on his mission and landed near the city of Salamis in the spring of 306 (Paus. 1.6.6; [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-21), with a force 15,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 163 warships. Ptolemy's general on the island, his brother Menelaus, contested the invasion with 12,000 infantry and 800 cavalry. The battle was of short duration with Demetrius winning a complete victory, killing 1000 and capturing 3000 of the enemy. Menelaus, however, with the remainder of his force retreated inside the port city thus necessitating a siege.

Certain aspects of this siege were a preview of the more famous later operation on Rhodes. Having secured craftsmen and materials from the Asian mainland, Demetrius had catapults and a great siege tower, the "Helepolis." The latter, designed by Epimachus of Athens, was a wheeled tower over nine stories tall, protected by armor and carrying artillery that fired through shuttered ports (Diod. 20.48.2, 91.2–8; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1; Vit. 10.16.4).³² While the siege was in progress, Ptolemy arrived with a relief force of 140 warships and 200 transports. Menelaus in the safety of his harbor commanded sixty additional warships, bringing the Ptolemaic fleet total to 200. Demetrius' armada totaled 180. In the sea battle, both commanders placed the larger and more powerful ships on their left, preparing to hold back the right as much as possible. The successful fleet would then be the one that succeeded in destroying the enemy's right and rolling up the center before the opposing fleet could do the same. Ptolemy set his fleet facing the harbor, forcing Demetrius' ships to put their sterns toward Salamis. When the two fleets engaged, Menelaus was to sail out and attack the rear of the enemy line. To counter this move Demetrius stationed ten of his best ships facing the harbor entrance. In the course of the battle these ten were able to delay Menelaus' relief force long enough for Demetrius' fleet to achieve its objective first, routing Ptolemy and his forces. Of the enemy's fleet, 100 transport ships carrying 8000 men were captured, along with 40 warships. Eighty Ptolemaic warships were sunk. The result of the sea battle was the surrender of the entire island to Demetrius. The victorious commander, having taken all of the cities and their garrisons, enrolled the captured into his army. The number of those thus incorporated was 16,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. The victory came in June of 306 (on the battle, see Diod. 20.46.5–47.4, 7–53.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 15–17.1; Just. 15.2.6–9; Polyæn. 4.7.7; Paus. 1.6.6; App. *Syr.* 54; for the date: [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B 21; Wheatley 2001).

The importance of Demetrius' victory cannot be overestimated. It was one of the largest sea battles waged in the ancient Mediterranean, and the triumph on a par with his father's victory over Eumenes. Demetrius at once sent news of his victory to his father. With this victory, Antigonus had himself and his son proclaimed kings (Diod. 20.53.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 17.2–18.1; .: Just. 15.2.10; cf. [Heidelberg *Epitome*] *FGrH* 155 F-1.7), and in this action they were followed later by Ptolemy in the first half of 304,³³ and shortly thereafter by Seleucus (Diod. 20.53.4; Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 20; Gruen 1985: 258–9), Lysimachus, and Cassander (Diod. 20.53; Plut. *Demetr.* 17–18; [Heidelberg *Epitome*] *FGrH* 155 F-1.7; Just. 15.2.12). Cassander, while addressed as king by others, continued in the traditional fashion of the Argeads of being addressed by his subjects by his name without title (Plut. *Demetr.* 18; App. *Syr.* 54).³⁴ The delay in proclaiming what must have seemed inevitable to most after the deaths of Alexander IV, Heracles, and Cleopatra, is surprising, but with much of their authority riding on the acceptance of such titles by army and allies, caution was not an unwise policy. Their power was based on military achievement, and that Antigonus was the first to venture forth into this new world after the twin triumphs of the liberation of Athens and the capture of

Cyprus is not that astonishing. These individuals were first and foremost commanders of armies, and their power was personal and absolutist (Billows 1990: 241–8; Chaniotis 2005: 57–68). Once Antigonus was crowned as king, the others would follow suit, but apparently needed some important event to precipitate the action. "Neither nature nor justice gives kingdoms to men, but to those who are able to lead an army and to handle affairs intelligently": so states the definition of *basileia* (kingship) in the Byzantine lexicon, the Suda (s.v. *basileia*).

The importance of conquests and victories cannot be overestimated in any discussion of these newly emerging dynasties. These new monarchies were tied to imperialism. All of the Diadochs, as seen in the narrative, did not pursue policies that were concerned solely to the holding of those territories that they already possessed, but rather they constantly sought to add to their power and possessions. None of the Successors was immune to the quest. In a very real sense their royalty depended on their military success (Chaniotis 2005: 57–8). The centrality of military command to power arises from a long history in the Near East. It was the goad that pushed Darius and Xerxes to attempt the conquest of Greece. It was the stamp that Alexander the Great had put on this age. But, it was also the practical result of the scramble for power that broke out on the Conqueror's death. With respect to the running of the state, the Successors followed Macedonian tradition in that it was exercised at the highest level through their friends (*philoí*) and solidified through patronage at all levels (Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 362–4, 378–80). As with Alexander, authority in the territories of the kingdom was divided among a multiplicity of officials, in most cases answerable ultimately to the king directly. Thus, satraps might govern provinces, but cities typically had their own royal officials, and garrisons their independent commanders.

Chronology from 314 to 306

One of the more recent arguments for the high chronology concerns the Nemean Games that were held under Cassander's presidency. Since these games were held every two years, both before and after the year of the Olympic Games, the only possible years in which the Nemean Games could have taken place under the presidency of Cassander as described in Diodorus are 315 and 313. Those in favor of the high chronology accept 315, assuming that Cassander's operations in the Peloponnesus, which began when he heard that Aristodemus had arrived in Greece and concluded with the celebration of the games, all occurred in the same year, 315 (Boiy 2007b: 149; Stylianou 1994: 83; Meeus 2012: 76–7), as opposed to the assumption that these events took place over a two-year period, with Cassander wintering near Orchomenus at the conclusion of his first year's operations (as in this chapter's narrative). Diodorus' archon year 315/14 (19.55.1) corresponds to a period beginning with the late spring or more likely early summer of 315, with Antigonus leaving Susa (19.55.1), having left winter quarters in Diodorus' previous year (316/15) (19.46.1), then proceeding through Antigonus wintering in Malus,

and concluding in the summer of 313, with the end of the fifteen-month siege of Tyre and some subsequent naval operations (Diod. 19.62.6–9, 64.7–8). This supposed archon year of 315/14 then covered two years.

Without the winter break in Orchomenus, Cassander's operations – if they all took place in the one year, 315 – become incredibly compressed. First, Diodorus makes it very clear that Cassander did not move from Macedonia until he heard of Aristodemus' arrival in the Peloponnesus, "of the multitude of mercenaries that he had collected," and of the alliance he had formed with Polyperchon and Alexander (Diod. 19.63.3). Aristodemus left for Greece early in the year, but only after Antigonos had left winter quarters, moved into northern Syria, and received the envoys from his former allies, whose demands he rejected. After hearing of the new alliance between Antigonos' officer and Polyperchon, Cassander then attempted to win the former regent over to his side before moving south. All of these individual events would have taken time. It was then at the earliest late spring before Cassander marched his army south. He spent some time in Boeotia rebuilding the Theban walls, proceeded to capture the Corinthian port and two other fortresses in Corinthia, before moving to Arcadia, there having the city of Orchomenus betrayed to him, from there proceeding to Messenia, and finally returning to Megalopolis. All of these activities would have to have taken place before August, when the Nemean Games began. Simply traveling, without the other activities, the roughly 560 miles would have taken time. Even though Diodorus does not indicate the entrance into winter quarters by Cassander between his departure from Macedonia and the start of the Nemean Games, this is clearly an oversight, for in the same time comparison (Europe/Asia), he also fails to note Antigonos entering winter quarters, thus placing the fifteen-month siege of Tyre all in the same archon year.

While Diodorus' chronology does have problems, he does appear to put events noted geographically into a relative sequence, and he makes a serious attempt to correlate the different geographic sections within the same time period. His difficulty with respect to events in Europe and Asia is that his source, again most likely in the main Hieronymus of Cardia, arranged events seasonally (Smith 1961), while Diodorus attempted to implement his flawed chronological system of archon and consular years, and Olympiads. In the case of Diodorus' archon year 316/15 (19.17.1), he correlates Cassander's campaign south, undertaken after the death of Olympias, to his return to Macedonia (Diod. 19.53.1–2, 54.1, 3–4), with the operations of Antigonos following his departure from Media down to his arrival in Susa (Diod. 19.46.5, 48.7–8). Cassander's invasion of the Peloponnesus in the following year, 315/14 (Diod. 19.55.1), including his presidency of the Nemean Games and his return to Macedonia (Diod. 19.63.3–64.1), is correlated with Antigonos' activities from his departure from Susa (Diod. 19.55.1) to the fall of Tyre (Diod. 19.61.5). It is clear that Diodorus, with respect to Antigonos, has related events that happened over two winters, that spent by him in Malus in Cilicia and the other likely at Tyre in the midst of his fifteen-month siege, which only began after Antigonos' departure from Malus. It should then be assumed that

Diodorus followed the same chronological pattern with regard to Cassander's activities during the same narrated time period. If this particular invasion of the Peloponnesus by Cassander begins in one year and ends in the next, then the problem of the Nemean Games is eliminated. By the low chronology, Cassander invaded the Peloponnesus after the arrival of Aristodemus in 314 and after wintering in the Peloponnesus presided at the games in August of 313.

Diodorus' archon year 314/13 (19.66.1) then begins in the summer of 313, and concludes with the winter of that same year. The last reference to Antigonus in this archon year has that commander entering winter quarters (Diod. 19.69.2). There then follows the indication of the new archon year, 313/12 (Diod. 19.73.1), which in reality then corresponds to the start of 312, with Antigonus leaving these same winter quarters (Diod. 19.74.1) and Polemaeus still in winter quarters when Asander and Prepelaus attempt their surprise attack (Diod. 19.68.5). This year then ends in the following winter, with the new archon year, 312/11 (Diod. 19.77.1), beginning with the spring departure of Polemaeus for Greece (cf. Diod. 19.77.1), and concluding in the winter with Antigonus (19.77.7) and Cassander entering winter quarters (19.89.2), and Demetrius returning from his attack on Babylonia (19.100.7). It is clear that Diodorus' archon year 312/11 reflects events occurring in the solar year 311.

The Battle of Gaza then took place in the late fall of 312: given the many references to winter around the time of the conflict, probably in November (see Anson 2006b: 228–9), or perhaps as early as October (Wheatley 2003a: 271–5; cf. 2009b: 328n. 22, 329–33). The high chronology dates the battle in the spring of 312, but much of this argument has now been demolished (Boiy 2007b: 115–17; Wheatley 2009b: 328 n. 22). Moreover, Diodorus' narrative of the prelude to the battle excludes such an early date. Demetrius (19.80.5), Antigonus (19.77.7), and Cassander (19.89.2) were all clearly in winter quarters prior to the conflict, and Diodorus 19.77.7 states that Antigonus took up winter quarters when the "winter season was closing in on him," and was still in these quarters when the letter from Demetrius calling him back to Syria arrived (Diod. 19.85.8, 93.3).

However, a new piece of evidence, one of the Idumaeian ostraca, has been presented which has in some circles been claimed to revive the old high chronology dating of spring of 312 (Porten and Yardeni 2008: 248). An ostrakon dated to the reign of an Alexander, assumed to be Alexander IV, has been dated July 5, 312, by Porten and Yardeni (2008: 248–9). Such an ostrakon does appear anomalous in a listing of what previously are mostly Antigoniid issues, and might suggest that Antigonus was no longer in control of this area, and that those recording these transactions reverted to the previous dating system of reference to Alexander's regnal years to accommodate the seizure of the area by Ptolemy. Porten and Yardeni (2008: 249) also list two ostraca referencing Alexander in the midst of what are mostly Antigoniid notations beginning in July 315. These are dated by Alexander (IV) to July 21, 315 (a most curious one since there is a surviving ostrakon dated by reference to Antigonus equivalent to July 20, 315), and April 10, 314. These two would appear to negate the hypothesis that the changes represent

changes in control of Idumaea. In the high chronology, this area was controlled by Antigonus from early 315 to the spring of 312; in the low, from early 314 to late in 312. The simplest solution to this problem is that variant dating systems were used concurrently in Idumaea, as they were in Babylonia (see comments in the chronology section of Chapter 4 above). Given the claim that these dates correspond with those in Babylon (Boiy 2007b: 90–1), it needs to be noted that cuneiform documents have been found that are dated with reference to Antigonus 3–9, and others dated, by Alexander IV, 1–11 (Boiy 2007b: 24–5). Antigonus 3 is the equivalent of Alexander IV 2; Antigonus 5 = Alexander IV 4, and so on (Boiy 2000: 121). Of course, if this particular ostrakon refers to Alexander the Great, rather than to Alexander IV as proposed, the problem evaporates. Moreover, there are other ostraca also dated with reference to regnal years for an Alexander, which complicate Porten and Yardeni's conclusion. Two of these, if referring to Alexander IV, can be dated to February 22, 311 (Porten and Yardeni 2008: 249; Wheatley 2003a: 271–5). Now, if these three particular ostraca refer to Alexander IV and do represent a change in the ruler of this region, and none are in error or representing concurrently used dating systems, then there is a problem. After the Battle of Gaza, Antigonus moved rapidly from Celaenae to join his son in Syria, with the result that Ptolemy retreated all the way back to Egypt (Diod. 19.93.3–5). If all three of these ostraca dated by reference to Alexander IV are accepted as accurate reflections of changes in regional leadership related to the Battle of Gaza, then Ptolemy must have held on to this area for more than seven months. If one ignores the ostrakon tentatively dated July 5, 312, accepting it as some variant dating, but accepts the other two dated February 22, as reflective of Antigonus' loss of this area due to his son's defeat, then, as Wheatley has argued, this is clear support for the low chronological date by demonstrating that Ptolemy was in charge of the area in February 311. However, the likely explanation for the ostraca dates is that multiple dating systems were in use.

Further evidence for the date of the battle comes from the Phoenician city of Sidon which issued a Ptolemaic coin dated by Merker (1964: 14–15) to year 22 in the Sidonian sequence, or 312/11, which most likely is to be connected to Ptolemy's victory at Gaza (Merker 1964: 14–15; Wheatley 2003a: 271–5). As to the year, Sidon was the first Phoenician city to go over to Ptolemy (Diod. 19.86.1), and the Sidonian year began in autumn (see most recently Wheatley 2003a: 274–5; cf. Boiy 2007b: 39). The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 16) places this battle in the Athenian archon year 312/11. From this preponderance of evidence, then, the battle must have occurred late in 312.

This analysis of Diodorus' archon year sequencing of events is supported by certain Babylonian cuneiform tablets relating to Seleucus. As noted in the chapter narrative, after the defeat of Demetrius in the Battle of Gaza, Seleucus was given a small force by Ptolemy and proceeded to invade Babylonia. According to Diodorus (19.90.1), Seleucus and his force left for Babylon before Antigonus' arrival in Phoenicia and clearly before the start of Diodorus' next year (19.105.1), which began in 310. The cuneiform tablet *BCHP* 3, Rev. 3–12 narrates Seleucus' arrival

in Babylon in April or May of 311 (van der Spek 2013a). Moreover, the Babylonian King List (BM 35603; see van der Spek 2013b) reports: "Year 7 (SE), which is year 1; Seleucus (I Nicator) was king. He reigned for 25 years. Year 31 (SE), Ululu [month VI], Se[leucus] the king was killed in the land (of the) Hanaeans" (BM 35603 Obv. 6–8). The document refers to two different systems for dating Seleucus' reign. Year 31 refers to his rule over his native Babylonian subjects; the figure of 25, to his assumption of the crown with respect to his "Greek" subjects (Boiy 2000: 117–18). Seleucus' regnal years are exactly dated by BM 41660 (trans. Stephenson 1997: 133), which relates Seleucus' "thirtieth year" to a solar eclipse. This eclipse occurred on January 30, 281 (Stephenson 1997: 133). Seleucus was murdered in the late summer of 281, or in his thirty-first regnal year, as specifically dated in the Babylonian King List (BM 35603 Obv. 7–8; see van der Spek 2013b). Seleucus then returned to Babylon in 311.

After 311, Diodorus' chronology, always somewhat confused, becomes more difficult to follow, with his increasing emphasis on Sicilian affairs, and the career of the tyrant Agathocles in particular. Diodorus' archon year 311/10, while reflecting events occurring in 310, with respect to events in the east of the Adriatic, only references the Peace of 311/10, which took place late in 311 or very early in 310, and the deaths of Alexander IV and his mother Roxane (Diod. 19.105.1–2). In Book 20, forty-seven chapters are devoted to Sicilian and North African affairs, and forty-eight to events in the world of the Diadochs. Moreover, eighteen of the chapters dealing with the eastern Mediterranean concern Demetrius' siege of Rhodes. While his source for European/Asian events, likely Hieronymus, was very careful of chronological matters, often making reference to times of day, seasons, solstices, and the rising or setting of fixed stars (Anson 2004: 19 and nn. 118–20), it is clear that, for events in Sicily, Diodorus is following a different source who paid far less attention to precise chronology.

Diodorus' archon year 310/9 (20.3.1) likely covers the period from the late summer 310 to the summer of 309; the year 309/8 (20.27.1) the period from the summer of 309 to that year's concluding winter. Diodorus 20.28.4 states that Polyperchon, after his failure to invade the Peloponnesus, "passed the winter" in Locris, hence the winter of 309/8, since his start of archon year 309/8 (20.27.1) is placed previous to this reference. Diodorus records the founding of Lysimacheia (20.29.1) in 309/8, as does the Parian Marble, along with Ophellas' expedition in North Africa, and Cleopatra's death (*FGrH* 239 B 19). Diodorus' next archon year, 308/7 (20.37.1), corresponds again to a solar year, beginning in the spring and ending in the winter of 308. This date is confirmed by the start of 307/6 (20.45.1). This year (in actuality 307) is fixed. Plutarch (*Demetr.* 8.5) reports that Demetrius arrived at Piraeus "on the twenty-sixth of the month Thargelion," or in early June. The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 20) places the liberation in the archon year 308/7, and the destruction of Munychia in 307/6 (*FGrH* 239 B 21). Diodorus (20.45.5) states that Demetrius of Phalerum served in his position in Athens for ten years (cf. Str. 9.1.20), having become the guardian of Athens in 317 ([Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B 13); and later proclaims that fifteen years after the end of the Lamian

War (322) the Athenians regained their freedom (20.46.3), a statement repeated by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 10.3). Diodorus (20.69.2), moreover, in his description of the escape of Agathocles after the collapse of his Libyan expedition, notes that the Sicilian tyrant sailed to Sicily “in the season of the setting of the Pleiades” (early November). Diodorus’ archon year 307/6, then, is clearly the solar year 307.

Diodorus begins his year 306/5 with Antigonus’ burial of his son Philip and that king’s preparations for his attack on Egypt (20.73.1). He has then omitted all reference to events occurring east of the Adriatic until the late fall of 306. The invasion of Egypt is dated by another reference to the setting of the Pleiades (Diod. 20.74.1), but this time in 306. From this point, Diodorus provides very few clear dating referents, other than his archon, consular, and Olympiad dates, and nothing after 302, when his work survives only in secondary fragments.

Notes

- 1 Heracleitus 22 F-B53.
- 2 Roisman (2012: 236) argues that the argyraspids may not have been as distrusted by Antigonus as the sources suggest. He notes that they were to perform important functions keeping dangerous local populations under control. However, as Roisman notes, this was the “end of the road” for these troops as a powerful and influential unit.
- 3 On their careers, see Heckel 2006: 161, 165–6.
- 4 Appian (*Syr.* 55) calls Nicanor the satrap of Media, but Diodorus, likely following Hieronymus, always refers to him as general.
- 5 On the death of a monarch his successor carried out a lustration (Just. 13.4.7; cf. Curt. 10.9.11–12), conducted funeral games, and performed sacrifices (Diod. 18.28.4, 19.52.5; Just. 9.7.11, 11.2.1; Athen. 4.155A). The body would then be formally laid to rest in the royal tombs at Aegae (Borza 1990: 167, 256–60). However, Cassander had disposed of Olympias without burial (Diod. 17.118.2).
- 6 The text reads Lycia, but emending the text to Lydia seems justified (Wehrli 1968: 43–8; contra: Billows 1990: 109 n. 36). Tarn (1969 [1953]: 484) wishes to emend to Cilicia, but this is highly unlikely. Lycia does appear a strange request, but Lydia does not. Cleitus, who was defeated by Antigonus in the Bosphorus, had been satrap of Lydia, and it is possible that Antigonus in his haste to pursue Eumenes had not adequately secured this region. Cassander may have been there securing this satrapy for the coalition.
- 7 Richard Billows, in his *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (1990), has assembled in a most useful appendix biographies of the various “friends, officers, and diplomats” associated with Antigonus.
- 8 Antigonus’ nephew had been sent to Eumenes as a hostage back in 319 during the negotiations after Eumenes’ entrance into Nora (Plut. *Eum.* 10.3).
- 9 See the chronological discussion at the end of this chapter.
- 10 On the Aetolian League in this period, see Mendels 1984; in general, see Larsen 1968: 78–80, 195–215.
- 11 On the Spartans’ government and its dual monarchy, see Powell and Hodkinson 2002; Kennell 2010.
- 12 According to Xenophon (*Resp. Lac.* 9.4–6) this would include exclusion from all social activities, being unable to gain a wife or to marry off a daughter, being unable to attend

the assembly, deferring to one and all, and even having to submit to beatings by one's "betters."

- 13 On the Sicilian tyrant see the dated, but still informative, Tillyard 1908, and Meister 2008.
- 14 For the date, see Bickerman 1968: 120. The connection of this honorary decree with an attack on Samos is questioned by many scholars. However, see O'Sullivan 1997: 110–12.
- 15 Diodorus describes these actions as taking place after the issuance of the Proclamation of Tyre by Antigonus.
- 16 On Demetrius' early years, see Wheatley 1999.
- 17 Much of this region never came to be under the control either of the Persians or of the Diadochs (Mitchell 2003: 43–4).
- 18 Billows (1990: 123) regards Diodorus' statement that Antigonus intended to invade Macedonia as doubtful. He suggests rather that this was a feint to draw Cassander from southern Greece. This is certainly possible, since this is exactly what did happen, but the overtures to Byzantium and the previous attempt suggest that Antigonus meant to invade his homeland at this time.
- 19 The first two were still held by Alexander's widow, and the last, without any evidence to the contrary, likely still loyal to Cassander.
- 20 For detailed accounts of this battle, see Devine 1984, 1989; Billows 1990: 125–8; Sabin 2009: 151–3.
- 21 Plutarch (*Demetr.* 5.2) lists 5000 as slain. Since Demetrius only had in total 17,500 troops, and 8000 were captured, only 4500 troops would have escaped with Demetrius and yet he was able later to defeat a Ptolemaic general in northern Syria (Plut. *Demetr.* 6.2–3). While Diodorus' report does appear low, the 5000 appears too great.
- 22 Pausanias (1.6.5) remarks that in this victory Demetrius killed "a few Egyptians."
- 23 Alexander Meeus (2009a: 236) notes that our sources only describe the fate of two of these marriages and that these authors' silence "cannot be used to argue that apart from Seleucus all Macedonians subsequently divorced [their wives]."
- 24 Mehl 1986: 19; Bielman Sanchez 2003: 45–6; Müller 2013: 206–9; Olbrycht 2013: 170–1, 178.
- 25 For this campaign, see Wheatley 2002.
- 26 While there is some doubt raised about the precise number of war elephants, 500 has recently been convincingly defended (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 295–6).
- 27 Justin (15.2.3) states that at this time he was 15.
- 28 Billows (1990: 145) suggests that the initiative for this plan came from Antigonus.
- 29 Justin says that Ophellas approached Agathocles.
- 30 The Suda (s.v. *Demetrius*) states that at this time there was an alliance in existence between Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, and Ptolemy. See Seibert (1969: 180–3) for a well-argued refutation of this claim.
- 31 Some of these honors may be related to a subsequent and even more elaborately honored visit by Demetrius to Athens (Habicht 1970: 44–8).
- 32 On the Helepolis, see Marsden 1971: 84–5.
- 33 Plut. *Demetr.* 18.1; [Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B 23; Just. 15.2.11; App. *Syr.* 54; Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 244–5; Gruen 1985: 258; cf. Diod. 20.53.3.
- 34 On this aspect of traditional Macedonian royal informality, see Errington 1974: 20; Anson 2013b: 20; Introduction above.

The End of the Diadochi

After so much success, Antigonus decided to cap this most successful year of 306 with a full assault on Egypt (Diod. 20.73–6; Paus. 1.6.6). The year had only one setback for him. Philip, Antigonus' youngest son, had unexpectedly died and was buried with royal honors. Summoning Demetrius from Cyprus, Antigonus collected his forces in Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes, a city recently founded by him, well situated for any campaign south to Egypt, east to Babylon, or northwest to Asia Minor (Diod. 20.47.5). He would command a land army of 80,000 infantry, 8000 cavalry, and 83 elephants. Demetrius was to parallel the army's movements with a fleet of 150 warships and 100 transports. The expedition reached Gaza eight days before the setting of the Pleiades, which occurred in early November 306 (Diod. 20.73.3; cf. Bickerman 1968: 143), making the time of the arrival late October. The setting of the Pleiades was the customary end of the sailing season in the eastern Mediterranean and the start of the winter storm season. Demetrius' pilots advised against the invasion based on the lateness of the season, but Antigonus pushed ahead. While the fleet was still passing along Sinai, a storm came up, resulting in the loss of three warships. Antigonus' timing could not have been worse. In addition to the difficulty facing his fleet due to the season, it was also a time when the Nile was not at its lowest level, which would not be reached until May. Antigonus and his forces attempted to find a crossing near Memphis, but Ptolemy had occupied the other side of the river at every possible crossing point. With all points of access blocked, Antigonus and his army returned to Syria (Diod. 20.73–76.6; Plut. *Demetr.* 19.1–5). Both Antigonus and Demetrius have been criticized for the failure. Antigonus has been charged with faulty strategy (Seibert 1969: 222; contra: Billows 1990: 164 n. 2); Demetrius, for the poor performance of the fleet (Billows 1990: 164). Neither appears a viable criticism. It should be noted that Ptolemy, as before against Perdiccas, had prepared Egypt well for this invasion. This preparation, along with the natural barriers that had long protected Egypt, and the season of the year, provide a more than adequate explanation for the failure. Antigonus, according to Diodorus (20.76.5), contemplated another invasion the following year during the season when the Nile was

at its lowest level. The only bad planning was, perhaps, the attempt to invade Egypt at all. The Nile was in flood stage from late May/June through September, with the flood not fully dissipating until more than a month later. These factors, along with the problems involved in the sailing season, with the eastern Mediterranean generally regarded as dangerous from November into March, and the shoals that protected the Egyptian coastline making coastal landings difficult at best, created few ideal opportunities for an invasion. The truth is that a determined defense made Egypt a virtually impregnable fortress at all seasons.

The true failure for Antigonos was in what might have been. By recalling Demetrius from Europe, Antigonos probably lost his best chance to gain control of Greece and Macedonia. Cassander, in addition to his losses in Greece due to the activities of Demetrius, also saw in 307 Glaucias, the Illyrian, place Pyrrhus, the son of Cassander's former enemy Aeacides (Just. 17.3.16–21), on the throne of Epirus. The previous monarch, Alcetas, Pyrrhus' uncle and Cassander's ally, was murdered by his own people probably in the fall of 307 (Diod. 19.89.3; Paus. 1.11.5). The time of Pyrrhus' accession is determined by the various references to his age at particular points in his life. Pyrrhus was 2 years old when his father was driven from the throne (Just. 17.3.17), in the spring of 316. He was either 11 (Just. 17.3.21), or 12 (Plut. *Demetr.* 3.5) when he acquired the throne. Five years later, at 17 years of age, he was again forced to flee (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.1). He joined Demetrius prior to that commander's departure for Asia in response to the call from his father in 302, the year before the climactic Battle of Ipsus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.2; cf. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 2.1).

Perhaps out of frustration at the failure of the Egyptian invasion, Demetrius in the next year, 305 ([Parian Marble] *FGrH* 239 B F-23), was ordered not back to Greece, but rather to the island of Rhodes. While the island had been allied with Antigonos during the Third Diadoch War, it had failed to join in the attack on Cyprus or the abortive invasion of Egypt, proclaiming that the Rhodians were at peace with all parties (Diod. 20.81.2, 4). They did, however, incline towards Ptolemy because of close trade connections with Egypt (Diod. 20.81.4). Antigonos was not content with their response to his request for an alliance, and sent Demetrius with a well-equipped force, including numerous siege engines, to bring the Rhodians to heel. Given the threat, the Rhodians sent ambassadors to Demetrius, agreeing to join in a war against Ptolemy, but Demetrius insisted upon receiving 100 hostages from the most prominent families and being allowed to enter the harbor of Rhodes with his entire fleet (Diod. 20.82). The Rhodians refused.

They now prepared to withstand a siege. For the siege Demetrius had 40,000 troops, 200 warships, and over 170 transports carrying siege equipment. After arriving, Demetrius set up his camp just out of missile range of the walls, while his forces thoroughly ravaged the island. At first, Demetrius launched an assault on the main harbor, using two four-story towers and two large penthouses containing artillery, all mounted on cargo ships. Also, a number of smaller craft were decked over and equipped with artillery and archers. The Rhodians responded by increasing the height of the harbor walls and by placing their own penthouses and

artillery on cargo ships and on the mole that extended out from the harbor. Demetrius' forces seized the end of the mole, only 500 feet from the city wall, and fortified it. The large-scale assault on land and sea was effectively countered by the Rhodians, and in the end Demetrius withdrew, his forces having suffered heavy losses. Not much later his forces on the mole were captured (Diod. 20.81–8).

With this lack of success, early in 304 Demetrius concentrated his forces on the city's land walls. In order to overtop these, he again built the "Helepolis," that had been used effectively on Cyprus. Additionally, troops were dispatched to fill the moat surrounding the wall, to undermine the walls themselves, and to build tunnels into the city. The besieged discovered the tunnels and built an interior wall just inside the threatened one. Despite repeated general assaults on breaches created in the exterior wall, Demetrius was again unable to capture the city. Demetrius' assault was hampered by the skill of the Rhodian sailors, who exited and entered the harbor almost at will and wreaked havoc on their enemies. Moreover, Demetrius was unable to stop supplies and reinforcements – periodically sent by Lysimachus (Diod. 20.96.3, 100.2), Cassander (Diod. 20.100.2), and in particular Ptolemy, who contributed substantially to the Rhodian defense (Diod. 20.88.9, 94.3–5, 96.1–3, 98.1, 100.2) – from reaching the besieged. Indeed, it was often Rhodian raiders who interfered with the supplies destined for the attackers.

After the passage of a year, both Antigonus and Demetrius were seeking an excuse to end the long siege, and it came from the Athenians who, with Demetrius' departure from Athens, had become involved in a war with Cassander (Habicht 1997: 74–7). Now they were under serious pressure and requesting assistance. Early in 304 Cassander had captured the island of Salamis and had begun to besiege Athens itself, having captured the Attic fortresses of Phyle and Panactum (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1–2; Habicht 1997: 74–6). With all concerned seeking an end to the Rhodian siege, after a year of fighting (Diod. 20.100.1), a compromise was reached between the respective parties. The Rhodians would retain their autonomy and remain ungarrisoned. They would support Antigonus and Demetrius against all enemies, except Ptolemy. The most important result of this unsuccessful siege was the proclamation by Ptolemy of his kingship (Gruen 1985: 257–8).¹ His effective assistance to Rhodes, in combination with his successful resistance of Antigonus' Egyptian invasion, gave him the personal confidence to join Antigonus as a king. Seleucus, who had a number of triumphs to his credit in the east and was already acknowledged as king by the Babylonians, followed suit. Lysimachus, with far fewer accomplishments, but perhaps also basking in the glow of the successful resistance of his ally Rhodes, also accepted a crown.² Indeed, the Rhodians, in addition to the honors they showered on Ptolemy (Diod. 20.100.3–4), also set up statues to "King Cassander" and "King Lysimachus" (Diod. 20.100.2). Other than convincing Ptolemy, and perhaps the other Diadochs, that it was time to become kings with respect to their Greek and Macedonian supporters, the results of the siege were modest. As noted earlier, Ptolemy had been given the title of *soter* (savior) by the Rhodians, a name that would become a commonly applied epithet to the Egyptian ruler from then on. Moreover, with the acquiescence of the Oracle

of Zeus at Siwah, Ptolemy henceforth would be worshiped as a god by the Rhodians (Diod. 20.100.3–4). One consequence of the failed attack was that Demetrius rather ironically received the epithet “Poliorketes,” or city-besieger (Diod. 20.92.2, 103.3). It should also be noted that the Rhodians used the money realized from the sale of Demetrius’ siege train in part to build one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, the Colossus of Rhodes (Maryon 1956: 68). Otherwise, the siege was a wasteful interlude in the war (on the siege of Rhodes, see Diod. 20.81–8, 91–100.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 21–2; Polyæn. 4.6.16; Berthold 1984: 66–80).

Demetrius, having abandoned the siege, arrived in the western Aegean in the late spring of 304, with 330 warships and a great many infantry. His appearance forced Cassander not only to abandon his siege of Athens, but to retreat rapidly back to Macedonia. In his pursuit of the fleeing Cassander, Demetrius acquired 6000 Macedonian troops who had deserted the Macedonian ruler (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1–2; Diod. 20.100.6). Halting his chase at Thermopylae, he began his return to Athens. He landed his fleet at Aulis in Boeotia and formed an alliance with the Boeotians, who renounced their ties to Cassander, and from there he continued south, where he “freed” the city of Chalcis on the island of Euboea from its garrison (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.3; Diod. 20.100.5–6). The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 24) places Demetrius’ freeing of Chalcis in the archon year 304/3. It is also likely that at this time he renewed his alliance with the Aetolians (Diod. 20.100.6). Arriving back in Athens, he recaptured Phyle and Panactum from their Cassandrean garrisons and returned them to the Athenians. The Athenians, having already granted elaborate honors to Demetrius during his previous deliverance of the city-state, would appear to have been hard pressed to find new ones to honor their again savior. But, in an age when the granting of honors to saviors knew few bounds, the Athenians found new ways to flatter the god Demetrius. He was given the rear chamber of the great Temple of Athena, the Parthenon, as his residence. Demetrius now often referred to the goddess as his sister. Moreover, he shared the Parthenon with at least four professional ladies, Lamia, often called “the love of his life” (Wheatley 2003b), Chrysis, Demo, and Anticyra (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.3–24.1, 25.9; [Demochares] *FGrH* 75 F-1). Two of Demetrius’ mistresses, Leaina and the aforementioned Lamia, were granted religious sanctuaries by the Athenians, and certain of his companions received altars and libations (Athen. 6.253A). These were all aspects of formal worship. Here in Athens in his new residence he spent the remainder of 304.

At the start of the new year (303) (Diod. 20.102.1), Demetrius proceeded into the Peloponnesus. None of the forces there loyal to either Cassander, Ptolemy, or Polyperchon chose to meet him in battle, but remained in what they hoped were securely fortified locations (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1; cf. Diod. 20.103.7). The last of these, the former regent Polyperchon, disappears at this point from the historical record (Diod. 20.100.6, 103.5–6). He was apparently one of those old generals who did simply fade away without fanfare. His career had demonstrated that ineptness was the kiss of death in an age of powerful and skillful individuals. Demetrius took the city of Sicyon by direct assault, and even though the Ptolemaic garrison fled into the citadel, these troops were persuaded through a bribe to surrender,

eliminating the need for a siege (Diod. 20.102.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1; cf. Polyæn. 4.7.3). The city was now proclaimed to be free and autonomous. In gratitude, the inhabitants granted their liberator divine honors, renamed the city Demetrias, and voted to celebrate annual festivals, games, and sacrifices in his honor. Having achieved this success, Demetrius moved on to Corinth, which was held by Prepelaus, Cassander's overall commander in the Peloponnesus. He captured not only the city but also the spectacularly situated and seemingly impregnable citadel, the Acrocorinth, as well (Diod. 20.102–103.3; Polyæn. 4.7.3). "At the request of the grateful Corinthians," Demetrius placed a garrison in the latter. While in Corinth, he summoned the Greek states to meet with him, with the result that a charter of a new Hellenic league was drafted. Some of its terms are strikingly similar to those of the original League of Corinth (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 372–5; Dixon 2007: 176–7). In a surviving, though fragmentary, inscription (IG IV² 1.68 [trans. Bagnall and Derow 1981: 18–20]), it is clear that Demetrius' league was to be both defensive and offensive (IG IV³ frg. 5; a *synedrion* (common council) of members was formed and its resolutions were to be binding on all members, with the provision that all were bound to go to war against violators. This same council was to have judicial authority over all violations. The monarchy of Antigonus and Demetrius and their descendants, as well as the constitutions of the cities, were to be preserved. Demetrius was proclaimed the *hegemon* or leader of the new league (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.5; Diod. 20.102.1; cf. Diod. 20.106.1). Demetrius, since this was an Isthmian year, may also have celebrated the games (so Dixon 2007: 177), but this is nowhere recorded.

The notice in the agreement that the monarchy of Antigonus and Demetrius was to be dynastic is a clear sign of the evolution of these personal monarchies. The association of a son and heir in the monarchy would ensure that the younger individual would have a share of the prestige enjoyed by his father and, hence, a claim on the loyalty of those who had served the father. But more importantly it would establish the concept of permanence associated with a dynasty. These monarchies were personal, not national. As one commentator has remarked, these were "kings without kingdoms" (Billows 1990: 160). Especially in the case of a multi-ethnic empire such as those created by Antigonus and Seleucus, nationalism was not a real possibility. As is clear in this new League of Corinth, Antigonus and Demetrius were looking to a future in which their kingship would endure in the hands of their descendants, not just for their lifetimes. It would be around these dynasties that the institutions of state would develop over time, most often copied from their Persian predecessors (Briant 2002), but also especially with respect to the "Greek" communities, those created by Philip II. However, these were never states that transcended their rulers. The central feature, the key institution, was the monarchy. While these were autocracies, it was absolute rule tempered by the practical need to secure the adherence of their supporters, especially their "friends." These Diadochs had an interest not only in their own successes and those of their immediate heirs, but in a future that transcended themselves and would see their regimes continue through the ages. This was an aspect of the Successors that

they did not inherit from Alexander the Great, whose interests hardly strayed beyond his own person.

From Corinth Demetrius marched back into the Peloponnesus. Here he freed of their garrisons all of the cities, with the exception of Mantinea. Most of these cities surrendered without Demetrius having to strike a blow (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1), but the Achaean cities of Bura and Scyros were taken by storm (Diod. 20.103.4), and the Arcadian city of Orchomenus was taken by storm and its commander and approximately eighty others were crucified. The commander, one Strombichus, the agent of Polyperchon, had not only refused to surrender the city, but had also insulted the besieger (Diod. 20.103.4–5). The mercenaries in the now crucified commander's employ were enrolled in Demetrius' army. Later in Argos, he presided at the games held to celebrate Argive Hera (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1–2). It was during this celebration that Demetrius married his third wife, Deidameia, the daughter of Aeacides and the sister of the new king of the Molossians, Pyrrhus (Just. 17.3.21; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 3.5). While Deidameia was still a child she had been nominally married to Alexander IV (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.2; *Pyrrh.* 4.3). The marriage between Demetrius and the recently come-of-age young woman created an alliance between her family, the Aeacids, then ruling Epirus, and the Antigonids (cf. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.3). Since Cassander had worked against this branch of the royal family, this was also an alliance isolating Cassander and Macedonia. Demetrius was already married to the Athenian Eurydice, a descendant of that Miltiades who had commanded at Marathon in 490 (Plut. *Demetr.* 14.1), and also to Phila, the former wife of Craterus (Diod. 19.59.3), and perhaps to others as well (Plut. *Demetr.* 14.2).³ Polygamy had been rare in the Greek world (Scheidel 2011: 108, 110), but was common among Macedonian royalty (see Greenwalt 1989: 19–45; Carney 2000: 23–7). It certainly became a commonplace among the Diadochs (Seibert 1967: 27–33, 45–50, 93–6, 100–3; Carney 2000: 228–32). With the conclusion of a most successful campaigning year, Demetrius retired to Athens.

With Demetrius' many successes in Greece, Cassander was in dire straits. Most of his possessions in southern Greece were lost. Demetrius had an alliance with his neighbor to the west, Epirus, and was planning a spring offensive into Macedonia itself the next year (Diod. 20.102.1). Given these circumstances, the Macedonian ruler opened negotiations with Antigonos concerning peace. During these past two years, Antigonos is barely mentioned in our sources. He was involved in the building of Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes, and when the request came from Cassander, he was preparing to celebrate games in his new city, having assembled the greatest athletes and artists from throughout the Greek world (Diod. 20.106.1, 108.1). It is also true that Antigonos was the oldest of the Diadochs. He was of Philip II's generation, not that of Alexander the Great. In 302, he was 85 (Plut. *Demetr.* 19.4; Eusebius [Porphyry] *FGrH* 260 F-32;⁴ App. *Syr.* 55), and obese (Plut. *Demetr.* 19.4). It is likely that the old warrior was simply slowing down. However, his response to the proposal from Cassander was quintessentially Antigonos. With his son poised for an assault on Macedonia, he offered the Macedonian ruler only unconditional surrender (Diod. 20.106.1–2). Rebuffed,

Cassander immediately formed an alliance with Lysimachus and the two kings sent envoys to Ptolemy and Seleucus offering an alliance against the danger represented by the power of Antigonus and Demetrius. Both agreed to join the alliance, and a second grand coalition against Antigonus was formed (Diod. 20.106.3–5; Plut. *Demetr.* 28.2; Just. 15.2.17, 4.1). The Fourth Diadoch War would begin the next year, although it hardly came after a peaceful interlude.

It was decided by the allies that Cassander would remain in Greece, while Lysimachus, taking with him part of the Macedonian's forces under the command of Cassander's general Prepelaus, who had been Cassander's commander in the Peloponnesus and had fled ignominiously back to Macedonia during Demetrius' invasion, would cross to Asia. Here he would be joined by Seleucus and Ptolemy. Once in Asia, Lysimachus and Prepelaus moved against the cities of the Propontis, Aeolis, and Ionia. The attacks on Abydos, Erythrae, and Clazomenae, failed due to the timely arrival of Antigoniid reinforcements, but other successes were to follow. Docimus, Antigonus' general operating in Phrygia, joined with Lysimachus and assisted in the capture of a number of the Antigoniid treasuries (Diod. 20.107.4). Ephesus fell and Phoenix, another Antigoniid general,⁵ deserted and delivered the city of Sardis, except for its citadel, which remained loyal to Antigonus. There were desertions also occurring as far east as Phrygia and Lycaonia (Diod. 20.108.3). Antigonus, as soon as he learned of his enemies' activities and the desertion of his generals, headed with his forces into Cilicia. There he took from the treasury at Cyinda enough to pay his troops for three months. In addition to these funds, he carried with him 3000 talents. In Phrygia, he won back all those who had formerly deserted him. Now that Antigonus had arrived in Asia Minor, Lysimachus decided to await the arrival of Seleucus before confronting the approaching forces of the enemy. He therefore fled deep into Phrygia hoping to hold out until the arrival of Seleucus. The chase across northern Asia Minor was only halted by the coming of winter with its storms, and both armies retired into winter quarters (Diod. 20.108–109.4). It was here that Antigonus learned that Seleucus was approaching from the upper satrapies. He now summoned Demetrius back to Asia (Diod. 20.109.5).

As noted earlier, Demetrius had moved to Athens after his activities in Corinth. Here, he delayed a planned invasion of Macedonia in order to be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries, a ceremony that normally took place in two stages over two different Athenian months. To satisfy the new god, who wished to be initiated in a single ceremony, and to remain in accord with the religious necessities, the assembly changed the name of the month, Mounichion (April/May), first to Anthesterion (February/March), and then, after Demetrius had been initiated into the "Lesser Mysteries," to Boëdromion (September/October), with Demetrius becoming an initiate in the "Greater Mysteries" (Philochorus *Atthis* [FGrH 328 F 69–70]; Plut. *Demetr.* 26.1–5; Diod. 20.110.1). Following the ceremony, probably in early May, Demetrius gathered his forces and moved towards Thessaly. But finding the passes blocked by forces loyal to Cassander, he took his army by sea to the Thessalian port of Larisa, which he captured. Cassander moved south with

an army of 29,000 infantry (presumably Macedonian) and 2000 cavalry, opposing Demetrius' 8000 Macedonian infantry, 15,000 mercenaries, 25,000 Greek infantry, and 1500 cavalry. Both sides delayed, awaiting the news of what they expected to be a great battle in Asia. Instead there arrived the envoys from Antigonus summoning Demetrius to join his father (Diod. 20.110–111.1). Demetrius quickly arranged terms with Cassander. These included a promise that all of the Greek cities in Asia and Greece would be free and autonomous. Both sides knew that the real peace terms would be dictated by the winners of the coming battle in Asia (Diod. 20.111.2). When Demetrius departed, he left with the 17-year-old Pyrrhus. With respect to their kings, the Epirotes were a fickle lot. At some point during the year 302, Pyrrhus was again forced to flee his homeland and seek refuge, this time with his brother-in-law Demetrius (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.1). Neoptolemus, the son of Neoptolemus I, who was the uncle of Aeacides, was the new choice of the Epirotes and became the new king (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.2; cf. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 2.1).

Demetrius landed at Ephesus, and that city now returned to its alliance with Antigonus, whose citadel Demetrius then garrisoned. So much for the validity of the agreement he had previously signed with Cassander. Demetrius proceeded to the Bosphorus, where he likewise enjoyed success, and after leaving a guard of 3000 infantry and 30 warships to guard against a possible crossing from Europe, he went into winter quarters (Diod. 20.111.3). Cassander, after the departure of Demetrius, took possession of the cities in Thessaly and attempted to send an army to Asia to aid Lysimachus, but this force found Demetrius' force in place. Since the commander, Pleistarchus, lacked the naval resources either to do battle with the opposing naval force or, given his lack of sufficient transport vessels, to carry the entire army across at one time, he divided his force of 12,000 infantry and 500 cavalry into three groups. Only the first crossed successfully. The second was captured by Demetrius' warships, and the third was almost entirely destroyed by a storm, with only its commander, who accompanied the last group, and 32 others making it safely to shore. These, along with the first group to depart, made their way to Lysimachus' winter quarters (Diod. 20.112).

During this same winter, Ptolemy moved to take advantage of the absence of Antigonus to recapture Phoenicia, but arriving at Sidon he was told that the great battle had already been fought and that Antigonus, the victor, was advancing into Syria. Ptolemy immediately retreated back to Egypt (Diod. 20.113.1–2). While Ptolemy would not be a factor in the coming battle, Seleucus had arrived in Cappadocia with 20,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, 100 scythed chariots, and 480 elephants (Diod. 20.113.4). The significant number of cavalry and the presence of the chariots suggests that the majority of this force was Asian, likely Persian and Mede. While there is no breakdown of the ethnic origin of the competing forces in the opposing armies, there are other indications of an Asian presence as well (cf. Diod. 20.113.3). The presence of the large contingent of elephants was the result of the treaty signed between Seleucus and Chandragupta, the founder of the Mauryan Empire. Seleucus' conquest of the upper satrapies had brought him into contact with this new power in India. Whether through battle or negotiation

is unknown, but an agreement was reached that ceded all of the Indian areas of Alexander's conquests to the Indian ruler for 500 war elephants (Str. 15.724; Plut. *Alex.* 62.4). With the players, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Antigonus, and Demetrius, in place, the Battle of Ipsus was at hand.

In 301, the opposing forces came together near the village of Ipsus in central Phrygia. Antigonus' army consisted of 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 75 elephants; their opponents, 64,000 infantry, 10,500 cavalry, and 480 elephants⁶ (Plut. *Demetr.* 28.5). Demetrius and the majority of the cavalry, most being heavy cavalymen, occupied the right wing. The plan was to hold back the infantry phalanx and the weaker left cavalry wing, and win the battle with the horsemen under Demetrius' command. On the allied side, Demetrius was faced by Seleucus' son Antiochus and a sizable cavalry force, the majority of which was made up of light cavalry. Lysimachus commanded the infantry phalanx (cf. Diod. 21.1.2), while Seleucus commanded the cavalry on the right and held a body of elephants in reserve. Both forces were screened by elephants interspersed with light infantry.

The battle opened with skirmishes between the two armies' light troops and elephants. Demetrius' superior cavalry drove Antiochus' wing from the field, but carried on the chase too long. It is very possible that the allies' plan was for Antiochus to withdraw rapidly from the battlefield to draw Demetrius away. Antiochus' light cavalry had been placed in opposition to the more dominant heavy cavalry of Demetrius. It would appear only logical that this arrangement was designed to draw this wing away from the battlefield (Tarn 1930: 68–9; Wheatley 2010: 87). The delay in returning to the battle gave Seleucus time to move his elephant reserve to a position blocking Demetrius' return to his father and the phalanx (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 29.5–6). In the son's absence, his father's enemies virtually surrounded their opponents. The weaker Antigoniid cavalry on the left was overwhelmed by the superior enemy's right. This cavalry under Seleucus' command never actually engaged the opposition's phalanx but kept feigning an attack. Fearing such an assault, large numbers of the Antigoniid force surrendered and the rest took flight (Plut. *Demetr.* 29.7–8). Antigonus, pierced by numerous arrows, lay dead on the field of conflict; the battle was over. The old warrior's enemies gave the dead dynast a funeral suitable for a king. Demetrius and Pyrrhus, who had fought in the engagement alongside his older companion (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.3), escaped the debacle with 4000 cavalry and 5000 infantry, and fled to Cilicia, where Demetrius joined his mother and, with all their valuables, sailed to Salamis in Cyprus (Diod. 21.4b). The victorious Lysimachus and Seleucus divided Antigonus' Asian territories between them, with Lysimachus receiving western Asia Minor and Seleucus most of the rest (on the battle and its immediate aftermath, see Plut. *Demetr.* 28–30.1; *Pyrrh.* 4.4; Diod. 21.2, 4b; App. *Syr.* 55; Just. 15.2.16–17, 4.21–2; Polyb. 5.67.8).

The Battle of Ipsus was a turning point. The death of Antigonus removed the successor whose ambition and ability had brought him, to this point in time, closest of all the Diadochs to reuniting Alexander's empire. It was most often his ambition and actions that called forth a response from his fellow Diadochs.

Of course, at the time of his death he was in his eighties ([Hieronymus of Cardia] *FGrH* 154 F-8; 260 F-32; Plut. *Demetr.* 19.4), and his aggression had slowed since his failed attempts to regain Babylonia and the upper satrapies in 310 or to conquer Egypt in 306. Ipsus would likely have been his swan song even if he had been victorious. While his son Demetrius possessed much of his father's talent, he clearly was not his father. Ipsus may only have cut short a brief wait for the inevitable. Ipsus, or more precisely the events leading to the battle, also mark a decisive moment in the history of the Successors for another reason besides the death of the most active of the Diadochs. Diodorus' narrative, except for the briefest of fragments or long paraphrases, most of which come from late Byzantine anthologies, breaks off shortly before the Battle of Ipsus. Plutarch and Justin now become the principal sources for the remainder of the Diadoch period.

In returning to the historical narrative, true to form, no sooner was this war over than disagreements broke out among the allies. The triumphant Seleucus journeyed south to Phoenicia only to find that Ptolemy had occupied the region. Ptolemy claimed that this region had been made subject to himself and was not part of Antigonus' holdings when he met his death. Additionally, he stated that he had been an ally in the recent war, and deserved some reward. Seleucus responded that to the victor belonged the spoils, that the victors in the actual battle were himself and Lysimachus, and that Ptolemy had not even been present (Diod. 21.1.5). But the Egyptian dynast further claimed that, in the negotiations that had created the alliance to oppose Antigonus, he had been promised Phoenicia (Polyb. 5.67). Seleucus finally stepped back, stating that on account of their former friendship he would not push the issue (Diod. 21.1.5). The quarrel was in truth over who would have the option of obtaining two of the major Phoenician cities, for Sidon and Tyre remained under Demetrius' control (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 22.9). Fearing Seleucus' future activities, Ptolemy now arranged marriage alliances with both Cassander and Lysimachus. While Antigonus was dead and his vast empire was now being divided up, his son Demetrius was still very much alive. While his land forces had been seriously diminished (Plut. *Demetr.* 30.2), his fleet, the largest in the Aegean, was still intact. Cyprus (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 25.6), the Phoenician cities of Tyre and Sidon (Plut. *Demetr.* 32.10), and his League of Islanders remained steadfast.⁷ It is difficult to know how much of his father's vast treasure he retained, but given the loyalty of the fleet and his army, it was probably a fair share. After all, charisma only goes so far. Demetrius at first fled to Ephesus (Plut. *Demetr.* 30.2), but planned on moving back to Greece and basing himself in Athens, but while he was in the Cyclades an Athenian delegation arrived informing him that the Athenians had determined that they would be neutral with respect to the "kings," and would admit none of the Diadochs into their city. The Athenians moved to cement relationships with the other Diadochs, with envoys being sent to both Cassander (*IG* II² 641; Habicht 1997: 82) and Lysimachus (*Syll.*³ 362; *IG* II² 657; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 204).⁸ Demetrius was further informed by the Athenians that his wife Deidameia had been moved from Athens to Megara, but her journey into exile had been accompanied by appropriate pomp and circumstance (Plut. *Demetr.*

30.4–6). Elsewhere in the Greek peninsula “his garrisons” were being expelled, as the cities began to make accommodations with Cassander (Plut. *Demetr.* 31.1). While Plutarch speaks of Demetrius’ garrisons, it is more likely that what was taking place was that exiles sympathetic to Cassander were being readmitted to the cities. It would appear that Demetrius had garrisoned very few cities. The situation in much of Greece was likely reflected in the unrest in Athens itself. Here a popular demagogue, Lachares, an ally of Cassander (Paus. 1.25.7; Ferguson 1929; Habicht 1997: 82–3), took control of the city through his command of the mercenaries in Athenian employ, probably in the spring of 300 (*P. Oxy.* 2082 = *FGrH* 257a F-1). He did, however, lose control of Piraeus to those opposed to his usurpation of power (*P. Oxy.* 2082 = *FGrH* 257a F-2–3; Polyæn. 4.7.5). It is likely that much of the Greek world was now convulsed by similar internal political divisions.

Demetrius left Pyrrhus behind in charge of his dwindling possessions in Greece and proceeded to the Chersonese, where he ravaged lands belonging to Lysimachus (Plut. *Demetr.* 31.2–4; *Pyrrh.* 4.5; Polyæn. 4.12.1). None of the latter’s erstwhile allies came to the Thracian dynast’s defense. Plutarch (*Demetr.* 31.4) relates that, while he was no more objectionable than Demetrius, Lysimachus was currently more powerful and hence to be left on his own. Pyrrhus likely used Corinth, where an Antigonid garrison was in place (Diod. 20.103.3), as his base of operations.

That Demetrius still regarded himself as a king and was so regarded by others is testimony to that interesting aspect of this new age. Demetrius was a king without a country. Nothing could more plainly speak to the truth of Diadoch kingship. Demetrius, more than any other of the contenders, is the epitome of the nature of political power at this time. Why after the debacle at Ipsus was he still a contender? Of course, an equally interesting question is: why did the death of Antigonus bring about the collapse of his empire and its division among the victors? Armies were the true basis for power. Antigonus’ attempt to secure a power base among the Greek cities is a case in point. While he was powerful and helped particular factions overcome their enemies, he was a savior and a god. The loyalty did not often transcend the power. Most were all too willing to ally themselves with the winners. Power was military strength and the wealth to pay one’s soldiers and reward one’s allies. Troops responded to charismatic and successful leadership, and, in particular, to well-financed charismatic leadership. Kingdoms were turf. Everything was spear-won or spear-lost land. Land, troops, treasure – all were simply the spoils to be won or lost in war.

In 300, with Demetrius at large in the Aegean and Seleucus a special concern, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander formed a new alliance. This one was cemented through marriage. Lysimachus divorced his wife and married Arsinoë, the young daughter of his new partner in Egypt. His eldest son, Agathocles, also married a daughter of Ptolemy, Lysandra (Plut. *Demetr.* 31.3–5; Just 15.4.24). Seleucus, seeing that a coalition was forming that could easily turn on him, sent to Demetrius asking for the hand of Stratonice, his daughter by Phila, in marriage. Demetrius, elated by this bolt from the blue, immediately sailed with his daughter and fleet to Syria. On his way he stopped in Cilicia, where he harassed the new satrap,

Pleistarchus, the brother of Cassander, and stopping at Cyinda he emptied that treasury of its last 1200 talents. He and Seleucus met at Rhosus in Syria with much royal pomp, after which Seleucus departed for Antioch with his new bride. This marriage has a peculiar history. In 293, Antiochus, Seleucus' son by Apama, fell in love with his stepmother, Stratonice. His obliging father now in a very public ceremony, in which he also declared his son to be king of the upper satrapies, gave the young woman to his son in marriage, declaring her now to be the queen of the upper satrapies (Plut. *Demetr.* 38; App. *Syr.* 59–61; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 24–5).

Demetrius returned to Cilicia and took possession of that region, sending his wife Phila to her brother Cassander to try and smooth things over with respect to the expulsion of Pleistarchus. Seleucus next arranged an alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrius, with Demetrius becoming betrothed to another of Ptolemy's daughters, Ptolemais (Plut. *Demetr.* 31.3–32.7). The marriage, however, would not take place until 287. Why Seleucus would be arranging an alliance between these two individuals is unclear, especially since he was soon to make rather pointed requests of Demetrius regarding lands under the latter's control, lands that were contested between Seleucus and Ptolemy. Perhaps these alliances were aimed at Lysimachus, who had emerged from the shadows as a major player in Diadoch affairs.

Pyrrhus was sent to Egypt as a hostage for Demetrius' good behavior. Here, he both impressed his host and his host's young wife Berenice (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.6–7). She was the cousin of Ptolemy's wife Eurydice, the daughter of Antipater, and had served as a lady-in-waiting for her cousin before catching the eye of Ptolemy (Carney 2000: 173–4). While in Egypt, Pyrrhus had married Berenice's daughter by a previous husband, Antigone (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.7). Both Ptolemy and Demetrius were polygamists, as was Pyrrhus later (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 9.1). Ptolemy married at least three times. He had married Altacama in the famous marriages that took place in Susa in 324 (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6), but this wife disappears from the record, and may have been divorced. Probably in 321, he had married one of Antipater's many daughters, Eurydice, and later he married Berenice (Paus. 1.6.8). The alliances supposedly cemented by these marriages arranged by Seleucus broke down almost as soon as they were formed. Seleucus requested that Demetrius sell to him the newly conquered Cilicia, and when the latter refused, he demanded the surrender of Tyre and Sidon instead (Plut. *Demetr.* 32.10). Demetrius, in 298 or 297, secured his possessions in Asia with garrisons and sailed to Attica to overthrow Lachares' tyranny (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1).

Demetrius' first attempt to secure the ouster of Lachares failed due to the destruction of most of his fleet and the deaths of a great many of his men in a storm off the coast of Attica. Without his fleet and with the loss of much of his army, his attack on Athens failed (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.2). While the date of the attempt is disputed, if the attack occurred in 297, then Demetrius was likely encouraged to retrieve Athens by the death of Cassander in the spring of 297 ([Euseb. *Chron.*] *FGrH* 260 F-3.4; *P. Oxy.* 2082 = *FGrH* 257a F-3). There is no

reference to any interference from Cassander in Demetrius' attack on Attica. The ruler of Macedonia and the son of Antipater died of disease,⁹ having previously designated his son Philip, now Philip IV, as his heir (Plut. *Demetr.* 36.1; Just. 15.4.24).

After his initial failed assault on Athens, Demetrius ordered his shipyards in the Phoenician cities and in Cyprus to prepare a new fleet, while he traveled to the Peloponnesus, where he attacked the city of Messene. Here he was wounded, receiving a bolt from a catapult that struck his jaw. After recovering and apparently failing to achieve his goal against Messene, he regained the allegiance of other communities in the Peloponnesus that had revolted from him. Following these operations he returned to Attica, and having seized both Eleusis and Rhamnous, proceeded to besiege the city itself (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.4–5; Polyæn. 4.6.5). To ensure a successful siege, he interdicted all grain ships heading for the city, bringing famine to the inhabitants. Due to the arrival of Demetrius' new fleet, a relief force from Ptolemy failed to break the stranglehold Demetrius had on the city. With this failure Lachares fled the city, escaping to Thebes, and Demetrius "freed" the city for a second time in April of 294 (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1–34.1; Polyæn. 3.7.1–3, 4.7.5; *IG II²* 646, lines 1–5; Thonemann 2005: 64–6). However, in a variation on an old theme Demetrius had chased out another tyrant but one who had risen as a popular leader, and the restored freedom was under a mildly oligarchic government (Shear 1978: 52–5; Habicht 1979: 28–30). Garrisons were also installed on the hill of the Muses in Athens and in Piraeus (Plut. *Demetr.* 34.4–7; Paus. 1.25.8); so much for Greek freedom and the new league's constitution. Having secured Athens, Demetrius now returned to the Peloponnesus, where he invaded Laconia, enjoying great success. He defeated the Spartans in two battles and apparently was near the conquest of Sparta itself. But news from the north was going to pull him away from his Spartan campaign (Plut. *Demetr.* 35.1–3).

In Macedonia, after the death of Cassander, his son Philip (IV) had succeeded to the throne only to die four months later of the same malady that had afflicted his father (*P. Oxy.* 2082 = *FGrH* 257a F-3; [Euseb. *Chron.*] *FGrH* 260 F-3.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 36.1). The result was a struggle for the throne between his two younger brothers, Alexander and Antipater. The boys' mother, Thessalonice, insisted that the two brothers share the rule. The kingdom was partitioned, with Alexander receiving the western part and Antipater the east.¹⁰ The mother's preference was for the younger Alexander, over the 16-year-old Antipater. This particular dual monarchy lasted only two and a half years (*FGrH* 260 F-3.4). The crisis was precipitated by Antipater's murder of his mother. The young Alexander then, fearing for not only his share of the kingdom but also for his life, sent letters both to Demetrius and to Pyrrhus, who was once again king of Epirus (Plut. *Demetr.* 36.1–2; *Pyrrh.* 6.3; Paus. 9.7.3; Diod. 21.7; Just. 16.1.5). Given the distances involved and Demetrius' engagement in the Peloponnesus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.2), which even though Demetrius ended it, still delayed him, Pyrrhus, coming from Epirus, was the first to respond.

That Pyrrhus was in Epirus was the result of those excellent relations he had established with his host in Egypt. Ptolemy even came to address his correspondence

to Pyrrhus as “the father to the son, greetings” (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.8). Ptolemy, in 297, sent the young man and his new wife to Epirus with treasure and an army to enable him to regain his throne (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.1; Paus. 1.11.5). Ptolemy, who still had designs on Greece, hoped to create an ally whose prior history made him less likely to join with Macedonia. Pyrrhus, instead of engaging Neoptolemus, his rival and the present king, in battle to secure the throne, formed an alliance with him, and they reigned jointly. Plutarch suggests that Pyrrhus made this bargain because he was afraid that Neoptolemus would appeal either to Macedonia or to Lysimachus for assistance. If this was the case for the former seeking to avoid conflict, it was an even stronger incentive for the latter. Pyrrhus had come with forces sent by Ptolemy and he was the ally also of Demetrius. As one would expect, the pairing did not last long: the two individuals plotted each other's demise. Neoptolemus was party to a plot to poison his rival, but Pyrrhus struck first, inviting the former to dinner and there murdering him (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5).

With the appeal from Alexander, Pyrrhus moved immediately, offering his assistance in return for large sections of western Macedonia, including the upper Macedonian province of Tymphaea,¹¹ and the neighboring Macedonian dependencies of Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphilochia. Alexander, without much choice, acceded to these demands. Pyrrhus, true to the bargain, moved with his army against Antipater (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.4–5; *Demetr.* 36.3). This brother, now faced being driven from his own fast-diminishing kingdom, appealed to his father-in-law Lysimachus, for aid (Just. 16.2.4). According to Plutarch, since Lysimachus was involved in a campaign in Thrace at the time, he forged a letter ostensibly from Ptolemy requesting that Pyrrhus halt his campaign and offering 300 talents by way of compensation. The letter was immediately recognized to be a forgery, and while Pyrrhus was upset by it, the threat of involvement from Lysimachus caused him to end his campaign and instead broker a treaty between the two brothers (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.8–10).

With the brothers reconciled, Demetrius arrived on the scene. At Dion, Alexander welcomed his now unneeded and unwanted rescuer. While the two pretended to be on friendly terms, they were in fact plotting against one another. Demetrius succeeded in murdering his host and proclaimed himself king of Macedonia (Plut. *Demetr.* 36; *Pyrrh.* 7.1; Just. 16.1.8–18; [Euseb. *Chron.*] *FGrH* 260 F-3.6). As he prepared to address the Macedonian troops in the hope of securing their backing, they proclaimed him king and joined him in his march to the homeland. In Macedonia Demetrius was also well received (Plut. *Demetr.* 37; *Pyrrh.* 7.2; Just. 16.1.17–18). Antipater fled to Thrace, and Demetrius occupied the entire kingdom. Lysimachus provided no assistance to his son-in-law, having difficulties of his own. Dromichaetes, a king of the Getae, Thracian tribesmen living along the Danube, had briefly taken Lysimachus prisoner (Plut. *Demetr.* 39.5, 52.4; Just. 16.1.19; Paus. 1.9.6).¹² Once in receipt of this news, Demetrius made a dash for Thrace, but soon discovered that Lysimachus had escaped and returned to Macedonia. Demetrius became king of Macedonia in the fall of 294.¹³ He was to rule for roughly six years ([Euseb. *Chron.*] *FGrH* 260 F-3.6). By becoming king

of Macedonia, Demetrius had reached the high-water mark in his independent career. In addition to Macedonia, he also gained control of Thessaly, in part through his foundation of Demetrias in 294/93, at the head of the Gulf of Pagasae (Str. 9.5.15; Cohen 1995: 111–12). This community was formed by the synoecism of a number of communities, formerly independent entities that were situated at the head of the Gulf of Pagasae, and was located so as to control the southern end of the Vale of Tempe, the great pass connecting Thessaly and Macedonia. Demetrius, also, still retained his possessions and allies in southern Greece, including now Athens, Megara, Euboea, and sizable portions of the Peloponnesus. His fleet may have numbered 500 ships and his army 98,000 men (Plut. *Demetr.* 43.4).

In a peculiar episode, Lanassa, the wife of Pyrrhus, in 291 offered herself in marriage to Demetrius. She was the daughter of Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, and had brought Corcyra to the marriage as her dowry. The island had regained its independence from the Spartan adventurer Cleonymus probably in 302 (cf. Trog. *Prol.* 15; Liv. 10.2.14). Cassander had attempted to retake it after Demetrius had left Greece to join his father in Asia prior to the Battle of Ipsus, but the island had been both saved from the Macedonian and acquired by Agathocles (cf. Diod. 21.2; Meister 2008: 406). Since the marriage would mean Demetrius would acquire this valuable island astride the trade routes between Greece and Italy, and given Demetrius' flagrant polygamy, he accepted the offer. Lanassa was moving from one polygamist to another. Pyrrhus also had a number of wives (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 9.1). Demetrius sailed to Corcyra, married his new wife, and acquired the island (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 10.8–9). While he had assembled quite a collection of possessions in the Greek peninsula, he had lost his possessions in Asia Minor and in Cyprus to Lysimachus and Ptolemy respectively (Plut. *Demetr.* 35.7). As with all of Alexander the Great's Successors, and in this case with the son of a Diadoch, there was no sense of contentment in what one possessed, but always the goal of adding more. This lust sent Demetrius into Boeotia, where he enjoyed success, placing garrisons in the cities with the exception of Thebes, which remained under siege, the besieging force under the command of the historian Hieronymus (Plut. *Demetr.* 39; Polyae. 4.7.11). The city finally fell and was garrisoned in 291/90 (Plut. *Demetr.* 39.9–40.8). During the siege of Thebes, Pyrrhus, while the new Macedonian king was thus occupied, had attempted to acquire Thessaly, but had been expelled by a returning Demetrius (Plut. *Demetr.* 40.1–2; *Pyrrh.* 7.3). The two former friends had no real falling out; this was just business. They were both rivals for the spoils that might be acquired through war.

Demetrius now decided to preside over the Pythian Games for 290. With his own peculiar brand of piety, finding that the passes to Delphi were blocked by the Aetolians, he decided to conduct the games in Athens (Plut. *Demetr.* 40.8–9). At their conclusion he returned to Macedonia, and from there proceeded to invade Aetolia, Pyrrhus' ally. He devastated the country before moving on to an invasion of Epirus itself (Plut. *Demetr.* 41.1–2). In an interesting turn of events, at the time when Demetrius was invading Epirus, Pyrrhus was marching to the defense of his allies in Aetolia and Boeotia. The two armies reached their respective goals without

ever being in contact with one another. Consequently, while Demetrius plundered Epirus, Pyrrhus confronted the former's general, Pantauchus, in Boeotia. The king of Epirus was victorious, defeating Pantauchus and taking 5000 prisoners, and apparently killing a large number of others (Plut. *Demetr.* 41.1–3).

While, with the exception of the setback described above, all appeared to be going well for Demetrius, a major crisis was brewing. Demetrius played the role of *condottiero* much too well. He wore extravagant clothing, even “gold-embroidered shoes” (Plut. *Demetr.* 41.6). He lived in great splendor, and his extravagances in Athens would not have gone unnoticed by the people in Macedonia. He was also aloof in his treatment of his new subjects, treating them with disdain. Traditionally in Macedonia the king was not only approachable, but lived with a minimum of pomp (Anson 2013b: 22, 24–6). Demetrius was losing the support of his new-found kingdom. Moreover, he still harbored the ambition to recover all of his father's former possessions in Asia (Plut. *Demetr.* 43.3; Just. 16.2.1). Demetrius appeared to view Macedonia only as a major resource for his invasion of Asia (Will 1984: 108). Even if this were not the case, there were a great many Macedonians who believed that it was. To further his Asian ambitions he patched up a peace with Pyrrhus and began to prepare for a triumphant return to Asia by preparing massive armaments (Plut. *Demetr.* 43.4–8). The Macedonians were to be the backbone of this invading force, and the revenues of the nation were to bankroll much of it. These preparations and their apparent purpose were not lost on his already disaffected people. Moreover, as a result of these preparations, all those kings who now had a reason to fear the new Macedonian monarch joined in a new coalition. Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus formed a league against him. Additionally, and despite his truce with Demetrius, Pyrrhus was persuaded to join the alliance. The new struggles began in the fall of 288 ([Euseb. *Chron.*] *FGrH* 260 F-3.4, 6; Wheatley 1997: 21–2). With Ptolemy sailing to Greece to undermine Demetrius' hold there, both Pyrrhus and Lysimachus simultaneously invaded Macedonia. When Demetrius, who was in the south preparing for his incursion into Asia, heard of the invasion, he left his son Antigonus to protect his holdings in Greece, and proceeded north. He planned to attack Lysimachus first, but his troops appeared far too sympathetic to the man from Thrace. Demetrius then turned his attention to Pyrrhus, figuring that as a foreigner that individual would have no chance of gaining the allegiance of Macedonians, an error many had earlier made with respect to the Cardian Eumenes. The troops willingly deserted to the Epirote, the Macedonians telling their soon-to-be-former monarch that they were tired of his wars and lifestyle. Pyrrhus entered the Macedonian camp and was acclaimed king by the Macedonians. When Lysimachus arrived on the scene and insisted on sharing in the spoils, he acquired part of Macedonia, but Pyrrhus kept the greater share (Paus. 1.10.2). The boundary was most likely the Axios river (Hammond and Walbank 1988: 230). Almost without striking a blow Pyrrhus and Lysimachus found themselves in possession of Macedonia (Plut. *Demetr.* 44; *Pyrrh.* 11.1–12.1; Just. 16.2.1–3; Paus. 1.10.2). When Antipater, Cassander's son and Lysimachus' son-in-law, protested that by rights the throne was his (Just. 16.2.4–5), Lysimachus

killed him, thus ending Cassander's line. Justin (16.2.4) also reports that Lysimachus imprisoned his own daughter Eurydice for supporting her husband Antipater in his complaints.

Demetrius, as once before, found himself on the run, first fleeing to Cassandreia. Here his wife Phila, in grief for the disaster that had befallen her husband, committed suicide (Plut. *Demetr.* 45.1). The former king of Macedonia now prepared to gather what remained of his forces and allies and reestablish himself in Greece. His holdings there also had diminished, but were centered on Corinth and Athens, which for the moment were still loyal. But in the world of Greek city-state politics, when your patron was weak, you sought a new patron. The ever-fickle Athenians revolted against their newest deity. They reestablished the full democracy, once again naming years after the eponymous archon instead of the elected priest of the savior gods, Antigonus and Demetrius (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.2; cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 10.4). Athenian inscriptions place this event in the late spring of 287 (in particular, the Decree in Honor of Callias [Shear 1978: 2–4]; Habicht 1979: 45–60).¹⁴ For Demetrius the bad news had traveled fast. Gathering his forces from the Peloponnesus, Demetrius marched to Athens and placed the city under siege. This operation occurred sometime in May, since the grain harvest was underway (Shear 1978: 2, line 26). The Athenians, in need of a new protector, appealed to Pyrrhus, who was dilatory in his response (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12.6–8). The new government in Athens sent Crates the philosopher to negotiate with the former king of Macedonia. He advised Demetrius to return to Asia, and the ever-changeable commander decided to follow his advice (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1–3). Such is the explanation for this strange turn of events in Plutarch, but an Athenian inscription implies that there was a third party to this agreement and peace, Ptolemy of Egypt. In the decree honoring Callias, an Athenian exile in the service of Ptolemy (Habicht 1997: 86), the Egyptian ruler is thanked both for sending a force of mercenaries to assist the Athenians during the siege and for negotiating the peace, which acknowledged the return of democracy and an alliance between the Egyptian dynast and Demetrius, and the departure of Demetrius which followed (Shear 1978: 2–3, lines 11–42). Nor did Demetrius leave empty-handed, for the Piraeus, Museum Hill, Salamis, Eleusis, Phyle, Panactum, and Sunion all remained garrisoned by forces loyal to him (*IG* II² 682; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 231). Leaving his holdings in Greece in the care of his son Antigonus, with 11,000 troops, his cavalry, and his still potent fleet, Demetrius sailed to Miletus in Caria, intent on wresting this area and Lydia from Lysimachus. In Miletus he was met by Phila's sister, Eurydice, who was accompanied by one of her daughters by Ptolemy, Ptolemais. She had lost favor in the eyes of her husband Ptolemy, who had become infatuated with his new wife, Berenice, the daughter of an obscure Macedonian nobleman (Paus. 1.6.8). Ptolemais had, as noted earlier, been betrothed to Demetrius. Now, with the blessing of her mother and father, the marriage took place (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1–5). Ptolemy, the adroit politician, had now gained all he could reasonably expect from the alliance against Demetrius. He was in complete control of Cyprus, and by virtual default was now the new patron of the Nesiotic League (Hammond and

Walbank 1988: 228 n. 2, 232). To occupy Demetrius in the struggle for Asia Minor would allow Ptolemy to maintain his hold on the regions under his authority without fear of interference from that quarter. Moreover, Lysimachus and Seleucus were now the Egyptian dynast's chief rivals. Let them be kept busy with the irrepressible Demetrius. For Demetrius, the alliance with Ptolemy meant he could proceed against Lysimachus without fear of attack from the powerful Ptolemaic fleet.

After his new marriage Demetrius spent some time recruiting additional troops and then proceeded to capture by assault or simple change of allegiance many of the Ionian cities. In Lydia, he captured Sardis and there were some desertions of Lysimachian commanders and troops, but these successes brought a response from Lysimachus. He sent his son Agathocles with a large force to confront the son of Antigonus, who, like Eumenes before him, fled towards the upper satrapies, planning on bringing these regions over to his side. It is unclear if this was an attempt to secure Seleucus' assistance or to challenge that ruler's authority in the east. And, like Antigonus against Eumenes, Agathocles followed in pursuit. Cut off from supplies, suffering from famine and disease, Demetrius' army saw 8000 deaths. The original plan of the flight now changed and Demetrius, with his surviving forces, turned back towards Cilicia but, with Agathocles blocking the Taurus passes, he wrote a long letter begging Seleucus for help. That commander ordered his subordinates in the region to supply Demetrius and his suffering army with needed supplies. Later, after consultation with his advisor Patrocles, Seleucus decided it would be to his advantage to take control of Demetrius rather than let him regain his strength. He therefore came to Cilicia with a large army. Demetrius withdrew into a number of strongholds in the Taurus mountains and begged his ex-son-in-law to be given some petty kingdom to govern. Seleucus refused. Demetrius and his remaining forces then burst forth from his refuges and, despite Seleucus' attempt to guard the pathways into Syria, these were seized. The man that had risen so often from what would appear to be the abyss would not succeed this time. In the midst of this latest campaign, Demetrius suffered a severe illness that left him physically weakened and his troops shaken. In a subsequent confrontation with Seleucus, that commander presented himself to Demetrius' mercenaries, exhorting them to join him, which they enthusiastically did (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.6–10). These events occurred during 286 and 285.

Demetrius attempted to flee, but after an abortive suicide attempt ultimately surrendered to Seleucus (Plut. *Demetr.* 47–50). Seleucus had him conducted to Apameia (Diod. 21.20), the city he had founded and named after his wife, where under guard the once-famed "City-besieger" spent the rest of his life in dissipation, dying in 282, while in his fifty-fifth year, after an incarceration of three years (Plut. *Demetr.* 46–52; Just. 16.2.6; cf. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12.9). His funeral was as grand as his life. When his son Antigonus received the remains, which were housed in a golden urn, he took them with his entire fleet in a grand procession through the islands, where at each stop the dead dynast was honored with garlands. When the ashes arrived in Corinth, as the ship approached, the most celebrated flute player,

Xenophantus, accompanied the sound of the rowing with a solemn tune. After more garlands and honors, Demetrius' urn was escorted to its final resting place in the city he founded and that bore his name, Demetrias on the Gulf of Pagasae (Plut. *Demetr.* 53.1–8). Certainly the most colorful of the contenders for power, his legacy to the future was his son Antigonus, who would establish the new ruling house of Macedonia, the Antigonid, which would rule that nation from 276 until its demise at the hands of the Romans in 168.

When Demetrius departed for Asia, Pyrrhus launched an invasion of Thessaly, attempting to win over many of the cities there garrisoned with Demetrius' forces (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12.4). Since Demetrias is found shortly thereafter to be still in Antigonid hands, it is unknown how successful this invasion was. This operation was suggested by Lysimachus, showing that as long as Demetrius was at large, Lysimachus was interested in maintaining friendly relations with all the other dynasts. Indeed, when he heard of Demetrius' capture, he offered Seleucus 2000 talents to execute his rival. The latter took this to be a barbarous request and refused (Diod. 21.20; Plut. *Demetr.* 51). With the captivity of his former nemesis, Lysimachus was ready to seize Macedonia. In a surprise attack, he captured the Macedonian army's supplies, then, in letters and in conferences with certain of his rival's forces, he attacked his opponent as a foreigner to Macedonia. Apparently, the claim that resonated with the Macedonians was not so much that Pyrrhus was himself a foreigner but that he was pursuing the interests of his homeland Epirus and not those of Macedonia. Pyrrhus' army deserted, and that commander was forced to flee with his allies and fellow Epirotes back to Epirus. Lysimachus was now, in 285, king of Macedonia in its entirety (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12.10; Just. 16.3.2). The retreat of Pyrrhus brought about another of those shifts in alliance that so characterize this age. Demetrius' son, Antigonus, and Pyrrhus now became allies (Paus. 1.10.2).

Lysimachus, like his predecessors at the apex of their power, was due to suffer an eclipse. Here, the coming disaster was one of his own making, a by-product of polygamy. Lysimachus' eldest son Agathocles was the grandson of that Antipater who had been regent of Macedonia during Alexander the Great's expedition to Asia. As part of the ever-changing alliances often cemented, however briefly, by marriage, Lysimachus had married, in addition to his son Agathocles' mother Nicaea, Ptolemy's daughter Arsinoë, and by her had three sons.¹⁵ With his mind poisoned against his eldest son by his new wife, he had Agathocles executed for treason (Just. 17.1.4; [Memnon] *FGrH* 434 F-5.6; Str. 13.4.1; Paus. 1.10.1; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 164–5). Of course, the charges may have been true (Carney 2013: 43–4). Those who had supported the young man were massacred. This led to an exodus of family members and supporters. These included Lysandra, Agathocles' wife, and her brother Ptolemy Ceraunus, who had fled to Lysimachus about the time his father Ptolemy Soter had set him aside for his younger half-brother, also named Ptolemy, in 284. It was this son Ptolemy, so-called Philadelphus, who did succeed to the throne on the death of his father in 282 ([Euseb. *Chron.*] *FGrH* 260 F-2.3). Most of those fleeing Lysimachus fled to Seleucus (Just. 17.1.6–7), including Lysandra and Ceraunus. Seleucus, with the desertion of many of his

rival's erstwhile military allies (among these was Philetaerus, who was in charge of the fortress at Pergamon and its treasury, which contained 9000 talents), decided the time had come for a reckoning with Lysimachus (Str. 13.4.1; Paus. 1.8.1). In the winter of 282/81, Seleucus invaded Lysimachus' possessions in Asia Minor. The forces of the two aged dynasts – Seleucus was 77, Lysimachus 74 (Just. 17.1.10) – met at Corupedium early in 281. In a battle about which virtually nothing is known due to a lack of sources, Lysimachus met his death (Just. 17.2.1; App. Syr. 62). According to Memnon of Heracleia's *History of Heracleia Pontica* (FGrH 434 F-5.7), Lysimachus was killed by a javelin thrown by Malacon, a Heracleian soldier serving under Seleucus. Seleucus was the last of those generals who had served the great Alexander. He was now not only the only surviving Diadoch, but held more power and territory than any of his rivals had at any time in this turbulent period. This preeminence, however, lasted but seven months ([Babylonian King List] BM 35603 Obv. 8; Just. 17.2.4). In the summer of 281, leaving Asia in the hands of his son Antiochus, Seleucus crossed the Hellespont to take possession of Lysimachus' European holdings as spear-won land ([Memnon] FGrH 434 F-8.1; cf. Just. 17.2.5). In his homeland for the first time in over fifty years, on the verge of becoming the new king of Macedonia and uniting the vast majority of Alexander the Great's former empire, he was murdered by the young man whom he had offered sanctuary, Ceraunus. Like so many others in the Diadoch period, he saw his opportunity to become a player and he took it. He fled to Lysimacheia and emerged with a diadem, the new, self-proclaimed king of Macedonia (FGrH 434 F-8.3). He would rule until his death at the hands of the Celts in 279, after which in one of those reversal of fortunes that permeate the period and so enthralled Diodorus of Sicily, Antigonos, the son of Demetrius, became the founder of a new line of Macedonian rulers, the Antigonids, who would rule Macedonia until its fall to the power of Rome. With the passing of Seleucus, the last of the great marshals was dead, and with his death the age of the Diadochs came to a close.

Chronology from 306 to 281

The year 306 concluded with the failed invasion of Egypt by Antigonos and Demetrius in the late fall. The new campaign year began with the start of Demetrius' epic siege of Rhodes (Diod. 20.81.1–2). Given the context in Diodorus, it is clear that the siege began in the spring of 305. This siege is dated by the Parian Marble (FGrH 239 B 23) in the archon year 305/4, as is Ptolemy's assumption of a diadem. It is likely, however, that the siege began in the previous archon year, or in the spring of 305, and is only being noted as continuing in this year. All of the previous year's activities cannot be read on the stone. Since the siege lasted a year (Diod. 20.100.1), and Ptolemy only took the diadem after the siege's end (Gruen 1985: 257–8), 304 was the year of the siege's end and the assumption of a crown by Ptolemy. Eusebius' *Chronica* (FGrH 260 F-2.2) also places Ptolemy's regnal proclamation in 305/4. The year 304 is noted as an Olympic year (Diod. 20.91.1), and begins with Demetrius

still besieging Rhodes. This year ended with the relief of Cassander's siege of Athens (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1), and Demetrius' campaigning in northern Greece (Diod. 20.100.5–6). That Diodorus' year 304/3 is in actuality 304 is confirmed by that author's listing of the death of Eumelus, the king of Bosphorus, in his sixth year of rule (20.100.7). He came to the throne in 310 (Diod. 20.24.4–5). Moreover, Diodorus includes in this year Demetrius' acquisition of Chalcis, dated by the Parian Marble in 304/3 (*FGrH* 239 B 24). The year 303 begins in the spring with Demetrius' invasion of the Peloponnesus (Diod. 20.102.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1), and ends with him still in the Peloponnesus (Diod. 20.103.7). It is also in this year that Diodorus (20.104–5) places Cleonymus' expedition to Tarentum (Oakley 2005: 48–50) and the Spartan adventurer's capture of Corcyra (Diod. 20.104.4, 105.3).

It is unclear where Demetrius spent the winter of 303/2. Diodorus makes no mention of winter quarters or any indication of the season. It would appear that the son of Antigonus may have wintered in Corinth. Diodorus' archon year 302/1 (20.106.1) is clearly the solar year 302. Early in this year (302), having over the winter summoned representatives from the Greek cities to join him in Corinth, he oversaw the creation of a new Hellenic League (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.4). It is possible that Demetrius also presided over the Isthmian Games in 302, but this is nowhere stated. Clear evidence places these events in the spring of 302, when the games were held (Gardiner 1910: 65). Diodorus notes in this same year Cassander's failed attempt to reach an accord with Antigonus, followed by his alliance with Lysimachus, and the latter's subsequent invasion of Asia (20.106.1–107.1). Lysimachus' Asian expedition is dated by the Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 25) in the archon year 303/2. When Antigonus summoned Demetrius back to Asia, the latter was in the midst of a campaign against Cassander in Thessaly. Demetrius immediately came to terms with the Macedonian ruler (Diod. 20.111.2). This agreement is dated by the Parian Marble in the archon year 302/1 (*FGrH* 239 B 26). The year 302 ends with the various parties entering into winter quarters (Diod. 20.109.2, 111.3, 112.2, 113.3). The Battle of Ipsus occurred in the late spring of the next year.

With Diodorus' extant narrative ending with the events leading up to the Battle of Ipsus, and the Parian Marble ceasing to record events after the archon year 299/98, with the last two entries, that for 302/1 and 299/98 being so fragmentary as to supply little useful information, deducing the chronology of the years 301 to 281 becomes much more complicated. Our sources for this information are a number of late chronographic works, primarily Eusebius of Caesarea's fourth-century *Chronica*, perhaps, based on a work by Porphyry of Tyre written a century earlier,¹⁶ and occasional dating references in inscriptions, papyri, and in various other literary sources, such as Plutarch's biographies of Demetrius and Pyrrhus.

Eusebius ([Porphyry] *FGrH* 260) unfortunately survives primarily in an Armenian text, the translation from the original Greek text likely dating from the sixth century, but the oldest surviving manuscript from the twelfth or thirteenth. While its accuracy has been questioned, it has also been described as mostly reliable (see Mosshammer 1979 for a full discussion). Eusebius (*FGrH* 260 F-3.4) dates Cassander's death in 298/97, in the third year of the 120th Olympiad. The date of

Cassander's death in Eusebius is supported by an anonymous chronicle (*P. Oxy.* 2082 = *FGrH* 257a F-3) which places the death in the late spring of 297. Demetrius' return to Athens and the overthrow of the tyranny can be dated in 294 by an Athenian inscription dated in March/April 294 (*IG* II² 646, lines 1–5). Cassander's heirs, Philip first, followed by Alexander and Antipater combined, "ruled for three years and six months," lasting into "the third year of the 121st Olympiad" (*FGrH* 260 F-3.5). Demetrius reigned as king of Macedonia for six years, after his murder of Alexander V, from "the fourth year of the 121st Olympiad" (294/93) until "the first year of the 123rd Olympiad" (288/87) (*FGrH* 260 F-3.5–6). The likelihood is that he became king of Macedonia in the fall of 294 and was expelled from that nation in the fall of 288 (see Wheatley 1997: 21–2 and n. 13). Much of this dating relies on the subsequent revolt of the Athenians from his authority. The time of the revolt is fairly well fixed. In an Athenian decree referenced by Plutarch (*Mor.* 851E), it is noted that the Athenian politician and orator, Demosthenes' nephew Demochares, left Athens on the takeover of the city by Demetrius, and was recalled by the Athenians in 288/87. This last event clearly took place after the departure of Demetrius. Demochares was exiled and played no part in the oligarchy, i.e., that Poliorcetes imposed (*Plut. Mor.* 851 F). A number of inscriptions also attest to this time frame, and most scholars place the revolt in the spring or early summer of 287 (Osborne 1979: 181–94; Wheatley 1997: 21–2 and n. 13; in support of 286: Shear 1978: 21, 61–78, 82–3). Demetrius ultimately fled to Asia, where he died in 282 (as per Wheatley 1997: 19–27). His death followed three years of house arrest in his fifty-fifth year (*Plut. Demetr.* 52.3). His capture by Seleucus occurred in the winter of 286/85 (*Plut. Demetr.* 48.1; cf. Wheatley 1997: 23).

Demetrius was followed on the Macedonian throne by Pyrrhus and Lysimachus. Eusebius mistakenly states that Pyrrhus ruled the Macedonians independently for seven months and was then replaced in the eighth month by Lysimachus, who then ruled Macedonia for five years and six months, from the second year of the 123rd Olympiad (287) until the third year of the 124th Olympiad (281) (*FGrH* 260 F-3.7–8). Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 12) makes it clear that Pyrrhus actually ruled with Lysimachus for almost two years, from 287 to 285. Seleucus' murder by Ptolemaeus Ceraunus is dated by Eusebius in the fourth year of the 124th Olympiad, or in 281/80 (*FGrH* 260 F-32.4). His murder is dated in the late summer of 281, or in his thirty-first regnal year, by the Babylonian King List (BM 35603 Obv. 7–8); Eusebius has Seleucus reigning thirty-two years (*FGrH* 260 F-32.4). Seleucus' regnal years are exactly dated by BM 41660, which relates Seleucus' "thirtieth year" with reference to a solar eclipse (January 30, 281), as noted in the previous chapter. Ceraunus then reigned as king of Macedonia for one year and five months, from "the fourth year of the 124th Olympiad" (281) until "the fifth month of the first year of the 125th Olympiad" (280). The death of Ptolemy took place in 282 (for a review of the Egyptian evidence, see Hazzard 1987: 140, 146–7, 149–50, 154). Eusebius lists the Egyptian dynast as ruling as both satrap and king for forty years, beginning in the year after Arrhidaeus' accession as Philip III and ending in 282/81 (*FGrH* 260 F-2.2–3).

Notes

- 1 Diodorus 20.53.3–4 (also Plut. *Demetr.* 18.2; Just. 15.2.11) states that the assumption of kingship by Ptolemy and the other Diadochs occurred shortly after the proclamation by Antigonus. These statements, however, conflict with Egyptian documents, numismatic sources (Grzybek 1990: 96–101, 171), the Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 23), Eusebius [Porphry] (*FGrH* 260 F-2.9), and Syncellus (*Chron.* 321).
- 2 Stanley Burstein (1978: 185) believes that Lysimachus did not officially style himself as king until after 301, and probably in 299, but see Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 132–4), who argues correctly for placing this event in 304.
- 3 He is known to have married subsequently at least two more women, Lanassa (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 10.5) and Ptolemais (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1).
- 4 On this particular source, see the chronological section at the end of this chapter.
- 5 Presumably this is a different Phoenix from another by this name who served Eumenes and later Antigonus, but became involved in the revolt of Polemaeus (Billows 1990: 424–5).
- 6 This passage in Plutarch actually says 400 elephants, but Diodorus (20.113.4) states that Seleucus arrived for the battle with 480 elephants. It has been suggested that from the original gift of 500, 480 represents the “wastage” from that time, and the 400, the loss of 80 beasts to the Cappadocian winter (Bar-Kochva 1976: 76–7; Mehl 1986: 201–2; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 150), which seems excessive. The problem may be no more than a scribal error.
- 7 Demetrius maintained this alliance until 286 (Merker 1970: 142).
- 8 This particular mission is dated in the archonship of Euctemon (299/98) (*IG* II² 657 lines 7–14).
- 9 The best discussion of the date remains that of Ferguson (1929: 21–4). Cassander’s death is described by Eusebius (*FGrH* 260 F-3.4) and Syncellus (265A) as a wasting disease, but Pausanias (9.7.2) relates that he died of “dropsy” and that his body was filled with worms.
- 10 While no source speaks of such a division, later events suggest it. When Alexander later requested help from Pyrrhus and Demetrius against his brother, he was apparently located in the western part of Macedonia, and Antipater, forming an alliance with Lysimachus, in the east (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.4–5).
- 11 The manuscript (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.5) reads Stymphaea, which was an alternate name for Tymphaea (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.5; Diod. 17.57.2).
- 12 Pausanias says that it was Agathocles, Lysimachus’ eldest son, who was taken captive.
- 13 While the chronographers make Demetrius’ first year as king 293/92 (*FGrH* 260 F-3.4), Habicht (1979: 21; cf. Wheatley 1997: 22), uses the evidence of Athenian decrees to arrive at the correct date of 294.
- 14 Shear (1978: 52–3) argues for a date in 286, but this is too late. See Wheatley (1997: 21 n. 12).
- 15 On Arsinoë’s career, see Carney 2013.
- 16 Felix Jacoby accepted this identification and includes this material from Eusebius in his fragments of Porphry (1962: 854–63). The assumption of this dependency has been challenged (Croke 1983; cf. Burgess 2013).

Epilogue: The New World

“For how men to whose rapacity neither sea nor mountain nor uninhabitable desert sets a limit, men to whose inordinate desires the boundaries which separate Europe and Asia put no stop, can remain content with what they have ... it is impossible to say. They are perpetually at war, because plots and jealousies are parts of their natures, and they treat the two words, war and peace, like current coins using whichever happens to be for their advantage...”
(Perrin 1968 [1920]: 379)

These men were truly Alexander’s Successors, not just because they were the principal contenders after his death, but because they exhibited many of his qualities. As Plutarch indicates in the epigraph to this chapter, like Alexander the Great, these men were conquerors first and foremost. Peace and quiet were virtually unknown to them. After the “unpleasantness” on the Hyphasis, where Alexander’s troops and their commanders made it very clear that they did not wish to conquer India, Alexander returned to Babylon, where he planned a campaign of conquest all the way to the Pillars of Heracles. In spite of recent attempts to limit the extent of Alexander’s ambition (Heckel 2003: 147–74; 2009: 49; Howe and Müller 2012: 21–38), the words of Arrian (*Anab.* 7.1.4) still ring true: “Alexander had no small or mean conceptions, nor would ever have remained contented with any of his possessions so far, not even if he had added Europe to Asia, and the Britannic islands to Europe.” While Alexander was waiting to embark on his western adventure, he did not take this time to examine his overall administrative structure; instead he engaged in symposia with his friends. The extent of his involvement in his empire was to impose or depose representatives of his authority. His Successors, likewise, constantly prepared new adventures.

It is curious that, with the exception of the occasional foray into the Ionian Sea or across Libya, most of the struggle was over Alexander's empire, not the pursuit of new worlds to conquer.

With respect to Alexander's conquests, Ian Worthington (1999: 53) has asked whether it was all worth it, given the destruction and death that they unleashed. An equally pointed question could be asked with respect to the forty years of war that passed before some semblance of order emerged after the Conqueror's death. Combined with the ten years of Alexander's expedition, this entire period has been seen as the beginnings of western imperialism and colonialism in the east (Burstin 1997: 2). While Bosworth (2002: 1–2) is correct that it is unlikely that even the great Alexander could have held his empire together, the disruption and chaos that followed his death must have made many look longingly back to the "good old days" of the Persian Empire. Yet out of this seeming chaos a new world did emerge.

These new regimes would seem to have had a multiplicity of examples to follow in creating their polities, but in truth, whether Near Eastern models were followed or that of Macedonia, in the final analysis both traditions endorsed autocracy. Whether it was the Persian Empire or Philip II's Macedonia, this was an autocracy tempered by the limits of pre-industrial bureaucracy. Local autonomy was permitted on a wide scale, but always under the absolute authority of the ruler. Style might differ and did, certainly from the Persian model, but in the end the king was the state, controlling all aspects of rule. With the Achaemenid Persian rulers or the Macedonian Argead ones, this power came from the charismatic aspect of the family or clan. What then gave these new regimes legitimacy? Much of the history of the generation that followed Alexander was the attempts to create new dynasties and new legitimacies.

In a very real sense the political regimes of the Successors were one-dimensional. There was no state, initially no dynasty, to which populations or subordinates could be loyal. Soldiers were in most ways mercenaries tied to their leaders because of those individuals' personal charisma, benefactions, and military successes. In the case of Demetrius Poliorcetes, the regime was clearly the man. After the defeat at Ipsus, he was a king without a kingdom, and yet he remained a king with a sizable number of adherents. This was to a great degree true of Antigonus. While Celaenae was his haven, the place where his wife resided, there was no great imperial apparatus that worked out of any central location. He had become a "king" by the acclamation of his army in Phoenicia. Michael Austin (1986: 456–62) suggests that, in the case of the emerging Hellenistic regimes, it was military success, "an ideology of conquest," that led to power. He even suggests that the Age of the Successors did not come to an end until the Romans displaced the old regimes with Roman governors (Austin 1986: 456). Certainly it helps explain the rise to prominence of Antigonus and Seleucus, who of all the Diadochs were the closest in military skill to the great Alexander. Ptolemy was not all that successful on the battlefield, and Demetrius failed before Rhodes and lost at Gaza and Ipsus. Yet, as Waldemar Heckel (2002: 86–7) has declared, the ultimate cause of the

fragmentation of Alexander's empire may be that the Conqueror's Successors were too competent and that their rough equality of talent doomed the unity of the empire. There is much truth to this claim. This was an age of almost endless warfare in which none could obtain the final, decisive, victory. While Alexander was undefeated in battle, none of his Successors could make a similar claim. The rough balance of abilities created situations where success or failure could be redeemed through new coalitions. In many ways, it was the history of Greece in the fourth century prior to the emergence of Macedonia. All Diadochs sought power and supremacy, but none were ready to concede them to a rival. This new Hellenistic political world was a variation on an old Greek pattern. Here the contenders were military commanders and future dynasts whereas before the contenders were city-states. The prominence of one would lead to a reaction by the others and the emergence of a new power or coalition, and the pattern would then repeat itself. Warfare as a means to a political end was not the creation of the Hellenistic age, it was endemic in the Greek experience.

Was the power of the Diadochs the result of their connection to the god Alexander? In a sense, yes, all of the winners were his lieutenants or their descendants. But then so were the losers. The jibe from Neoptolemus that Eumenes was merely a scribe carried no weight with the Macedonian veterans who recognized his close connection to Alexander and his military ability. Nor was it solely the generals who advertised their connection to the great Conqueror; the common soldiers did as well (Roisman 2012: 242–3). In part, the prominence of the various contenders was tied both to their relationship with Alexander, the man and the legend, and to their sharing of this tie – initially with the Macedonian veterans and subsequently, through the legend, to troops who had no personal experience of the Conqueror. One contender who attempted to make the most of his connection to Alexander was Lysimachus. He had been one of the seven *somaphylaces* and had saved the Conqueror's life. His coinage emphasized his connection to Alexander; his intercession to save his king from the attack of a lion was noted by the inclusion of the symbolic lion in the background of coins depicting the deified Alexander (Hadley 1974: 50–65; Mørkholm 1991: 81–2). Lysimachus also founded a number of cities, naming them after himself, family members, and at least one to honor Alexander (Hadley 1974: 63; Lund 1992: 175–6). A connection to the Conqueror, however, does not explain the prominence of all the Diadochs. Despite his son's later claim to the contrary (Just. 16.1.12–17), Antigonos had not served on all of Alexander's campaigns. Of all the Successors in that first generation after the Conqueror's death, he was the least connected. He had been abandoned in Phrygia in 333. He was older, not one of those who grew up with Alexander; he was of Philip II's generation. Indeed, those who had the closest connections to Alexander were all dead by the close of the First Diadoch War: Leonnatus, Perdiccas, and Craterus. It is also true that the importance of Alexander's veterans diminished exponentially as the years progressed. After Antipater returned to Macedonia in the winter of 320/19, recruitment of Macedonian soldiers was virtually non-existent for the Diadochs in Asia or Egypt. For these individuals, manpower was increasingly

supplied by Greek mercenaries and the non-Greek indigenous populations. For these groups, connections to Philip II, or Alexander the Great, or to the Argead clan in general, were much less of a draw. It is true that as the legend of the Conqueror grew so did the status of those who had served with him. However, the Macedonian heartland came to be ruled by Cassander, who was rumored to have been part of a supposed plot that killed Alexander the Great, and was clearly responsible for the deaths of Olympias, Roxane, and Alexander IV. Moreover, the indigenous peoples of Asia and Egypt appeared anxious to have a dynasty in place as the harbinger of stability. Ptolemy became pharaoh of Egypt (Manning 2010: 94–5 n. 85; cf. Meeus 2013: 88); royal honors were given to Antigonus in 315 in both Persia (Diod. 19.48.1) and Babylonia (Diod. 19.55.2), and Seleucus was hailed as king of Babylonia (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 18.2–3; BM 35603 Obv. 6–8). As opposed to “generals,” the tradition of royalty encompassed dynasty. Routine, hereditary, succession to power was, outside of the Greek city-state and the Roman republic, the definer of stability.

The question then arises: if the Macedonian presence in the armies serving most of the Successors had diminished significantly, and the indigenous peoples were unaffected by Argead loyalty, then why did Antigonus wait almost four years after the death of Alexander IV, and the other Diadochs later still, to accept diadems in a Greek/Macedonian context? Erich Gruen (1985: 254) states that the difficulty was that power down to this moment was theoretically based on the Argead monarchy. Individuals were the satraps, generals, or regents for the monarchy. While the fiction of such rule might seem patent, power still needed a focus. The initial struggle in Babylon had centered on the succession to Alexander, and power was distributed in the name of the kings and the regent. This *de jure* position was, however, important only with respect to the Greeks and Macedonians. It is clear that neither Ptolemy, Antigonus, nor Seleucus had any problem accepting royal titles handed out to them by those indigenous peoples under their authority, nor did the native populations have any problem dispensing such. When the break with the past occurred, it was complete. These new monarchies were not to be based on some invented extension of Argead power, but were new kingdoms based on the person of the charismatic leader and his dynastic heirs (Gruen 1985: 256). But if these new kingdoms were not to be territorial or ethnic, how were they to be maintained?

Patronage was the major element in the creation of these new states. Largesse was to a degree responsible for the deification of kings. Gods received worship when they were seen as being in a position to confer benefits or inflict harm on the worshiper (Mikalson 2005: 27). Kings were in just such positions. Unlike the Olympians, their largesse was clear and often immediate. Kings were the distributors of wealth, and stinginess was considered to be unworthy of a king. Through patronage the general, dynast, or monarch created a party of adherents, whose possession of power and privilege emanated from the person of the leader. This was especially the case at the royal court and in the army. In the former, whether called *philoi* or *hetairoi*, this coterie was critical. These “friends” were the intermediaries

who linked the king to others, including cities and native populations, through the exercise of the king's authority and patronage. As noted, the monarchies of the Hellenistic age were personal. Over time a bureaucracy developed; in Egypt there was already in existence an extensive bureaucracy governing the native Egyptians, but Hellenistic royal government was never about government institutions. The founding of cities, the granting of land, and the bestowal of benefits to supporters both great and small: these were the keys to the rise of Macedonia under the rule of Philip II. Through his granting of land he established a loyal following personally, and since these land titles flowed from the monarchy, this loyalty transcended the single king and encompassed the dynasty (see Anson 2008a; 2013b: 62–71). To support the king was to ensure your prosperity and future in the state. If all power flowed through the regime, then it was in the interest of everyone with a stake in society to support that regime. Intelligent kings would incorporate in their rule their adult sons to ensure a smooth transition, and the stakeholders would acclaim the continued status quo. The cities, the army, the businessmen: all had a vested commitment to the regime. To do otherwise would jeopardize one's present and future.

What made this complicated was the diversity of the people included in many of these emerging states. Even Macedonia transcended the traditional heartland and through outright annexation and alliances extended its power far and wide in the Greek peninsula. Much of the struggle among the Diadochs was over the control of the Greek mainland. Its importance was tied to the desire for manpower, or to restrict a rival's access, or simply the result of Greek/Macedonian ethnocentrism.

Whether it was a proclamation of freedom for the Greeks or garrisons and political puppets, patronage still ruled the day. In Seleucid Asia and the Ptolemaic empire, by various means local populations were tied to the monarchy through royal patronage. Eumenes of Cardia secured the loyalty of the Cappadocians and Paphlagonians in his satrapy through such patronage. Ptolemy I initiated close ties with the all-important religious establishments in Egypt. With the exception of Macedonia, these kings were initially strangers in strange lands, not unlike the Argead kings initially in Macedonia itself. By tradition this clan originated in Argos and moved to Macedonia, where they became the ruling family (Hdts. 8.137–9, Thuc. 2.99.3).

Having a central territorial and/or ethnic focus became increasingly important over time (Bosworth 2002: 2–3), but these still remained personal kingdoms. What gave shape to two of these emerging dynasties was that each of them had a base, that central focus. The Antigonids eventually had Macedonia and the Ptolemies from the beginning centered their ambitions on Egypt. Both were bases with different anchors. Macedonia was held together through nationalism and a sense of a common heritage and citizenship; Egypt, by the advantage of impregnability. Seleucid Asia on the other hand was multinational, without secure borders, and was always being dismantled and reassembled. Unlike Macedonia, there was no true core. Its dynasty began its rise to prominence in Babylonia and then moved its base of power west to Syria, but it was never centered on a single land or ethnicity.

While the Achaemenid Persian Empire had stretched over more territory, there was the Persian heartland. It was in the case of Seleucid Asia where the one great innovation of Alexander would have benefited this new empire. Peucestas had fostered close relations with the Persians, adopting their dress, using them extensively in his army. Unfortunately while, in comparison to Antigonus, Seleucus might have appeared as a true benefactor to the Persians, and while he maintained his marriage to Apama, the daughter of the Sogdian or Iranian rebel Spitamenes, and appointed his son by this marriage as his successor, his empire like the others was dominated in its highest positions by Greeks and Macedonians, and over time those who had acclimatized to Greek culture. The ownership of the Seleucid Empire never moved much beyond a limited ethnic focus; lower-echelon officials and troops might be Asian, but the empire remained Greek. In a very real sense what held the Seleucid world together were its cities, not those of long-standing tradition, but those of Seleucid foundation. Most of these had colonial cores of Macedonians and Greeks located in often very cosmopolitan communities (Cohen 1978: 37–41; Billows 1995: 172–8). These communities were primarily created for military purposes, as islands of loyalists in the sea of indigenous peoples, and as a source for soldiers. Since the key elements in these foundations were Greek settlers, they also provided pockets of Hellenism in a wide span of west Asia and northeastern Africa. Even though native peoples might serve in the army and in local administrative positions throughout these kingdoms in Asia and Egypt, in the court and in the new urban foundations, native Greeks and those assimilated to Greek culture dominated.

The new rulers did not push their racism to the extremes of conceiving of the others as evil and in need of extermination, but the native population mostly engaged in agriculture did most often find themselves existing as tenant farmers or *laoi*, serfs, or even chattel slaves. Yet the new rulers rarely attempted to impose their culture or religion on others, and most often participated in native practices, especially establishing ties to local religious institutions. Hellenism was not enforced, but proved attractive to those who wished to thrive, as opposed to simply survive, in this new world. Greek-speakers became a privileged class in a world that far transcended the city-state. Greek ethnicity was never so much tied to blood as to culture (Anson 2010b). Isocrates (4.50) expressed it best, stating: “The title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood.” Herodotus (1.56.2, 57.2–3, 58; 8.44.2) put this concept in a historical context when he noted that the Athenians, the embodiment of all things Greek in the Classical and Hellenistic ages, were originally Pelasgians, who through the adoption of Greek culture and especially language became Greeks (Anson 2010b). Through intermarriage and through the need to succeed in business and politics, Greek culture spread throughout the native elites of the Near East. Hellenistic kings patronized Hellenism in its many forms. Even though many new “Greeks” simply adopted the veneer of Hellenism, much as the nouveaux riches today stock their bookcases with impressive volumes which they never read and buy art they dislike for the sake of appearances. While the Persian Empire may

not have been the dying carcass of former greatness put out of its misery by Alexander, it was very different from the Hellenistic world that eventually replaced it. It may be that, as dragonflies hover just above a quiet pond, Hellenism may have only existed at the surface with the elite, not in the depths of the Egyptian and Asian populations, but it existed, and it had influence. Paul of Tarsus is but one example of the enduring legacy of the Hellenistic world. He was a Roman citizen, a Jew, and, as is clearly shown in his letters, a man imbued with Greek thought, the last certainly a legacy of the Hellenistic age.

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